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I 
Abstract 
Qatar is a small country in the Middle East which has used its oil wealth to invest in the 
country’s infrastructure and education. The technology for Internet voting now exists or 
can be developed, but are the people of Qatar willing to take part in Internet voting for 
national elections?. This research identifies the willingness of government and citizens 
to introduce and participate in Internet voting (I-voting) in Qatar and the barriers that 
may be encountered when doing so. A secure I voting model for the Qatar government 
is then proposed that address issues of I-voting which might arise due to the 
introduction of such new technology. Recommendations are made for the Qatar 
government to assist in the introduction of I-voting.  
The research identifies the feasibility of I-voting and the government’s readiness and 
willingness to introduce it. Multiple factors are examined: the voting experience, 
educational development, telecommunication development, the large number of Internet 
users, Qatar law which does not bar the use of I-voting and Qatar culture which 
supports I-voting introduction. It is shown that there is a willingness amongst both the 
people and the government to introduce I-voting, and there is appropriate accessibility, 
availability of IT infrastructure, availability of Internet law to protect online consumers 
and the existence of the e government project. However, many Qataris have concerns of 
security, privacy, usability, transparency and other issues that would need to be 
addressed before any voting system could be considered to be a quality system in the 
eyes of the voters. Also, the need to consider the security threat associated on client-side 
machines is identified where a lack of user awareness on information security is an 
important factor.  
II 
The proposed model attempts to satisfy voting principles, introducing a secure platform 
for I-voting using best practices and solutions such as the smart card, Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates. The model was reviewed by a number of 
experts on Information Technology, and the Qatari culture and law who found that the 
system would, generally, satisfy voting principles, but pointed out the need to consider 
the scalability of the model, the possible cyber-attacks and the risks associated with 
voters’ computers. which could be reduced by enhancing user awareness on security 
and using secure operating systems or Internet browsers. From these findings, a set of 
recommendations were proposed to encourage the government to introduce I-voting 
which consider different aspects of I-voting, including the digital divide, e-literacy, I 
voting infrastructure, legal aspects, transparency, security and privacy. These 
recommendations were also reviewed by experts who found them to be both valuable 
and effective. 
Since literature on Internet voting in Qatar is sparse, empirical and non-empirical 
studies were carried out in a variety of surveys, interviews and experiments. The 
research successfully achieved its aim and objectives and is now being considered by 
the Qatari Government. 
Key words 
Internet voting, voting principles, transparency, anonymity, privacy, security, 
authentication, mix netting, blind signature. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
This chapter sets the scene for this research project. The background to the problem area 
is described along with the motivation for the research. It defines the research scope, 
research questions, aim and objectives, contribution to knowledge and thesis structure. 
 
1.1 Background 
There has been an increasing demand around the world for replacing paper-based voting 
(Buchsbaum, 2004) with electronic-voting (e-voting) and several trials have been 
introduced (Aeby and Wiget, 2007; Buchsbaum, 2004; Krimmer et al, 2007). Internet-
voting (I-voting) has attracted some debate on security vulnerability and large-scale 
fraud and most IT experts suggest the need to overcome these problems in the interest 
of ensuring accuracy and enhancing trust in such a voting system (Anane et al., 2007). 
The Netherlands is one of the countries which underwent a negative experience in 
e-voting and decided to stop in 2007, fearing that an intended secret vote may not be 
kept secret (Loeber, 2008). 
 
Security requirements for e-voting and, in particular, I-voting have been defined as 
follows: (Cranor and Cytron, 1996, 2007; Nielsen et al., 2005): 
 
Accuracy: to ensure accuracy of the system without interference or errors. 
Democracy: to achieve democracy by allowing legal voters to vote only once. 
Privacy: to keep all votes secret. No participant other than a voter should be able to 
determine the value of the vote cast by that voter. In other words, neither election 
authorities nor anyone else can link any ballot to the voter who cast it. 
Verifiability: to provide individual and universal verification to ensure that votes are 
counted correctly. 
Fairness: to ensure the system is available and accessible for all voters and free from 
possibility to declare results before the election closes. 
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According to Neumann (1993), availability, reliability, auditability, accountability and 
transparency were assigned as e-voting requirements by Cranor and Cytron (1996, 
2007), and convenience, flexibility and usability were found to be crucial requirements 
for an e-voting system. In addition, I-voting has to meet political and legislation 
requirements (Council of Europe, 2004; Volkamer and McGaley, 2007). 
  
1.2 Research Structure 
The general research structure is shown in Figure 1.1. The thesis begins with an 
introduction which gives background information about voting, followed by an in-depth 
literature review of I-voting with an emphasis on examining the scope of the research 
based on I-voting experience and looking at filling the gaps in the literature and 
providing a contribution to knowledge. Subsequently, the research methodology is 
defined for achieving the research aim, including a review of the literature to illustrate 
the factors which make Qatar an appropriate place for introducing I-voting; surveys and 
interviews in Qatar to demonstrate the barriers for I-voting in Qatar in terms of technical 
aspects, government readiness and people’s willingness and acceptance, along with 
defining the possible features of such technology. 
 
Additionally, an experiment was undertaken to assess the feasibility and acceptance of 
I-voting in Qatar as a technical solution and for satisfying voters and election 
committees, through an effective prototype of I-voting developed according to Qatar’s 
election requirements. Moreover, the results of the experiment were compared with a 
case study of Estonia, which shares many characteristics with Qatar (e.g. country size, 
readiness) to extract lessons from a successful I-voting experience. Accordingly, the 
findings are built on the research results, covering all aspects of the research and finally 
achieving the overall contribution of the research which is to define an effective 
framework for I-voting in Qatar to help the government in introducing such new 
technology in a general election. The framework involves formulating effective 
recommendations for the Qatar government and proposing an appropriate I-voting 
model for use in elections in Qatar. More details of the thesis are outlined in Section 
1.8. 
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Figure 1.1 : Research General Structure 
 
1.3 Research Motivation 
Many democratic and modern countries have developed their own I-voting systems. 
These countries include the USA, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Estonia, the 
European Union, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Romania, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The literature shows that I-voting was 
successful in many countries including developing nations, which made a start in such 
new technology (ACE, 2010). 
 
The I-voting approach has been the subject of much research and it is clear that the 
experience of I-voting illustrates many advantages along with many concerns in terms 
of both technical and non-technical factors including security, privacy, transparency, 
social and the digital divide. Although many researchers focus on identifying solutions 
to I-voting concerns and on providing models and best practices, it is still a developing 
area of research (Jefferson et al., 2004).  The experience of I-voting shows variations 
from one country to another, some show it to be positive and others negative in some 
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contexts. However, I-voting took different forms in each country, some proposed 
different I-voting models depending on the country-specific factors and requirements 
and consequently each presents different issues and shows varying willingness for 
I-voting (Boyd, 1990; Jan and Lin, 1995; Jan and Tai, 1995; Borrell and Rifa, 1996; 
Schneier, 1996; Fan and Lei, 1997; Abadi and Gordon, 1999; Adams, 1999; Kaldellis 
and Doumouliakas, 2000; Wu and Sankaranarayana, 2002; Meng, 2008; Purushothama 
and Pais, 2009). 
 
This has motivated the researcher to further investigate I-voting and work on 
developing an effective I-voting model which satisfies essential voting principles and 
addresses the possible problems arising from I-voting. However, this would be hard to 
achieve since each country has its own requirements and characteristics and therefore 
implementing a standard model for all countries would be challenging. As a result, the 
researcher discovered an interesting case for research which is the State of Qatar for 
which there is a lack of literature on I-voting, which motivated him to shed light on one 
of the world’s fast developing countries with a high GDP (QSA, 2008). 
 
Qatar faces a rapid deployment in all sectors, including IT and democracy, especially 
since it is on the way to creating its parliament (Khalaf and Luciani, 2008). 
Furthermore, Qatar has developed e-government which could offer a usable IT 
infrastructure for I-voting (Al-shafi and Weerakkody, 2010). All of these factors 
provide an encouraging foundation for the introduction of I-voting in Qatar with the 
purpose of offering Qatari voters the possibility to vote over the Internet. 
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1.4 Research scope 
This research focuses on eliminating the threats in introducing I-voting in general 
elections in Qatar. Since many challenges surround the adoption of I-voting, the 
research scope is narrowed to focus on designing a secure and effective I-voting model 
which satisfies Qatar’s election requirements. The time constraint of PhD research has 
affected covering all the possible challenges (technical and non-technical), although the 
thesis provides a comprehensive solution for the State of Qatar government by 
analysing Qataris' willingness and government readiness and providing an effective 
I-voting model alongside recommendations for the Qatar government to assist in 
introducing such new technology in Qatar. 
 
Although global solutions are essential to standardise I-voting, this research focuses 
only on the State of Qatar’s requirement to motivate other countries to introduce 
I-voting. The research underlines the problem of introducing I-voting in the State of 
Qatar from both aspects of citizen and government, benefiting from experience in 
advanced countries, such as in Estonia, to introduce I-voting by taking advantage of 
Qatar’s wealth and communications infrastructure without disregarding people’s 
willingness to use such new technology. 
 
The research also seeks to understand the factors which make I-voting successful in 
Qatar society and to propose a solution to the government to help in introducing 
I-voting through an effective framework consisting of an I-voting model along with a 
set of recommendations. Qatar was chosen as the case study for this research due to the 
convenience of access and the decision of the Qatar government to allow Qatari citizens 
to exercise their right to vote in parliamentary elections for the first time in 2012 (Tore, 
2010). The lack of data on I-voting in Qatar makes it an original and interesting topic 
for investigation. 
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1.5  Target Group 
The research will provide a contribution to scholarly research on I-voting. It addresses 
the challenges with cross-references to possible solutions to overcome obstacles, offers 
an effective model for I-voting and provides recommendations for the Qatar 
government to help in introducing I-voting in Qatar. It also provides an empirical study 
of I-voting adoption in the State of Qatar which has not been covered before in the 
literature. 
 
Moreover, the findings of this research are intended to be of potential significance to a 
variety of groups such as: 
 
1. Qatar government. The research focuses on identifying key elements which help 
in introducing I-voting and the importance of resolving problems. Also, a 
theoretical and practical solution along with a set of recommendations for the 
government with the main focus on providing technical solutions as a mean of 
eliminating I-voting threats. Moreover, other governments could benefit from 
the research outcome and the model proposed and the recommendations made in 
this research would be applicable elsewhere with certain variations, taking into 
account cultural and country-specific factors. 
 
2. Qatar citizens. Since the problems associated with current voting methods affect 
all individuals, a solution for I-voting would be valuable for everyone, even 
those who do not have knowledge of using a computer and the Internet because 
the government would take the responsibility to educate people, which would 
help in enhancing computer literacy to benefit from an easy and convenient 
I-voting method. 
 
3. Scientific goal. The research is expected to contribute to an enhanced 
understanding of what challenges are facing I-voting against the available 
solutions to establish comprehensive design theory and design methodology of 
an I-voting model, in order to improve I-voting development worldwide. 
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In addition, the research identifies the factors which make Qatar a suitable candidate for 
I-voting, including cultural, country-specific and other factors. This is a valuable 
outcome for all target groups which could be further studied. Although the discovered 
factors might be alike for other nations with certain variations, this would give clues as 
to what makes people in general willing to use such new technology which could 
therefore make I-voting more likely to succeed. The discovery of those factors would 
help to ease the introduction of I-voting and to develop effective I-voting solutions in 
both technical and non-technical aspects.  
 
1.6   Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is: 
“To propose an effective Internet voting model for the State of Qatar to be used for 
future elections, taking into consideration technical and non-technical factors”. 
 
Towards achieving the research aim, multiple objectives are required as follows: 
 
1. To review the literature to determine the basic requirements for a democratic 
voting system and I-voting to support such a system and, hence, to form a set of 
criteria to act as a checklist to test the adequacy and acceptability of any existing 
or proposed system. Furthermore, to examine different ways of voting in a 
democratic environment and to assess each method using the criteria established 
to determine the strength of the case for using I-voting. 
 
2. To review world-wide experience of adopting I-voting to highlight the successes 
and failures, and to address critical issues associated with their experience. Also, 
to review the literature to discover sociological and technical obstacles to 
adoption of such technology and to investigate potential solutions to overcome 
I-voting challenges. 
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3. To investigate and define the best practice research methodology to carry out 
this research. 
 
4. To investigate the readiness of Qatar in terms of technical and non-technical 
aspects such as cultural, national and other country-related variables that might 
motivate the development or use of I-voting in Qatar by means of literature and 
interviews. 
 
5. To assess, by means of a questionnaire and interviews, the confidence and 
willingness of Qatari citizens to take part in the initiative of I-voting, and to 
reveal the barriers that would inhibit I-voting in Qatar. 
 
6. To further assess, by means of experiment, questionnaire, interviews and 
demonstrating a prototype of I-voting for Qatar elections, people’s opinions and 
problems encountered while engaging in the voting process. Also, to test the 
effectiveness of the prototype solution in overcoming I-voting challenges and 
satisfying Qatar election requirements. Furthermore, to make a comparison 
between the Qatar experiment results and the experience of I-voting in Estonia 
to measure success or failure of the Qatar experiment in overcoming Estonia’s 
problems.  
 
7. To investigate the security risks that might appear due to lack of awareness of 
information security on the client side and to measure the level of awareness of 
Qatari people on the client side of I-voting in order to propose appropriate 
methods for solving the problem. 
 
8. To design an effective I-voting model for the State of Qatar, by combining 
available technology and best practice to overcome I-voting challenges. 
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9. To test the applicability of the proposed model for overcoming the challenges of 
I-voting in the State of Qatar by means of simulation, experiments and expert 
opinion. 
 
10. To propose, from the above findings, effective recommendations for the Qatar 
government to help in introducing I-voting in Qatar society  
 
1.7  Research Questions 
From the above aim and objectives, a number of research questions have been 
formulated for further investigation in this research, as shown in Table 1.1. These 
questions are answered in subsequent chapters as each of the main objectives are 
achieved. 
Table 1.1: Research questions. 
Objective 
number 
Research Questions 
1 
What are the different types of e-voting? 
What is the e-voting process? 
Can I-voting simplify the voting process? 
2 
What are the worldwide experiences of I-voting? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of I-voting? 
What are the challenges to I-voting? 
What are the best practices and models or solutions proposed to meet 
the challenges of I-voting? 
Does I-voting comply with the current election law?  
3 
What are the research methodologies available to the researcher? 
What is the appropriate methodology for this research to achieve its 
aim and objectives? 
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4 
Is the Qatar government prepared to introduce I-voting? 
Can I-voting be developed in Qatar using the available technology? 
How could I-voting be implemented successfully in Qatar while 
ensuring the fulfilment of voting principles? 
How could Qatar government take up and introduce I-voting? 
5 
Are the people of Qatar willing to take part in I-voting for national 
elections? 
What are the barriers to introducing I-voting in Qatar? 
What are the possible desirable features for I-voting?  
6 
Did the applied technology in the prototype overcome the challenges of 
I-voting? 
Did the Qatari people have the same level of acceptance of I-voting 
after using the prototype? 
What was the role of IT security and its management in I-voting? 
What are the real-world challenges for securing large-scale I-voting? 
What are the differences and similarities between the Qatar and Estonia 
case studies? 
7 
Does Qatar share the same problem of securing client machines? 
How far can this affect the voting process? 
Are the Qatar people aware of the need for securing of their computers 
and information? 
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8 
What are the architecture and components of an I-voting model? 
What are the different types of protocol currently adopted? 
What are the international and industrial standards used for I-voting? 
How can smart cards and biometrics be used in I-voting? 
What anonymity protocols and standards are to be adopted? 
Will the proposed model gain acceptance of Qatari people? 
Does it meet the voting principles and accommodate Qatar’s 
requirements? 
Was the model effective in the view of expert and public evaluation? 
9 
What are the technical measures taken to secure the I-voting? 
What is the software development methodology to be used for the 
implementation? 
Could a prototype application demonstrate sufficient security measures 
for I-voting using a smart card? 
Do the general security test, compliance test and performance 
evaluation results of the developed prototype validate a secure 
implementation of I-voting? 
10 
Was the proposed recommendation effective and feasible? 
Does it help the government of Qatar in introducing I-voting? 
 
  
1.8  Research contribution to knowledge 
The contribution of this research is to develop a secure and effective I-voting model for 
the Qatar government as part of its e-government project, and also introduce the use of 
three factors of authentication for web application, which would encourage the use of 
this approach in applications such as Internet banking and e-government. It also 
measures willingness and acceptance regarding the introduction of such technology in 
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Qatar in terms of technology and sociology and proposes an effective I voting 
framework. This framework consists of an I-voting model that addresses the possible 
issues in I-voting and a set of recommendations to the Qatar government to help the 
uptake and introduction of I-voting in Qatar. It also provides a comparison of the Qatar 
experiment case study with the experience of Estonia with I-voting, looking for 
similarities and differences in each case. Furthermore, the research is beneficial to other 
researchers, as the lessons learned from the Qatari case study could be of use in 
introducing I-voting in other countries by considering the effectiveness of the developed 
model and recommendations proposed, taking account of the country-specific and 
cultural aspects of each country. 
 
1.9  Originality of research contribution 
The research is original since it sheds light on a part of the world that is largely ignored 
in the literature, the State of Qatar. This research fills the gap in the literature by 
exploring Qatar’s possible move towards improving the current election system by 
adopting I-voting. 
 
1.10 Thesis structure 
This thesis consists of twelve chapters, as shown in Figure 1.2 below, beginning with an 
introduction to the thesis, giving background knowledge on the I-voting system, 
followed by a literature review of related work in the field of I-voting, reviewing the 
I-voting experience, advantages and disadvantages of I-voting along with the proposed 
models and solutions to overcome the problems in I-voting. A justification is then 
presented for the research methodology applied in this research towards achieving its 
objectives. 
 
The following chapters assess the willingness to introduce I-voting in Qatar and 
people’s acceptance of such technology, based on a review of I-voting in Qatar, surveys 
and experiments. Furthermore, an experiment is reported using an earlier version of 
I-voting to assess people’s acceptance of such technology and provide a comparison of 
experimental outcomes with the case study of I-voting in Estonia. 
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Figure 1.2: Thesis structure 
 
Findings from the data collection reveals much willingness to embrace I-voting but also 
some barriers to I-voting in Qatar. This leads to the research contribution in proposing 
an I-voting model for Qatar to overcome the identified barriers, which was then 
assessed by a prototype I-voting system. Finally, recommendations are put forward to 
the Qatar government for the introduction of I-voting in Qatar. The thesis ends with a 
summary and proposals for future work. 
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Chapter 2  Background of voting 
 
This chapter gives background information on voting, voters’ characteristics and the 
types of voting systems. I-voting is introduced as a type of electronic voting. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Voting is a process by which people express their opinions, commonly on selection of 
candidates or policies, and is a feature of a democracy (Dictionary.com, 2011). A 
healthy electoral system is one of the basic foundations of a free and democratic society 
as it acts as the main avenue by which the public exerts control over government, 
influences public policy decisions and holds officials accountable; although there are 
various signs which imply the unfavourable disposition of most voting systems across 
different countries (Amy, 2000).  
 
The type of voting system which encompasses the overall voting process has often put 
stress on people.  Frequently, voters face difficulty with registration and vote casting, 
and election officials and volunteers face a very strenuous process in vote counting 
(Amy, 2000). 
 
According to Habermas (1989) (philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and 
pragmatism), an informed and engaged citizenry contributes greatly to improving a 
country's political process. When people participate more in the electoral process not 
only do they feel accountable for their political choices but it also adds further to the 
legitimisation of elections, hence mirroring a healthy democratic society (Kent, 
Harrison and Taylor, 2006). It is in this respect that Habermas noted that forces which 
can meaningfully contribute to the democratic society come from re-energised, activists 
and engaged groups who work together to create new small-scale communicative 
associative institutions (Shane, 2004). 
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Habermas claimed that decentralisation, which allows pluralistic decision making, 
comes from diverse societal groups, can pave the way to a healthy democratic electoral 
process. Decentralisation prevents the creation of mass loyalties normally brought forth 
by mass institutions such as political parties and states. According to Habermas, 
subgroups must break into smaller discourse communities which through elaborate 
interactions can create a discursive whole (Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; Shane, 
2004).  
 
Habermas also claimed that civil society's role is very important as it creates a 
communicative power that influences political outcomes which are mainly about 
concepts of legitimacy. Practical discourse, according to him, is important to test the 
validity of norms that are being proposed and considered for adoption in the society 
(Shane, 2004). It is in this respect that it could be said that a society in which people 
live separately and maintain highly different views (i.e. anarchy) is a society which fails 
to legitimise its political, legal and government processes (Gibson et al., 2003; Shane, 
2004).   
 
Habermas's emphasis on the importance of discourse in legitimising the electoral 
process could be aided by other means which could further improve ways in which 
people collaborate with one another. According to Schwartz and Phoenix (2001), as 
cited by Shane (2004), technology will allow people a relatively easier process of 
discourse.  
 
This section has shown the importance of voting in the democratic process and it is 
therefore important for people to engage with the voting process. This then provides the 
basic motivation for this research, as any improvement in the ease with which people 
can take part, together with an improvement in the security and reliability of the voting 
system can only help in legitimising the electoral system and, as a consequence, 
enhancing the democratic process.  
 Chapter 2: Background of voting 
 
16 
2.2 Voters’ characteristics 
Theories on social choice have claimed that there are two types of voters: sincere and 
strategic. This categorisation capitalises on the value of the mental process in 
determining voters' decisions on who they should vote for. According to theories of 
social choice, sincere voters vote in accordance with their preferences, while strategic 
voters put much value on their voting strategies relative to the type and outcome of their 
calculations (Trechsel & Mendez, 2004; Kent et al., 2006).  
 
Game theory is one of the branches of science which explains human decisions. 
According to game theory, there are four instances in which a voter can be constrained 
in making the right decision (Saco, 2002; Trechsel and Mendez, 2004;).  
 
1) Procedural constraints. This refers to the difficulties encountered by people 
when they cast their votes, which are mostly procedural in nature. These 
constraints are often affected by the number of candidates competing for a 
particular situation in which voters are given various alternatives, which by 
virtue of their cognitive framework must be assessed and ranked. In voting 
situations, there are various constraints that voters have to face: the act of 
conducting, secretly or openly, the process of voting simultaneously, and the 
sequence or roll call decision (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004). 
 
2) Information constraints. Voters find it difficult to decide who to vote for, or they 
consider it difficult to know if they are overloaded with information. Voters 
assess their preferences based on that information. In this case as well, voters 
can be categorised as having complete, partial or no information at all (Trechsel 
and Mendez, 2004). 
 
3) Cooperation constraints. More informed and organised voters also face a lot of 
constraints, particularly when their decision lies on the binding agreements that 
they have within their group (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004). These types of voter 
have commitment to vote for whoever the party ask to vote for.  
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4) Compensation constraints. Money has always been involved in the decision of 
most voters. In some instances, voters among themselves offer compensation in 
exchange for support (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004)  
 
All of the above constraints would act as barriers facing the voter while casting their 
votes. However, as the scope of this research is limited to the time and resource 
constraints of a PhD, only the barriers given in (1) will be considered to ensure the 
voters are provided with a voting system which is usable and satisfies the voters’ needs.  
 
2.3 Voting systems 
Voting systems are important since there is a technical process which determines who is 
elected and eventually proclaims who runs the local, state and federal governments 
(Bimber and Davis, 2003). The people who are elected define the policies adopted and 
eventually determine who will benefit from them. Voting systems also determine the 
methods which can declare who among the candidates will win (Amy, 2000).  
 
For instance, suppose Candidate A receives 42%, Candidate B 40% and Candidate C 
18% of votes, respectively. Under Plurality Rules, Candidate A will win because he/she 
is the person with the most number of votes. However, if the voting framework only 
declares a winner by majority, Candidates A and B will be forced into a run-off in order 
to declare a winner with more than 50% of the votes (Amy, 2000; Gibson, Nixon and 
Ward, 2003).  
 
A voting system is made up of procedures which people follow to elect their chosen 
candidate to a particular office. In this system, this includes the process by which the 
ballot is structured, together with the manner in which people cast their votes and this 
determines which candidate will win (Amy, 2000; Bimber and Davis, 2003).  
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There are two main systems in the voting system paradigm adopted by democratic 
countries in the West. The first is the single-member district plurality system in which 
votes are cast in single-member districts in which only one candidate for the legislative 
seat will be elected (Bimber and Davis, 2003). There are two structures of the ballot:  
 
1) Simple, includes basically the list of all candidates from whom the voter will 
only have to choose one.  
2) Complex, in which the voter ranks the candidates in order of preference.  
 
On the other hand, the proportional representation system (PR) is the method adopted 
by most countries in the European region e.g. Austria, Belgium and Germany. This 
method is more elaborate as it uses different ballots and ways of vote computation 
(Amy, 2000). However, it must be noted that all PR systems share a common variable: 
they allow candidate election in multi-member districts (Bimber and Davis, 2003).  
 
In addition, rather than having one member of the legislature elected in a small district, 
PR uses larger districts wherein more than one member is elected (Amy, 2000). Also, 
multiple seats are distributed in accordance with the proportion of votes won by a 
particular party or political group.  
 
The voting system passes through phases, starting with preparation and registration, 
where eligible voters register, prove their identity, then authenticate themselves before 
proceeding to vote, where their votes are then cast and the results are calculated and 
published. 
 
This implies that the more complicated voting systems require more time, firstly to 
carry out the voting process and, secondly, to calculate the result. The power of 
computer processing in electronic voting may make the system quicker and therefore 
more viable. However, the complications would increase the need for transparency as 
people would need to know how their vote had been handled (e.g. Single transferable 
vote (STV) is a voting system based on proportional representation and preferential 
voting). This section has therefore provided a motivation to research the potential of 
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electronic voting, but it has also established that the voting process, whether by 
electronic or other means, must be transparent in its operation. 
 
2.4 Election process 
Voting systems are one of many important components of the overall election process 
(Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; United States General Accounting Office, 2004). Thus 
there should be an integration and cooperation between parties, including institutes, 
researchers and politicians in charge of the introduction of I-voting. 
 
The entire paradigm is actually composed of several stages which are made up of 
people, process and other technological variables. Figure 2.1 shows the entire election 
process.   
 
 
Figure 2.1: Election Process (U.S General Accounting Office, 2004) 
 
The stages of elections are normally comprised of:  
 
(1) Voter registration. Local election of officials requires voters to be registered and 
included in the official list of registered voters. In addition, their corresponding 
information must be presented, e.g. ID card or passport. A list of voters no longer 
eligible to vote must be maintained on a separate database (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004). This implies that any new system must take into account the 
need for completeness, all eligible people must be allowed to vote, and uniqueness, each 
eligible person must only be allowed to enter his/her vote once. 
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(2) Absentee and early voting. For some people who have legitimate reasons such as 
illness, religious or educational commitment that prevents them from attending the 
polling station, voting must be allowed either in person or by mail before the actual day 
of the election. Voters who have legitimate reasons such as illness, religious or 
educational commitment that prevents them from attending a polling station would 
normally find mail voting a suitable option to cast their votes. 
 
(3) Choice of voting mechanisms. Prior to vote casting, election officials must design 
ballots and other systems to allow that electorate to vote (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004). This is required for completeness to ensure this group of 
voters is able to vote. However, it complicates the voting process and must therefore be 
considered when choosing the voting mechanisms that will be provided in an election. 
The ways of conducting absentee voting are examined in more detail in the next section.  
 
(4) Conduct of election/ Vote casting. Election administration must be fully prepared 
before the Election Day. Polling places, recruiting and training of poll workers, 
designing of ballots, preparing and testing of voting equipment for use in casting and 
tabulating votes, together with the preparation of election day activities like opening and 
closing of polling places must be all specified (United States General Accounting 
Office, 2004). This level of care is to ensure the system is both robust and reliable. 
Officials will also need to be aware of procedures to ensure the privacy and anonymity 
of each individual’s vote. 
  
(5) Vote counting. Finally, the process of how to tabulate and count the ballots must be 
fully defined, together with those unable to be read by the voting equipment. A process 
of final votes’ certification must also be established and any process of recounting must 
be laid down prior to the elections (United States General Accounting Office, 2004). 
This implies that the method of counting the votes and calculating the winner must not 
only be accurate and reliable, but it must also be seen to be accurate and reliable by 
allowing for recounts if required. 
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2.4.1 Absentee voting  
Absentee voting is used for voters who can not attend the polling place for various 
reasons (unable or unwilling). Many countries have adopted this type of voting to suit 
the new life style of voters and to increase voter participation by providing a more 
flexible means of voting. Absentee votes are delivered using three methods, as follows: 
 
(1) Postal voting. A voter would need to request this type of voting in advance, then the 
election council would send a referenced voting form to be filled in by the voter and 
sent back before the actual election according to country election law. However, this 
type of vote has experienced problems in the United Kingdom where voting anonymity, 
secrecy and delivery of the voting papers to the correct person could not be guaranteed 
(Isobel W, 2009). 
 
(2) Proxy voting. Again, a voter would need to request this type of voting in advance.  A 
proxy vote requires the voter to notify the election authorities of a trusted person who 
will vote on his/her behalf. 
 
(3) Internet voting. A voter can cast his/her vote using the Internet network which is 
very cheap to access for voters and would be cheaper to administrate compared to postal 
and proxy voting. It would add the flexibility to vote at any time, anywhere, as long as it 
is within the defined election period. Furthermore, I-voting would have the beneficial 
side effect of pushing the government and organisations to use state of the art 
technology, such as smart cards, which could be used with a range of different 
applications. The one-off cost of the card would then benefit a range of security areas of 
concern. 
 
Absentee voting can provide the ability for some voters to vote who would not 
otherwise be able to do so and would therefore increase voters’ participation. However, 
the voters might lose secrecy as the lack of any supervision of the voting could mean 
they may be subject to pressure from others to vote for a particular candidate. With 
absentee voting in the form of postal voting, voters must vote in advance since the 
postal service takes time for delivery. 
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In 1956, absentee voting was introduced in Germany (Eckhard Jesse 2003) where voters 
met specific criteria with an acceptable reason for not being able to vote in a polling 
station, such as illness, age or disability. Still, absentee voting remains exceptional. In 
Germany in 1957, only 4.9% used absentee voting though this increased to 13% in 
1980. In the 2002 election, a high percentage of voters (one in every five eligible voters) 
used absentee voting (Norbert Kersting 2004). 
This shows that, over the years, absentee voting has become more popular with changes 
in life style, indicating that people would like to have the flexibility and convenience to 
vote remotely at any time. They may therefore be willing to turn to I-voting as a 
convenient and innovative method of voting that will fulfil this growing need. 
 
I-voting could be considered as the best method of absentee voting in terms of 
flexibility, security and cost of setting up the election. However, many people currently 
regard I-voting as an insecure system, but on the other hand, technology is moving very 
fast and should soon provide a secure environment for I-voting.  
 
2.5  Voting mechanisms 
The ways of administering elections may vary with the voting system adopted by 
different countries and even in different elections within one country. Therefore various 
equipment has been developed by respective countries to cater for their voting needs. 
There are a few variables such as budget, culture and tradition, which would affect 
countries’ choices of a particular voting technology (Shane, 2004).   
 
2.5.1  Paper ballots 
Ways in which people have voted throughout the years have changed from verbal 
expressions to the placement of small balls in a box to the use of paper ballots. Paper 
ballots were used during the mid-nineteenth century where voters were able to write the 
name of their chosen candidates on a piece of paper or use a pre-printed ticket from a 
political party where they just simply signed their names. Voters would then deposit 
their ballots in a designated area for counting (Bimber and Davis, 2003; Yang and 
Gaines, 2004).  
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Table 2.1: Comparison of voting methods against voting principles 
 
Paper 
Ballot 
Lever 
Machi
nes 
Punch 
cards 
Optical 
Scan 
DRE 
Mail 
voting 
Proxy 
voting 
I-
voting 
Eligibility + + + + + + + + 
Privacy Partly + + 
Not for 
the 
disabled 
Partly - Partly 
Conditi
onally 
Receipt-
Freeness 
+ + + + + + + + 
Fairness + + + + + + + + 
Accuracy Partly + Partly + Partly - + + 
Individual 
Verifiability 
- - + + - - + + 
Universal 
Verifiability 
+ - + + + + + + 
Reliability + + + + + - + + 
Convenience Partly Partly 
Can be 
ambigu
ous 
+ Partly + + + 
Flexibility of 
the usability 
+ Partly Partly - + + + + 
Mobility - - - - - + + + 
Transparency + - + + Partly + + Partly 
Scalability + + + + + + + + 
Efficiency Partly Partly Low + + - + + 
Security + + + + + - + 
Conditi
onally 
Cost effective - + + - + + - + 
 
The paper ballot form of voting could be strenuous process for some voters, particularly 
during vote casting and counting. Illegible writing, the incapacity of voters to choose 
outside a certain party and lack of voting anonymity were a few of its main issues 
(Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; Lock et al., 2007). To reduce the problems, the USA 
Government has standardised and printed ballots since the late 1800s. However, 
scandals and improper vote counting continued and this eventually mandated most USA 
states to abandon paper ballots (Yang and Gaines, 2004).  
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2.5.2 Lever machines 
The lever machine is one of the earliest forms of mechanical voting which requires 
voters to pull selected levers assigned to their preferred candidate (See Figure 2.2). 
After each voter has made his/her choice, the levers return to their original position, 
while the internal counter in the machine advances immediately to record the vote 
(Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; Yang and Gaines, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Lever voting machine displayed at National Museum of American History (RadioFan, 
2010) 
 
After the polls, the total number of votes for a particular candidate is produced by the 
machine. However, since lever machines do not produce a record of each individual 
vote, a recount would be impossible. Furthermore, lever machines are prone to 
breakdowns and tampering. As a result, lever machines are no longer manufactured and 
are in the process of being phased out in most countries which used them (Kent, 
Harrison and Taylor, 2006; Yang and Gaines, 2004).  
 
2.5.3 Punched cards 
Punched cards were used during the US Presidential elections in 2000. With punched 
cards, the voter inserts a card into a machine under a ballot label, then uses a stylus to 
punch through the space assigned for the preferred candidate, hence removing a ‘chad’ 
or the rectangular shape from the card (Saco, 2002; Yang and Gaines, 2004).  
  
After this, a computerised tabulating device counts each result as represented by the 
hole. Through this process, vote counting speed is increased and recounts have become 
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possible and relatively easier (Bimber and Davis, 2003). However, various problems in 
using the punched card have been noted in several elections, particularly in the 2000 
presidential elections in Florida. For instance, some voters did not punch their cards 
cleanly enough, hence preventing the machine’s reading.  As a result, the US Congress 
encouraged the phasing-out of punched card machines by 2006 (Yang and Gaines, 
2004). These have generally been replaced by new voting technologies such as E-voting 
and I-voting (Kent et al, 2006). 
 
2.5.4 Supervised electronic voting (E-voting) 
There are generally two types of supervised E-voting systems adopted by modern 
countries in the West, such as the United States: optical scan and direct recording 
electronic (DRE). Other than this, there are also a few other, relatively older voting 
technologies, as used in the 2000 US elections: punched card and mechanical lever 
voting (United States General Accounting Office, 2004; Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 
2003). 
 
E-voting is an encompassing term referring to technologies adopted by countries all 
over the world which use advanced technologies as the core of the entire voting process. 
E-voting makes use of technologies from the basic punched cards up to the most 
advanced DRE systems and optical scan (Bimber & Davis, 2003). On the other hand, 
unsupervised I-voting makes use of a broad range of electronic telecommunication 
technology in which telephones, cables, satellite television and computers serve as the 
means by which citizens can cast their votes. Unlike E-voting, which requires citizens to 
vote in specific and designated areas of voting using stand-alone machines, I-voting 
allows citizens to vote using almost any means of technology made available: personal 
computer, mobile phone and even television sets (Trechsel & Mendez, 2004). 
 
Increased voter participation is one of the primary arguments promoting the use of 
E-voting and I-voting. For instance, parliamentary elections across Western Europe, 
ever since the 1990s, have shown a downward trend in voters going to the polls (Bimber 
and Davis, 2003). Across the Atlantic, attention is also drawn to the problem of absence 
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from participating in election (Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; Trechsel and Mendez, 
2004). 
 
In 1968, seven per cent of voters in the United States did not cast their votes and over 
time this figure had tripled by the year 2000. Low voter turnout among younger voters 
was also noted. In the US Presidential elections in 2000, only 36 per cent of those aged 
18 to 24 participated (Kent, Harrison and Taylor, 2006). The same fate was experienced 
in the British General Election in 2001 in which voter turn-out dropped to its lowest 
levels since 1918, in which over 60% of voters aged between 18 to 24 did not vote 
(Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; Trechsel and Mendez, 2004). Some countries counter 
this by making voting compulsory, e.g. Australia (Mackerras
 
and McAllister, 1999).  
 
Optical Scan and Direct Recording Electronic are two types of E-voting systems. 
However, E-voting can also be considered to include I-voting, for which Internet Voting 
at the Polling Place and Remote Internet Voting are the two main types (Kent et al, 
2006). Each type of E-voting is considered as follows:  
 
2.5.5  Optical scan ballots  
The Optical Scan System is a technology developed almost three decades ago for 
scoring standardised tests. It was not until 2000 that this technology was used in US 
elections to tabulate paper ballots (United States General Accounting Office, 2004; 
Bimber & Davis, 2003). The optical scan system is made up of computer-readable 
ballots, marking devices, privacy booths and a computerised tabulation device (Bimber 
& Davis, 2003; United States General Accounting Office, 2004).  
 
The ballot is designed so that it is capable of adjusting itself to various sizes, listing the 
names of the candidates and the like. During elections, voters record their choices by 
using an appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes or ovals or in some cases put 
arrows indicating their choice of a particular candidate. This technology also allows a 
space for write-ins to be placed directly on the ballot (Kent et al, 2006; United States 
General Accounting Office, 2004). 
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Optical scan ballots work by having state of the art optical-mark-recognition equipment 
read ballots by sensing or reading the marks on ballot papers. Counting is then carried 
out either by a precinct-count optical scan or at a central location (Kent et al, 2006).  For 
ballots counted at the polling place, voters or election officials put them inside 
tabulation equipment in which the votes are tallied. These tallies are captured in 
removable storage devices which are then transported to a central tally location or 
electronically transmitted to it from the polling place (United States General Accounting 
Office, 2004).  
 
For ballots that are centrally counted, voters drop their ballots in sealed boxes and, 
eventually, election officials transfer these to the central location after polling for a 
particular area has been completed (Bimber and Davis, 2003; United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004).  Figure 2.3 shows the optical scan ballot technology.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Precinct-Count and Central-Count Optical Scan Tabulator (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004) 
 
This technology instructs the tabulation equipment to assign each valid mark on the 
ballot to the chosen candidate. Such technology also allows the identification of 
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particular contests and candidates and configuration to capture a straight party voting 
and votes strictly to a particular number of contests. Over-votes  (e.g. voting for two 
candidates where there should be one) and under-votes (e.g. voting for one candidate 
where should be more than one) can also be identified by using precinct-based optical 
scanners; in addition, a specific response can be provided for the two scenarios 
mentioned (Bimber and Davis, 2003; United States General Accounting Office, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, this technology allows the use of vote-tally software which can count the 
votes from one or more tabulation devices. The benefit of this is also the immediate 
notification provided by the computer if an over-vote or under-vote occurs, hence 
allowing voters to fix their choices prior to leaving the polling place (Bimber and Davis, 
2003). In instances where voters are unwilling or unable to correct their ballots, a poll 
worker can manually override the program and accept the ballot. Where ballots are to be 
tabulated centrally, mistakes cannot be corrected by voters. Clearly over-voting and 
under-voting affect the accuracy of a voting (Bimber and Davis, 2003; United States 
General Accounting Office, 2004). Alternatively, I-voting would overcome such a 
problem by minimising the number of people having direct access to the equipment. 
 
2.5.6  Direct Recording Electronic Systems (DREs) 
A DRE is a voting technology which captures votes without the use of paper ballots, but 
rather tallies them in an electronic manner. It was introduced in the 1970s and used in 
the 2000 US elections by almost 12 per cent of voters (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004; Bimber and Davis, 2003). 
 
Push-button DRE is a relatively older technology, somewhat larger and heavier than the 
touch screen. It also presents ballots in a full-face interface (where all choices are on 
one page) which, for instance, could have 50 buttons on a three by three foot ballot, 
with a candidate represented by each button (Gibson et al., 2003; United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004). 
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A touch screen DRE displays ballot information in colour and can also present pictures 
of the candidates. In addition, since the space on a touch screen ballot is relatively 
smaller than the push-button machine, voters who use this technology can navigate 
throughout the ballot information. Both touch screen and push-button DREs can also 
accommodate multilingual ballots (Kent, Harrison and Taylor, 2006; United States 
General Accounting Office, 2004). It should be noted though that push-button and touch 
screen ballot information is connected to electronic storage which eventually updates a 
central database with the votes cast (United States General Accounting Office, 2004). 
Figure 2.4 shows both the push-button and touch screen DRE. 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  DRE Push-button and DRE Touch screen (United States General Accounting Office, 
2004) 
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2.5.7  Internet voting (I-voting) 
I-voting is a sub-type of electronic voting where votes are cast in a secure and secret 
electronic ballot and transmitted to the officials over the Internet. I-voting is therefore a 
technology which works through a broad range of electronic telecommunications 
technology using telephones, cables, satellite television and computers (Trechsel and 
Mendez, 2004; Kent et al., 2006;). 
 
The Internet radically empowers people and creates new tools which allow people to 
communicate with one another and share their interests regardless of any distance 
barriers (Shane, 2004; Kent, Harrison and Taylor, 2006). The Internet also plays a big 
role in providing new links between the citizens and government where the government 
has initiated projects such as e-government, e-participation and e-democracy to increase 
participation in an effective, transparent, democratic system. According to Habermas 
(1964), the Internet, in its provision of new media for communication, draws power 
back to the public sphere and away from bureaucratic government systems. In addition, 
the Internet creates new virtual spaces where people can visit and express their opinions 
and this helps to “guarantee freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to 
express and publish their opinions” (Habermas, 1964, quoted in Pusey, 1987: 89). The 
use of democratised access to a new form of mass media allows more room for self-
expression and makes people engage more in debate, which has created new forms of 
communities of discourse (Shane, 2004; Bimber and Davis, 2003). 
 
The use of the latest hardware and software technologies, such as smart cards, 
biometrics and PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) allows easy information exchange 
which fosters discourse in healthy debates and arguments.  As the base of Internet users 
increases, the utilities brought forth widen further. In addition, discourse-enabling tools 
are being developed and barriers such as cost, low computer literacy, lack of trust and 
unwillingness to use such technology that formerly hindered people from collaborating 
by electronic means are now being resolved (Kent, Harrison and Taylor, 2006).  This 
increasing use of the Internet for communication and discourse means that the Internet 
is becoming more acceptable as a means of carrying out business and for interacting 
with government. A natural progression of this, therefore, is for citizens to accept the 
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Internet as a means to facilitate the most basic aspect of a democracy, the right to vote.
  
The practice of I-voting is less common compared to optical scan systems and DREs, in 
part because the Internet is a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, one of the earliest 
political uses of this technology can be dated as recently as 1996, when the US Reform 
Party made its members cast a vote for their chosen president through their computers 
(Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003). 
 
The first use of I-voting on a large scale and in a legally binding manner was by the 
Arizona Democrats in March 2000 (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004; Kent et al., 2006).   
The Republican Party of the USA also used I-voting in Alaska for the 2000 elections; 
however, the results were disappointing as only 35 votes were made online, less than 
one per cent of the eligible voters in the area. 
 
The use of I-voting by the State of Arizona has stimulated interest of other countries all 
over the world to adopt I-voting. In fact, the Electoral Commission in the United 
Kingdom, together with the company responsible for the Arizona elections, and British 
Telecom, piloted a number of I-voting systems for 12 local elections (Bedford, 
Breckland, Broxbourne, Dover, Gateshead, Rushmoor, Sheffield, Shrewsbury and 
Atcham, South Bucks, Stratford-on-Avon and Warwick (joint pilot), Sunderland, and 
Swindon) between 2002 and 2007. This initiative allowed the use of interactive digital 
television, SMS by mobile phones, home personal computers and Internet-connected 
public kiosks in libraries and supermarkets (Saco, 2002; Trechsel and Mendez, 2004).  
 
The result, of those trials shows a good degree of success, however the trial was held on 
a small-scale, which does not reflect the real threats of national elections. Moreover, 
some people found difficulties to cast their vote due to lack of standardisation in 
defining the election process.  
 
As I-voting enables voters to cast their choices at any machine connected to the Internet, 
voters can log-on to an election website from their personal computers at home, work, 
 Chapter 2: Background of voting 
 
32 
through their digital television or even mobile phone. Computers made available in 
other public areas such as post offices, libraries and shopping malls could also be used 
(Trechsel and Mendez, 2004).  
 
According to Internet Policy Institute (2001), I-voting systems are categorised 
according to the siting of the voting terminals (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004; Kent et al., 
2006). 
 
(1) Poll site. The E-voting system is in a polling station in a safe, supervised 
environment. If implemented, it would replace existing voting equipment such as paper 
ballots or punched cards (Saco, 2002). 
 
(2) Kiosk. The unsupervised E-voting system is located in specific locations such as 
shopping centre or libraries similar to ATM machines. However, such a system was 
found to be easily hacked if physical access to the machine is obtained even though it is 
protected and configured against security issues (Masnick, 2005). I-voting might suffer 
from hacker attacks targeting the weakest link, voters’ computers, especially insecure 
ones. 
 
(3) Remote Internet Voting (RIV). This is a system where voters are allowed to vote 
online and remotely from any digital device connected to a network or to the Internet. It 
could be conducted from PCs, mobile phones, games machines and other technologies 
which can access the Internet. This requires less effort and cost from the authorities and 
provides more flexibility for voters to cast their vote. 
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2.5.8  Conclusion on voting mechanisms 
This section has examined the different voting mechanisms used in government and 
other elections. Each of the methods has been shown to have its problems. Paper voting 
is labour intensive and is prone to some human error. It also means that voting remotely 
is only possible by using the postal service, which necessitates voting in advance. Lever 
machines work well for those present but the way they work means that any form of 
recount is impossible. Punched cards have some reliability problems when the holes are 
not punched properly, as was highlighted in the US Presidential election of 2000.  
 
Electronic voting appears to be a step forward in that it eliminates human error in the 
counting process. However, optical scan ballots still involve paper and suffer from most 
of the disadvantages of paper ballots and neither this method nor the direct recording 
electronic systems enable absentee voting. I-voting is perhaps the mechanism that 
shows the most potential, but as the Internet is relatively new, its security is not as well 
tried and tested and it is uncertain whether the majority of the public will have the 
confidence to use it. However, the growing use of the Internet by the public for 
communication and business indicates that citizens may be coming to the point where 
they will use it for voting if the right conditions of security and transparency are 
provided. 
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2.6  Summary 
This chapter gives background information about voting beginning with the importance 
of voting in a democracy. From this it was concluded that any voting system needs to 
satisfy citizens’ requirements of being easy to use, secure and reliable in order to 
encourage the maximum number of people to take part in the voting process.   
 
The chapter then examined the election process from voter registration, absentee and 
early voting to vote casting and vote counting. This showed it is a complicated process 
requiring expertise from different fields. Further characteristics of a good voting system 
were revealed: the system should be transparent in its operation; it must be complete so 
that it enables all people to vote but also offers uniqueness so that a person cannot vote 
more than once; it must allow absentee voting in a manner that is convenient, but also 
gives privacy; it must be robust as well as reliable; it must ensure privacy and 
anonymity for voters; it must be accurate and allow for recounts if required; and it 
should inspire confidence in the users that their vote is secure and properly handled. 
Ideally, the system should also be inexpensive and fast in calculating the winner. 
 
The mechanisms for voting systems were then examined from the traditional paper 
ballot voting to advanced forms of electronic voting. All mechanisms of voting have 
some advantages and disadvantages, but the future technology of I-voting, which allows 
voters to vote remotely from their PCs through a secure channel, appears to offer the 
most promise if it can be made to satisfy all voters’ requirements identified above.  
 
The next chapter presents the literature review on the subject of I-voting, identifying the 
barriers to the implementation of such a system, the willingness of people to accept it 
and the experience of others who have introduced I-voting. This leads to specification of 
the research scope based on the gap identified in the literature in this area of research.   
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review and Current Systems Review 
 35 
Chapter 3  Literature Review and Current Systems Review 
 
This chapter summarises world-wide experience of I-voting, pointing to the successes 
and failures of such a system. Furthermore, it identifies the problems arising from 
I-voting and its introduction and the available potential solutions, models and schemes 
to overcome them. The literature review satisfies objective 2 of the research and assists 
in defining the research scope, aiming to add a contribution to knowledge and filling the 
gap in existing literature by shedding light on introducing I-voting in a country so far 
ignored in the literature, the State of Qatar. In the belief that I-voting could be 
introduced in Qatar, by designing the best of all I-voting models, it takes into 
consideration the relative I-voting experience around the world and the country-specific 
factors.    
 
3.1  I-voting and e-commerce  
For Internet voting (I-voting) and electronic commerce (e-commerce), some of the 
threats or characteristics might be similar. In this section, the researcher examines this 
possibility and argues that the similarity is more real than apparent. As a consequence, it 
will be necessary to explore novel means to support I-voting.  
Jefferson et al. (2004) argued that it is important for people to understand the 
differences between I-voting and e-commerce in order to avoid possible attacks. 
 
Elections are a link to democracy and any problem in the voting process would affect 
democracy. Therefore I-voting needs as high a level of security, if not higher, than 
e-commerce. In I-voting, the right to vote should not be handed over or sold (Jefferson 
et al., 2004). An occurrence of a denial of service (DoS) attack would cause consequent 
loss of confidence in the system since, if the election web server went down due to the 
huge volume of traffic, it would prevent voters from casting their vote. This could 
compromise the legitimacy of the whole election. Moreover, it is hard to protect against 
such an attack (Regenscheid and Hastings, 2008) and also difficult to recover votes 
since, as voting should be anonymous, no receipts are produced. This should be 
compared to e-commerce, where costs could be recovered through repayment and legal 
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actions. Moreover, offers of receipts after the commitment to I-voting might enable vote 
selling or pressure (Jefferson et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the story of successful 
e-commerce does not essentially make an I-voting system secure (Fairweather and 
Rogerson, 2005). 
 
Some researchers anticipate the success and large-scale use of I-voting, as has happened 
for e-commerce. However, Ronald (2002) commented that the feasibility of 
e-commerce does not necessarily imply the feasibility of the I-voting since there are 
several different issues between the two, as explained in detail below (Jefferson et al., 
2004; Schryen, 2004). In financial transactions, online and offline processes are 
provided, which might be referred for auditing, whereas in I-voting, it should be easy to 
do a recount but impossible to trace votes to individual voters. Moreover, in 
e-commerce there is the opportunity to dispute the transaction, whereas in I-voting, 
although this is possible, it requires many court appearances, yet the time for voting is 
limited. In e-commerce, the customer’s identity is available, whereas in I-voting the 
case is different as the voter’s identity must be anonymous and kept private. However, 
this might be subject to limitation. Even the characteristics of attackers are different: 
attackers of I-voting are more intelligent, can alter votes without notification and might 
be powered by foreign countries interested in affecting the poll results. 
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3.2 I-voting experience 
This section reveals a large number of issues to be considered when deciding on the 
merits of I-voting and on the design of a system for this activity. In order to reduce the 
risks and produce a defensible system, it is necessary to identify the risks involved. 
  
The section concludes with a brief description of previous experience with I-voting. As 
will be seen, various conclusions have been drawn about the process and its viability 
and it should be noted that the scope of these various experiments have been different. 
This reveals a large number of issues to be considered when deciding on the merits of 
I-voting. The testing of voting systems is a practical problem so the approach taken is to 
examine various methods for testing the correctness, security, usability, etc., of voting 
systems, starting with test ballots and verifiable protocols, code voting and so on. Quite 
clearly, these various testing methods can inform the design of new I-voting systems 
and models such as the one presented in this thesis. 
 
Many countries have used I-voting, such as the USA, Netherlands and Belgium, using 
different technologies, such as touch screens, smart cards, tokens or machines similar to 
ATM engines, to cast votes (Gefen et al., 2005; Tan et al., 2005; Bonsor, 2004). 
However, others including Denmark, are still planning to initiate I-voting, although 
Danish election laws have already adopted the use of technology in elections to assist 
election practices. 
 
Overall experiences of trial I-voting were different in different countries; however, the 
system security was generally not satisfactory. In addition, not every country employs 
open source systems which can be used by the public. Transparency was identified as an 
important aspect to enhance public trust in the Dutch, USA, Swiss and UK I-voting 
trials. Verification is necessary to avoid insider attacks. Evaluations of I-voting trials 
illustrate the importance of I-voting system testing, the possibility of Denial of Service 
(DOS) attacks and other attacks that might occur due to insecure platforms, especially 
on the client side, such as the DOS attacks on many government servers in Estonia. 
However, many countries have decided to stop using I-voting, including the UK, 
Germany and Italy (Ziegler, 2006) due to discovery of irregularities. The details of 
I-voting experiences in some countries are shown in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Global picture of I-voting experience 
Country I-voting experience Main outcome 
UK May 2000: 38 experiments in E-voting 
and counting in 32 local council 
elections. 
2002, 2003 and 2007: Several pilot tests 
of remote voting by mobile phones (UK 
Electoral Commission, 2003) 
Security, integrity, availability and 
accessibility were the main challenges 
in I-voting (UK Electoral 
Commission, 2007a).  
Consequently, the Commission does 
not recommend continuing further 
pilots on I-voting (UK Electoral 
Commission, 2007b). 
France 2001: I-voting from kiosk for municipal 
and cantonal elections  
May 2003: French citizens resident in 
USA allowed to vote online (voting 
participation 60%). 
March 2004: E-voting results declared 
for 33 cities, experience in general 
successful. 
2007: E-voting in French Presidential 
elections, but huge queues and 
equipment faults put some cities’ 
systems out of action. 
In spite of the support of some 
officials for the initiative of I-voting, 
some politicians wanted to stop I-
voting.  
April 2007: more than 80,000 
signatures were gathered in a petition 
against I-voting.    
 
Germany 1999: Many pilot tests on E-voting 
technology at two universities 
(Osnabrück, Bremerhaven). 
2002: 1 million voters voted in 
Bundestag elections. 
2003: all polling stations connected 
electronically. 
2005 and 2006: E-voting in Bundestag 
elections and extra security measures 
adopted. 
2008: Optical-scan voting system based 
on digital paper used in Hamburg 
election since there had been numerous 
lawsuits about use of E-voting in 
Germany. 
I-voting still illegal (Federal Ministry 
of Germany, Domestic Policy, 2007), 
it could be reconfigured easily by 
Erasable Programmable Read-Only 
Memory (EPROM).  
Consequently, the government 
removed approval for voting 
machines given in 1997 (Report of 
the Election Process Advisory 
Commission, 2007). 
 
India 1982: First initiative on E-voting in 
experiment in North Parur, State of 
Kerala. 
2003: State elections by E-voting 
machines (EVMs): 1 million supplied 
for 700,000 polling stations around 
India.  
 
 
Supreme Court of India ruled that 
E-voting does not contravene the law. 
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Country I-voting experience Main outcome 
Norway 2003: Pilot test for E-voting for local 
elections with touch screen technology.  
 
Pilot shows system feasible, 
considering possible security issues. 
Furthermore, a specialised working 
committee assigned to E-voting drew 
up a report on issues and 
opportunities for E-voting and 
recommended continuing with pilot 
testing.  
Spain 
 
Since 1995: Several E-voting pilot 
projects in polling stations 
November 2003 and March 2004: an 
I-voting pilot used to assess the 
efficiency of the I-voting system, 
especially regarding security. More than 
23,000 residents abroad participated in 
I-voting. 
 August 2004: the government 
considered some changes to the law on 
general elections to support I-voting.  
February 2005: I-voting held after 
changes applied in election law to 
support I-voting.  
July 2007: Experience repeated 
successfully. 
Main challenge for I-voting was 
election law. However, in August 
2004, the government considered 
some changes to the law on general 
elections to support I-voting.  
I-voting shows low participation: in 
February 2005 only 10,543 of two 
million voters cast their vote online 
by I-voting, using smart card 
technology.  
  
 
Brazil 1994: Arrangements for an E-voting 
system set up 
1996, 1998 and 2000 elections: Direct 
Recording Electronic (DRE) voting 
system used, with significant increase in 
voting participation, reaching 100% in 
the year 2000.  
Brazil has experienced an increase in 
number of voters using E-voting by 
computers since introduction in 1990. 
Use exceeded 400,000 machines; data 
stored and transmitted on secure 
compact disk or by satellite modem. 
Ireland 
 
February 2000, May 2002 and October 
2002: E-voting launched in 2000 using 
modern technology in securing 
information, providing superior 
flexibility and facilitating voting 
process. Testing by independent 
authorities. 
May 2002 and October 2002: E-voting 
in General Elections proved its success 
June 2004: Initiated an E-voting system 
for European and local elections. 
  
 
 
 
93% of voters found E-voting an 
incredibly simple practice; 
nevertheless, 87% favoured paper-
based voting. Later, effort made to 
improve user interface and security. 
 
To examine confidentiality and 
accuracy of E-voting system, the 
government initiated an Independent 
Commission on Electronic Voting 
(CEV) in March 2004. In July 2006, 
CEV recommended use of E-voting 
for elections in Ireland, with some 
additional recommendations. 
Afterwards, a Cabinet Committee on 
E-voting examined E-voting issues 
and CEV’s considerations.   
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Country I-voting experience Main outcome 
Austria 
 
Spring 2004: the Federal Ministry of 
Interior established a group to study 
E-voting. 
May 2003: Vienna University of 
Economics and Business 
Administration held a remote voting test 
in a Student Union election. Tokens 
consisting of an electronic National ID 
Card distributed for voting. April 2004 
System used in Austrian Presidential 
elections. 
September 2006: System used for 
Austrians abroad; voters supplied with 
an electronic voting card to cast their 
vote online. 
I-voting e-participation low, only 
1,786 from 20,000 students from WU 
Vienna voted electronically. 
Belgium November 1991: E-voting was used in 
two electoral cantons.  
1995: 20% of voters voted 
electronically; later, in 1999, 
participation increased to 44%. 
Elections were broadened from 
regional, local, and general to European 
elections in  2000, 2003, 2006 through 
to 2007. In 2003, vote automatically 
stored in a database. 
April 2004: the government made some 
changes in election law to make E-
voting promising in Belgium. However, 
in 1999, 2000 and 2003, an optical 
reader was used to scan ballot papers to 
provide an automated and reliable 
count. 
 
E-voting software open sourced, 
opening polling station to voters 
triggered by Polling Station Chair and 
optical reader used to scan ballot 
papers towards providing automated 
and reliable count.  
However, some members of 
parliament displeased with E-voting 
system in which participation has not 
exceeded 44% since 1999.  Also, 
there were many issues associated 
with the system in terms of security 
and secrecy. In July 2006, the 
Regional Parliament of Brussels 
asked for improvement of 
transparency of the E-voting system. 
Australia October 2001: First launch of E-voting 
in Australian parliamentary election, in 
8 polling stations, where only 8.3% of 
voters cast electronic votes. 
October 2004: Experiment repeated: the 
need to provide an E-voting system for 
the next Federal election considered, to 
be accessible and usable by disabled 
people with poor vision or by blind 
persons. 
September 2007: E-voting tested on 
sample of disabled people with poor 
vision or blind persons after 
modifications of system to ensure they 
could cast their vote independently and 
Barcodes applied to authenticate 
voters’ votes. Computer used as a 
voting terminal, linked through secure 
local area network to a server in each 
polling location. Later, electronic 
counting combined all electronic and 
paper ballots. 
 
The Australian Electoral Commission 
(AEC) has worked on development of 
E-voting to enhance accessibility by 
providing audio, as well as enlarged 
screens and large telephone keypad to 
navigate and choose the preferred 
candidate and to cast the vote. 
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Country I-voting experience Main outcome 
secretly in the 2007 Federal election. 
Canada    Since 1990s: E-voting in use although 
there are no Canadian E-voting 
principles; voters have to obey some 
local principles but generally each city 
uses its own machines and principles. 
 
November 2003: 12 cities in Ontario 
used E-voting via the Internet and 
phone; as many as 100,000 voters 
participated. Authentication based on 
Voter Identification Number and 
password, given to voters. Some cities 
have used different technologies such as 
I-voting, touch screens, optical scan 
machines and some even still use paper-
based voting in addition to E-voting.  
October 2007: VOTEX ‘touch-screen 
voting machines’ used in local election 
after its initiative in 2004. 
E-voting has increased voting 
participation from 25 - 30% to 55% in 
some cities. Generally, growth of 
48% experienced in the 2006 election. 
 
However, recent use of E-voting in 
main cities of Canada showed some 
issues, which indicates that E-voting 
needs to be improved. Main issues 
addressed included requests for re-
votes, cultural barriers and lack of 
legislation, standards, management 
and security measures. 
 
Netherlands 
 
Since the late 90s E-voting began in the 
Netherlands. Since then, in 2000, the 
Netherlands’ government experimented 
with I-voting for voters abroad. I-voting 
in European parliament and locally in 
2004 and 2006. Experiments in June 
2004 for I-voting and telephone voting 
for Dutch voters abroad. The Dutch 
Electoral Commission report suggested 
enhanced accessibility for people who 
found difficulty in accessing or using 
the system (Pieters and Haren 2007; 
Report of Election Process Advisory 
Commission 2007). 
I-voting shows increase in voter 
participation from 5000 in 2004 to 
21,000 in 2006. 
Secrecy and security were major 
issues identified by experts and this 
guided government to use certain 
computer voting machines in the 2006 
national elections to avoid hacking 
and interrupting voting results. 
Currently, implementation of I-voting 
has been stopped 
Switzerland 
 
Since 2000: The government assessed 
the possibility of E-voting and 
conducted several trials to examine 
systems (Kersting, 2004) in which 
anonymity was guaranteed by use of 
anonymous mixnets channels. 
(Volkamer and Krimmer, 2006).  
January 2003: Geneva voters are the 
first citizens to vote electronically.  
December 2004: I-voting pilot tested in 
students’ parliament election at 
University of Zurich where voters were 
allowed to vote by SMS. A secret key 
was sealed into the voter’s polling card 
and votes were cast by selecting the 
In Switzerland, voter turnout for 
elections is the lowest among 
democratic countries, dropping to 
58% in 1945 - 1997 (Nohlen, 2007). 
Later, mobilisation suggested and 
seen to increase % of the turnout with 
interest in I-voting (Maur and 
Vontobel, 2007). 
 
Trials successful with no noticeable 
incidents, (Swiss Federal Council 
Report, 2002 and 2006) showed that 
securing I-voting is possible. 
However, some problems considered 
on authentication and securing of 
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Country I-voting experience Main outcome 
number of the candidates as represented 
on the polling card. Code voting was 
used to provide security from possible 
frauds on client side and anonymity 
ensured with mixnet technology.  
 
However, I-voting used as an 
alternative voting method (State of 
Geneva. E-voting, 2007; Sperlich, 
2007).  
 
client side, found hard to achieve, and 
possible appearance of vote selling 
and intimidation (Oppliger, 2002; 
Swiss Federal Council Report in 2006 
commented on the risks associated 
with I-voting continuously increasing 
and therefore security measures 
should be improved. The Swiss 
government decided to continue E-
voting pilot test and allow I-voting for 
citizens abroad in 2009 (Wili, 2007). 
The government still uncertain 
whether to consent to adoption of E-
voting in Switzerland by 2012 as an 
alternative to paper and postal voting.     
Estonia 
 
2002: Legal provisions for I-voting 
assigned in Councils Elections Act  
(Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, 2007; Breuer et al., 
2006) aimed at increasing the 
participation rate in electoral voting, 
benefiting from availability of free 
Internet access for all citizens since 
1999. 
2004: Development of E-voting system 
commenced; later, E-voting pilot in 
Tallinn for 703 voters. Following pilot 
outcome, some modifications applied to 
the system and, in 2005, Estonia 
introduced I-voting for local elections 
as an alternative method of voting 
(Thielbeer 2007). The encryption 
process also applied and ID-card 
authentication certificates for 
authentication; in February 2006 more 
than 900,000 ID-cards had been 
reported. In 2007 parliament elections 
used I-voting using the same technique 
and participation reached 30,275 voters. 
The Council of Europe stated that 
I-voting has increased participation 
slightly but it is not motivating for 
people who do not participate in 
traditional voting schemes (Breuer 
and Alexander 2005). Their report 
indicates participation lower by 0.5% 
since only 5.4% voted electronically. 
Also, a survey by Alexander (2007) 
indicates only one tenth of E-voters 
prefer voting via the Internet. 
Although Estonia applied smart card 
technology, PKI and digital signatures 
to ensure the security of E-voting, the 
security of the system from possible 
attacks was a problem which might 
alter and affect the anonymity of the 
vote (Madise and Martens, 2006). 
USA 2002: In the USA, Federal Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA) spent about 
$4 billion to replace lever machines by 
stand-alone, touch-screen voting 
machines.  
 
February 2004: E-voting first used in 
South Carolina’s Presidential primary 
election, but showed many security 
issues (Lemos, 2004).  
An issue of I-voting was recounting 
votes through lack of voter verified 
papers; also, problems of 
transparency and security. In 2004, 
the US presidential election, there 
was a miscount of 18,000 votes in 
Florida due to electronic miscount 
(Krugman, 2007). Experience of I-
voting in the USA shows the huge 
scale of vulnerabilities and risks of 
attack which requires redesign of 
hardware and software and 
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Country I-voting experience Main outcome 
 
2007: USA certified to continue using 
E-voting (California Secretary of State) 
and initiate the Ballot Integrity Act to 
guarantee accuracy, integrity and 
security of the vote in federal elections 
(Top-To-Bottom-Review, 2007). Also, 
the US Department of Defense 
sponsored use of I-voting for US 
citizens abroad for the 2008 and 2010 
presidential elections. Accessibility is 
an important issue that the election 
authority attempted to improve, where 
precise disabilities were concerned, 
such as visual and physical 
impairments, by using technologies 
such as a Braille-enhanced keypad. 
 
continuous development of security 
measures to ensure security is under 
control  (Jefferson et al., 2004). 
 
2000: An experiment called SERVE 
(Secure Electronic Registration and 
Voting Experiment) by the US 
Department of Defense to support 
eligible overseas citizens and military 
to vote, showed issues were security, 
integrity, availability of  Internet 
access and the possibility of 
sophisticated attacks (California 
Internet Voting Task Force, 2000; 
Report of National Workshop on 
Internet Voting, 2001; Jefferson et al., 
2004; Camp and Bowman et al., 
2005). As a result, the Pentagon 
recommended discontinuing the 
implementation of SERVE in 2004 
elections. 
 
In Europe, an emphasis was given to improving the current voting system with E-voting 
and, therefore, the CyberVote project was proposed with recommendations to study and 
assist the feasibility of E-voting and, in particular, I-voting. The CyberVote project and 
the Council of Europe’s recommendations are described in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.2.1   CyberVote project   
In 2000, the European Commission (EC) launched the CyberVote project in 
collaboration with industries and universities across Europe (European Commission, 
CyberVote Report, 2003a). To study the possibility of using I-voting which ensures 
privacy of votes and contributes to the modern system of voting, the CyberVote project 
attempted to define a secrecy-integrated voting system, guaranteeing freedom, 
accessibility and usability for voters.  
 
The voting system used homomorphic threshold encryption (a type of I-voting protocol) 
to hold multiple elections and cryptography. Smart cards with PIN codes were used for 
authentication. The system could be run on PCs, mobile phones and PDAs connected to 
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the Internet. The system was evaluated during elections in 2002 in France and in 2003 
in Germany.  
 
The experiment showed a low level of participation in E-voting. In a Swedish city, the 
trial was with elderly voters and about 200 took part, even though the testing was for a 
week. However, the experiment was successful, although some issues were raised about 
security (European Commission, CyberVote Report, 2003b). 
 
3.2.2  Council of Europe’s recommendation 
With regard to voting, the Council of Europe (COE) aims to protect human rights and 
enhance democracy. In September 2004, the Council adopted a recommendation to 
develop an E-voting system (Council of Europe Recommendation, 2004). In the 
E-voting trial held by experts in the field, research by the Internet Policy Institute in 
2001 showed the requirements of legislation, technology and users’ familiarisation were 
essential for an E-voting scheme, with an argument over whether to process remotely 
through online voting or as stand-alone applications (European Commission, 2001). The 
recommendations state that I-voting should fulfil the fundamentals of democratic 
elections; it should be a reliable, secure integral system relevant to the law. 
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3.3  Why move to I-voting? 
E-voting was introduced by politicians in the development of e-participation and 
e-government (Jan and Tai, 2007, pp.93-101). According to eGov Stakeholder 
Consultation (2005), 64% of people believe that e-participation and e-voting will help 
democratic philosophy by increasing turnout as result of simplicity. There are many 
advantages which motivate the introduction of I-voting, mainly its transformation to 
mobility, automated system and its support to ‘green’ IT. Each of these advantages is 
explained as follows. 
 
3.3.1  Transformation to mobility  
Saco (2002) and Alvarez et al. (2007) claim that the use advanced technologies could 
facilitate a successful voting process in remote or overseas sites. The rapidly expanding 
pool of voters from various locations, from cities, provinces, remote areas and even 
overseas, implies a need for creating ways to make the process of voting relatively easy, 
leading to a projected increase in voters' turnout. By these means, groups of people who 
are normally not found to participate in elections such as people overseas, young voters, 
elderly and people with disabilities can also be catered for (Alvarez, Hall and Roberts, 
2007). Moreover, logistical challenges are one of the main variables to strengthen the 
need for I-voting.  
 
Dictson and Ray (2000) claim that I-voting would enhance voters’ convenience to vote 
remotely from any place and at any time through a secure channel. Also it is believed 
that the election committee could extend the voting period for a couple of days with 
minimum cost, unlike in paper-based voting which requires public service buildings as 
polling stations. In addition, voters can vote without the need to be restricted to 
attending their local polling station (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004; Kent, Harrison and 
Taylor, 2006).  
 
Additionally, I-voting can cater for a population often less attracted to the elaborate 
traditional voting process, and capitalise on the use of technologies, gadgets and trends 
that mostly appeal to the young, hence significantly including them in the election 
process (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004; Kent, Harrison and Taylor, 2006). 
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3.3.2  Transformation to automated system 
Administrative efficiency is also another advantage of I-voting. Ballot production and 
distribution will be eliminated in this process, hence removing previously inevitable 
waste of staff and money as a consequence of unnecessary production and, at times, 
over-production. In cases of I-voting, staffing costs for polling stations could be 
reduced, especially during the counting stage where computation is done electronically 
since voting areas will be populated by stand-alone voting machines (Dictson and Ray, 
2000, p.4; Kent, Harrison and Taylor, 2006).  
 
I-voting can also shorten the time needed to produce the final tally and reduce counting 
errors in the voting process as intelligent software is used to prevent over-voting or 
under-voting (Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003; Trechsel and Mendez, 2004;). 
Furthermore, I-voting would not allow ineligible voters to vote. (see Authentication, 
section 3.4.1). 
 
According to Gibson (2001) and Grant and Chau (2005), I-voting is less costly than 
paper voting and it is accurate, easy to adapt to traditional voting techniques and 
expected to increase the level of participation since it reduces physical barriers which 
prevent voters from reaching polling stations and allows convenience to vote at any 
time and easily without the need to go to them (Dictson and Ray, 2000).  
 
In contrast traditional voting in the USA has experienced a reduction in the level of 
participation from 63% to 50% in 1960 and 1996, respectively, and there were practical 
difficulties and annoyance with registration, long queuing and transportation, which 
might reduce voter participation (Bonetti, 2000; Bonsor, 2004). Voters who faced these 
problems did not find the voting process effective and precise.  
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3.3.3 Transformation to ‘green’ IT 
Since technology is rapidly spreading all over the world, from the industrial sector to 
the basic home setup, this has, in turn, increased the demand for energy. However, ICT 
is among the fastest growing sectors of energy use and even though one of its main 
advantages was that it was an alternative to the more energy consuming industrial 
processes of the past, it has now become a danger to the energy sector also. Currently, it 
is estimated that the global carbon emissions of ICT industries are at 2 to 2.5% of the 
total world carbon emissions, very close to those of the airline industry (Green IT, 
2010). This percentage rises in the developed countries to 5 to 6%. Also, the energy 
costs in many IT budgets are slowly rising from a previous low of below 10% to a 
perceived future peak of over 50% (Green IT, 2010).  
 
This definitely warrants a closer look at green IT and its perceived green advantages. 
One of the obvious advantages of green IT is that it is clean and slows down the effects 
of global warming through the general reduction in CO2 production (Harris 2008, p. 
71). Thus, it has become necessary for the public to be educated on the real effects of 
these seemingly lifesavers when it comes to the environment and how society may take 
responsibility. Approaches to ‘green’ IT are many and can be broadly categorised into 
two main areas: optimisation in the IT software and management of power use by the 
various machines (Sam, 2008, p. 24). There are also other approaches that are less 
technology based, such as the recycling of materials and the enforcement of various 
employee regulations in IT companies. The above are just a few of the many strategies 
that may be used to achieve energy conservation and actually realise the true benefits of 
using ‘green’ IT as a means of saving natural resources.  
 
Likewise, I-voting can support ‘green’ IT since it shifts the voting process from a 
manual system towards a computerised, remote voting system. I-voting will help to go 
green with the reduction of a huge amount of paper consumed in the traditional paper-
based voting system. However, there comes the need to ensure optimisation in the IT 
software and power usage. This would could be reduced either by human beings being 
responsible enough to carry them out, or there can be the alternative of installing special 
sensors that will be able to interact automatically with control systems that will shut 
down power when it is not in use or after a certain number of hours.  
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In the same vein, the management of individual IT companies should make the effort to 
purchase products that use advanced power management devices and software such as 
ASICs, PMICs and VRMs, among others (Kevin, 2003). Another alternative may be the 
use of energy-star equipment, popularly known as e-star, which maximises energy use 
and has very little wastage. When these steps are taken, there will not only be a 
reduction in energy use but also a reduction in CO2 emissions per voter.  This was a 
great motivation for the researcher to promote I-voting for a green, healthy environment 
for the future.  
 
On the other hand, Gibson (2001) has commented that I-voting might reduce the 
number of voters because of a limitation of access for poor people, people with limited 
computer skills and other ethnic marginals. Hence, although I-voting should be 
accessible for all voters as far as possible, bearing in mind different disabilities (Boutin, 
2004), ensuring accessibility might have some cost implication since it requires special 
equipment such as headphones and Braille keypads to assist sight-impaired voters to 
cast their vote without need for assistance. Consequently, use of both I-voting and 
traditional voting schemes would be effective where citizens would choose their 
preferred method to cast their votes (Mercuri, 2000). Although there are lots of 
arguments that support I-voting because of its advantages, some are against, since it has 
a lot of associated negative issues as described in the next section. 
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3.4 Architecture of I-voting 
I-voting requires ensuring voting basic principles, including authentication, mobility, 
flexibility, accountability, anonymity, security and privacy (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1: I-voting basic requirements 
 
All of these requirements are defined as challenges for I-voting. There are a number of 
proposed voting schemes in the literature to overcome these challenges, each of which 
is addressed below, with possible solutions. 
 
Hoffman (2005) and Rodriguez (2003) suggested the need for standards and regulations 
for I-voting to administer the whole voting process and guarantee fulfilment of the 
voting requirements defined earlier. On the other hand, the development of standards to 
certify I-voting would need to cope with rapid changes in the technology. 
 
In general, I-voting has a number of arguable concerns, in particular the possibility of 
huge threats in the Internet world (Rubin et al., 2004a), such as denial of service attacks, 
malicious code attacks, spoofing, social engineering, server operating system 
vulnerability, authentication attacks and Domain Name System (DNS) attacks (Rubin.et 
al., 2004b; Coleman, 2003). Table 3.2 shows the possible threats to I-voting, their 
consequences and countermeasures.   
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Table 3.2: Possible threats to I-voting 
Threat Skill 
needed 
Impact  Realistic? Defeat mechanism  
Denial of 
Service (DoS) 
Low Disenfranchise-
ment 
Common on the 
Internet 
No simple tools; requires hours of 
work by network engineers; 
launchable from anywhere in the 
world. 
Trojan horse High Disenfranchise-
ment 
Common on the 
Internet e.g. 
spyware  
Can mitigate risk with careful 
control of PC software 
On-screen 
electioneering 
Low Voter 
annoyance, 
frustration, 
distraction, 
improper 
influence 
Trivial with 
today’s Web 
Nothing a voter can do to prevent 
it, unless they have a clean 
Operating System 
Web spoofing  Low Vote theft, 
privacy 
compromised, 
disenfranchised 
voters 
Common on the 
Internet 
None exists; likely to go 
undetected; launchable from 
anywhere in the world. 
Client 
compromising 
High Vote change or 
theft, privacy 
compromise 
Common on the 
Internet 
None exists for all possible 
mechanisms. Too difficult to 
anticipate all attacks; some likely 
never diagnosed. 
Insider attacks Medium Complete 
compromise of 
the election 
Most common, 
dangerous, 
difficult to 
detect of all 
security 
violations. 
Need to restrict access and involve 
more than three people to perform 
any task. 
Automated vote 
selling 
Medium Disruption of 
democracy 
Very realistic, 
since voter 
willingly 
participates. 
Over-write vote could solve the 
problem. 
Coercion Medium Disruption of 
democracy 
Man in the 
middle attacks 
makes it 
achievable. 
If successful, likely to go 
undetected. 
Specific virus Medium/
high 
Vote change or 
theft, privacy 
compromise, 
disenfranchised 
voters 
Some attacks 
require only 
experimenting 
with the system; 
others require 
leak of I-voting 
source code and 
a resourceful 
attacker 
Virus scanning can detect known 
viruses, but not new ones; likely 
to be undetected. 
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These possible attacks have become common due to the availability of many free-of-
charge tools which provide assistance even for people with novice computer knowledge 
in making malicious attacks (Coleman, 2003). DoS attacks might, in consequence, have 
a huge impact on the voting process because they send a flood of requests for the 
service which the server can not handle, leading to slowing down or shutting down of 
the server (Rubin, n.d.; Marconi, n.d). However, such attacks could be dealt with in two 
steps: (1) analysing the incoming packets, strip headers and trailers, looking for attack 
packet information, and (2) developing patch filter attacker packets (Xianju et al., 
2000). Moreover, election committees could use redundancy of servers to handle a large 
number of requests. Another possible risk is physical attack on the Internet cable which 
could cause disruption in accessing the I-voting website; for example, in 2008 four 
undersea cables were damaged causing slow Internet access (BBC News, 2008). 
However, in a highly networked environment this may not be too serious as alternative 
routing would always be available.  
 
In the last three decades experts strove to propose a cryptographic voting protocol to 
maintain a secure system, assuming that the client machine is reliable and secure from 
which to send ballots. However, those protocols were mainly considering securing 
ballots over the network channel and at the server side. In I-voting there are three main 
components which communicate to facilitate the voting process: the client, Internet and 
server. The client will send a ballot via the Internet network to the server which will 
then run the ballot through different protocols to ensure that it reaches its destination 
safely. The possible attacks associated with the client, Internet and server-side of 
I-voting are described as following sections. 
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3.4.1  Client-side attacks 
Unreliable client machines create serious problems leading to compromising the 
integrity of the election (Gerck et al., 2001) (see Figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Client-side malware attacks 
 
Computers connected to the Internet are known to become infected with viruses, 
worms, Trojans, spyware, malware, etc. (Gritzalis, 2002; Rubin, n.d.), although some 
studies on I-voting consider viruses and Trojans are acceptable threats (California 
Internet Voting Task Force, 2000). However, the extent of this threat is that it can 
change a voter’s choice without their knowledge, before the ballot is sent to the server, 
so even if the Internet voting protocol is well designed and cannot be hacked, hackers 
can still make a major effort to tamper with some of the important voting principle of 
secrecy and integrity. Moreover, an add-on to the Internet browser which needs 20 to 30 
lines of JavaScript code could be programmed to change or spy on a voter’s choice 
(Chaum et al., 2010). Such an attack could be done in two ways: (1) a selective attack 
needs knowledge of a voter’s choice to change it to the attacker’s preference (2) a 
random attack, changing a voter’s choice randomly. The first attack is considered to be 
hard to accomplish since the attacker needs to know the voter’s choice which cannot be 
predicted or known with an automated attack. The random attack is widely used to 
disturb the election process (Jefferson et al., 2004; Kohno et al., 2003). Table 3.3 
summarises some of the possible attacks to infect computers. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of possible computer attacks 
Threats Attack  Description   
Automatic vote 
changing 
Malware Randomly alters a voter’s choice without the 
user noticing. This type of attack could focus on 
a certain party or geographical area to change 
votes to the attacker’s preference e.g. target 
Wales and change its votes to support London 
candidates. 
Vote dropping  DoS, 
malware 
Deludes the voter that vote has been successfully 
cast, whereas it might not have been. 
Voter impersonation  Malware, 
Virus 
This type of attack needs human agency. It 
needs to capture the user credentials’ 
information and then send them to the attacker, 
who would cast the vote instead of the real 
voter. This type of attack is impossible if the 
Internet voting system is using two or three 
factors of authentication (see section 3.4.1). 
Vote disclosure Malware, 
Virus 
This type of attack could tamper with secrecy by 
recording the voter name and choice to then be 
made public. 
 
Chaum (2001) and Oppliger (2002) argued that a hybrid solution is the best to maintain 
client machine security by using another medium that is unavailable to computer 
malware (e.g. a smart card) along with one of the solutions described below. A hybrid 
solution would be ideal since each individual solution has advantages and 
disadvantages. Therefore a combination of a vote coding sheet with a smart card or 
clean operating system with a smart card would be a good solution to make vote 
changing harder or impossible. A survey of proposed solutions found in the literature to 
help maintain a reliable system is described below.  
 
3.4.1.1  Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans 
Apart (Captcha) 
The aim of this approach is to have input from a human in which a virus could not 
determine what is the input. The Captcha development takes various forms (text, image 
and 3D Captcha). Text and image Captcha is the easiest approach to implement and to 
crack with high success rates reaching 100%. Some researchers describe the breaking of 
Captchas (Mori and Malik, 2003; Chellapilla and Simard, 2004; Chellapilla et al., 
2005). In I-voting, different factors weaken this approach since the algorithm would be 
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limited by a number of candidates to compute the text or image to challenge the virus. 
However, malware or viruses would require part of the Captcha image to determine the 
candidate name. Also, the size of candidate name is an important factor in calculating 
the Captcha image.  Captchas are widely used by Google, Yahoo and AOL to prevent 
viruses from automatic creation of accounts and in recent research by Websense, 
Sumeet Prasad (n.d.) demonstrates how easy automatic creation of accounts is using 
optical character recognition (OCR) with success rates between 10% and 35% within 6 
seconds. Also, the size of candidate name is an important factor in calculating the 
captcha image. Figure 3.3 shows an example of Captcha image developed by 
Scantegrity (2008).  
 
Figure 3.3: Example of Captcha image Scantegrity (2008) 
 
On the other hand, multi Captcha images computed from different factors (mouse 
clicks, candidate name, voter data) would create a strong Captcha which the malware 
code could not determine, even if the attacker knows how the algorithm works. 
However, it would be difficult to include many Captcha images with good size on the 
voting page. 
 
A better technique using 3D was introduced by Kaplan (n.d.), which depends on human 
differentiation of details in the image (see Figure 3.4). The image would be divided into 
parts and each part has some text or signal character. Users would be asked to type what 
is the text in some part of the image. Due to the dependence of the natural design of the 
algorithm on different user input there is no way to crack it, because it would require 
identification of each part of the image. This then suggests that each candidate should 
have 3D captchas on a complex background which can be easily identified by a human 
but with difficulty by a virus. 
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Figure 3.4: Example of 3D captcha: Walking man attributes 
 
3.4.1.2  Code sheet voting 
This approach was first observed by Chaum (2001a) to resolve the problem of privacy 
and integrity of voting by making the voter’s PC secure from any vote manipulation. 
The idea of this approach is that each voter is given a code representing each candidate, 
the codes being randomly chosen from a wide range of numbers. The voter would be 
asked to type the appropriate code for the chosen candidate. This will prevent viruses 
and malicious software from detecting the voter’s choice unless the voter has revealed 
the codes. The codes are sent by mail to voters and once they cast their vote, the voting 
server decodes the code to the related candidate. An example of a ballot and CodeCard 
is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Example of ballot and CodeCard 
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Code voting would ensure voter privacy and integrity, since only the voter has the code. 
The applicability of the approach has been tested in a number of elections e.g. Swiss 
cantonal elections and in the UK. However, in the Netherlands, codes are used only for 
voter identification because it would be complex for multiple casting. Hellbach and 
Schwenk (2007) improved the approach by using a three-way-handshaking protocol 
which asks for a third code to confirm the vote. Moreover, some of the code voting 
approaches provide a verification number for voters to verify their votes. Helbach and 
Schwenk (2007) and Oppliger (2002) believe that code voting would maintain security 
of the client machine from vote manipulation. Moreover, Rubin (2002) added that code 
voting and trusted computing could achieve high security on the client side. However, 
improvement could be made by using a matrix table for the vote, an idea was inspired 
from the Entrust IdentityGuard. The idea behind it is that the voter would be asked to 
enter the randomly determined code, e.g.1F 4D 7D 8S, using the matrix table which 
could be provided on the back of the voter smart card, and the voter would cross-
reference the given value to determine the code. An example of the approach can be 
seen in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6: Improvement of code voting by using matrix table 
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3.4.1.3  Clean Operating system and voting application 
This approach suggests use of a ‘clean’ and certified operating system and voting 
application, booted directly from a CD-ROM or other media such as a USB or hard disk 
drive. The voter would need to boot the clean operating system to access the voting 
application. Although it would ensure reliability of the voter machine, some drawbacks 
are: 
(1) Compatibility of client hardware. 
(2) Configuration of Internet connection e.g. BT has different configuration from 
O2. 
(3) Ensuring integrity of the CD to boot from. 
(4) The costly of the CD distribution.  
The Trusted Computing Group (2007) do not believe that this approach could be 
successfully used to enable secure voting from any computer with an Internet 
connection. On the other hand, the day-by-day software development requires people to 
change their hardware to keep up to date with what is on the market, and regarding the 
Internet connection, programmers can include all the configurations for all 
telecommunication companies. Moreover, the configuration to access the Internet is 
done at the router side, so even dial-up requires simple configuration such as the 
Internet service provider username, password and domain. 
 
3.4.1.4 Special secure hardware for PC 
This approach suggests use of an external device, with secure I/O, connected to the 
voter’s machine, e.g. through a USB port. The device should display the ballot, allow a 
vote to be cast, carry out cryptographic computations and acknowledge the voter result. 
The voting protocol is carried out by the secure device which uses closed software that 
can not be changed or configured, therefore there is no chance of infection from 
malicious code. There are a few main drawbacks to this approach: (1) the cost of the 
device, (2) the manufacture and distribution of the devices (Saltman, 1988).  
 
Z´uquete et al. (2007) used a secure smart card reader as a secure device which supports 
I/O and the ability to display the ballot and read the voter’s choice. The advantage of 
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using a smart card is that the PKI approach could be implemented for authentication and 
encryption, as used by Z’uquete et al. The advantage of using a smart card reader is that 
it is hard to tamper with. Also, another approach could be used along with the smart 
card reader, such as a vote coding sheet, to achieve maximum security on the client side. 
Bearing in mind both solutions could work perfectly together, since many countries use 
a smart card to authenticate to an E-government portal, such as Qatar, Estonia and UAE, 
it is therefore assumed that a card reader does exist. Regarding the vote code matrix 
table, this could be printed on the back of the smart card (see section 3.4.1.2).  
 
3.4.1.5 Closed secure device 
This approach is similar to special secure hardware for a PC (see section 3.4.1.4) and 
was suggested by the California Internet Voting Task Force (2000). The idea was the 
use of special closed software with Internet-capable devices, such as a hand-held PDA 
or mobile phone. However, mobile phones and PDAs allow users to access the Internet 
and install applications which make them open to malicious attack. The idea of 
developing a special device to access the Internet and cast votes works against the 
I-voting advantages of being an easy to use and cost effective system, so this approach 
is not considered further. 
 
3.4.1.6 Secure PC operating systems 
This approach suggests the use of secure PC operating systems composed of digitally-
signed modules, that would then permit secure applications to exclude, as untrusted, 
modules of unsure source (i.e. potentially malicious programs). This approach was 
recently named “trusted computing” to offer secure platform support (Trusted 
Computing Group, 2007). It allows remote ratification of machines. In I-voting, it could 
be used to certify that a voter is using a trusted application or machine. It also secures 
the I/O process between the application and the devices and as result establishes a safe 
environment for an application to run. The ratification operation is based on measures 
carried out using software by a hardware module called a trusted platform module 
(TPM).   
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According to Rubin (2002) and Volkamer et al. (2006), a trusted computing approach 
guarantees trusted connection between the voter and the voting application, so that no 
malware can record the user input or modify it. The regency of this approach is 
considered as a barrier to deploy this technology (Sadeghi et al., 2006) and the 
withdrawal of cracked machines (Brickell et al., 2004).  
 
The trusted computing concept ensures stabilising of voting application behaviour 
(Volkamer et al., 2006). This suggests that voters could access trusted computers via a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) and a government would need to provide a clean and 
secure  machine to be used for the VPN so voters could connect to this machine using 
the VPN to cast their vote using a trusted machine. Even if the client machine is 
compromised, users would not be affected by any virus or malware attack. This 
approach could be expensive but some operating systems provide free VPN. The real 
problem remains with the usability, since voters would need to learn how to access the 
trusted computer using a VPN connection which would create a private network 
between voter and the trusted machine. 
 
3.4.1.7  Test ballots 
Test ballots and voter verifiable protocols are examples of two methods of testing, 
where test ballots will examine the voting system before vote counting. A vote 
verifiable protocol is a method in which the test is conducted under real conditions, 
where receipts are provided for voters as a verification of their voting in case any 
problems are encountered during the election. In the test ballot, voters and voting 
administrators have the responsibility of testing the system for any malfunction and 
other risks. This is a kind of intrusion detection that helps in recognising attacks that 
might introduce viruses and malicious software, so that trust in the system is enhanced 
(Oppliger, 2002). Analysing the I-voting system involves establishment of a threat 
model, which defines and evaluates the possible risks associated with an I-voting 
system (e.g. viruses, DoS, phishing, etc.). However, there is a chance that attackers 
might know the ballot is a test and not real and therefore would not engage in their 
attack. Also, attacks are improving rapidly, which brings new risks for the future. 
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Vote-verifiable protocols provide verification to enable voter auditing when required 
without abuse of privacy, though some believe that it might be used as a proof of vote 
and thereby enhance vote selling and intimidation. However, there are four verifiable 
voting protocols: Neff’s voting scheme (Neff, 2004a, b), Chaum’s visual crypto scheme 
(Chaum, n.d), Ryan’s voter scheme (Ryan, 2004) and Chaum’s Scantegrity scheme 
(Chaum et al., 2008). Each tries to reduce the risk of vote selling and intimidation by 
providing receipts with less information. Individual verification ensures that votes have 
been cast and universal verification tries to ensure the correctness of the voting process 
through transparent tallying. This process requires a trusted bulletin board which shows 
the votes, so that every voter can check against the receipts; if it does not match, voters 
can dispute it. 
 
Neff’s, Chaum’s and Ryan’s schemes all provide receipts containing an identification 
number and verifiable calculation, an approach called End to End verifiability. In 
Chaum’s and the Scantegrity scheme, voters are provided with their registered vote 
number. It could be argued that those schemes are vulnerable to security problems such 
as voter recording or changing vote attack which could be achieved by malicious 
software installed in the voter machine as it would motivate vote selling, since the voter 
could provide a confirmation of vote to the vote buyer. However, those schemes could 
be improved by allowing voters to over-write their vote. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that the Ryan and Scantegrity schemes are usually applied in optical scanning ballots 
and security issues might arise, dependent on authority, chain voting and illegal 
receipts. Even Neff’s and Chaum’s schemes are vulnerable to security problems (Neff, 
2004a, b; Chaum et al., 2008). 
 
3.4.1.8 Obscurity/Complexity 
This approach, while not sufficient to guarantee the security of the system, raises the 
cost for potential attackers. Digital ballot formats and voting software may be kept 
secret prior to the election and possibly randomly changed during the election. In order 
to carry out an attack successfully and escape detection, malicious software authors 
must have a great deal of information about the internal format of the ballot and voting 
software. If these details are not available in advance, and/or if that information is 
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complex, the potential authors of attack software may not have enough time to develop 
and distribute it within the election window. 
 
On the other hand, it is difficult to establish a lower bound for the time needed to write 
malicious software. Additionally, the system is still vulnerable to attacks that collect 
voters’ authentication data and use them later in the real voting client software. 
 
3.4.1.9 External channel verification 
This approach aims to provide an additional communication channel to the server to 
make sure that correct votes reach their intended destination. Kutylowski and Zag´orski 
(2007) designed a voting scheme which uses this approach to first “decrypt” the voter 
choice and then to verify with a probability of 1/2 that the vote was cast successfully to 
its destination. The major drawback of this approach is the complexity of the 
verification process, especially when voters must deal with the encrypted ballots.  
 
Skagestein et al. (2006) suggest verification of the clear cast vote, where voters could 
verify their vote using another machine. It would ask the voting server for the voter’s 
vote, obtaining it using a secret encryption key to encrypt the vote to be stored in a 
secure medium at the time of vote casting, and display the vote to the voter. To solve 
the problem of vote selling and coercion, over-writing could be enabled so voters could 
re-vote at any time within the election time and only their last vote would be counted 
(Volkamer and Grimum, 2006). Volkamer and Grimum (2006) added that a decision on 
the voting channel could be made either before or during the election.  
 
In multiple casts, fairness is an issue, since it is allowed only for online votes and not 
paper-based ones. Other issues might arise on assigning the final casting of votes, where 
a trusted timekeeper is required to ensure reliable timing. Although it might resolve 
intimidation issues, it will not prevent fraud. In addition, trusted computing is essential 
to enhance trust. However, this scheme has some weaknesses such as (1) it does not 
stop vote manipulation on the server side, (2) an insider attacker who has access to an 
encrypted vote can decrypt it using the secret encryption keys kept by the voters, (3) it 
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requires the voter to have two machines (see Figure 3.7), one for vote casting, the other 
for verification. This would not be convenient for some voters because verification is 
done after vote casting. However, the Skagestein et al. (2006) approach could be 
improved by sharing the secret key between parties using the Threshold encryption 
concept (see section 3.4.3.5). 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Use of two channels (1) vote casting (2) vote verification 
 
3.4.1.10 Public bulletin board 
The idea of public bulletin boards is to publish all voters’ votes online, so voters could 
verify that their vote was cast and counted, without the ability to modify it. In this 
approach it is not clear whether the voter name should be listed with the vote or the 
serial number with the vote; however, in several voting schemes all options were 
suggested. However, since voting should be kept private, this implies the use of 
anonymous channels although this raises verification issues; hence the suggestion of 
providing a receipt for voters with only a serial number along with the voter choice to 
prevent vote selling. 
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3.4.1.11 Authentication 
An authentication mechanism would ensure that only people eligible by law can vote 
but only once (Juang and Lei, 2006), as the entire election would be linked to a central 
database (Dictson and Ray, 2000). This could be ensured in I-voting through 
registration and authentication and linking to the central database (Cranor and Cytron, 
2007). The purpose of kееping а voters’ register is to guarantee that only people eligible 
by law are allowed to vote and that no onе cаn vote more than once, unless the law 
allows multi-vote casting  (Juаng аnd Lеi, 2006 pp. 339–348). 
 
Authentication can be performed by a trusted authority to ensure its voter eligibility, 
electronically and/or manually, depending on election requirements. In the manual 
authorisation process, identification of eligible voters depends mainly on the person and 
authority responsible for validating voter eligibility before vote casting. This is a time 
consuming process and prone to human error in large-scale elections compared to 
electronic methods of authentication where this process is done automatically through 
advanced technologies such as digital signature, smart card and biometrics.  
 
According to Schneier (1996), to attain an advanced level of authentication, votes 
should use numerous authentication processes: something they know (e.g. a username 
and password), something they are (biometric) or something they have (e.g. a smart 
card) (Adams, 1999). However, according to Newton (2007), there are still questions 
about the accuracy of biometric technology, e.g. labourers might find difficulties in 
reading their finger print. Moreover, use of a smart card can be costly, since it requires 
reader equipment and there is the possible problem of experience in terms of usability of 
the system and consideration of the human-computer interface (Quesenbery et al., 
2003). However, the use of a smart card would enhance the security of the system since 
tampering is impossible (Joaquim and Ribeiro, 2007). This suggests having more than 
one level of authentication combining smart card, biometrics and PIN. The use of a 
virtual keyboard might prevent spyware from detecting keyboard actions. Also, a digital 
signature would be useful to ensure data accuracy and integrity while transmitting over 
the Internet, since it has an embedded special code by which the receiver can know if 
the data were read by a hacker (Fujioka, 1992). 
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3.4.2 Internet-side attacks 
Concerns about security and potential violation of voter privacy have also been a major 
issue in using I-voting, which takes place in an insecure communication channel 
(Internet network) (Cranor et al., 2000; McGraw et al., 2000; Rubin, 2000, Weinstein, 
2000; Oostveen and Besselaar 2004). The Internet-side of I-voting encounters many 
malware attacks (see Figure 3.8). 
 
Figure 3.8: Internet-side malware attacks 
 
These issues have been emphasised in a number of reports from government appointed 
agencies, together with independent policy institutes (Bimber and Davis, 2003). The use 
of I voting is strongly opposed, mainly due to its security constraints. With 
responsibility for voters and voting infrastructures removed from election 
administration and staff, there are many fears that they may be manipulated to cause 
unfavourable voting outcomes (Trechsel and Mendez, 2004).  
 
In this section, three basic Internet voting protocols are discussed, each of which is 
improved by a number of researchers.  Those protocols hide a voter’s identification, 
making it anonymous so that no one can know the voter identity and decision. Both in 
traditional voting and I-voting, authorities are assumed to be fully trustworthy, even if 
they are not thorough. At least two authorities are involved, one for authorisation and 
one for vote counting (Wu and Sankaranarayana, 2002). 
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Concerns about privacy would be eliminated by the anonymity of a voter’s ballot, also 
the election committee should not have control over the voting system and 
infrastructure (California Internet Voting Task Force, 2000; Rubin, 2001). Also 
involving more than one element with a secret key would solve the problem of an 
insider attack (Chaum, 1981; Danezis and Diaz, 2008). A comparison between different 
I-voting protocols: blind signatures, mix-nets and homomorphic encryption is shown in 
Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Comparison between blind signatures, mix-nets and homomorphic encryption 
 Blind signatures Mix-nets Homomorphic encryption 
Improvements 
on Protocol 
Fujioka et al. 1992, 
Sako 1994,  
Cranor and Cytron 1997,  
Herschberg 1997, 
Okamoto 1997, 
Ohkubo et al. 1999  
DuRette 1999 
Chaum 1981, 
Park et al. 1993, 
Sako and Kilian 1995, 
Ogata et al. 1997 
Jackobsson 1998 
Benaloh and Fischer 1985, 
Benaloh and Yung 1986,  
Benaloh 1987,  
Benaloh and Tuinstra 1994,  
Sako and Kilian 1994,  
Cramer et al. 1996,  
Cramer et al. 1997, 
Hirt and Sako 2000 
Baundron et al. 2001 
Remarks on 
protocol 
Simplicity, low 
computational costs and 
ballot independent. 
Requires less voter 
interaction, but would 
be complex to prove 
vote correctness 
Very complex mathematically, 
therefore high computational 
costs. Used for one candidate 
elections (Yes or No)  
 
With the requirements established, it is necessary to investigate the protocols explored 
in the I-voting literature. It is clear that protocols must be established in order to 
maintain secrecy. Exploration of these protocols will help in the present research to 
define the best practise Internet protocol to be used as a basis for the Qatari I-voting 
system. As will be seen below, blind signature plays an important part in the 
researcher’s proposal as it is more flexible and with less computation (see Chapter 9). 
 
I-voting might involve huge risks associated with functionality. Therefore, it can be 
regarded as an untrustworthy platform. Therefore, a way forward is to identify and 
clarify the risks and then produce methods of defence against the risks and testing their 
effectiveness.  
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3.4.2.1 Blind signature 
A digital signature provides secure authentication and anonymous voting (Anane et al., 
2007). Many voting protocols are based on blind signature since it is simple and 
efficient (Chaum, 1982, 1983). It is used to isolate the ballot from the voter’s identity 
without the need for anonymous channels (Fujioka et al., 1992, 1993). 
 
Blind signatures allow electronic text to be signed without exposing its contents. Valid 
legal voters will be given a blind signature for a token from the authorisation authority. 
From the blind signatures, the signed tokens are pulled out and then sent to the vote 
counting authority (Chaum, 1983).  
 
Although this straightforward solution tries to resolve the anonymity issue, still it is 
difficult to ensure complete anonymity, especially with the involvement of all the 
authorities where hiding the link between voters and their votes becomes a challenge 
(Wu and Sankaranarayana, 2002).  
 
Common implementations of blind-signature based on the Fujioka et al. (1993) scheme 
are: Sensus (Cranor and Cytron, 1996) which was found to be heavy and not  balanced,  
EVOX (Herschberg, 1997; DuRette, 1999), and REVS (Robust Electronic Voting 
System) (Joaquim et al., 2003) an improved version of EVOX, which is an I-Voting 
System employing blind signatures. Joaquim et al. (2003) have improved the robustness 
of EVOX by associating vote weights; however, complexity of vote registration process 
was encountered in this proposal.    
 
Some researchers propose cryptographic-based I-voting, such as in the Votopia project 
(Kim, 2002) which proposed I-voting for the Soccer World Cup of 2002 based on PKI 
using a Java applet to execute cryptographic processes. However, Votopia had problems 
with ensuring the anonymity of votes. Another well known project is the SERVE 
(Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment) I-voting project (Jefferson et 
al., 2004) which proposed a practical I-voting scheme involving a PKI, however the 
project was cancelled due to arising issues (Schwartz, 2004), such as anonymity, where 
the web server knows the vote of each voter. 
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The Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES, 2009) developed for the Water Board 
elections in the Netherlands raises some issues such as the use of a single master triple-
DES key. EVM2003 (Evm, 2003) is an example of open source I-voting which had 
some drawbacks due to not using any cryptographic voting protocols such as Blind 
signature or Mix netting. GNU.FREE (2004) proposed a stand-alone I-voting system 
using a Java program and BlowFish cryptographic algorithm, which showed security 
vulnerability. 
 
Research by Wachowicz (2010) focused on introducing new ideas to voting, the so-
called bidirectional voting and continuous voting to help in improving the quality of the 
democratic process by giving voters the chance to indicate their favoured candidates in 
bidirectional voting and consequently allow candidates to continuously review their 
grading. The Condorcet Internet Voting Service (CIVS, 2003) is an example of a 
bidirectional I-voting system which gives rise to security privacy issues due to lack of 
full cryptographic integration.  
 
Ibrahim et al. (2003) proposed a secure e-voting using blind signatures, however the 
system requires preparation on the client side by installing a specific application to use 
the proposed I-voting system. Recent research by Purushothama and Pais (2009) 
overcomes issues identified by Kim et al. (2001) and Ibrahim et al. (2003) by proposing 
a secure I-voting system using an Identity Based Encryption System (IBES). The 
system ensures security of the client side voter without requiring the voter to download 
specific programs or browser. An Applets program was used and could be executed in a 
voter’s browser that supports Java.   The system shows its effectiveness in fulfilling 
many security requirements including privacy, anonymity, eligibility, accuracy, 
fairness, uniqueness and verifiability. This was proved using a security analysis process 
including calculation of the cost per request to vote and the cost of the PKG (Private 
Key Generator) server operations and database operations. Those calculations shows the 
speed of the proposed system where the voting process can be completed securely in a 
second. However, the system does not use PKI cryptography nor certificate recovery 
and confirmation. This suggests the use of an Identity Based Encryption System is not 
enough to ensure security and PKI and digital certifications would be better. 
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3.4.2.2 Mix Networking (Mixnet) 
Mixnet establishes anonymity for the sender of the message by reshaping the 
communication. This technology can provide anonymity for voters (Chaum, 1981). 
 
The process works as follows. Large messages are split into short ones and random bits 
are then added to obtain a specific length. These split messages are encrypted and mixed 
so that the identity of the message is mixed by more than one mixer to avoid recognition 
of the sender and receiver (see Figure 3.9). The output of the mixnet does not correlate 
with the input (Wagner, 2006). 
 
The mixnet protocol was improved by a number of researchers to solve some of the 
problems occurring in re-encryption while shifting between servers. The re-encryption 
mixnet was improved by using threshold el-Gamal crypto in which all authorised parties 
run mixnet together. The message is decrypted only when all parties participate in the 
process (Ryan and Schneider, 2006). Furthermore, a verifiable mixnets approach 
achieves the integrity of the system since the plain-text input into the mixnet matches 
the decryption cipher-text output of the mixnet. However, this will not ensure 
anonymity. Zero knowledge interactive proof (ZKIP) is applied for each mix-server to 
provide verification (Buchmann 1981; Wagner 2006). For auditing, randomised partial 
checking is allowed (Jakobsson et al 2002; Chen 2007). 
 
Research by Chun-Ta et al. (2009) proposes an I-voting protocol offering vote 
verification for voters to avoid vote selling. The proposed protocol was compared with 
similar protocols by Liaw (2004) and Chang and Lee (2006) and show their 
effectiveness in satisfying many requirements, including accuracy, simplicity, privacy, 
democracy and verifiability. 
 
The research community have made important improvements towards providing a 
robust mixnets scheme in practice (e.g. Furukawa and Sako, 2001; Neff, 2001; Boneh 
and Golle, 2002; Golle et al., 2002). Common mixnet schemes are VoteHere VHTi 
(Neff, 2001) which emphasises voter verifiability, Scytl Pnyx (Riera and Brown, 2004) 
commonly applied in some government systems in Europe and SureVote (Chaum, 
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2004; Vora, 2004) a hardware improvement of the mixnet method introduced by Chaum 
(2004) which includes visual crypto to ensure voter verifiability. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Trial of ballot during decryption process 
 
3.4.2.3 Homomorphic encryption 
This was introduced by Benaloh (1987). It can be used for I-voting to provide 
anonymity but is less common in practice (Benaloh, 1987; Sako and Kilian, 1994; 
Cramer et al., 1997), yet it ensures that individuals are unable to decrypt messages using 
only private decryption keys. However, it requires zero knowledge proofs and does not 
allow multiple candidate elections. However, for each protocol there are advantages and 
drawbacks, therefore some systems use a mixture of protocols to overcome the latter.  
 
Homomorphic encryption was implemented in many European Union projects (e.g. 
CyberVote (2008) and E-Vote (Gilberg, 2003) which is based on Paillier homomorphic 
encryption (Damgård, Groth and Salomonsen, 2003). 
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3.4.2.4 Other related cryptographic techniques 
This section gives the reader brief information about cryptographic concepts and 
techniques used to design I-voting schemes. 
 
A.  Public key infrastructure (PKI) 
Küchlin (1987) presents the basics of the PKI public key encryption and RSA 
encryption algorithm which ensures secure transmission of messages over insecure 
channels where only authorised users with the appropriate key can decrypt the encoded 
message. Furthermore, Küchlin (1987) presents separate algorithms for generating 
encryption and decryption keys and an algorithm for encryption and decryption key 
pairs.  In public key encryption, users will have to exchange public keys, after which the 
user will encrypt the data with the intended recipient’s public key and then the recipient 
can decrypt the message with the private key kept secure under any circumstances 
(Küchlin, 1987). 
 
The strength of public-key cryptography lies in the fact that the asymmetric algorithm is 
more valuable than symmetric secret key cryptography, allowing a safe transmission of 
data without the need to devise a secret way of key exchange (Küchlin, 1987).  
 
On the other hand, there are some weaknesses associated with public-key cryptography 
which is more computationally costly and requires a longer key than secret-key 
cryptography to ensure equivalent security. Keys in asymmetric cryptography are also 
more vulnerable to various attacks than in secret-key cryptography, such as such as the 
man-in-the-middle attack (Küchlin, 1987; Halevi and Krawczyk, 1999). According to 
Halevi and Krawczyk (1999), RSA algorithms were found to be susceptible to attacks in 
less than brute force time. Also, Vacca (2004) identified key distribution issues of PKI. 
On the other hand, research done by Kim et al. (2001) shows redundant complexity 
elaborated in the PKI certification, certificate chain determination and certificate 
verification.  
 
In I-voting, PKI is used to provide secure authentication to the voters (see section 
3.4.2.4. B) or to establish secure connection between the voters and the server 
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B. Certificate Authorities 
These act as trusted third parties that verify the identity of the sender of an encrypted 
message and issue digital certificates as proof of authorisation. These digital certificates 
comprise the sender’s public key, which is then exchanged with the proposed recipients. 
Certificate authorities have been applied in the online environment in protocols such as 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS), therefore 
issuing digital certificates can prevent transmitted data from man-in-the-middle attacks 
and enhance the security in web browsing, email and other means of data exchange. 
(Halevi and Krawczyk, 1999). 
Although certificate authorities assist in enhancing security, they can be susceptible to 
attackers who can succeed in cooperating with the certificate authority to gain false 
certificates which could then be used to impersonate each member of the information 
exchange, acting as a legitimate trusted entity (Halevi and Krawczyk, 1999). 
 
C.  Digital signature 
This performs as a verifiable seal to confirm the authenticity of the sender and the 
integrity of the message. To ensure identity and integrity of messages, the sender will 
encrypt the message with his/her private key, then the recipient will decrypt the message 
with the sender’s public key (Booth, 1981). A digital signature will protect the message 
from a man in the middle attack where, if the message has been altered during 
transmission, the digital seal would be broken and the recipient would realise this when 
verifying the seal with the sender’s public key. Furthermore, it ensures the identity of 
the sender since only the true sender would have been able to sign the message with his 
or her private key (Booth, 1981).  
 
However, in a digital signature there is a lack of inherent time stamping, therefore it is 
difficult to essentially separate the fake messages created by the unauthorized entity 
from the real ones sent before the breach. By knowing someone’s private key, the 
unauthorised entity could send fake messages and sign them with someone else’s 
private key. Then, successfully posing as that other person, lead the user whose private 
key was stolen to trust the false messages without having to regenerate a new private 
key (Booth, 1981). In I-voting, private keys are stored in a smart card which makes 
them hard to tamper with.  
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3.4.2.5  Comparison of I-voting schemes 
This section summarises available I-voting schemes, providing a checklist review for 
each scheme against voting principles (see Table 3.5). This checklist was initially 
created by Krishna and Radha (2006) and extended by the researcher. 
 
Table 3.5: Comparison of schemes based on voting principles 
Scheme 
Eligible 
Private 
V
erifiable 
A
ccurate 
Fair 
R
obust 
R
eceipt-
free 
Scalable 
Practical 
Chaum, 1981 + CP IV X X X X X X 
Chaum, 1988a + CP\MPV IV X X X X X X 
Boyd, 1990 + CP\MPV IV X X X X X X 
Sako and 
Killian, 1995 + CP + X C X + X X 
Chaum, 2004 + CP IV\CU C C C + + C 
Cohen and 
Fischer,1985 + CP + + X X X X X 
Cohen   and   
Yung, 1986 + CP + + C X X X X 
Benaloh, 1987 + CP + + C C X X  
Iverson, 1992 + CP IV C C X X X C 
Sako and 
Killian, 1994 + CP + + C X X X + 
Cramer et al., 
1996 + CP + + C C X X + 
Cramer et al., 
1997 + CP + + C C X C C 
Schoenmakers
, 1999 + CP + + C C X X + 
Hirt and Sako, 
2000 + CP + + C C + X C 
Baudron et al., 
2001 + CP + + C C + C C 
Chapter 3: Literature Review and Current Systems Review 
 73 
Scheme 
Eligible 
Private 
V
erifiable 
A
ccurate 
Fair 
R
obust 
R
eceipt-
free 
Scalable 
Practical 
Lee and Kim, 
2002 + CP + + C C + + X 
Kiayias   and 
Yung, 2002 + 
CP\
MPV + + C X X X + 
Damga°rd and 
Jurik, 2001 + CP + + C C + C C 
Fujioka et al., 
1993 + CP IV X C X X + X 
Baraani-
Dastjerdi, 
1995 
+ CP IV C + C X X + 
Okamoto, 
1997  + CP IV X + C + X X 
Juang et al., 
2002 + CP IV C C C X + + 
Golle et al., 
2002 + CP 
IV\C
U C C C X C + 
Lee et al., 
2003 + CP + + C C + C X 
Kiayias and   
Yung, 2004 + CP + + C C + C C 
Juels and 
Jakobsson, 
2002 
+ CP IV C C C + X X 
Acquisti, 2004 + CP IV C C C + X X 
Proposed 
Scheme, 
Alhamar 2011 
(see Chapter 
9) 
+ CP\MPV + + + C + + + 
 
+: Satisfied X: Not satisfied C: Conditionally satisfied CP: Conditionally private 
MPV: Maximum privacy 
verifiable. 
IV: Individually verifiable CU: Conditionally universal 
Source: Krishna and Radha (2006), extended by researcher 
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3.4.3  Server-side attacks 
To avoid corruption of the ballot, cryptography must be employed in the network using 
the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a protocol suite for 
securing Internet Protocol (http) (Rodriguez, 2003) to prevent attackers from ‘sniffing’ 
or hearing network traffic. Alvarez (2005) suggests using intrusion detection systems or 
firewalls to block unauthorised traffic. Figure 3.10 shows the server-side attack.   
 
 
Figure 3.10: Server-side malware attack 
 
3.4.3.1 Server-related security issues 
Possible security issues arising from the server-side in I-voting are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Possible security attacks associated with the server-side 
Possible 
attacks 
Risk Description Solution 
DoS 
(Denial of 
service) 
High High demand on service with 
intention to overload the server, 
so legitimate users would find 
difficulty in or be prevented 
from reaching the voting 
website. 
No effective mechanism known. 
However, this type of attack is done 
using PCs infected by viruses or 
malicious code with network name 
botnet. Solutions on the client side 
could eliminate the effects of this 
attack. 
Router 
attacks 
Medium DoS attack on the router which 
forwards IP packets. 
A solution to DoS attacks would also 
solve this attack problem. 
DNS 
attacks 
Low DNS used to translate from IP 
addresses, which PCs use to 
reference each other (e.g. 
145.132.142.15) to domain 
names, which people use to 
reference PC (e.g. 
www.aljazeera.net) 
Attacks targeting DNS could 
route voter to different route. 
Researcher’s approach (see 9.4) 
suggests using a customised operating 
system preconfigured with the voting 
IP address, therefore there is no need 
to rely on the DNS service. 
Spoofing 
attacks 
Low The true IP address of domain 
name overwritten with a fake IP 
address. 
Solved with protocol Domain Name 
System Security (DNSSEC)  (RFC 
2535 and 2931) since it allows 
dynamic update without online zone 
keys; that is, avoid storing private 
keys on the online server. 
Insider 
attack 
Low A member of staff can 
physically have access to 
servers; the extent of this attack, 
if successful, could have full 
control of the election. 
Solved with access control, sealed 
hardware equipment and use of a 
hardware security module (HSM) that 
needs more than one person key to 
gain access. 
 
A.  DoS attacks (indiscriminate or selective) 
The idea of this attack is derived from the concept that the server has limited capacity to 
handle requests, where attackers use these techniques to demand more service than the 
server can handle. There are two main types of this attack: 
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A.1  DoS attack via bandwidth consumption 
This attack aims to use all the server bandwidth, so voters would suffer from no 
bandwidth available for them. Attackers use the following protocols: UDP or ICMP 
ECHO packets, to reserve bandwidth. 
“A simple bandwidth consumption attack can exploit the throughput limits of servers or 
network equipment by focusing on high packet rates – sending large numbers of small 
packets. High packet rate attacks typically overwhelm network equipment before the 
traffic reaches the limit of available bandwidth” (Householder et al., 2001). 
“In practise, denial of service is often accomplished by high packet rates, not by sheer 
traffic volume” (Householder et al., 2001). 
 
A.2  DoS attack via protocol attack 
This kind of attack uses infected computers to start attacks on a particular source; 
however, installing the recent operating system patches would helps minimize the 
problem. There are two types of attack: 
 
(1) “SYN (synchronised) flood is an asymmetric resource starvation attack in which the 
attacker floods the victim with TCP SYN packets and the victim allocates resources to 
accept perceived incoming connections” (Householder et al., 2001).  
 
(2) A Smurf attack generates network traffic on a victim network by flooding a target 
network via spoofed broadcast ping messages. An attacker would send an ECHO (Ping) 
message to be broadcast to network nodes, therefore nodes would reply to the ECHO 
message to the target network and as a result it would create high traffic on the targeted 
network (Householder et al., 2001). 
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A.3  Denial of service attack via a logical attack 
“Logical attacks exploit vulnerabilities in network software, such as web server, or the 
underlying TCP/IP stack”. Examples of logical attacks are (1) Teardrop, (2) Land 
crafts, (3) Ping of death, (4) Naptha (Householder et al., 2001). However to overcome 
this problem it would be essential to ensure a reliable client machine. Users remain the 
weakest link in this chain of process to deploy I-voting, therefore a secure client using 
one of the discussed approaches would be worth trying even with the complication with 
usability or complexity (Householder et al., 2001). 
 
B.  DNS attacks 
The extent of DoS could affect a DNS known to be vulnerable to many attacks. The 
company regulating the Internet DNS uses only thirteen DNS root servers. In 2002, a 
DoS attack successfully targeted some of the DNS servers and caused server downtime 
and degradation in the service. On the other hand, some companies mirror the DNS 
server to ensure that even if the DNS server is down, users could still access the website 
via a mirror server.  
 
The extent of this attack is that voters would not be able to access the website using the 
DNS address so only those voters who know the IP address of their voting server could 
then vote. Another type of attack is DNS spoofing that over-writes the real IP address 
with a fake address, an attack regarded as difficult. Using DNSSec (RFC 2535 und 
2931) could overcome this problem; also, the use of digital certificates could distinguish 
between real and fake websites.  
 
C.   Router attacks 
Internet routers are vulnerable to several attacks during forwarding of IP packets 
through the Internet to reach the voting server. A DoS attack on IP routers could affect a 
whole region from accessing the voting server; however, this would have low impact 
since the Internet protocol would re-route the packets to an alternative route to reach the 
voting server. 
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D.   No post-auditing  
In paper-based voting, secrecy of voting is guaranteed by physical protection, whereas 
in I-voting secrecy is susceptible to destruction by hackers. Therefore, in I-voting, 
secrecy should be ensured during the whole election process, no parties should be 
involved in the voting process or be able to manipulate the votes. Furthermore, the 
registration and authentication process should be defined clearly so that only eligible 
people can vote only once and, for secrecy, voters should not be able to verify their vote 
(Soder, 2002, pp.67-128). However, voters should have the ability to verify their vote 
casting through a print of a unique, randomly generated serial number which only 
shows the chosen candidate with the voter’s unique signature; this will support secrecy 
of voting and will assist in auditing the ballot’s results and prevent insider attacks 
(Kohono et al., 2004). Some argue that verification could reduce the risk of intimidation 
and vote selling. However, vote selling is actually a common and difficult abuse to 
control in any voting system (Anttiroiko, 2003). 
 
Although electoral provision should ensure secrecy of vote, it is difficult to ensure that 
there is no external influence on it (Notton et al., 2008, pp.581-584). This risk is also 
high in I-voting systems. Therefore secrecy has to be related to a democratic philosophy 
for the election. To reduce the threat, encryption and authentication processes should 
allow only authorised persons to cast a vote which is then encrypted; subsequently, 
when gathering ballot results, only authorised persons should be allowed to gather them 
in a decrypted form after the voting period ends (which has the implication that voting 
should not be observed during the election process). Hence, in order to ensure secrecy in 
I-voting, the technology used for vote control should be feasible (Lazou and Papatsoris, 
2000).  
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3.4.3.1.5   Insider attacks  
This threat is considered as low risk if the election committee uses best practice 
methods to protect the servers from insider attack. Possible solutions are (1) sealed 
servers so no unauthorised physical backup or access to equipment is allowed, (2) use of 
physical access control to prevent unauthorised access, (3) allow a trusted third party to 
observe the election, (4) harden access to the server using Threshold encryption, This 
encryption process will guarantee the strength of the I-voting process by reducing the 
chance of an unauthorised person gaining access to confidential information since the 
private key is reconstructed and shared by several parties instead of a single person 
(Boneh et al., 2005). 
 
In conclusion, this section indicates that the greatest threat is from a DoS attack on the 
voting server which could result in it being cut off from the Internet, for which no 
effective protection mechanism is known, although some of the good practice could be 
used to reduce the chances of this type of attack. Also, the use of a vote receipt without 
mentioning the voter choice would help in preventing some of the attacks described 
above. The client machine could act as a DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) to prevent 
the impact of the voting server being down due to a DoS attack, although this is not 
likely to be effective due to the unreliability of the client machine (Internet Policy 
Institute, 2001). 
 
According to Xianju et al. (2000), some of the good practice solutions to avoid a DoS 
attack are as follows: 
 
1. Filter all the packets in the network which are entering and leaving the network 
to prevent attacks from the neighbouring networks. “This measure requires 
installing ingress and egress packet filters on all routers” (Xianju et al., 2000). 
 
2. Upgrade the client machine with the latest security patches and techniques to 
prevent, for example, the SYN flood attack. Increase the size of the connection 
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queue, decrease time-out waiting for the three-way handshake and employ 
vendor software patches to detect and circumvent the problem.  
 
3. Disable IP broadcasting, so that the client machine will not be used as an 
amplifier in ICMP Flood and Smurf attacks. To prevent this attack all the 
neighbouring networks need to disable IP broadcasting.  
 
4. Disable unused network services to prevent tampering and attacks. 
 
5. Monitor traffic patterns on the network to indicate when the system is under 
attack, to enable protection from the attack.  
 
The above points help in eliminating the DoS attack impact on the I-voting process. It 
would, therefore, be important to follow this best of practice advice in any proposed 
I-voting system.  
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3.4.4 Other implications 
There are many other implications of the I-voting system, other than the risks associated 
with client, Internet and server-side. The following are other issues which might arise in 
I-voting. 
 
3.4.4.1 Legal issues  
Since I-voting was first considered, several writers have made their contributions on the 
legal viability of this idea. According to Carley (2008), election issues are in every way 
legal issues and any slight breach of the electoral law renders the election null. This 
claim is, however, challenged by the fact that there have been cases of breach of 
electoral laws without nullification of the results (Carley, 2008). In other words, it may 
be possible, in some cases, to manipulate results, regardless of the existence of electoral 
laws, and get away with it. According to Strassman (1999), the traditional way of doing 
things, including voting and elections, has been greatly challenged by the advent of the 
Internet. He further says that the delays witnessed in the implementation of 
technological changes in the area of voting are actually due to the legal issues 
surrounding it. Thornburgh and Celeste (2006), Rubin (2006) and Niemi (2008) seem to 
agree that there are four main areas which present the greatest concern. These are 
privacy, security, availability and authentication. Additionally, policy and logistics have 
also been identified as needing to be addressed before I-voting can be considered a 
success (Schaffer 2008). Some legal experts (Strassman, 1999; Friel, 2006 and Gritzalis, 
2006) have advanced the view that it is actually more difficult to handle these two than 
the four others combined. In some parts of the world, giant steps have already been 
made towards an Internet-based voting system. A classic example is the first trial held 
in New Zealand where over 21,000 people participated in voting for shadow 
representatives using the Internet (Niemi 2008). The interesting thing is that due to the 
security-related concerns surrounding this activity, hackers were actually invited to try 
and get into the system in order to help identify the possible threats.  
 
As indicated, the laws of every single country across the world have set a particular 
standard within which voting can and must be done. The four areas discussed form the 
basis of any voting system and actually constitute the major barriers that must be 
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overcome before I voting in any part of the world can actually be realised (Alkhelaifi et 
al., 2009).  
 
Generally, the legal requirement is that privacy be accorded to every citizen during the 
voting process, so that voters have the opportunity to exercise their conscience ‘behind 
the curtain’, so to speak (Mehdi, 2001). The aim in this case is to eliminate any 
possibility of manipulation or coercion from interested quarters and this is done through 
maintenance of voter anonymity. For Metz (1996), the legal determination of privacy is 
that no-one should be in a position to identify a vote with a particular person and that 
the voters themselves should be unable to prove that their vote was cast in a particular 
way. However, it seems that this can only be possible in countries with a mature 
democracy. The challenge in this case is that anything that is done through the Internet, 
including voting, cannot be fully guaranteed to be free of interference (Metz, 1996). 
This can however be addressed by an automatic authentication and validation system 
which allows for automatic encryption of information to ensure that no interference is 
possible (Mehdi, 2001).  
 
The security of an electoral system seeks to ensure that only voters who are eligible can 
actually participate. However, the Internet does not always accord the highest level of 
security needed (Metz, 1996). According to Gritzalis (2006), there are, therefore, 
possibilities of threats such as sabotage, for instance through Trojan horse software that 
is highly sophisticated to the point that it could actually divert the votes or change them, 
while viruses can be created to cause crashes of the computerised voting systems, 
creating a possible legal crisis, even acting as serious challenges to democracies around 
the world. According to Thornburgh and Celeste (2006), for a vote cast through the 
Internet to be valid, it must necessarily satisfy three criteria. First, it should be free from 
any possible alteration. Secondly, it should be impossible for anyone to eliminate a 
validated vote from the final tally. Finally, invalidated votes should be automatically 
excluded from that final tally.  
 
For an I-voting system to be generally accepted, the uncertainties of people regarding 
authentication of votes cast through the Internet must be addressed. It should be 
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possible to identify a vote as being a real one (Glass, 1999). However, this is not an 
easy task, considering that the computer systems are designed by human beings and as 
such are capable of manipulation (Rubin, 2006).  
 
Another major barrier that makes I-voting a challenging affair is availability. The 
technological infrastructure as well as the infrastructure needed for this undertaking is 
still largely unavailable. Everyone should be able to have reasonable access to Internet 
services (Thornburgh and Celeste, 2006).  
 
Californian laws on I-voting offer a classical example of what can be considered a 
model I-voting system. There are a number of legal requirements that must be fulfilled 
before any individual can be allowed to vote through the Internet. For instance, voters 
are required to make a request in writing every time they wish to vote. It is illegal to 
request both I-voting and an absentee vote (Mehdi, 2001). The system of voter 
authorisation must be designed in such a way that it is possible to link the actual vote 
cast to the voters’ register for verification. Each voter must be issued with an 
authentication code combined with his/her PIN in order to allow voters to authenticate 
themselves. Additionally, any form of advertising is disallowed on the I-voting system 
screens. The system should allow easy navigation while at the same time preventing any 
cases of over-voting (Mehdi, 2001). Generally speaking, the features of the I-voting 
system borrow heavily from the absentee ballot system features, making possible 
voters’ trust in the system. The Internet voting laws in the State of California can 
therefore be considered best not only for California, but for other countries as well 
(Mehdi, 2001).   
 
The current electoral law, namely absentee ballot system, has gained acceptance over 
time. This is perhaps due to its features that guarantee free and fair voting (Gritzalis, 
2006). In other words, the issues discussed here as constituting the challenges of 
I-voting have been adequately addressed by the current legal system. The new system 
must therefore take an approach that is evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. This will 
enable it to learn from the existing laws and avoid creating vacuums in the voting 
process. Therefore, if the shift is to be a successful one, it ought to be gradual, but all 
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the principles of an absentee ballot system must be applied and maybe improved in the 
new system (Gritzalis, 2006). 
 
The bringing e-transaction laws into force in Qatar was meant to open up previously 
unexploited possibilities. The structure and principles of these new laws have a lot to 
offer to the debate on the possibility of an I-voting system (Alkhelaifi et al., 2009). It 
would be important to understand what these laws require in order to assess whether 
they can actually address the challenges of I-voting. These laws can be applied 
successful to I-voting, because they actually address most of the challenges discussed 
earlier. For instance, issues of integrity, digital signature and digital signature 
certification, of the transmission and storage of data, of consumer protection and, more 
importantly, of the offences and penalties applicable to defaulters can all be successfully 
addressed (Alkhelaifi et al., 2009). These are provisions with extreme significance for 
the prospects of I-voting and, if used, can easily make it possible to vote through the 
Internet without raising the current challenging questions (Alkhelaifi et al., 2009). 
 
It is concluded, therefore, that although the age of I-voting is here, it faces many 
challenges which must be addressed before the process can be considered to be up to the 
expected standard. Some of the challenges are actually not technical. Most of the 
already existing electoral laws need to be amended so as to accept electronic aids to the 
process. This can be a valuable start but the entire process must at all times be guided 
by integrity. The example of Qatar is a good one for setting up the technological as well 
as the legal infrastructure for a successful implementation of such a process.  
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3.4.4.2   Transparency 
Although I-voting provides faster, less costly and more accurate results, people still do 
not trust the system. Furthermore, since the process is not clearly available, people rely 
on experts’ evaluation of the source code. 
 
An I-voting system should involve a high level of security, usability and trusted 
infrastructure, and software should be open source (Ata et al., 2004; Kitcat, 2004). The 
process should allow voting monitoring by trusted authorised parties and experts who 
carry out inspections to ensure voters’ trust in the voting system and that votes are not 
interfered with or manipulated (Muselli, Notton and Louche, 1999; Trechsel, 2005). 
However, existing I-voting systems hardly ever provide an open source system (Kohono 
et al., 2004). 
 
In I-voting, successful fraud could be perpetrated remotely by a single person and might 
have a large scale effect, whereas in paper-based voting it is hard to commit an attack 
on a large scale (Jefferson et al., 2004). Since, in I-voting, there is a huge chance of 
fraud, and since the process of voting is anonymous, it is harder to investigate cases of 
crime. In e-commerce, proceeds of e-crimes could be easily recovered by legal actions 
(Marconi, n.d). The most threatening attacks are malicious programs since they might 
result in a considerable damage to client machines because they can alter votes (despite 
the system security and compressed encryption or authentication) without being 
detected, since they act before the encryption and authentication are applied to the data, 
thus leaving no proof of fraud (Rubin, 2002). Between the client and legitimate website, 
attackers can act as a man-in-the-middle (Phillips and von Spakovsky, 2001), but the 
risk of this could be reduced by use of the secure socket layer (SSL) and digital 
certificates available in the website.  
 
No detection of incidents does not necessarily mean that no successful attack has 
occurred, since most attackers will have carefully hidden their attacks (Rubin, 2002; 
Jefferson et al., 2004). They are good at tricking people, they usually exploit 
vulnerabilities in their victims in order to engage in an attack and, once this is achieved, 
the secrecy of voters could be infringed, votes could be manipulated, and even the 
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integrity of the election itself could be destroyed (Statements about Internet Voting 
from Experts, 2008).  
 
The principles of I-voting must be categorised. Phillips and von Spakovsky (2001) state 
that there should be a paradigm of terms of infrastructure, communication protocols, 
software and a hardware platform for I-voting which guarantees people’s right to vote 
freely and fairly through guidelines provided for all entities to follow to implement the 
I-voting system (Bouras, 2003), since there is a lack of understandable guidelines (Joe  
and Glidden, et al  2001) 
 
According to the California Secretary of State (2000), research states that it is currently 
hard to replace the existing traditional voting with I-voting system since it is yet not 
legal or practical to develop it due to many issues associated with such a system, for 
example, secrecy, trust, culture, usability, etc. 
 
Other research (US NTIA, 2000) suggests that I-voting in its first launch should be 
implemented along with the existing traditional voting and the use of supervised 
I-voting in polling stations would provide an idea of people’s acceptance of such 
technology and the experience of it. However, supervised I-voting  would reduce voters’ 
convenience to vote remotely since it only allows voting in a supervised environment in 
specific polling stations (US National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, 2000). 
 
According to Trechsel (2005), open source applications are not welcome since they 
provide attackers with detailed information about the system design which they can use 
to commit their crimes by determining system weaknesses. The Netherlands reported 
that their I-voting had been hacked within 24 hours. Experts claimed that the open 
source had assisted in conducting the attack. However, Larman (2008) claims that open 
source systems should have a high level of security so that no one can use it maliciously 
although it is publicly available (Phillips and von Spakovsky, 2001). Open source can 
be considered good practice because security experts and the community could help 
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detect and correct errors, since all actions are recorded in log files (Gordi and Gosep, 
n.d.; Marconi, n.d.). Jan et al. (2001) noted that I-voting source code should be available 
through the Internet to be evaluated by experts. 
 
Transparency can be achieved not just by technical solutions but also by enhancing 
government trust (Leontine, 2008). 
 
3.4.4.3   Freedom  
Voters should have the full freedom to vote without stress, interference or manipulation 
(Okamoto, 2007, pp. 25-35). I-voting creates significant problems regarding fraud and 
vote selling, which might limit the freedom and integrity of voters, whereas in postal 
voting they are required to sign a declaration. 
 
Freedom of voter decision could be ensured by providing privacy for voters to vote 
remotely from any place, using the Internet (International for Data Protection and 
Telecommunication, 2001, p.86). 
 
3.4.4.4  Equality 
Since voting is a practice of democracy, equality is important, where all candidates are 
treated equally and all eligible voters have the right to vote. Equality is one of the main 
challenges for I-voting as it is a broad concept. To achieve equality many aspects have 
to be assured, such as eliminating the digital divide and providing usability and 
accessibility. Each of these aspects is now described. 
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A.  Digital and social divide 
The use of the Internet as a voting channel is argued to be available to some people who 
are of a relatively better standing through their access to the technology (i.e. Internet, 
computers and the like). Belanger and Carter (2010) concentrated on reviewing the 
influence of the digital divide on I-voting and proposing a model to limit digital divide 
issues. The model was examined against a large sample of citizens identifying that age, 
income, education and Internet experience have an impact on the I-voting process. 
Trechsel (2004) pointed out that I-voting is not yet a truly public medium. According to 
studies, only a small percentage of the population have access to and are regularly use 
the Internet (Gibson et al, 2003; Trechsel and Mendez, 2004). Moreover, Arab et al. 
(2001) added that this would lead citizens to face difficulties in exercising their right to 
vote, if such limitations were experienced in postal voting (Notton, 1999; Cramer et al., 
2007). However, these studies are quickly becoming out of date as more and more 
people are connected to the Internet with some countries now having high speed 
Internet access at low cost. For example, Qatar has more than 50% of Internet users, 
436,000 out of 840,926 (QSA, 2009).  
 
One of the main difficulties facing I-voting is the social divide and the ability to adapt 
to new technology alongside the legacy methods; this requires effort and would be 
costly and time consuming, since human nature resists change and some people do not 
know how to interact with such new technology (Gordi and Gosep, n.d.). Also, some 
claim that I-voters will miss the voting experience of the traditional voting system 
(Barrat, 2004a; Reniu, 2005).  The TruEVote project (Bruschi et al., 2002) explored 
people's acceptance of I-voting, focusing on technical and social matters. Workshops 
with various groups of citizens and politicians showed a clear acceptance of I-voting 
technology though there were some worries on the technical aspects of I-voting and 
very minor concerns on possible security risks.  
 
Hence, this research project has aimed to consider digital and social divide issues, 
which describe the gap between what technologies people have and do not have. 
Accordingly, I-voting should be an option so voters would have the choice to vote at the 
polling station or through the Internet with I-voting. 
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B.  Usability 
ISO 9241-11 identifies usability as the degree to which a product can be used easily by 
users and attain its goals efficiently (Quesenbery et al., 2003). A user guide of how the 
voter would vote should be provided for voters, especially in I-voting to facilitate the 
voting process. Although the system should be user friendly, it would still be useful to 
provide easy to follow guidelines to ensure all voters would understand it, even those 
with novice computer knowledge (Quesenbery et al., 2003).   
 
Since the act of voting is not frequent (e.g. in the USA, it occurs once a year), voters 
might be novices in dealing with the system, therefore it is important to provide one that 
is usable (Nurmi et al., 2001).  Studies by Strassman (2000) and Larman (2008) on the 
usability of I voting concluded that the design should consider usability in terms of 
ability to start the vote, read the screen, navigate, change, review and verify votes. 
Moreover, Hoffman (2005) argued that I-voting should be carefully designed and 
implemented to assist citizens to exert their right confidently and easily. In general, 
applying usability in an I-voting system will develop voters’ trust (Quesenbery et al., 
2003). Dictson and Ray (2000) suppose that if usability issues were resolved, IT would 
facilitate the voting process for people. 
 
Usability involves ease of navigation, understandability, simplicity and avoidance of 
complexity (Rogers,1995; Hirt and Sako, 2000; Marche and McNiven, 2003). The 
structure of the system should be well defined, there should be a clear and reasonable 
number of options on the ballot, the paper should have a clear layout, request for 
verification before committing the vote, allowing citizens to be aware of the I-voting 
process with the ability to cast their vote efficiently with minimum skills and equipment 
required (Mote, 2001; Storer, 2004). An I-voting system should include a candidate 
description, since it plays a big role in voters’ decisions about candidates (Kaldellis and 
Sotiraki, 1999; Komnimoglou and Kaldellis, 2001). In addition, it is important to 
consider the relative advantages for the I-voting process in improving the standing of 
the existing voting system, considering accessibility and usability of vote casting 
(Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003; Thomas and Streib, 2003; Chen, 2008). According to 
Chaum (2002), training is required for I-voters to facilitate the voting process, 
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especially for voters who find it difficult to vote. As a result, it is crucial to discover the 
views of the Qatar government and citizens before adopting the I-voting innovation 
(Rogers, 1995). Compatibility defines the suitability of innovation in relation to needs, 
principles, knowledge and beliefs. This was considered in this thesis to illustrate 
Qataris’ awareness of the pleasant nature of I-voting in their society. 
 
According to Hall and Alvarez (2004), young citizens in the age group (18-27) found 
I-voting more comfortable to use compared to older age groups. Also, it was discovered 
that citizens who use the Internet regularly for communication and electronic 
transactions appreciated the simplicity of I-voting (Carter and Belanger, 2005). 
 
The research community have assumed that, in general, young and educated people 
have more enhanced computer knowledge than less educated and older people (Manna 
and Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2003; Bonsor, 2004; Smith and Manna, 2005). Moreover, 
to enhance participation in I-voting, the system should be cheap, fast, usable and as 
accessible as possible, especially for people with disabilities (Alvarez, 2005).  
 
C.  Accessibility  
I-voting should ensure equal accessibility, without differentiating between candidates. It 
should treat all candidates equally and should ensure transparency and guarantee that 
voting results are not interfered with (Kaldellis et al., 2004, pp.187-203). Voting system 
should provide an equal accessibility, where the system is easy to use regardless of 
voters’ computer knowledge, education, age or disability. In 1965, the USA Voting 
Right Act required the avoidance of discrimination between people (Bonsor, 2004), but 
this might prevent establishment of I-voting since it uses Internet technology which 
might be inaccessible to some citizens and this is a kind of discrimination.  
  
According to  Kaldellis and Doumouliakas (2000) the opportunity for equal access in 
I-voting is not ensured, while in online access only those who benefit from it and who 
have some computer knowledge can vote, leading to unequal accessibility to the voting 
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system. Norris (2001) noted that this limitation of access would increase the issues of 
digital and social divide (see Section 3.5.4.1).  
 
Since accessibility is one of the main advantages of I-voting, it must be ensured that 
voters can vote from anywhere as long they have access to the internet whether through 
Ethernet, dial-up connection or wireless networks. Accessibility should be defined 
earlier according to the election requirement for internal access within network 
organization, national or international access. Furthermore, I-voting provides flexibility 
where some elections might give voters the ability to use varies devices (e.g. PC, mobile 
phones, PDA) and to use different ballot formats. 
 
Additionally, the usability of I-voting systems is a main concern especially for disabled 
voters where a special tool and/or software might be included to help them to cast their 
votes. The use of a virtual environment could give voters the feel of the voting 
experience, but this would require a high Internet speed for fast browsing (Morgan et 
al., 2001). 
 
Dictson and Ray (2000) suggested providing a public Internet access in the country to 
enhance I-voting participation, especially for people who find it difficult to have 
Internet access. However, there is still another limitation, the level of literacy of people 
in general and computer literacy in particular. Some experts advocate I-voting based on 
the number of Internet users within their country without taking into consideration 
users’ knowledge of how to use such technology (Demunter, 2005).   
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3.5 I-Voting Adoption 
Many organisations provide electronic elections, for instance the IEEE and governments 
such as the United States and Australia. Despite the successful and unsuccessful 
experience and challenges and limitations of I-voting, still many organisations are 
inspired by e-voting. I-voting is a new process and will be extremely strange to almost 
all voters. It is necessary to consider how such a system and in particular how a system 
can be constructed according to the prescriptions of the model proposed in this thesis, 
should be introduced into general use. This section is concerned with that question. 
 
The need for acceptance by the population suggests I-voting should be introduced 
gradually, for instance starting with poll site voting and then kiosk I-voting, until it is 
accepted by the community and people get used to it. When associated legal 
certification issues are resolved in the future, I-voting can start. 
 
The technology of smart card compressed encryption and authentication can be used in 
I-voting since it provides a higher level of security, contains a huge amount of data and 
enables services to be integrated (Simons and Graham, 2008; Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman, 2008). The use of the smart card reduces time and cost associated with huge 
amounts of paper work and labour involved in elections (Lin, Hwang and Chang, 2003). 
Hence, it is estimated that the revenue of the smart card would be increased by 30%.  
 
A survey of UK voters in 2002 concluded that a huge percentage of voters (87%) 
believed online voting would be preferred for the next general election so people can 
vote remotely from anywhere (Touch Plc, 2002) 
 
According to Carter and Belanger (2005), the proposed e-government adaptation model 
depends on the TAM (technology adoptation model), DOI (diffusion of innovation) and 
the trust of the Internet and government. Although this model provides a valuable 
contribution for e-government, it is practical for I-voting adaptation, since I-voting can 
be considered to be part of e-government.  
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Davis (1989) uses TAM to examine the adoptation of e-commerce and e-government. 
TAM involves Perceived Usefulness and Perceived Ease Of Use, which affect users’ 
acceptance of the system, whereas the DOI consists of compatibility, relative advantage, 
image and complexity (Davis, 1989). 
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop an I-voting adaptation framework for Qatar 
employing the proposal of Carter and Belanger’s (2005) e-government adoptation 
model, considering the cultural and country-specific factors for the State of Qatar.   
 
In the context of I-voting, Perceived Usefulness defines Qataris’ insight of the 
efficiency of process in election practice, also Perceived Ease Of Use describes the offer 
of a usable system for users. This is important to consider, especially for I-voting, since 
the users of the system are people with different backgrounds, some with insufficient 
computer literacy. 
  
All of the above factors, if considered, will assist in enhancing citizens’ interest in 
e-government (Carter and Belanger, 2005) and this suggests they will have the same 
effect for I-voting. 
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3.5.1  Trust of government and the Internet 
If I-voting is to be employed in deciding matters of national importance, for example 
the constitution of the next legal government, it is necessary for the Internet to be 
trusted (because it is the medium through which I-voting is conducted) and for 
governments to be trusted.  This is the subject of this section. 
Trust is an initial requirement for I-voting adaptation. A survey by Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in 1999 concluded that 1,000 adults trusted businesses more than 
government (ITAA, 2000). 
Sofia (2009) claims that e-government will enhance the trust between citizens and 
government if transparency is applied. However, McKnight (2002) commented that 
there is no clear evidence that e-government is associated with trust having found that 
visiting government websites to retrieve contact or information has no relation to trust. 
However, it can be argued that usage of e-government services with transparency would 
increase trust in government.  
According to Sofia (2009), any mistakes occurring within the e-government service will 
have a negative influence on citizens’ trust in government. Therefore, government 
should move gradually towards developing the trust of its citizens and, once this is 
achieved, it will play a big role in adoption of I-voting. To establish trust should involve 
trusted parties, such as government officials, politicians, legislators and expert system 
developers, to support the I-voting system.  
Jillbert and Musaruddin (2003) argued that it is easier to use I-voting in developed 
rather than in developing countries, since it requires a huge amount of effort and time 
and most developing countries have an inadequate national budget to adopt I-voting. 
Also, it would require training and education of people on how to use the system. Carter 
and Belanger (2005) reported that the client platform was an untrusted entity which is 
hard to secure with current malicious software and viruses. 
In general, most voter verifiable protocols still fail to resolve the intimidation that voters 
might experience. Helbach (2007) suggests multiple vote casting is a good method to 
protect against intimidation.  However, social and political scientists are still doubtful 
about using I-voting. Thus, Ewert et al.(2006) stated that election-voting participation 
would not necessarily be increased when voters have the flexibility to vote remotely 
from anywhere and they also added that reduction of cost is not an issue. 
Chapter 3: Literature Review and Current Systems Review 
 95 
3.6  Discussion 
I-voting has attracted a great attention as a result of growth in e-government and digital 
communication. The main characteristics of successful I-voting are security, privacy, 
accuracy and mobility. Internet voting still suffers from insecure computer networks. 
However, the literature shows that the major problem with I-voting is that the client 
machine is not supervised, therefore it might be infected with malicious code or viruses 
which can affect voting, although there are some ways to avoid this but until now it has 
been considered too costly. One method would be connect each voter’s machine though 
a VPN (virtual private network); this is considered secure but requires a large budget 
and computer literacy. However, one of the simple methods distributes voting 
responsibility and functions to the voters.  
 
Transparency in I-voting has received considerable attention, using a voting verification 
method as one way of solving this problem. Verification should show voting success or 
failure when proving correctness of voting. Moreover, this builds trust in a system, 
since voters can verify the integrity of system functions and contribute to election 
observation; although the goal of coercion resistance cannot be guaranteed. On the other 
hand, Helbach (2008) has argued that multiple vote casts could be used to eliminate 
vote selling by allowing voters to vote again and again; however, this could yield many 
fraud cases in which someone could sell his/ her vote many times. In practice, current 
law does not promote multiple casts. There may also be the effect that, instead of taking 
a decision on the basis of accurate long-term and personal perspectives, voters may 
begin to respond to current affairs and the results of surveys. The practice of multiple 
casts is not common for democratic elections, so for these reasons, its use is not further 
considered in this research. 
 
The code voting method has shown its worth in achieving integrity and privacy through 
secret ballots, where an attacker would need to get hold of the code sheet to translate 
voter choices. Furthermore, the use of smart cards and voting coding together 
guarantees a reasonable degree of security where, instead of storing voting code sheets 
in a central database, smart cards have the necessary storage capability.  
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Adopting both code voting and vote verification in future Internet voting is desirable. 
Vote verification needs appropriate platforms for secure use but trusted computing 
guarantees increasing confidence in the platforms’ integrity and faithfulness. Moreover, 
trusted computing could simplify voting adoption since it provides trustworthy clients. 
However, the trusted computing approach does not seem to be good practice for now, 
since accurate performance cannot be verified on its own. 
 
Election law is an Achilles’ heel in I-voting, since the existing law was written for 
paper-based voting. There is a huge difference in the legal requirements between 
traditional and I-voting methods. For example, traditional voting would give the voter 
the ability to participate in an election without selecting a candidate and an important 
addition in Internet voting is that the voter would have a receipt to be used for appeal 
whereas traditional voting does not provide one. 
 
The secrecy aspects remain challenging, although researchers suggest some best 
practice methods, but it still remains impossible to fully guarantee end-to-end 
protection. In order to vote in absence, confidentiality may have been infected because 
it is a form of additional vote and officially associated with strict regulations. Here, the 
benefits are more important than the losses. If I-voting offers a complement to absentee 
voting, it must be measured according to the same rules.  
 
The uncertainty of people’s acceptance of I-voting suggest that more needs to be 
learned about voters attitudes and acceptance of the plans, including methods for fraud 
protection and for verification. Experiments and trials need to be carried out, preferably 
during elections that are not legally binding (such as workers councils, universities, 
boards or councils of social security institutions). Here, the methods proposed for 
further evaluation are within the limits of adequate control and the risk is limited.  
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Future work can be summarised into three main phases: 
1) First, determining people’s acceptance of I-voting using a variety of methods 
(survey, interview and experiments). 
2) Second, measuring the voter’s security awareness to provide an accepted 
solution to bribery and coercion problems.  
3) Third, real time and practical testing outside the laboratory of the released 
version of the system in order to report on its performance and reliability. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Although there are many advantages of I-voting, some disadvantages appear to 
influence negatively on voting experience. Gerck (2000) states that the main concerns 
with I-voting are limitation of access, requirements for training people to use the 
system, lack of a paper examination review to ensure integrity of voting process and 
political risk. The lack of paper-examination review could be resolved by examining the 
log files in which all actions are recorded. According to Wolosik (2004), in a personal 
interview, I-voting candidates were not able to observe voter practice, and this 
prevented them from exercising their right. Moreover, he commented that I-voting 
might be implemented in the future only if issues associated with I-voting are resolved. 
Therefore, those disadvantages and possible issues and attacks in client, Internet and 
server- side have to be considered carefully.  
 
The issues reported varied from country to country according to the country specific 
factors. There is no research in I-voting in the State of Qatar, this identifies the need to 
do some research to discover the possibility of having I-voting in this part of the world. 
Each country has used a different model to introduce I-voting, and this shows that each 
country has its own criteria and characteristics which have an effect on the design of 
I-voting system based on resources available. Consequently, issues associated with 
I-voting in Qatar might be different to those experienced in other countries and, 
therefore, there is the need for investigating how to reduce all possible issues and for 
developing an effective I-voting model for Qatar taking into consideration the country 
factors and cultural effect to introduce an effective I-voting experience.  
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This identifies the need to identify possible I-voting protocols and solutions and build a 
combination of protocols that suits Qatar. The majority of research on I-voting has not 
taken account of user input in introducing I-voting which will create a problem in 
getting people’s acceptance of such new technology. Therefore, in this research, cultural 
and community factors will be investigated to provide an effective introduction to 
I-voting in the Qatar community.  
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Chapter 4:  Research Methodology 
 
This chapter summarises best practice in regard to research philosophy, strategy, 
approach and data collection methods. Hence, a justification of the suitable research 
methodologies for this research is presented in this chapter to satisfy the aim and 
objectives stated in Chapter 1. 
 
4.1 Research Philosophy  
Any researcher needs to address a project from a particular philosophical stance. An 
information system (IS) project thus requires a research philosophy based on the nature 
of the project, whether it constitutes research in natural or in social science. According 
to Crossan (2003), research philosophy helps in clarifying research design and in 
evaluating different methods so that the appropriate choice is made. On the other hand, 
research philosophies employ two different approaches: epistemology (what is known 
to be true) and doxology (what is believed to be true). Positivist/scientific (positivism) 
and anti-positivist/interpretivist (interpretivism) are the common research stances 
encountered in research in the natural and social sciences (Galliers, 1992). 
 
4.1.1 Positivism  
Many researchers have found that the positivist position fits best for IS research 
(Galliers, 1992; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Walsham, 1995; 
Themistocleous, 2002). According to Orlikowski and Bardoudi (1991), about 97% of IS 
research is based on such a stance. Positivism started to become more popular in the late 
1970s (Dickson and DeSanctis, 1990, cited by Jackson and Scott, 2001) and is inspired 
by the fact that reality is independent of the individual’s thoughts. In another sense, 
positivists consider that knowledge can be developed through the observation or 
experience of real world events. Positivists deal with proven facts based on 
measurement and experiments; mathematical and scientific theory thus provide good 
examples.  
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4.1.2 Interpretivism  
In contrast to positivism, the interpretivist approach is „aimed at producing an 
understanding of the context of the information system, and the process whereby the 
information system influences and is influenced by the context‟ (Walsham, 1993, pp. 4-
5). Interpretivism underlies studies of phenomena based on empirical observation and 
social interaction with the community (Myers, 1997). Interviews and surveys are 
common methods of data collection in this approach. In addition, interpretivism could 
influence the researcher and lead to definition of a solution to the phenomena (Galliers, 
1992; Miles and Huberman, 1994). On the other hand, people’s opinions and 
observations reflect their views and beliefs which might not reflect the reality, so 
research should be interactive to enable the researcher to get to know the interviewees 
opinions better. Social research is a wide-open subject where researchers can obtain 
totally different results for the same subjects. 
 
4.1.3  Selection of Research Philosophy 
Some researchers advise the use of both approaches in order to achieve quality research 
because of the complexity of real world problems where facts and social context are a 
control variable (Benbasat, 1984; Kaplan and Duchon, 1988; Galliers, 1992; Pervan, 
1994).  
 
I-voting is a topic of increasing interest in the research field and therefore researchers 
should consider technological developments along with social aspects of the community 
(government or citizens)   (Sarker and Lee, 1998). 
 
This research examines the possibility of implementing I-voting in Qatar, considering 
whether people would accept such new technology and whether resources are available 
to implement it. Therefore, positivism and interpretivism are both invoked in this 
research to investigate its feasibility in terms of technical facility and social acceptance 
of I-voting. 
 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology  
 101 
4.2 Research approach 
Research approaches adopted in the light of the researcher’s philosophical position are 
essential in any research since they are used for planning the research methodology. 
Iivari (1991) identified three such approaches: constructive, nomothetic and idiographic, 
as shown in Table 4.1.   
 
Table 4.1:Three approaches to research (Iivari, 1991) 
Constructive Research Nomothetic Research Idiographic Research 
1. Conceptual development of 
frameworks 
1. Formal mathematical 
analysis 
1. Case studies 
2. Technical development of 
frameworks 
2. Experiments: laboratory 
and field 
2. Action research 
 3. Field studies and surveys  
 
Constructive research is concerned with developing and refining frameworks by means 
of conceptual and technical methods (Cornford and Smithson, 1996). Nomothetic 
research is described as a tendency to generalize and it is a common approach within the 
natural sciences for the natural sciences. It investigates objective phenomena in general 
through field studies in order to achieve the research objectives (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Iivari, 1991).  
 
Idiographic research is described as a tendency to specify and it is typical for the 
humanities. It explores a particular case study or phenomenon, which might be 
supported by action research in the field to provide an effective outcome. It also 
describes the effort to understand the meaning of dependent, unique, and often 
subjective phenomena (Cornford and Smithson, 1996). 
 
Myers (1997) has described research approaches as objective and subjective. The 
former involves prediction of the case instead of control over the situation in the field, 
which is what subjective research aims to do. In objective research, the researcher is 
independent of the fieldwork but in subjective research the researcher is involved 
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directly in the fieldwork. Basically, objective research studies the case from the outside 
whereas subjective research studies it from the inside, leading to a more effective 
outcome. In addition, Myers described quantitative research as appropriate for natural 
sciences’ research where quantity and numerical data lead to valuable findings, whereas 
qualitative research suits social sciences’ research where qualitative data and 
information gathered lead to effective results.  
 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.40) state that qualitative methods usually lead to direct 
outcomes such as one/zero or true/false; qualitative research is more investigative and 
leads to more informative outcomes and it therefore forms the basis for many research 
projects.  
 
According to Firestone (1987, 14-19), „Quantitative studies “persuade” the reader 
through de-emphasising individual judgement and stressing the use of established 
procedures, leading to more precise and generalizable results. On the other hand, 
qualitative research persuades through rich depiction and strategic comparison across 
cases, thereby overcoming the “abstraction” inherent in quantitative studies.‟  
 
Dedrick and West (2003) propose the use of qualitative study for developing an 
effective framework. In contrast, Miles and Huberman’s (1994) view is that researchers 
should use quantitative methods for investigating and proving a particular hypothesis. 
Furthermore, Sieber (1973) has reported the effectiveness of using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to provide in-depth analysis of the topic. 
 
In this research, a combination of constructive, nomothetic and idiographic research is 
applied subjectively as appropriate and in response to available resources. Since 
I-voting in Qatar is a new topic, not covered before, this inspired the researcher to 
investigate it through a combination of various approaches, which enrich the research 
and provide comprehensive findings. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used 
in analysing the data gathered to provide a superior research approach where the 
ultimate benefit of each method is derived and each is used to support the others. 
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4.3   Research Design 
Research design describes and identifies the process of data gathering in any research 
(Gallier, 1992). Many researchers have identified different methods of research design 
which could be used to create richer research. A summary of the methods is given in 
Table 4.2. (Galliers, 1992; Alavi, 1994; Cavaye, 1996; Remenyi and Williams, 1996; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). 
 
Table 4.2: Research design 
Research 
Design 
Explanation 
Field Study Researcher acts as observer involved in field of study and aims to achieve 
defined research objectives by applying specific techniques of data 
collection in the organisation.   
Action 
Research 
The researcher both observes and contributes to the organisation to 
investigate and solve a phenomena in field experiments and by shared 
partnerships having control over variables (Denscombe, 2002; Rapoport, 
1970). It has the following characteristics: Practical, Change, Cyclical 
process and Participation. 
Ethnographic 
Research  
The researcher attempts to investigate phenomena through the understanding 
of society and human activities. Ethnographic research could involve 
various methods of data collection such as interviews and questionnaires. It 
is based on observing patterns of human activity and societies where the 
researcher could draw conclusions from participants' activities and views. 
Case Studies The researcher aims to investigate existing phenomenon embedded within a 
specific context, and utilizes various methods, usually a social phenomena 
using various methods of data gathering such as experiments, surveys, and 
archival analysis (Stone, 1978; Benbasat, 1984, 1985; Kaplan, 1985 cited in 
Benbasat et al., 1987 ;Yin, 1989). 
Survey These are one of the most common methods of gathering data (Weisberg 
and Bowen, 1977). Creswell (2003) states that surveys include cross-
sectional and longitudinal studies using questionnaires or structured 
interviews with representative sample of population. 
Sekaran (1992) defined cross-sectional surveys as data collected just once 
over a given period of time, whereas in longitudinal surveys data are 
collected more than once at regular intervals. 
Surveys involve several stages, from identifying the sample and developing 
the survey questions to administering them and analysing the data gathered 
qualitatively and quantitatively and finally drawing conclusions about the 
population under study (Thomas, 1996). 
Experiment This is a common method of data gathering which could be applied both in 
natural and social science. Experiments involve practical processes and 
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Research 
Design 
Explanation 
specific measurements applied under certain conditions, either in a 
controlled laboratory or as a real world event, aimed at the study of a 
specific subject, theory or phenomenon. 
Modelling This involves creating and/or investigating a specific model in order to 
improve it to enhance performance and obtain beneficial results, or could be 
used just to understand the situation. 
Grounded 
Theory 
This research is based on in-depth analysis of a combination of data 
gathered using a series of methods to identify and conclude with theory 
based on all findings. 
Operational 
Research 
This is based on examining operational activities in order to optimise them 
in the pursuit of set objectives. This type of research is common in 
economics (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Saunders, 2000). 
Archival 
Research 
This is based on archival data gathered from historical events 
 
Yin (1989) summarises some empirical studies based on interpreting real world events 
(see Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Relevant situations for different research strategies (from Yin, 1989) 
Strategy 
Form of research 
Question 
Requires Control 
Over Behavioural 
Event? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis 
(e.g. economic 
study) 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
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In this research, a mixture of research designs is chosen to achieve the research 
objectives. The thesis is based on a case study of I-voting in a particular part of the 
world, the State of Qatar, and to investigate this case, a wide variety of methods will be 
employed including experiments and surveys, and interviews and questionnaires were 
based on specific and representative participants. In addition, the thesis involves 
developing a model to study a method to improve the existing voting process (paper-
based) in Qatar by adopting I-voting technology. Furthermore, it contains action 
research not only to develop I-voting but also to apply it in reality by getting support 
from responsible organisations. However, it was hard for the project to be applied fully 
in Qatar owing to the sensitivity and the confidentiality of voting as a democratic 
process, so a demonstration of I-voting was used to examine the effectiveness of 
I-voting and people’s acceptance of such new technology.  
 
Table 4.4 details the research objectives and the research design applied towards their 
achievement. 
Table 4.4: Research design and research objectives 
Research objectives Research design 
1. To review the literature to determine the basic requirements for a 
democratic voting system and I-voting to support such a system and, 
hence, to form a set of criteria to act as a checklist to test the adequacy 
and acceptability of any existing or proposed system. Furthermore, to 
examine different ways of voting in a democratic environment, and to 
assess each method using the criteria established to determine the 
strength of the case for using I-voting. 
2. To review world-wide experience of I-voting adoption, to highlight 
the successes and failures, and to address critical issues associated with 
their experience. Also, to review literature to discover sociological and 
technical obstacles to adoption of such technology and to investigate 
potential solutions to overcome I-voting challenges. 
3. To investigate and define the best practice research methodology to 
carry out this research. 
4. To investigate the readiness of Qatar in terms of technical and non-
technical aspects such as cultural, national and other country-related 
variables that might motivate the development or usage of I-voting in 
Qatar by means of literature and interviews. 
Literature review 
5. To assess, by means of questionnaires and interviews, the confidence 
and willingness of Qatari citizens to take part in the initiative of I-
voting, and to reveal the barriers that would inhibit I-voting in Qatar. 
Case study, 
Literature      review, 
Surveys, Interviews, 
Experiments 
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Research objectives Research design 
6. To assess by means of experiment, questionnaire and interview of the 
Qatari people a prototype of I-voting for Qatar elections, to obtain a rich 
picture of people’s opinions and problems encountered while engaging 
in the voting process. Also, to test the effectiveness of the prototype 
solution in overcoming existing I-voting challenges and satisfaction of 
Qatar election requirements. Furthermore, to make a comparison 
between the Qatar experiment results and those of Estonia's experience 
with I-voting to measure success or failure of the Qatar experiment in 
overcoming the Estonia's problems with I-voting.  
7. To investigate the security risks that might appear due to lack of 
awareness of information security on the client side, to measure the 
level of awareness of Qatari people on the client side of I-voting to 
propose appropriate methods for solving the problem. 
Surveys, Interviews, 
Experiments 
8. To design an effective I-voting model for the State of Qatar, by 
combining available technology and best practice to overcome I-voting 
challenges. 
9. To test the applicability of the proposed model for overcoming the 
challenges of I-voting in the State of Qatar by means of simulation, 
experiments and expert opinion. 
Modelling Findings 
based on qualitative/ 
quantitative analysis 
10. To propose, from the above findings, effective recommendations for 
the Qatar government to help in introducing I-voting in Qatar society. 
Action research 
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4.4  Data Sampling Method  
To provide a robust piece of research, data needs to be gathered from a representative 
sample of the population. Therefore it is important to define the appropriate data 
sampling method applied for the research. Sekaran (1992) has classified sampling 
methods into probability and non-probability sampling. A summary of the methods is 
given in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5: Sampling methods 
Probability sampling 
Simple random 
sampling  
Samples selected randomly 
Complex 
probability 
sampling  
 
 
 
 
 
Systematic sampling: Random selection of samples of population, every nth 
element.  
Stratified random sampling:  Population divided into groups known according to 
defined criteria (e.g. geographical areas or age groups) and then random selection 
of a sample from each group.  
Cluster sampling: Population divided into groups based on different criteria (e.g. 
hobbies, religion, etc.), then a random selection of the sample from each group. 
Area sampling: Associated with regions, involves random selection of samples 
from different regions (e.g. countries and villages). 
Double sampling: Sub-sample chosen from the first sample for further 
investigation to clarify results.  
Non-probability sampling 
Convenience 
sampling 
The researcher takes advantage of his/her convenient and available resources 
(e.g. contacts and position) to gather samples of participants for research.   
Purposive sampling The researcher chooses participants carefully to obtain the best sample able to 
provide the required information. 
 
In this research, both probability and non-probability sampling are used as appropriate 
in different data collection methods. In particular, stratified random sampling is used for 
questionnaires and experiments, whereas purposive sampling is used for interviews. 
Convenience sampling is used mainly in experiments where obtaining participant 
consent was a challenge and therefore the researcher took advantage of colleagues and 
friends to obtain consent to participate in the evaluation of the I-voting demonstration. 
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4.5  Research Process 
Since literature on I-voting in Qatar was found to be lacking, there was a need to define 
a planned research methodology to satisfy the research objectives. A review of I-voting 
in Qatar was therefore based on reviewing voting experience in the country using a 
questionnaire and interviews with domain experts to study the possibility and 
willingness to introduce I-voting in Qatar. The entire outcome from all data collection 
methods was analysed qualitatively and quantitatively. Consequently, an experiment 
was used to explore people’s acceptance of I-voting technology by demonstrating to 
them a standalone I-voting system. Later, an I-voting model was proposed, a prototype 
of which was evaluated by a sample of experts and the general public to ensure its 
effectiveness and fulfilment of voting principles. Finally, based on the conclusions 
drawn from the data collected, some effective recommendations were proposed for the 
Qatar government to adopt I-voting. These recommendations were then reviewed by 
experts in the field and were also assessed for their applicability in other countries. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the research process.  
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Figure 4.1: Research process 
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4.6 Summary 
This chapter has summarised the research methodology which forms the basis of the 
research. The research philosophy, approach and design were reviewed and selected 
carefully to suit the research and achieve its objectives effectively. Positivist and 
interpretivist philosophy both underlie this research in its investigation of the 
technological and social aspects of I-voting in Qatar. In addition, a combination of 
research approaches, constructive, nomothetic and idiographic, are applied subjectively.  
  
To achieve the research objectives effectively, various research designs are found to be 
appropriate, including a case study of I-voting in Qatar, modelling the present paper-
based voting system electronically and, finally, applying I-voting in Qatar based on 
action research. Moreover, different methods of data collection are applied, including 
surveys and experiments in which participants are chosen to represent the population by 
means of stratified random sampling, purposive sampling and convenience sampling. 
Finally, the data gathered are analysed qualitatively and quantitatively to derive 
valuable and effective findings. 
 
Chapter 5: Qatar Toward Internet voting 
 
111 
Chapter 5  Qatar Toward Internet voting 
 
This chapter provides an empirical study on the feasibility of I-voting in Qatar taking 
into account the country and citizens‟ readiness along with possible barriers for I-
voting. This chapter satisfies Objectives 4 and 5. 
 
5.1  Background  
Qatar is a very small Middle East Arab country which is also recognised as the State of 
Qatar and, in official terms, as an Emirate. It occupies a small area of approximately 
11,500 sq. km, about double the area of Lincolnshire, on the northeast coast of the 
Arabian Peninsula and on the border of Saudi Arabia to the south, and is otherwise 
surrounded by the Persian Gulf (QSA, 2009).  A passage from the latter separates Qatar 
from the nearest island, the nation state of Bahrain. Although Qatar is a small nation 
with a population of approximately 1.4 million (about double that of Leeds), it is 
estimated that native Qataris comprise approximately 200,000 of the population, it has 
the third largest gas reserves and highest per capita income in the world (QSA, 2009). It 
has been ruled by the Al-Thani Family since the 18th century (Bahry, 1999; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007a). 
 
Qatar has gone through enormous changes in the past few decades. There was a huge 
expectation of modernisation in the country but the western values have inundated Qatar 
with all kinds of modern technology. This became a major reason for a gap between the 
generations and also for losing some traditional values, especially among the younger 
generation (BTI, 2010). Qatar was once counted among the poorer countries of the 
world with a very small population but, with the discovery of its oil in the year 1940, it 
started on its way to modernisation. Along with economic growth, there has been much 
progress in human rights and politics. Qatar became independent from the UK on 3 
September 1971 and opted to continue with the hereditary form of government 
maintained by the Al-Thani family for many years (Bahry, 1999; CIA, 2008a).  
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The Emir is considered as a supreme leader of the nation and of any institution or 
individual, though in practice his rule is not so absolute. He is bound completely by 
Islamic perceptions and all his decisions regarding his public and private life are 
affected by the religious and ethical values of Islam (BTI, 2010). There is a separate 
advisory body named the Al-Shura Council, which is partially elected and holds the 
right to debate government decisions before they are approved.  
 
There were 16 Council of Ministers‟ posts in Qatar in 1992 and around 10 were 
occupied by the Al-Thani family. Qatar generates the highest per capita income in the 
world and, for this reason, there is no state tax for individuals and, at the same time, 
health care and education are provided free of charge for all Qataris (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007a). 
 
All the major decisions over the executive and legislative affairs in Qatar are made by 
the Emir. All political parties and labour unions were banned in 1976 and no elections 
were held until 1999 when the first municipal elections took place for the 29 member 
Central Municipal Council. For the first time in the history of the Gulf countries, 
women were allowed to vote and also to stand for office (Khalaf and Luciani, 2008).  
 
The ruling Al-Thani family continued to hold power even after the declaration of 
independence in 1971. The Emir was to be considered as the head of state but all rights 
to rule Qatar were to reside with the Al-Thani family. This was the time when Qatar 
started developing its political abilities and moving from a traditional society to being a 
modern welfare state. Later on, government departments were established to meet the 
needs of social and economic progress (BTI, 2010). The basic Law of Qatar (1970) was 
rooted in the Wahhabi Heritage and the provisional constitution allowed the existing 
system of traditional rule to continue and granted extensive powers to the Emir to rule 
the country. He was also granted the right to appoint and dismiss any of the Council 
ministers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007a). 
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The first political elections took place in 1999, and subsequently in 2003 and then in 
2007. Later on, in March 2003, the Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa bin Hamad Al-
Thani, wanted Qatari society to get further involved in politics as this could help the 
state to achieve a modernised democracy and also create strength and leadership skills 
in Qatari employees. A new constitution, accepted in a public referendum with 96.6% 
participation in 2003, proposed parliamentary elections with two-thirds of the members 
(30 out of 45) elected by citizens and the remaining 15 assigned by the Emir. 
Involvement of the people would provide training in all the areas important for 
parliamentary elections which were originally scheduled for 2004 but have been 
postponed to 2012 due to administrative issues. However, a new election law was 
approved in May 2008 which should address all problems delaying the election. To the 
author‟s knowledge from personal contact, the government has started working on 
developing an E-voting system (Khalaf and Luciani, 2008; BTI, 2010). Although 
parliamentary elections have not yet taken place, this would be significant progress to 
real democracy in Qatar. 
 
According to Amiri Diwan (2009), Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani stated, “We 
are on the threshold of a new epoch overlooking the 21st century where we aspire to 
attain the status befitting us.” 
 
5.2  Voting experience in Qatar 
In order to understand the voting system in a country, it is useful to first understand its 
political system and its governing criteria. Qatar is a politically stable nation. It does not 
have a well-defined democracy or a democratic government where the people choose 
their leaders, but follows a system of governance where a single head or a single leader 
controls the entire country and its affairs (BTI, 2010). The head of the country, the 
Emir, has complete control over the country and is solely responsible for the running of 
the nation. He is answerable only to a few, now 15 in number, of his close associates 
who constitute his cabinet or council (Bahry, 1999).  
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In the first municipal council elections in 1999, 248 candidates have participated, 
including six women, who were contesting for a 4-year term. These elections witnessed 
a participation of approximately 22,000 people (55% of eligible voters) who exercised 
their voting rights for the first time in Qatar‟s political history. The success of these 
elections built the foundation for a strong political base in the country (Bahry, 1999) 
which experienced its subsequent municipal voting in the years 2003 and 2007. 
 
In contrast to the 248 candidates in the first elections in 1999, the second municipal 
elections on 7 April 2003 saw only 78 contestants for the 29 seats. Four of them were 
unopposed, out of which three were female candidates who ran for top positions. The 
elections of 2003 thus saw the country‟s first female contestant to occupy a seat. 
Shaikha Yousef Hassan Al-Jufairi won the elections when her counterparts withdrew. 
However, one major setback which became the highlight of these elections was the poor 
voter turnout ratio. In contrast to the earlier or the first municipal elections which 
showed a voter participation of around 55%, the second elections of 2003 saw a voter 
turnout ratio of a mere 30% of the voting public (Bahry, 2010).  
 
A few variables could be behind the low turnout: (1) municipal elections do not change 
things in national government, (2) the inconvenience of the voting method, and (3) 
complacency. Complacency is a characteristic of Qatar culture (BTI, 2010), and this 
would mean voters are willing to vote only if it is easy, without having to queue for a 
long time or having to take part in a sequence of procedures to record their vote. 
Internet voting could, therefore, be useful to encourage voter participation.  
 
Voting in the third municipal elections took place on 1 April 2007 and saw an increased 
performance from the election point of view. These elections could be regarded as more 
successful than those of 2003 due to the increased number of candidates who stood, in 
addition to the increased percentage of voters who exercised their voting rights. The 
2007 elections had around 120 candidates in contrast to a mere 78 in 2003. Two 
contestants were unopposed in the elections which also returned three of the female 
candidates who contested the 29 seats. Shaikha Al-Jufairi became the only female 
contestant to occupy a leading position in the country for the second time when she 
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defeated her male counterparts with a huge margin of 90% of the vote. These elections 
also witnessed a greater voter turnout ratio of more than 50%. The government of Qatar 
played a prominent role in supporting the smooth running of the elections and special 
teams were formed to supervise the elections in accordance with the law of the country 
(Khalaf and Luciani, 2008).  
5.3  Corruption experience  
According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Hornby, 1995), „corruption‟ 
means „corrupting or „being corrupted‟. In any sphere of influence, this implies 
dishonest interference with the intended agenda of the matter or creating illegal defaults 
in the process, often with concealed financial inducement. Corruption is a widely 
present phenomenon in many fields and in many countries, as revealed by journalistic 
and other more formal investigations. It can take various forms, such as political 
corruption, data corruption, corruption in the various public services, etc., typically 
based on bribery and the granting of favours. Any type of corruption is harmful for the 
process or service which is intended to be carried out for the benefit of individuals or 
the general public. The Qatar constitution, in Articles 129-131 and 134, declares 
assurance of independence of the judiciary and of each single judge; accordingly, in 
1999, a Court of Cassation and the Supreme Judiciary Council were established. Later, 
in 2002, an independent public prosecution system was established, followed by an 
Administrative Court and a Constitutional Court in 2007, thus emphasising a clear 
development in the independence of the judicial system. In contrast, in 2002, Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani was accused of accepting irregular 
payments from a British defence company; however, the investigation was terminated 
and the case was most likely settled out of court. Furthermore, in 2005, three senior 
figures including two ministers were dismissed from employment as a result of 
fraudulent activities. This provides strong evidence of improving transparency and 
accountability and an example of separation between public funds and the royal family.  
 
Despite all challenges, Qatar has defeated corruption by a series of actions, such as 
being a signatory member of the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 
2005. Also, in 2008, Qatar hosted the “Corruption-free Asia Conference”, to fight 
corruption and to improve transparency and accountability. As a result of Qatar‟s hard 
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work towards being a democratic country, Qatar received global recognition, 
demonstrated in comments made by the Managing Director of Transparency 
International, Cobus De Swardt, with regard to successful implementation of “first 
steps” in the state‟s fight against corruption. (Aljazeera, 2009) 
 
According to the Corruption Perception Index 2010 (CPI, 2010), Qatar was recorded in 
the top 20 least corrupt countries in the world, where Transparency International ranked 
Qatar first among the Arab nations and 19th instead of 22nd recorded in 2009 among all 
178 listed countries and reported that Qatar made significant improvement over the 
2009 score. Furthermore, MENA reported that Qatar scored 7.7 among 178 countries, 
where 0 signified highly corrupt while 10 signified low level of corruption. 
  
Qatar has not had a major problem at the grass-roots‟ level although some corruption 
was alleged, involving just a few senior figures of the political system (BTI, 2010), 
which is not very common in the history of Qatar. However, such instances of 
corruption are found very rarely in Qatar, and this facilitates the introduction of I-
voting, which would be helpful to the population of the nation to overcome the digital 
divide where each voter has the equal access to services from the government (InfoDev, 
2002).  
 
5.4  Data collection method 
This section examines the barriers to I-voting in terms of technical and non-technical 
aspects and the willingness of the society to introduce I-voting in Qatar. Towards this 
aim, a combination of data collection methods were used: (1) a literature review focused 
on discussion of the key findings and future directions for the I-voting initiative in 
Qatar, and (2) interviews with a sample of experts, voters and candidates used to 
support the literature and to obtain more recent findings on the aspects which could 
make the State of Qatar willing to introduce I-voting. 
 
Three groups of respondents (voters, candidates and experts) were interviewed to 
explore the current voting system in Qatar and the difficulties faced with voting, along 
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with the feasibility of introducing I-voting, its opportunities and threats, how it would 
be implemented effectively and whether it could replace the current system. The first 
group of respondents were seven experts in the field of Information Technology (IT) 
and Information Systems (IS) within relevant organisations in Qatar. These interviewees 
provided a purposive non-random sample and were thus recruited by direct personal 
contact. The purpose of the interview was explained to each interviewee who was also 
provided with a list of the topics which it was hoped to cover. Confidentiality was 
assured in person and also in a covering note. Each interview was therefore semi-
structured, was held individually and lasted 45 – 60 minutes, depending on job role, 
with notes being taken by the researcher. The interviewees preferred note-taking rather 
than digital recording, so they could feel comfortable and secure and could also review 
and comment on a copy of the notes taken.  
 
The seven representative experts interviewed were as follows:  
 
1.  Head of IT department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
2.  Manager of Patient Care department, Ministry of Health (MOH) 
3.  Head of IT, Ministry of Interior (MOI)   
4.  Manager of E-services, IBQ Bank (IBQ Bank)   
5.  Head of ISP, Q-Tel (Q-Tel)   
6. Manager of Incident Management, Supreme Council of Information and 
Communication Technology (ictQATAR)  
7.  Head of Prosecution, Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC)  
 
Due to limited resources the researcher was only able to interview a small proportion of 
candidates and voters. A random sample of 4 candidates from the 2007 election and 6 
voters, from different backgrounds was recruited using personal connections and 
convenience. These interviewees were briefed and interviewed individually, face-to-
face. They were asked 20 questions on the following 10 topics:  
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1. The feasibility of I-voting in Qatar 
2. Election procedure with or without I-voting 
3. Willingness to participate in and barriers to I-voting 
4. Government opinion and readiness   
5. Legislation and laws regarding the e-project (I-voting) 
6. The ability of the IT Infrastructure in Qatar to adopt I-voting 
7. Political opinions on introducing I-voting  
8. I-voting implications on security, privacy, accessibility, vote selling and the 
digital divide and recommendations to overcome those problems 
9. Increased turnout of voters 
10. The results of the survey conducted earlier in this research (see section 6.4). 
 
These interviews aimed to review public opinions on I-voting in comparison with the 
experts‟ view to see whether people would accept I-voting technology and whether they 
believed it would be effective. Consequently, the information gathered from the 
interviews was then analysed qualitatively to identify the main outcome. 
 
The sections below discuss the responses to the ten question topics.  
 
5.5  Feasibility of I-voting in Qatar  
The head of IT in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) claimed that rapid 
development in the country might make I-voting feasible and acceptable, especially 
since Qatar aims to lead the development in technology in the region. Similarly, the 
Ministry of Health (MOH), Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC), Q-Tel and IBQ bank 
experts believed I-voting was feasible and could increase participation and fulfil voting 
principles if it was designed with a solid and secure infrastructure.  
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The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and ICTQatar experts stated that it was not possible to 
introduce I-voting in the short term but maybe in the future, when people would be 
more capable of using such technology. Also, the issues associated with I-voting would 
have to be reviewed or maybe overcome, especially security, privacy and usability. 
They added, I-voting would be even more feasible if e-government infrastructure was 
used to provides very secure authentication using a Smart card and a digital signature as 
the person‟s signature (see section 3.4.1). 
 
5.6  Election procedure with or without I-voting  
The Head of IT in MOFA stated that in the current voting system, Qataris abroad vote 
for their preferred candidates safely and securely through the embassy of Qatar in the 
country and their votes are sent to Qatar in a diplomatic bag. Running the election in the 
embassy would meet all voting principles since all embassies are going to be provided 
with a very secure system where all the information is encrypted and transferred into a 
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) line or satellite communication, covering all 
Qatari embassies around the world. In addition, all communications are monitored and 
controlled by the MOFA in Qatar. He added Qatar is not yet prepared for ensuring 
reliable and secure voting from abroad until the project for connecting embassies is 
completed. In the cases where there is no embassy in the country, the State of Qatar 
collaborates with some other countries‟ embassies to cover some of the Qatari embassy 
duties. For example, in Kazakhstan there is no Qatari embassy but the Oman embassy 
provides such collaboration. The Qatar approach to solve the problem of citizens abroad 
by establishing a polling station per country would be costly.  This implies the need to 
use an I-voting system, so citizens abroad would be able to vote without the need to be 
physically at the embassy. Qatar would save time and cost since it would not require 
any polling station to be established abroad. 
 
The MOI and ICT Qatar interviewees stated that I-voting could be used alongside paper 
based voting, but there is a need first to make a study of I-voting and look at 
experiences with it elsewhere and then to carry out a feasibility study to look at the 
country-specific factors and whether it fulfills voting principles. They believed that 
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verification of voting and ensuring security, transparency and privacy are the prime 
considerations for I-voting and that accessibility and usability also have to be ensured. 
 
The MOH and SJC interviewees mentioned that voters unable to attend polling stations 
with valid reason could delegate someone to vote on his/her behalf (Proxy voting). This 
approach has some implications for ensuring privacy of voters, however it is legal and 
voters are responsible for assigning a trusted person to vote on their behalf. 
 
5.7  Qatar’s movement towards I-voting 
Qatar history of voting system has various levels, such as the municipal elections in the 
years 1999, 2003 and 2007 and the legislative elections during 2009. Thus, for a country 
which engages in the voting processes, it would be advisable to enhance the voting 
system to suit the convenience of the people and to carry out further development 
activities in the nation. I-voting would, therefore, be a potentially useful development 
for voters and for Qatar to be the first nation to introduce such a system for elections. 
Since Qatar has encountered rapid development for the last few years, developing its 
most important system of voting could maybe further raise its performance levels, 
according to the survey reported in Chapter 6. According to an interview held with 
Head of the IT department in MOFA, a large number of Qatari citizens living abroad 
exercise their rights by casting their votes for elections in their own country. He added, 
in such cases, Qatari citizen have to present themselves at the embassy of Qatar in the 
respective country and make their votes which are then carried to Qatar in diplomatic 
bags. Furthermore, he believed that technological developments in Qatar could pave the 
way for I-voting but it also needs all people to be aware of the technology, especially 
older people. However, he believed I-voting to be a superior and more favourable 
option for the Qatari citizen living abroad than for those who reside in the country. 
There are various aspects that should be considered before adopting I-voting. The 
following sections give a summary of the different aspects that make Qatar ideal for 
adopting the option of I-voting according to the literature and the experts that were 
interviewed. 
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5.7.1  Country size.   
As mentioned earlier, Qatar is a very small country with an area of approximately 
11,500 sq. km, with a population of approximately 1.4 million (QSA, 2008) of whom, 
however, approximately 350,000 were believed to be Qatari citizens (United States 
Department of State, 2005). The small size of a country such as Qatar provides an 
advantage for the implementation of any new country-wide initiative. Most interviewees 
believed the smaller country size makes it easier to make or bring about changes in the 
functioning of a particular system. Hence, it will be simple to introduce the concept of I-
voting in this country. Moreover, the introduction of I-voting in Qatar would be more 
economical and cheaper due to the smaller population size, thus facilitating the success 
of the concept of I-voting.  
 
5.7.2  Economic development.  
The economic development of a country plays a very important role in the all-round 
development of the nation reducing the opportunities for corruption in governments 
(Hazlett, 2003). Qatar is an economically developed country and has rich reserves of oil 
and gas. Being an oil-rich nation, it has an enormous amount of financial resources to 
support and develop its economy (Sambidge, 2009a). Qatar has been ruled by a single 
family since it gained independence from British rule, and this provides a major 
advantage to the nation in being politically stable, where its reserves are well-
maintained and taken care of by the ruler of the country. 
 
Qatar enjoyed a growth of 14% yearly compared to the UK‟s 0.7% since 2003; 
according to GDP it was ranked third highest in the world and per capita income 
reached $72,634 in 2007 compared to the UK which reached $36,600. The population 
growth was estimated to be 4.5% annually. Furthermore, Qatar had the lowest 
percentage of unemployment with 0.60%, compared to the UK‟s 5.5% (QSA, 2008). 
Qatar aims to make best use of its resources and financial abilities. It manages its 
resources and its developmental processes by investing the returns on oil, gas and 
petroleum into developing its infrastructure (Sambidge, 2009a). 
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One interesting development for Qatar is the presence of Internet connections in all its 
hospitals, thus facilitating the use of the Internet. Moreover, the hospital is equipped 
with a telephone line at the end of each patient room that can be connected to the 
Internet. According to the Manager of the Patient Care department in MOH, this facility 
can be useful for sick and disabled people who often vote from the hospital. Moreover, 
the Head of IT in MOI stated there are plans to use the network of self-service kiosks in 
public areas for election voting. Thus, a country such as Qatar with strong monetary and 
IT infrastructure and with a vision of transforming itself into a knowledge-based society 
is capable of building a more participative form of government by encouraging I-voting, 
debating and sharing of information (Reynolds and Regio, 2001; Bonham et al., 2001; 
InfoDev, 2002; Davison et al., 2005). 
 
5.7.3  Educational development.  
The State of Qatar has a very strong and educated base of citizens. The country has a 
sound education system that focuses on the quality of education imparted to its people. 
It has a good relationship with the topmost educational institutions of the world 
including those of the US and the UK. Under the guidance of H.H Sheikha Mozza, the 
wife of the Emir, the government has developed well-planned educational facilities for 
its female population. The government has educational plans for its people according to 
which every child has to attend classes from kindergarten till high school (H.H. Sheikha 
Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, 2009).  
 
During recent years, Qatar has seen a large improvement in its educational system, in 
2005 3.3% of GDP was invested in the education sector (CIA, 2009a). The Educational 
Foundation of Qatar has collaboration with many universities of the USA such as Texas 
A&M University, Virginia Commonwealth University and Georgetown University. 
Many leading American universities have opened branches in the State of Qatar which 
contribute towards providing quality education. As a consequence, recently Qatar 
became attractive for students, mainly from GCC Countries, due to the world-class 
universities in one place (QSA, 2008). In addition, various medical colleges and 
research centres have also been developed which attract students from all over the world 
to the world-class education system provided by the country. There is also a sound IT 
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curriculum and use of the Internet is provided for students at school and university 
levels (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007c). According to UNDP (2009), Qatar has 
improved its literacy rate to reach 93%. On the other hand, although Qatar is showing 
great improvement in the education sector, the literacy rate is still below the average of 
95% in the developed nations (AME info, 2004). Interviews with the ictQATAR experts 
claimed that all schools have computer classes and a majority of employees are asked to 
join various forms of computer courses to be better skilled with computer programs, 
thus making it easier for people to readily accept any computer-related change in the 
country. 
 
In conclusion, educational development has not only improved people‟s general literacy 
but also their computer literacy, making ICT a compulsory subject taught at all 
education levels, and has encouraged an increase in Internet users, thus making it easier 
for people to readily accept any computer-related change in the country. This has raised 
Qatar‟s suitability for I-voting.  
 
5.7.4  Technology development.  
The ictQATAR interviewee stated that I-voting is part of an existing E-government 
project in Qatar and the MOI expert stated that Qatar has the IT infrastructure needed 
for I-voting. This was supported by the Qtel expert who claimed that as an ISP, Qatar 
has state-of-the-art technology to develop I-voting. The MOI and ictQATAR experts 
stated that there is currently a plan for e-voting by using an ATM machine, but it is not 
yet running because of technical and political difficulties and the need for more research 
and approval. However, the MOI expert claimed that Qatar is now capable of 
introducing an I-voting system both politically and technically. 
 
Moreover, Qatar has a very strong network of telecommunications, roads and transport, 
seaports, postal services, airports and various other services to support communication 
links (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007b; INTELSAT, 2010). In addition to this, the 
country has effective national and international communication services. the 
government has taken steps to set up individual bodies to regulate air transport, postal 
services and seaport affairs. These areas are regulated by the Civil Aviation Authority, 
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the Postal Service Authority and the Customs and Port Authority, respectively (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2007b). 
 
One of the most important aspects is the evolution of the telecommunication system in 
the State of Qatar. In 1987, Qatar Telecom (Q-tel) was established as the major provider 
of telecommunication services for the people of Qatar. The services include a Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network, Internet access, e-commerce and 
the launch of the fibre optics cable between Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007b), thus fulfilling its role as the major telecommunication partner 
in Qatar. Q-Tel is solely responsible for improving the standard of telecommunication 
in the country and has introduced various mobile services such as short messaging 
service (SMS), voice messaging and a pre-paid card service. In addition, according to 
the CIA (2009), Q-tel reaches 2,472 million mobile subscriber and 285,300 thousand 
customers by landline. Moreover, it played a very prominent role in developing the 
Internet technology to fulfil and improve the communication criteria by introducing a 
fast Internet service, broadband facilities, etc. (Greenway and Robinson, 2000). 
 
In August 2004, the Supreme Council for Information and Communication Technology 
(SCICT, ictQATAR) was established, acting as the main regulatory authority in Qatar  
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007b). IctQATAR aims to build an advanced knowledge-
based research centre to extend the use of IT, developing and leading the national 
strategic vision relating to ICT initiatives in government, business, education, health, 
cyber security, market development and knowledge management. In 2006, a new 
telecommunications law was launched, mainly for organising competition and dominant 
service providers (ICT Qatar, 2009a; ICTQatar, Decree Law No. (34) of 2006  ).  
 
In addition, the country has invested in ship-to-shore communication that helps to carry 
messages between land and sea and also in satellite communication. IctQATAR 
announced, in 2007, the licensing of Vodafone as a second telecommunication company 
operating in Qatar. Vodafone launched its service in 2009 and acquired an 18% share of 
the mobile market in less than a year (AME Info, 2008; ICT Qatar, 2009b). Vodafone in 
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Qatar currently provides only a mobile network. Fixed lines and the Internet are not yet 
not offered, but delivery is expected in the near future (Vodafone, 2009).  
 
As result, Qatar has been ranked in the top 30 in the world for governmental readiness 
and usage of ICT (Global Information Technology Report, 2008-2009; ICT Qatar, 
2009f). Also the ICT infrastructure is one of the regional broadband leaders in the Arab 
world (Sofiane 2005, cited in Al-shafi and Weerakkody, 2007). The interviewees from 
Q-tel and ICTQatar expressed the belief that there is a solid infrastructure that can 
support the introduction of I-voting technology with the massive improvement in the 
telecommunication sector and the government readiness to invest in technology. 
 
 All these considerations support the idea of introducing I-voting in Qatar with its 
development of IT and communications which could form a reliable infrastructure for 
an I-voting system. 
 
5.7.5  The large number of Internet users 
There has been a substantial growth in the number of Internet users in Qatar in the past 
few years. The number had reached 436,000 by 2008 and this was expected to reach the 
500,000 mark by the year 2011 (CIA, 2008a). With the increase in technology and 
telecommunications, the Internet is making its own space in this country for carrying 
out different operations in various fields such as E-government, Internet banking and e-
commerce. It was estimated that the Internet user rate increased from 2000 to 2009 by 
1,353% due to the rapid rate of development in Qatar (Internet World Stats, 2009b). 
which positioned Qatar as the second highest growth of Internet usage in the Gulf 
region after Saudi Arabia (Internet World Stats, 2009b). Though the speed of the 
Internet provided to the people in Qatar is only 8 Mbps as a maximum, which is below 
the normal levels used in the major developed countries such as the US and the UK 
which use at least 20 to 50 Mbps, this medium has succeeded in attracting people to use 
it. However, the price for use of the Internet is high in Qatar (from 200 to 600QR, about 
33 to 100GBP, depending on Internet speed) when compared to the other countries. 
However, the cost issues are likely to be resolved in the near future due to competition 
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between Q-tel and Vodafone. Qatar people have already benefited from a decrease in 
mobile service prices and have received a better quality service. Such an example was 
in April 2009, when Q-Tel Business users benefited from Free Internet Broadband 
Business ADSL Speed Upgrade (Qtel, 2009d).  
 
Also, the Secretary General of Information and Communication Technology launched 
the I-park initiative through ictQATAR in collaboration with the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Agriculture in March 2007. I-park is a free wireless Internet service to 
increase the use of the Internet by the people of Qatar. This Internet service, in 
accordance with the ictQATAR standards, is provided in public places such as parks, 
etc., thus making it accessible to a large number of people at an economical price 
(ICTQatar, 2007). Most interviewees believed that I-park will facilitate the process of 
I-voting, but it is still not accessible to all people, as some might not have a computer or 
even the knowledge required to operate such a system. Furthermore, the expert from the 
MOH mentioned in the interview that Internet technology is available in Qatar hospitals 
for patients to vote, free of charge, so I-voting would become accessible to all patients.  
 
Moreover, the expert from ICT commented that providing this service free of charge has 
succeeded in attracting the general public to use the Internet. Such steps taken by the 
government play a major role in enhancing and improving the role of the Internet in the 
lives of the people of Qatar, giving them the benefit of this technology. This then 
provides support for the proposal to introduce and establish I-voting in this country (Al-
shafi and Weerakkody, 2010).  
 
5.7.6  Transformation to e-commerce 
e-commerce is a rapidly evolving area wherein businessmen can fulfil their various 
objectives and can simplify their businesses with the help of Internet. With the increase 
in technology and communication, the GCC countries have considered e-commerce as a 
major priority for enhancement (GCC Secretariat General, 2001). Interviewees from 
IBQ, Q-tel, ICTQatar and the MOI claimed that Qatar is making an effort to transform 
business to e-commerce and is coping well with the development and, today, most 
business transactions in Qatar are carried out electronically (Al-shafi and Weerakkody, 
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2007). With ever increasing development in the field of technology, most of the 
companies in Qatar are transforming their operations to e-commerce (QSTP, 2007). 
Qatar is in the first stages of e-commerce adoption (Ashrafi et al., 2007; QSTP, 2007) 
but the experts expect ongoing uptake of e-commerce with the continuing development 
of the Qatar economy and enhancement of computer literacy. 
 
In addition to e-commerce, another upcoming area of advanced technology, paving their  
way in the business world of Qatar, are e-services. This area of development uses the 
Internet to provide services to people which were originally provided in person. The 
Qatar government has been keen to provide e-services, including e-education, e-health 
and e-government (ICT Qatar, 2009d)., Most developing countries are planning to 
implement e-government services comparable to those implemented in most developed 
countries (Accenture 2006; Chircu and Lee, 2005; World Markets Research Centre, 
2001). In Qatar, e-government called Hukoomi, was introduced in July 2000 by the 
Ministry of Interior, offering many government services (e.g. paying for traffic 
violations, applying online for visas and permits). In 2005, the success of the Qatar E-
government was considered in a UN Global e-government readiness report, being 
ranked as number 62 worldwide and as a best practice for western Asia (UN, 2005). 
High growth in the number of visitors and transactions reached QR 428 in million in 
2009 compared to QR 237 million in 2007, with total revenues reaching QR 930 million 
in 2005 (ICT Qatar, 2009e). 
 
According to the interview with the Head of IT in the MOI, Qatar has a wide usage of 
secure e-services such as those using smart cards, biometrics, and digital signatures in 
E-government services, thus facilitating the addition of more and better e-services. This 
step further enhances the global position of Qatar as one of the emerging and 
developing nations, thus facilitating new companies to invest their money in developing 
their businesses in the country. The interviewee from ictQATAR believed there is a 
high acceptance from the people of Qatar of various new and improved e-forms such as 
the e-passport, E-government, e-gate (for airport immigration control), etc., hence 
accepting that the system of I-voting would not be a cultural hindrance in the country. 
This is also supported by literature (ictQATAR, 2009). 
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This fast transformation has led to the growth in the number of Internet users 
communicating online with organisations, motivating the introduction of I-voting 
technology as an enhancement for the e-democracy plan. 
 
5.7.7  Political 
The Head of IT in MOFA discussed the political point of view on I-voting. He believed 
I-voting will affect the monitoring of voting practice and the voting experience, 
including media coverage. In his view, it will affect voting practice where a lot of 
people will not go to polling stations to vote. Basically, the country and people will thus 
miss the voting experience, including media coverage of voting practice. He added that 
the law and transparency still remain the main political considerations and barriers to 
implementing such a system. Regarding transparency, he believed the Qatari 
government has developed strong relationships with its citizens and there is a coherent 
trust of the government.  
 
The ictQATAR expert said that as a political consideration, there is a fear of failure of 
such a system which might have negative consequences for government trust. However, 
the MOI expert stated that the political system would encourage development of I-
voting as it could ensure transparency. Nevertheless, most interviewees pointed to the 
political fears regarding security associated with I-voting and the possibility of a rising 
vote selling problem which might affect government trust. 
 
5.7.8  Election law  
Voting rights are seen in countries that follow a strict democratic form of government. 
In countries such as India, which is known as the world‟s largest democracy, all citizens 
attain the right to vote at the age of eighteen, as in the UK. Similarly, every country 
practising democracy has its norms and policies regarding the power conveyed to its 
citizens to exercise their voting rights.  
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The Head of Prosecution of the Supreme Judiciary Council claimed the state of Qatar 
does not follow a strict form of democracy and has certain rules that govern its political 
system. For example, since the country has been ruled by the Al-Thani family since its 
independence, formation of any kind of political party is considered illegal. However, 
candidates can contest elections to occupy different positions in various departments of 
the government institutions or government centres. He added, one major rule that 
governs this policy is that members of the police force or the armed forces cannot be 
contestants or exercise their voting power to select any contesting candidate. Voting 
rights are granted to the people of the country on attaining the age of 18, when they are 
legally considered to be an adult and can, therefore, exercise their voting power.  
 
The State of Qatar has strict regulations regarding its political security. The government 
has various rules and laws in practice that govern and prohibit the formation of any 
political parties. However, a law was passed in May 2004 that granted permission to 
form private institutions and professional centres but which were given restrained 
powers, so as to have minimal influence over the politics of the State. In addition, all the 
managerial activities and official appointments dealing with the private institutions were 
required to gain approval from the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing 
(Khalaf and Luciani, 2008). An improvement in this law came about in May 2005, 
which relaxed the imposed restrictions dealing with managerial affairs but which 
restricted these operations and rights to the citizens of Qatar aged 18 and above and 
forbade any affiliation to groups outside the country. 
 
A survey by the Worldwide Press Freedom Index ranks Qatar in 79th position in a list 
of about 170 countries, thus highlighting the liberal operation of mechanisms inside the 
state. This gives a positive hope for the concept of I-voting to be introduced in the 
country with high chances of success (BTI, 2010). 
 
Since Qatar is an Arab country which follows the Muslim religion of Islam, the law 
operating in the State of Qatar is based upon the „Shariah‟ which is the set of rules and 
justice followed according to the Islamic religion. Qatar has various laws for all the 
processes relating to the national interest and follows a varied view of rule 
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implementation. The laws are neither too strict nor too liberal so as to harm the dignity 
of the nation. However, Qatar has a few sets of rules and laws which are totally distinct 
from the other nations of the Gulf which follow the same religion. 
 
The first and the foremost law regards the nationality of the people. The State laws 
forbid the practice of dual citizenship, i.e. a citizen of Qatar is not allowed to hold 
citizenship of any other country at the same time. Apart from this, it has various liberal 
laws which are not found in other Gulf nations (BBC News, 2009). These include the 
permission to open public bars and night clubs; however, these operate only in 
expensive and luxurious hotels (Greenway and Robinson, 2000).  
 
Based upon this analysis, Qatar possesses a liberal set of laws which can be amended 
for modernisation and advancement of the country and this can be used in promoting the 
concept of I-voting. The interview with the Head of Prosecution in the Supreme 
Judiciary Council claimed the government of Qatar would not raise objections to this 
concept on condition that the voting process retains the manual voting that has been 
practised in the country since voting began. It should be clear, transparent, secure and 
private. The interviewees from the MOI and ictQATAR mentioned there is a new e-law 
developed by ictQATAR in collaboration with MOI which has been prepared but has 
not yet been approved by the government. Both added that the government of Qatar has 
built a strong relationship of trust with its citizens over a period of time. Ironically, the 
interviewees believed the political willingness and the absence of a strong law regarding 
Internet voting might benefit introducing this system in Qatar. However, with no 
protection for Internet users because of the lack of any e-law in Qatar, Qatari voters 
would have concerns on ensuring their security through electronic channels. Research 
by Al-hamar et al. (2010) has pointed to the effect of Qatar culture and country-specific 
factors in making citizens vulnerable to online crimes with the clear absence of Qatar e-
law. Therefore, protecting online voters should be considered along with cultural and 
country factors to assist in the introduction of I-voting.  
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5.7.9  Culture 
Culture refers to the set of values and traditions followed by the people of a country in 
their day-to-day life activities. Culture defines the use of principles and processes to 
deal with everyday situations and to confront problems in a well-defined manner 
according to the rules of their religion. Since Qatar follows the Shariah or the Islamic 
set of rules and regulations in the governing of the country, it is essential that any new 
processes or proposals introduced in the country should be within the acceptable limits 
of the national culture. However, a country is not only a home to its nationals but is also 
a destination for people from all over the world who stay in this country for education, 
tourism, employment, etc. Around 80% of the population is Muslim, 6.5% Christian and 
the remaining 13.5% belong to different religions (CIA, 2008a; QSA, 2008; U.S. 
Department of State Diploma in Action, 2007). Qatar culture is influenced by the 
Islamic religion and traditions which have a major impact on people‟s daily life 
behaviour. However, even with the rapid development encountered, Qatar has 
maintained its culture with the support of the Ministry of Culture and the Arts which 
aims to preserve Qatar culture and heritage (Ministry of Culture, Art and Heritage, 
2008; Al-hamar et al., 2010).  
 
The government of Qatar has liberal laws when compared to other Islamic nations of the 
Gulf and, despite the varied diversity of the Qatari population, the Qatari people still 
seem to be trustful, helpful, generous and good willed (Al-hamar et al., 2010). The 
ability of the culture of Qatar to adapt to the multi-ethnic living of Qataris (CIA Facts, 
2008; Al-hamar et al., 2010), rapid developments and modernisation means the 
introduction of a new concept such as I-voting would not prove to be a hindrance for the 
culture of the country. Recently, Qatar was the first Arabic country to win the bid to 
host the 2022 FIFA World Cup (FIFA, 2010). All interviewees pointed out the 
government‟s outstanding achievement in keeping itself updated with the continuously 
evolving technologies across the world in all sectors and in supporting the nation‟s 
development. As I-voting is considered to be a simple technological process, it should 
not face any major objection from the government of the country and should be easily 
and effectively introduced in the nation if it is correctly designed. This implies 
considering the cultural and country specific factors while designing I-voting, taking 
into account people acceptance to such new technology.  
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5.8  Barriers to I-voting  
Although, there is an obvious Government readiness and willingness for I-voting in 
terms of politics, technology and accessibility, I-voting still faces concerns over 
security, privacy, accuracy, getting people‟s acceptance and eliminating the possibility 
of vote selling. Still, government approval of such a system and ensuring trust in the 
system are essential to achieve success. This implies that although there is a lot of 
willingness towards I-voting, there are still many barriers which need to be addressed to 
introduce I-voting in Qatar in the near future. 
 
5.8.1  e-Law 
The majority of interviewees claimed the e-law discussed in section 5.7.8 is on the way 
to approval. The law involves all topics associated with electronic communications and 
is being developed by ictQATAR in cooperation with other related bodies including the 
SJC and the MOI. The law will protect online consumers‟ rights. The law does not 
permit verification for voting because it may be used for vote selling. The Head of IT in 
MOFA stated that the approved Internet law would encourage I-voting. In contrast, the 
interviewee from the MOH‟s view was opposed to voting through the Internet as he 
thought there is no need to change the law and provide an e-law since voting in 
elections in Qatar runs smoothly. The MOI expert, however, suggested there should be 
development of an e-election law to assist the introduction of e-voting.  
 
The Head of Prosecution of the SJC claimed that in Qatar law there is nothing to say 
that I-voting is not allowed. If it is proved that it fulfills all of the voting principles, then 
why should it not be applied? However, it could be applied as an experiment to assess 
its effectiveness alongside the traditional voting system, and also to assess people‟s 
acceptance. He added that override voting (allowing a person to change their vote 
within the voting time frame) is a complex feature which the current law does not allow 
because it could be used for vote selling as voters might change their vote several times 
in order to sell it to different candidates. Although some might say the override is a 
valid option, especially for people who might be intimidated and forced to vote for a 
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specific candidate, this is, however, difficult to prove and therefore he still believed 
overriding is not a valid option. Moreover, he pointed out that Qatar law does not allow 
for source-code to be made available to the public to avoid it being used by malicious 
people who wish to hack into the system and manipulate voting results. However, work 
still need to be done on e-law to facilitate I-voting, this implies the need for 
collaboration with information security expertise and election committees towards 
identify all the possible threats might face election process and embed them in the E-
law. Furthermore, having a separate section covering e-election is advisable to protect 
election process from possible electronic threats. 
  
5.8.2  Accessibility and Accuracy 
All interviewees stated that I-voting would increase voting turnout by providing 
accessibility. The sample of four candidates and six voters interviewed believed I-voting 
would aid accessibility, especially for voters unable to come to polling stations, as they 
could vote over the Internet at any time. The MOI and ICT experts claim that it 
facilitates the efforts of the voting committee, since votes are counted automatically 
through the website and this might reduce human errors and save the time and effort 
required for counting votes manually. Experts from the MOFA, MOH and Qtel claimed 
that Internet voting would provide accessibility and privacy for voters as they can vote 
freely online at any time.  
The interviewees from Qtel and the IBQ Bank said that Internet voting as an option 
would provide a fast voting process with no need to wait in queues, and this would 
increase voting participation due to accessibility, especially for those who cannot come 
to polling stations, such as patients in hospital, Qataris abroad and old and disabled 
people. The interviewee from the MOH stated that I-voting would facilitate the voting 
process for patients unable to vote in polling stations compared to the current voting 
system which allows patients to vote in an election by an arrangement set up upon 
patient request, where the judge will simply come to the patient personally to collect 
his/her vote manually, which is time-consuming and costly. 
 
The Head of IT in MOFA added that I-voting could be considered as an appropriate 
option for Qatari voters abroad due to the accessibility, Government willingness to 
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introduce new technologies, E-government project infrastructure, and citizen computer 
literacy.  
 
However, there are number of barriers to accessibility and accuracy which most 
interviewers mentioned such as the lack of 100% computer literacy, and the lack of 
100% access to computers and Internet technology. Also, resistance to change is one of 
the barriers that should be considered were some of interviewed mentioned people 
resistance to change to I-voting even when they have the enough computer literacy and 
accessibility to the Internet and that due to their preference of traditional voting which 
they get used to and the fear of missing voting experience.  
 
5.8.3  Security, privacy and usability 
The majority of interviewees listed the main barriers faced or expected to be faced in 
the uptake of I-voting in Qatar are getting people‟s acceptance of such technology, 
especially considering the security, transparency, vote selling, missing voting 
experience and privacy issues, and the huge potential threat of hackers on the Internet 
nowadays. According to Waldrop (1999), “There is virtually no software that can't be 
hacked and most anything in a computer can be hacked”. This means there is a 
possibility for hackers to penetrate I-voting and manipulate results. The MOI expert 
asserted that security can be implemented but it might affect usability and accessibility. 
The interviewee from the SJC stated that ensuring security is an issue, especially with 
possible threats from hackers on the Internet. Both the MOI and SJC experts believed 
that there is a possibility of infringing the privacy of a voter. In addition, the expert from 
IctQATAR stated that it is complex to achieve the same degree of privacy as in paper 
based voting. 
 
The Head of IT in the MOFA mentioned the need for technical and non-technical 
solutions to secure I-voting but fear of a new type of attack remains a problem. 
However, the interviewees from the MOI, IBQ Bank, Q-tel and ictQATAR all claimed 
that the security aspect of I-voting can be assured technically with an acceptable 
percentage of error. The MOI and ictQATAR experts pointed out that, so far, the E-
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government website had never become unavailable as a result of an attack, although 
they have received many attacks from different countries. However, IT experts from Q-
cert and ICT, MOI and Qtel are collaborating to prevent and eliminate these attacks. 
The interviewees from Qtel and the IBQ bank stated that I-banking has a proven track 
record of success in security, people acceptance and trust. Therefore, Qatar could learn 
from I-banking in developing I-voting. However, I-voting is different to I-banking 
because voting is done anonymously, unlike in a bank where everything is recorded and 
can be traced. 
 
Most interviewees spoke of the importance of getting people‟s acceptance and ensuring 
the usability of the system for all voters regardless of their computer knowledge. The 
interviewee from the MOH believed that older people would experience real problems 
in dealing with computers but, on the other hand, the new generation would welcome 
such a system. Therefore, they need to be involved in training and awareness sessions 
on how to use the system successfully and securely to eliminate the resistance to 
change, digital and social divides and usability issues.  The Head of IT in the MOFA 
and the MOI claimed, Qatar is taking huge steps to improve education and to make 
learning computer technology a priority in the academic sector and in all jobs, this 
would assist people's acceptance of I-voting technology.  
 
According to Al-hamar et al. (2011a, 2011b) Qatar is considered an attractive 
environment for e-crimes due to the lack of some Qatari‟s absorption of the rapid 
technological advances, the lack of laws to handle e-crime and availability of large 
number of unaware Internet users in terms of information security. This implies the 
essential need for consideration of the security of I-voting and enhancing people‟s 
awareness on how to use I-voting technology, and how to protect themselves from 
possible e-crime associated with the client-side of I-voting to providing a secure I-
voting system on both client and server-side by applying the best practice security 
controls. 
5.9  Summary of expert interviews 
The interviews with experts are summarised in matrix form in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of expert interview responses 
 Increas
e 
turnout 
Law Technology Political Security Privacy Accessibility - 
Mobility 
Vote 
selling 
Digital divide 
Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs  
Yes 
Internet law 
would 
encourage I-
voting 
Qatar not prepared for 
voting from abroad 
until connection of 
embassies is 
completed 
Will affect 
monitoring of 
voting practice, 
missing voting 
experience, 
including media 
coverage of 
voting practice. 
Technical and 
non-technical 
solution can 
secure I-voting 
but fear of new 
type of attack 
remains  
Internet voting 
provides more 
privacy 
Computer can 
use some devices 
to make it 
accessible  
Will 
increase 
Government 
should 
provide free 
Internet 
Ministry of 
Health 
Yes 
No need to 
change the law 
None None 
Security will still 
be barrier in 
I-voting. Is it 
going to be as 
secure as 
traditional 
voting? 
No-one must 
know voter 
choice 
Older people 
would experience 
real problems 
Will 
increase 
Government 
should 
provide free 
Internet 
Ministry of 
Interior 
Yes 
E-election law 
should be 
introduced. 
Qatar has IT 
infrastructure needed 
for I- voting 
Political system 
would encourage 
development of 
I-voting which 
could ensure 
transparency 
Security can be 
implemented, but 
usability and 
accessibility 
would be 
affected 
No software that 
cannot be hacked 
and most 
anything in a 
computer can be 
hacked 
Computer can 
use some devices 
to make it 
accessible 
Will 
increase 
Government 
should 
provide free 
Internet 
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 Increas
e 
turnout 
Law Technology Political Security Privacy Accessibility - 
Mobility 
Vote 
selling 
Digital divide 
Q-Tel Yes 
Current e-law 
with election 
law could work 
with minor 
changes 
As ISP, Qatar has 
state of art technology 
to develop I-voting 
Fear of using 
I-voting for 
commercial or 
political purposes 
I-banking has 
proved its 
security and 
people accept 
and trust it, so 
use of such 
technology in I-
voting would be 
effective. 
I-voting provides 
more privacy 
Computer can 
use some devices 
to make it 
accessible 
Will 
increase 
Government 
should 
provide free 
Internet 
ictQATAR Yes 
ictQATAR has 
developed e-law 
Covers 
e-commerce, 
e-transactions, 
e-signatures, 
e-documents 
and 
authentication 
Internet voting part of 
existing E-
government project in 
Qatar. Besides 
designing Internet 
voting, need to apply 
best model 
Fear of failure of 
such a system 
which might 
have negative 
consequence for 
government trust 
Qatar can 
develop secure 
Internet voting 
Complex to 
achieve same 
degree of privacy 
as in paper based 
voting 
Computer can 
use some devices 
to make it 
accessible 
Will 
increase 
Government 
should 
provide free 
Internet 
Supreme 
Judiciary 
Council 
Yes 
Qatar should 
develop new 
law for Internet 
voting. Lack of 
legal 
requirement to 
use I-voting 
Question for MOI, 
ictQATAR and Qtel 
Qatar interested 
in being first 
country to apply 
state of the art 
technology in an 
election 
Ensuring security 
an issue, 
especially with 
possible huge 
threats from 
Internet hackers 
Possibility of 
infringement of  
voters‟ privacy 
becomes a 
problem 
Computer can 
use some devices 
to make it 
accessible 
Will 
increase 
Government 
should 
provide free 
Internet 
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5.10  Summary of candidate and voter interviews 
Generally, interviews with four candidates and six voters have confirmed what the 
experts say with some differences, for example they were divided between those who 
supported I-voting and those who thought it was not feasible due to the difficulty in 
getting people‟s acceptance and giving them knowledge on how to use such a system. 
This implies that I-voting is feasible, but only with consideration of people‟s acceptance 
and knowledge of how to use such a system. Furthermore all of the election candidates 
commended the low corruption in Qatar, and this provides motivation for the promotion 
of I-voting to boost electronic democracy with minimal risks. Also, all interviewed 
voters believed that the voting was corruption free, showing a great trust in the 
government and most show a great interest in I-voting with some concerns on the 
security aspects associated with such new technology. 
 
Furthermore, the majority of interviewed candidates suggested I-voting could be applied 
as an alternative way of voting alongside the traditional voting system. They also 
suggested having an experiment to obtain an estimation of people‟s acceptance and 
whether it would increase participation levels and fulfil all voting principles. Similarly 
most of voters recommended using I-voting alongside with paper-based voting for 
redundancy and to give voters the choice to choose which one method of voting they 
prefer. This implies that I-voting could be used alongside paper based voting to provide 
flexibility and accessibility for voters. 
All candidates believe that there is support to introduce I-voting in Qatar including the 
huge development introduced in Qatar in many sectors including education and 
telecommunication which has assisted in increasing internet accessibility and computer 
literacy. an interview with voters provide further evidence that the government is ready 
in terms of technology with some fears to people's acceptance and resistance to change 
along with security and usability.  
 In contrast, most candidates point out to the barriers of I-voting in terms of ensuring 
voting principles including security, privacy, transparency, anonymity, usability and 
accessibility. They added there is a fear of losing government trust if those principles 
were not achieved in I-voting.  
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5.11  Conclusion 
This chapter determines the feasibility of I-voting in Qatar, based on a literature review 
and interviews. Seven representative experts were interviewed along with four 
candidates and six voters from different backgrounds. The interviewees were asked 
about the feasibility of I-voting and the knowledge required on how to use such a 
system, and they all concluded it would be feasible. The literature and interviews have 
identified the feasibility of I-voting in general, the possibility of modernised democracy 
and identified the willingness and barriers to introduce I-voting in Qatar. Research 
shows the willingness of Qatar to introduce I-voting due to various factors: educational 
development, technology development, the large number of Internet users, election law, 
the political aspect which does not bar the use of I-voting and Qatar‟s culture which 
supports the introduction of I-voting.  In contrast, there are many issues concerning I-
voting that need to be overcome, including ensuring security, privacy, usability, 
accessibility, accuracy and an e-law. This implies I-voting could be feasible, with 
government readiness and willingness pointing to the need for considering the possible 
barriers of such a voting system. It is therefore suggested that I-voting is provided as an 
alternative method of voting alongside the current paper based voting system. 
 
Further investigation is described in the next chapter to determine the people‟s values 
and opinions about I-voting in Qatar for a general election. 
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Chapter 6  Qataris’ Views on I-Voting 
 
This chapter describes a survey combining interviews and questionnaires to discover the 
willingness of Qataris to participate in I-voting in Qatar and the barriers that may 
prevent them from accepting it. The data has been gathered to enable recommendations 
to be made on designing such an election system. Therefore, this chapter satisfies 
objective 5 of the research (see Section 1.5). 
 
6.1  Aim of survey 
A survey was carried out to assess the confidence and willingness of Qatari citizens to 
take part in the initiative of I-voting and to find the barriers that would inhibit I-voting 
in Qatar. It was aimed to highlight willingness and barriers from the viewpoint of 
Qataris. The purpose was to enable recommendations to be made to the Qatari 
government to introduce and encourage the uptake of I-voting in the State of Qatar. 
Additionally, the questionnaire asked participants for their opinions on features needed 
in an I-voting system. 
 
6.2  Survey design  
According to Yin (2003), “The analysis of case study evidence is one of the least 
developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies’’. 
 
The research followed the design recommended by Myers and Avison (2002) to ensure 
smooth movement from objectives and questions, to theories, to specific data uncovered 
and, finally, to results and conclusions. The general approach was to use survey data to 
develop profiles for those people likely to use I-voting in Qatar. This carefully designed 
study followed a sequential explanatory strategy as explained by Creswell (2003). In the 
first instance, the population of the survey was defined as being all Qatari citizens, since 
the research focuses on the State of Qatar. However, the sampling was then further 
restricted to Qataris aged 18 and above, 18 being the legal voting age. The survey was 
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designed in Arabic as well as English versions, since Arabic is the national language in 
Qatar. It aimed to use simple and clear language and to be well structured in order to 
fulfil the ultimate aim of the survey. 
 
Before its implementation, the survey questionnaire was pilot tested by five researchers 
in the field of E-government, IT and Internet use. The researchers were recommended 
by the Supreme Council of Information & Communication Technology (ictQatar) and 
were selected according to their knowledge and experience of similar systems. Several 
subjects of the pilot test commented that they felt uncomfortable answering some of the 
questions, such as the technical questions about designing the application and a few 
questions about the “digital divide”. Most of the researchers also commented that the 
questionnaire was too long. The comments were taken into consideration and the survey 
was modified accordingly to make it more effective.  
 
The final form of the survey consisted of 11 simple questions arranged into 4 sections 
on background, willingness, barriers and features. Some questions were related to more 
than one section. Finally, the survey questionnaire was distributed by hand to a large 
number of Qatari public (about 4,000) with a return rate of 64.2% from governmental 
and private organisations across the country, using the drop-off and pick-up method, to 
ensure that only targeted participants (Qataris over 18) would contribute. The 
researcher’s sponsor provided a letter of support to make the survey distribution easier 
and to encourage a response (see Appendix A). The population sample for the survey 
was taken from addresses provided by organisations with which the researcher had 
contact.  The organisations contacted were the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Qatar Foundation, Qatar University, the North Atlantic College, Q-
Tel, ictQATAR, several banks, Qatar Petroleum and others (see Appendix A for more 
details). The organisations interested and willing to co-operate were asked to distribute 
the survey only to Qataris eligible to vote, and these organisations tried their best to 
ensure they followed the sampling criteria. 
 
Chapter 6: Qataris’ Views on I-Voting 
 
142 
 It took about one month to conduct the survey and collect responses.  Later, the data 
was analysed electronically using an online survey tool (www.proquestion.com) since it 
facilitates the analysis process and provides the feature of response filtering. 
 
 
6.3  Survey structure  
The survey questionnaire asked the participants about their opinions on the design of the 
I-voting system, the barriers I-voting may encounter and the willingness of Qataris to 
participate in I-voting. 
 
It included the following four individual sections:  
 
1. Demographics (age, gender, education, Internet and computer knowledge)  
2. E-services usage (online banking usage, experience)  
3. Confidence in the management and accuracy of general elections 
4. I-voting  
 
The aim of the survey was to discover barriers to, willingness to participate in, and the 
opinions on the required features for I-voting, in correlation with the participants’ 
demography. Willingness and barriers were derived from the participants’ response to 
questions on the use of online banking, and on participants’ confidence in the 
management and accuracy of general elections and on I-voting. Participants were also 
asked which of a list of system features would be required for an Internet voting 
(I-voting) system. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the structure of the survey questionnaire. 
The relationship of response choices to the willingness to participate in I-voting, 
barriers and system features is indicated accordingly. 
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Figure 6.1: Survey questions (Page 1) 
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Figure 6.2: Survey questions (Page 2) 
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6.4  Survey results and analysis     
The data gathered from the survey were analysed qualitatively and quantitatively. A 
summary of the results is as follows: 
 
 The total number of Qatari participants eligible to vote was 2,567, a 64.2% 
response rate. 
 The majority of participants (62%) were female. 
 The majority (52%) were aged 18 – 24 years. 
 Most participants (about 86%) were in further and higher education or had been 
educated to further or higher education level. 
 56% of participants had computer knowledge, ranging from having some 
knowledge to being pretty knowledgeable or expert. Less than 4% were novices 
in computing. 
 The majority of participants (73%) use e-services. 
 The majority of participants who are not using e-banking claim they prefer 
personal interaction (36%) or they do not think it is secure (25%). 
 With regard to I-voting, 29% think its major barriers are that the technology 
would be difficult for some people to use and 25% believe that computer 
hackers might influence election results. 
 About half of the participants (48%) were very confident about general elections 
in Qatar. 
 The majority (76%) would prefer voting online rather than in polling stations. 
 43% of the participants thought that use of websites for voting would be an 
excellent proposal for citizens abroad. 
 Most participants (70%) indicated they were comfortable with the idea of 
I-voting, and that it gave them confidence, ensured privacy and offered the 
ability to vote freely, though there was some doubt about security. 
 Half of the participants (50%) thought it is essential to ask voters for 
confirmation of their vote before casting it and to enable them to verify their 
votes online and through different channels, e.g. SMS and telephone.   
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6.4.1  Demography   
The majority of participants (62%) were female and the rest (38%) were male (see 
Figure 6.3) 
.  
Figure 6.3: Gender of respondents 
 
The results indicate that 52% of participants were aged 18 – 24, which reflects the fact 
that the majority have yet to complete their education (see Figure 6.4). 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Age of respondents 
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The largest group of participants (45%) were in or had completed further education and 
42% were in or had completed higher education. Less than 10% were at school or at 
postgraduate educational level (see Figure 6.5). 
 
Figure 6.5: Final/current education level of respondents 
 
56% of the participants have computer knowledge ranging from being pretty 
knowledgeable to expert, and about 40% had some or average knowledge level. Less 
than 4% considered themselves to be absolute beginners (see Figure 6.6). This is a good 
sign for the vision of I-voting since the majority of Qatari citizens have the knowledge 
required to use such a system.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Computer knowledge of respondents (Self-rated) 
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6.4.2  Willingness to participate in I-voting  
The use of e-commerce or e-services was not high: about 42% of the participants do not 
use e-commerce or e-services, about half of the rest use it very rarely (29%), only 12% 
use it once a week or more. This might be because most of the questionnaire 
participants were students of young age (between 18-20 years old) who do not have the 
income to perform such transactions (see Figure 6.7). However, more than half (58%) of 
them have used e-commerce before and therefore this indicates they are likely to be 
capable of using I-voting as it employs a similar process, except that they would be 
choosing their preferred candidate instead of choosing a product or a service. 
   
 
Figure 6.7: Frequency of use of e-services 
 
About half (48%) of the participants were very confident about general elections in 
Qatar, considering them to be fair and accurate. This confidence would be an advantage 
for the vision of I-voting. About one third were not sure and about 13% had mid-range 
confidence and only 4% had no confidence in the national election process. Although 
there is high confidence in elections in Qatar, I-voting would need to be efficient and 
successful to avoid losing it (see Figure 6.8). 
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Figure 6.8: Confidence in elections in Qatar 
 
More respondents would prefer to vote online than in polling stations (37% compared to 
24%), but a significant number (39%) did not commit themselves strongly either way 
(see Figure 6.9). 
 
Figure 6.9: Preference for I-voting 
 
Furthermore, 43% of the participants thought that the use of websites to vote was an 
excellent proposal for citizens abroad, but nearly half (49%) thought it would be better 
to go to the Qatar embassy to vote and a few (8%) thought it would be better for citizens 
abroad to vote by phone and other channels such as mail. This means there are a 
significant percentage of people who would trust I-voting, even from abroad. Although 
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this is less than half, it is a good indicator that they could trust I-voting given suitable 
safeguards and assurances (see Figure 6.10). 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Voting method for citizens abroad 
 
With regard to whether the participants felt comfortable with using an I-voting system, 
slightly more (30%) felt comfortable than those who did not (27%).  
A significant number (43%) did not commit themselves strongly either way (see Figure 
6.11).  
 
 
Figure 6.11: Comfortable feelings with I-voting 
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These results reflect the preference for I-voting compared with voting at the polling 
station shown in Figure 6.9, though it is interesting that slightly more said they would 
prefer I-voting than those who were comfortable to use it. This shows the desire for I-
voting is stronger than people’s readiness to use it. The results show a similar pattern for 
people’s confidence in their voting privacy with I-voting. More people (35%) were 
confident than those who were not (27%), but a larger number did not commit 
themselves strongly either way (see Figure 6.12).  
 
 
Figure 6.12: Confidence in privacy of I-voting 
 
Interestingly, slightly more people (39%) responded that I-voting would enable voters to 
vote freely without influence from anyone than were confident in the privacy (35%), 
and fewer disagreed (22%) than were not confident in the privacy (27%), but again a 
large number (39%) did not commit themselves strongly either way. Perhaps the lack of 
confidence in voting privacy was connected to doubts about the security of the system 
as the number of people who had strong doubts about the latter was as large as those 
who had confidence in it (both about 29%), but again there was a large number (42%) 
who showed some uncertainty (see Figure 6.14). 
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Figure 6.13: Ability to vote freely in I-voting 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Confidence in security of I-voting 
 
In general, responses indicate a willingness for I-voting to be introduced in reality, since 
many thought they would be comfortable with and have confidence in I-voting. They 
felt their privacy would be sufficiently safeguarded and they would have the ability to 
vote freely, but there were some significant concerns about the system security. 
However, a significant finding was that for all considerations there were between a third 
and a half of the people surveyed who felt unable to commit themselves strongly either 
in favour of or against I-voting.  
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6.4.3  Barriers to acceptance of I-voting 
Of the participants who do not use e-commerce or e-services, the largest number (36%) 
gave their reason as a preference for personal interaction, then 25% blamed security 
issues and 20% said there was no need for such a system. A few (5%) referred to 
considerations restricting Internet use, such as its cost and a lack of knowledge of 
computers. 7% were unsure and 6% referred to other reasons such as they would miss 
the shopping experience, they were not interested or do not have a Visa credit card (see 
Figure 6.15).   
 
 
Figure 6.15: Reasons for not using Internet for e-services 
 
The participants who do not believe there should be I-voting in Qatar referred to the 
following reasons: 29% said the technology would be difficult for some people to use, 
25% were afraid computer hackers might affect the results and about 13% blamed the 
difficulty to inspect whether the results had been manipulated or the reliability of the 
technology. Only a few (10%) stated that there is no need for it and fewer still (8%) 
referred to the possibility of vote selling (see Figure 6.16). 
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Figure 6.16: Possible barriers for I-voting 
 
6.4.4  I-voting features  
Participants were asked their opinion on the need for the system to ask for confirmation 
of the identity of a person online, for voters to be able to verify through different 
channels, such as SMS, who they were voting for before casting their vote, and for the 
ability of voters to verify their votes by messaging or phone.   
 
In general, over half the participants responded that these I-voting features were 
essential, about 20% said they were nice to have and only about 7% thought the features 
were unimportant. Approximately 13% were unsure of the need for these features. This 
reflects the need for confirmation and verification through different channels to ensure 
the vote casting is correct. This gives an indication that, although more people found I-
voting acceptable, they still require verification to ensure their votes are recorded 
correctly (see Figures 6.17-6.19). About half of participants thought it essential and a 
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further 20% thought it would be a nice-to-have the feature to be able to request 
confirmation using a different means of communication, such as SMS text.  
 
Figure 6.17: Voter confirmation of candidate selected before vote recorded 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Ability to revisit the voting website to confirm choice 
 
 
Figure 6.19: Ability to verify votes through different channels such as SMS 
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6.5  Analysis by respondents’ education 
It was discovered from the survey outcome that the respondents’ education level was 
the main factor which reflected their acceptance of I-voting. The survey outcome with 
regard to each educational level is, therefore, shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Results by different education levels 
Key to Education levels: P= Postgraduate, U= University, C= College, S= Secondary 
school 
Education level* S C U P Comments 
Biggest age group 18-24 18-24 30-39 30-39  
% with good level of 
computer  knowledge 
91% 97.3% 96.9% 80.8% Some over-confident in their 
computer knowledge. 
Postgraduates more aware of 
what they did not know.  
Confidence in Qatari 
general elections 
64.2% 50% 63% 70% Government builds trust in the 
community by proving 
transparency, e.g. the 
E-government, global 
transparency ranking for Qatar. 
So varies slightly with 
participant’s beliefs 
Preference for Online 
voting  
71.5% 71.6% 74.5% 74.7% No significant difference 
Use e-services 19.7 24 33% 52.8% Postgraduates use more e-services 
due to their greater 
responsibilities  
Online voting for citizens 
abroad 
41% 45% 40% 46% No significant difference 
Preference to vote at Qatar 
embassy 
45% 44% 55.4% 46% Most participants would prefer to 
use I-voting from an Embassy of 
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Education level* S C U P Comments 
Qatar because of the trust issue  
Comfortable with I-voting 71.6% 71.6% 74.5% 74.7% No significant difference 
I-voting gives sufficient 
privacy 
78% 61% 73.5% 73.6% No significant difference 
I-voting free from outside 
influence 
82.1% 78.1% 76.8% 78% No significant difference 
I-voting secure 75.7% 69% 71.7% 71.3% No significant difference 
I-voting unnecessary 12.8% 11.6% 7.6% 12.6% No significant difference 
Technology too difficult for 
some to understand 
32% 24.3% 32.8% 31.1% No significant difference 
Computer hacking a 
problem 
21.5% 25.7% 25.1% 18.5% Postgraduates are less concerned, 
believing that available solutions 
can overcome the problem 
Can’t check vote 11.5% 14.5% 13.5% 13.3% No significant difference 
Vote selling a problem 8% 8.5 7.1% 8.15% No difference. Participants share 
the same low concerns due to 
faith and trust in government 
Need system to confirm 
who is voted for 
77.5% 81.5% 78.5% 71.4% Postgraduates are less in favour 
of these features, probably 
reflecting their belief that such 
features could help vote selling 
 
Need ability to check vote 
has been counted 
83% 82.1% 81.5% 73.6% 
Need ability to confirm 
with alternative media 
78.4% 78.7% 79.8% 74.7% 
Technology may not be 
reliable 
11.9% 14.6% 13.2% 13.3% No significant difference 
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In conclusion, the responses indicate that there is relation between participants’ 
education and their willingness to participate in I-voting, but only if the education is at 
postgraduate level. People educated at that level were more experienced in e-services 
and this seems to give them more confidence in Internet transactions and fewer 
concerns about I-voting. 
 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that there are many encouraging factors for the vision 
of I-voting. However, there are some barriers that will need to be countered to provide 
an effective I-voting experience in Qatar. With regard to I-voting features, participants 
believed that usability, confirmation and verification of vote are essential. Therefore 
attention would need to be paid to these features in any I-voting system to fulfil their 
requirements and for the system to be considered adequate and effective. Table 6.2 
shows the willingness of Qataris towards I-voting versus the barriers that would inhibit 
it. 
 
Table 6.2: Factors constituting willingness and barriers towards I-voting 
Willingness Barriers 
High confidence in general elections in 
Qatar. 
Majority comfortable with idea of 
I-voting. 
Preference to vote online instead of 
visiting a polling station, especially 
citizens abroad. 
Most believe it provides comfortable, 
private, secure, independent voting to 
some extent. 
Preference for personal interaction 
Lack of belief that such a system is needed 
Concerns over: 
 Security issues 
 Usability issues 
 Restrictions of Internet use 
 Vote manipulation 
 Vote selling. 
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6.6  Chi-squared test 
In this research, the chi-squared test (χ2) was applied to discover the relationships 
between the responses gathered in the survey according to the following hypotheses: 
H0= The two responses are not related 
with  
H1= The two responses are related  
χ2 was calculated using the following formula: (Bock, Velleman and De Veaux, 2007, 
pp.608-615): 
 
where  is the observed number of individuals in category  and  is the expected 
number of individuals in category . 
 
In this research, the value of P (level of significance) is usually 1%, 5% or 10%. For a 
small P value, χ2 is larger and this leads to the rejection of H0. Therefore, 5% was 
chosen as the target level. An online chi-squared calculator (Kirkman, 1996) was used. 
There were some potential relationships between the different variables examined in the 
survey. These were tested and the results are given in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Relationship between survey responses 
 C1 C2 C3 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 F1 F2 F3 B1 B2 B3 B4 
B5 N P N N P N P N P P P N N P P P 
B4 N P N N P P P N P N N N X N P 
B3 P P N P P N N P P P N N P X 
B2 P P N P N P N P N P P N X 
B1 P P N P N P N P P P P P 
F3 N P P N P N P N N X X 
F2 N N P P P N P P P X 
F1 N X P P P N N P P 
W6 P N P X P X X X 
W5 P N P X N P X 
W4 P P P X P X 
W3 P N P X P 
W2 P X P P 
W1 P N P 
C3 P P 
C2 N 
 
Key: 
P = Positive correlation 
N=Negative correlation 
X=No correlation 
Personal characteristics: 
C1: Good computer and Internet knowledge  
C2: Internet used for banking and e-commerce 
C3: Confidence in general elections in Qatar 
Willingness to use I-voting: 
W1: Online voting is the preferred voting 
method 
W2: I-voting should be used by citizens abroad 
W3: Comfortable with voting online 
W4: Confidence in privacy of online voting 
W5: Confidence in being free from influence if 
voting online 
W6: Confidence in security of online vote 
I-voting features required: 
F1: Confirmation of who is being voted for  
F2: Verification that vote has been received  
F3: Verification via alternative media  
Barriers considered important 
B1: Technology would be too difficult 
B2: Technology may not be reliable 
B3: No means to check a vote 
B4: Computer hackers may influence the vote 
B5: Vote selling is a problem 
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Table 6.3 shows the following interesting correlations: 
 
There is a significant correlation between the following variables 
 
1. Frequency of use of the Internet for online banking or making online purchases with 
the belief that citizens abroad should vote online. This agrees with the finding that 
postgraduate educated voters, who had greater experience of e-services, had fewest 
concerns about Internet voting security (see Section 6.5). 
 
2. Respondents that do not use online banking or e-commerce with those that do not 
believe there should be I-voting in Qatar. 
 
3. Respondents with low computing knowledge with those who do not believe there 
should be I-voting in Qatar. 
 
4. Respondents who are confident in the accuracy of Qatari elections with those 
believing that I-voting is unnecessary. 
 
5. Respondents who would prefer to vote online with those who do not have concerns 
about the security of I-voting and those that believe they would be free from outside 
influence in their voting. 
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6.7  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the survey has assisted in discovering Qatari citizens’ views on the barriers to 
I-voting, their willingness to participate in I-voting and the features of I-voting that Qatari 
citizens would want to have. In general, the willingness to participate in I-voting is indicated 
by the high computer knowledge (more than 56% with pretty to expert knowledge), high 
usage of e-services (about 40%), and the trust in general elections in Qatar (48%), as well as 
more than one third of people indicating a preference for I-voting over traditional methods, 
even for citizens abroad. 
  
Furthermore, the survey shows 30% of participants were comfortable with the idea of I-
voting and more than a quarter are confident their privacy and security will be ensured and 
39% of them believe they will be free from undue outside influence on how they vote. In 
general, the willingness to participate was considerably higher for people who use e-services 
than those with no experience of them. It was discovered that education level has a major 
effect on people’s responses to the survey, mainly when the education is at postgraduate 
level. 
  
Although there is a lot of willingness, there are some barriers to I-voting needing to be 
considered before the introduction of I-voting. More than one third believed there were 
difficulties with the technology, including the use of computers and the Internet; about one 
quarter stated that I-voting is not secure enough for vote casting since it is vulnerable to 
computer hackers; about one seventh believed the system would not be reliable or accurate as 
it would be difficult to inspect the election results; one tenth think there is no need for I-
voting and less than this proportion were concerned about the possibility of vote selling with 
this technology. Also, there might be a barrier in that some people simply prefer personal 
interaction, a problem many participants referred to regarding the problems of using e-
services. 
  
However, it was clear from the results that a significant number of people did not feel 
confident to give a strong answer either for or against the idea of I-voting. There is clearly a 
great deal of uncertainty. According to discussions subsequently held with 10 questionnaire 
respondents, the majority suggested the need to see what I-voting would be like in reality in 
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order to assess its acceptability. About half felt it would be essential to have a means of vote 
confirmation and verification to ensure voters have successfully cast their votes and to assist 
in the auditing process if there is a need for it.  
 
The survey demonstrates some significant correlations between different survey variables 
including: participants who do not use online banking or e-commerce with those that do not 
believe there should be I-voting in Qatar, participants with low computing knowledge with 
those who do not believe there should be I-voting in Qatar, participants who are confident in 
the accuracy of Qatari elections with those believing that I-voting is unnecessary and 
participants who would prefer to vote online with those who do not have concerns about the 
security of I-voting and those that believe they would be free from outside influence in their 
voting. 
  
As a result of the findings in this chapter, it was decided to conduct an experiment to 
experience I-voting in reality with a system with all the suggested features that may be 
introduced in Qatar elections in the future to evaluate people’s acceptance of this technology. 
  
The next chapter describes the development and results of the I-voting experiment to assess 
people’s acceptance of such technology in Qatari elections. Also, to compare results with the 
Estonian election and to review both cases to learn for future development. 
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Chapter 7  Experimental Study: Comparison between Qatar 
and Estonia in Acceptance of I-voting 
 
This chapter discusses the instigation of a voting experiment utilizing a prototype I-
voting system to assess the feasibility and acceptance of I-voting in Qatar in terms of 
technical solution, voters and election committees. The prototype was developed 
according to Qatar‟s election requirements and voting principles. The voters‟ behaviour 
and experience were assessed by means of questionnaires and interviews. Furthermore, 
a member of the Qatar Election Committee kindly assisted in the experiment by 
checking the vote counting to assess the accuracy of vote results. A comparison is 
provided between the outcome of the experiment and the outcome of the Estonia 
general election held in 2007. From this comparison, a lesson can be learnt on how to 
overcome possible obstacles when introducing I-voting in Qatar‟s election. This chapter 
satisfies objective 6 (see section 1.5). 
   
7.1  Experiment methodology  
In this chapter, an experimental case study of I-voting in Qatar was carried out, to 
investigate: the security of the approach, the election environment, the acceptance and 
trust of the people, system usability and accessibility, the transparency of the process 
and the quality of I-voting system. Comparisons were then made with the Estonian 
experience reported in the literature.  
 
According to Abercrombie et al. (1984) and Campbell and Stanley (1966) case studies 
are an ineffective research methodology since they do not provide reliable information 
about the broader subject. Nevertheless, case study methodology has recently become 
more common in research, showing its success in exploring many subjects effectively 
(Ragib and Becker, 1992; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003a,b). 
 
The research community has identified (e.g. Jensen and Rodgers, 2001; Perry, 2001; 
Welman and Kruger, 1999; Myers, 1997; Tellis, 1997; Cavaye, 1996; Yin, 1994) case 
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studies as empirical work deployed to investigate a phenomenon. Yin (1994) thus states 
the purpose of a case study is to investigate a phenomenon in real context. Furthermore, 
Stake (1995) defines a case study as “the study of the particularity and complexity of a 
single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”. Others 
(e.g. Alavi and Carlson 1992; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) have added that it is a 
common qualitative method. 
 
According to Yin (1994), there are different types of case study, determined by three 
choices: 
1. Is the research exploratory, explanatory or descriptive?  
2. Does the research cover a single case or several cases (multiple case studies)? 
3. Does the study follow an embedded or holistic design? 
  
The case study methodology is an ideal technique for investigating I-voting acceptance 
in Qatar and answering the research questions identified for this experiment, which is 
targeted at determining. 
 
1) Whether the I-voting prototype was designed according to Qatar‟s election 
requirements, 
2) Whether Qataris would accept I-voting after using the prototype,  
3) How effective the prototype is in fulfilment of voting principles and overcoming 
the possible I-voting challenges,  
4) What the differences and similarities are in I-voting between the Estonian and 
Qatari case studies. 
 
Hence, this experiment is a combination of exploratory and descriptive case studies. 
Furthermore, it is a multiple case study involving both Estonia and Qatar. An embedded 
case study involves more than one unit of analysis in the same context, whereas a 
holistic case study involves only one unit of analysis. Since this experiment only 
addresses one unit of analysis which is to determine the level of acceptance of I-voting 
by Qataris, this experiment will be a holistic case study.  
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There are different categories of case studies defined by Jensen and Rodgers (2001: 
237-239): 
Snapshot: A comprehensive study of one research area at one point in time. 
Longitudinal: A quantitative and/or qualitative investigation of one research study 
at multiple time points. 
Pre-post: The study of one research entity at two time points delineated by some 
critical event. 
Patchwork: Defines a comprehensive vision of the research since several case 
studies are used for one research project (e.g. snapshot, longitudinal and/or 
pre-post). 
Comparative: Uses various case studies for different research to provide a 
comparison. 
 
This research used a combination of both pre-post and comparative case studies which 
aimed at studying Qataris‟ acceptance of I-voting in Qatar after the critical event of 
being in an experiment involving a prototype of I-voting. It also provided a comparison 
of Estonia‟s experience in I-voting and the outcome from Qatar‟s experimental case 
study. Yin (1989, 1994) claims that case studies could involve several data collection 
methods such as observations, interviews and surveys. In this experimental case study, 
questionnaires and interviews along with observation were used.  
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7.2  Experimental process 
There are many I-voting approaches and solutions suggested in the literature (Krimmer 
et al., 2008). Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. This research attempts to 
assess the feasibility and acceptance of I-voting in Qatar by means of an experimental 
case study, a unique system was proposed for use.  
 
The process of the experiment involved four phases to achieve the overall aim of the 
study: 
1) Plan and design the experimental systems,  
2) Test the system and experimental performance,  
3) Analyse the results and discuss the findings,  
4) Finally, compare and contrast the results and findings with the Estonia I-voting 
case study (see Figure 7.1).  
 
Each phase is explained as following sub-sections. 
 
Figure 7.1: Experimental process 
   
7.2.1  Plan and design 
The I-voting application design used in this experiment was based upon best-practice, 
and made in accordance with the Qatar election .. Considerations have been given to 
fulfilment of voting principles and their applicability to the situation in Qatar.  
 
A face-to-face semi-structured interview was held with Abdul Rahman Al-Sulati, the 
head of the Permanent Election Committee in MOI, to discuss the process of replacing 
manual voting with I-voting. This interview included a discussion which identified the 
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requirements for introducing a successful I-voting system in Qatar. Since the system is 
Internet-based, there is almost no limit to the number of personal computers which can 
be used to send information to the system. 
 
The main outcome from the interview was to identify Qatar Election requirements for 
the voters and the system: 
 
1. The original citizenship of voters must be Qatari or Qatari citizenship must have 
been granted at least 15 years earlier. 
2. Voters must be aged 18 years or more. 
3. Voters must not be convicted of dishonourable crime unless rehabilitated. 
4. Voters must be resident in the electoral constituency in which electoral rights 
will be exercised. 
5. Voters must not by employed by the armed forces or police. 
6. Multicast voting must be forbidden. 
7. The system must be easy to use and must have a Qatari „look and feel‟. 
8. The system must satisfy basic voting principles such as security and anonymity. 
   
A simple design was used, which required only a limited number of resources. Where 
votes are encrypted. This encryption system is based on private and public keys. A 
public key is given to the citizen in order to secure their data. The private key is used by 
the server to identify and confirm the eligibility of the voter while the design was 
simplified compared to other I-voting models, it allowed for a pilot study which 
determined the acceptance by the Qatari people of such a new technology. The 
algorithm was designed to ensure that the anonymity of the voters is maintained with 
the strictest confidence. 
There were two experimental viewpoints:  
(1) the voter environment, which allows authorised voters to cast their votes. 
(2) the permanent election committee environment, which allows the committee to 
view the election results.  
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7.2.2  Test  
After the design had been implemented and tested successfully by two computer experts 
from Almajaz Telecommunication Company, the testing and evaluation of the 
developed I-voting prototype was carried out by the researcher to assess its 
effectiveness in terms of fulfilment of voting principles (See section 1.1). Semi-
structured interviews were held with the two computer experts in order to evaluate 
potential threats to the source code. They were asked questions oriented towards the 
technical aspects of the system and its ability to meet the voting requirements of Qatar. 
The experts were testing the functionality of the I-voting system based on the document 
provided by the researcher (See appendix C).  
 
The experts believed that the system was sufficiently usable to act as a pilot study, 
providing a demonstration of how I-voting could take place in Qatar. They indicated 
that they thought it was well structured and easy to use, even by novice computer users. 
However, they said that it would only be useful on a small scale for demonstrating I-
voting. This is due to the infrastructure employed to run the application which was only 
capable of handling an experiment and would not be practical for large-scale voting. 
They indicated that it would be unstable for larger scale application. Additional 
resources, servers and more advanced infrastructures would be required to introduce I-
voting throughout Qatar for all its citizens. Also, the programming language (Visual 
Basic) used in the application was not capable of managing large scale operations and 
so they suggested using a more robust programming language, such as Java or PHP for 
a full scale implementation. Furthermore, the experts stated that the application required 
improvements to provide more authentication factors, such as the use of a smart card 
and biometrics. Also, the system needs to provide a method for distributing the required 
PIN for logging-in to the system, such as through SMS to ensure privacy. In addition, 
there is a need for advanced encryption method such as 3AES and a combination of 
mix-networking and blind signature to maintain anonymity. Additional suggestions 
were to provide a backup for recounting through paper-based voting and enabling a 
third party to monitor the integrity of voting processes. 
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The experts also suggested having an awareness programme and training sessions for 
people, especially those with little computer knowledge, to enable them to use the 
system easily. It was suggested that the media, academics and employers should play a 
role in the awareness programme to help introduce the society to such a new 
technology. The experts voiced the opinion that the I-voting system developed was a 
good step for Qatar since it was uniquely designed to fit Qatar‟s election requirements. 
However, they suggested a lot of improvements in the application are required before 
moving from the experimental stage to large-scale application (see Appendix B).  
 
7.2.3  Running the experiment 
After ensuring that the I-voting system was functioning properly, the experiment was 
carried out with a sample of 86 eligible Qatari voters from different demographic 
backgrounds (age, education and computer knowledge) selected by convenience from 
friends and relations of the researcher. Due to the large participant sample size, the 
experiment was held in 5 sessions each involve about 17 participants. This would ensure 
that all participants had adequate resources to participate in the experiment and the 
researcher had the capability to observe and assess their acceptance. The participants 
were motivated to join in the experiment by invitation letters which explained its 
significance and the importance of their participation. They were then given a consent 
sheet to sign, indicating their willingness to participate in the experiment and ensuring 
their confidentiality. Participants were given an oral short presentation which took ten 
minutes explaining about the I-voting prototype capability and how it worked (See 
Appendix B). The participants were asked to vote through the I-voting system within a 
maximum of 5 minutes including the time for authentication and vote casting (see 
Appendix B). 
 
Later, the participants were asked to provide feedback on a questionnaire to evaluate 
and assess how acceptable they found the I-voting in practice and to determine the 
nature of any barriers to successful implementation that may exist. The questionnaire 
consisted of two sections, a background section and a post-ballot section. In the 
background section, the voters were asked to provide some background information 
about their gender, age, occupation, computer literacy, previous voting behaviour, and 
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their opinion of I-voting and the effects of ICTs on society. In the post-ballot section, 
specific questions were asked about the usability of the system, the quality of the system 
in terms of secrecy (privacy) and security (against fraud), about their viewpoints related 
to I-voting and some questions related to the voters‟ identity (see Appendix B).  
 
An independent observer from the Qatari election committee (QEC) was involved at the 
end of each session to inspect the vote counting, where votes were counted manually 
and compared with the vote counting shown in the I-voting system in order to determine 
the accuracy of the I-voting counting process. 
 
7.2.4  Analysis of results & discussion of findings 
After the experiment, the questionnaire results were gathered and analysed 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Both the positive and negative reactions of voters were 
examined, as well as their ability to use the technology successfully. The results of this 
study indicated that the overall reaction of the voters towards the I-voting system was 
favourable. There was a high correlation between pre-voting anxiety and good 
perceptions of the new system. The vote casting stage had a slightly less positive 
reaction due to problems regarding the functionality of the system. There were 
difficulties with the pictures of the candidates, graphics describing how to use the new 
system, and explanations of encryption and decryption. The studied results indicated 
that voters reacted to the electronic system similarly to the traditional voting methods. 
However, individuals with high degrees of anxiety regarding the system often recorded 
a less positive experience with the new technology. The election committee showed 
their acceptance of the proposed system and of the accuracy of vote counting as result 
of comparing the manual count matched the electronic one. 
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7.3  Reasons for the comparison with Estonia 
Estonia was chosen for a comparison with Qatar case study because it shares some 
similar characteristics to Qatar: 
(1) the small country size  
(2) rich in computer literacy and Internet access  
(3) the people‟s and government willingness  
(4) a well-established of IT infrastructure  
(5) an E-government portal which used Smartcard, e-certificate and e-signature are 
deployed and in operation since 2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007b).  
 
However, there are some differences and similarities in election environment of both 
countries which has to be considered in the design of I-voting. 
Elections in Qatar are limited to the Central Municipal Council (CMC) at this moment but, 
the Emir established the Permanent Elections Committee (PEC) of the Supreme Council 
for Family Affairs in 2003 to raise public awareness of voting rights and responsibilities 
and to empower citizens, particularly women, to prepare Qatari people for future 
parliament election. Qatar is divided into 10 Municipal areas. The election committees are 
responsible for validating candidate applications.  By law, voters are invited by letter to 
participate in the election. Each voter should register and the staff committee should use 
ID cards to verify the identities of the applicants and whether they fulfil the conditions to 
contest the CMC elections. The voters are only allowed to register in their district area. 
The voters will be flagged as having voted once the voter has cast his/her vote. Any 
blank vote card would not be counted.  
In comparison, in the Estonian electoral system, the country is divided into 12 multi-
mandate electoral districts. The law permits advance voting by means of paper-based 
votes at a polling station or Internet voting from anywhere. Voters who choose to use 
paper-based voting have to register with the National Election Committee (NEC) in the 
voters‟ electoral district. Internet voting offers a registration-free process that means 
voters do not need to register, but simply use their e-ID card to vote online. In paper-
base voting, voters write the registration number of the candidate of their choice to cast 
the vote. 
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7.4 Technical details 
This section described how the experimental system was inspired by the Estonian 
system (see Table 7.1). The Estonia case study was based on available reports obtained 
from the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO,2007) and the Estonian 
National Electoral Committee (2007a,b). Solvak and Pettai (2008) have drawn up an 
overview of Estonia political concerns. 
 
Table 7.1: The technical details of Estonia experiment and Qatar case study 
Qatar Experiment Estonia Election 
Theoretical approach  
1. Authentication Stage 
1.1) Voters insert an e-token (instead of a 
Smart card), which has public and private 
keys, then type their own password to be 
identified by the authentication server. 
1.2) The authentication server checks if the 
voters are eligible for voting. 
1.3) Eligible voters receive an e-certificate 
from a certificated authority (CA) server. This 
would be stored in the voter machine to be 
used in vote casting to digitally sign the vote.  
 
2. Vote casting Process 
2.1) The voter chooses a candidate. The vote 
is then concealed using a blind signature 
algorithm, e-signed using a digital certificate, 
and encrypted using a public key and sent to 
the election committee server (trusted third 
party) to confirm the vote and to add their e-
signature. A copy would be made by this 
1.Authentication Stage 
1.1. The voter inserts a Smart card to a card 
reader and then types their PIN1 (This system 
use two PINs). The server then checks if the 
voter is registered in the eligible voter 
database.  
1.2 The authentication server checks if the 
voters are eligible for voting. 
 
2. Vote casting Process 
2.1. A screen with the candidate names would 
appear allowing the voter to choose one 
candidate and confirm their choice.  
2.2. The vote is then encrypted using a public 
key obtained from a Counting Server. Also the 
voter types a second PIN (PIN2). PIN2 is used 
to digitally sign the encrypted the vote. 
2.3. Data is then sent to Internet Server to 
check the validity of the digital signature to 
ensure data integrity. 
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server. 
2.2) The election committee server sends back 
the voter data to the voter to check the 
integrity of the data, the voter e-certificate is 
flagged to show the user has voted and can‟t 
vote again. 
2.3 The voter sends back the data to the 
application server (this server is a front server 
consisting of several servers connected 
internally) to eliminate any attack on the 
actual servers:- The first server checks only 
the validity of the vote and keeps a copy of 
data for auditing. This server has only the (e-
token) private key to decrypt the data. The 
second server has the Election Committee 
private key to decrypt the content and count 
the votes. 
2.4) The Application Server acknowledges to 
the voter that the vote has been received 
without confirming the choice. 
  
3. Counting Process 
3.1) The Counting Server and Election 
Committee Server compare both lists to check 
the integration of data (the data was not 
altered by an insider) then the Election 
Committee server decrypts the data using their 
private key which no one else has knowledge 
of. 
3.2) The Count Server computes the results 
  
2.4. The Internet Server then sends the data to 
Vote Storage Server, to check the validity of 
the voter's certificate from the CA Server. If 
valid, the Internet Server verifies the digital 
signature using the voter's public key from the 
voter's certificate. 
2.5. The Vote Storage Server sends an 
acknowledgment to the voters through the 
Internet server to inform the voters that their 
vote casting was successful. 
2.6. The vote is kept in the Vote Storage 
Server to perform vote counting on election 
day. 
 
3.Counting process 
All entries transferred to the Counting Server 
are logged 
3.1. A list of votes is sent to the Counting 
Server by CD-ROM. The Counting Server 
decrypts the votes using the Hardware 
Security Module (HSM) and performs 
counting.  
3.2. Results were then published and viewed in 
a spreadsheet. 
 
Notes: (1) Any communication between voters 
and server is secured using an SSL connection. 
(3) The HSM required six physical keys. 
By law, at least half of the NEC 
members must be present in order to 
decrypt and count the votes. 
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Election environment 
With I-voting, a similar process would take 
place: (1) invitation letters would be sent to 
voters (2) the voters already have their own 
Smart card since Qatar law requires every 
adult to obtain a card to perform any 
government services. (3) The voters would 
access the Internet voting website and follow 
the instructions e.g. a video demonstrating 
how to vote. 
In this experiment, voters were allowed to 
vote only one time. 
Internet voting offers a registration-free 
process that means voters do not need to 
register, but simply use their e-ID card to vote 
online. In paper-based voting, voters write the 
registration number of the candidate of their 
choice to cast the vote. With Internet voting, 
voters simply select the candidates from 
options. The NEC allowed the voter to over-
write their vote multi-times using Internet 
voting only, only the last vote would be 
counted. Voters were also allowed to vote 
using Internet voting and then change it at the 
polling station but it would then be final. 
Internet voting is used only in advance voting, 
so voters would not be able to use I-voting on 
election day. 
Acceptance and trust 
In this experiment, the e-voting system was 
not used in a real election, but an experimental 
election was set up to record people‟s 
experiences and comments.  
In the Estonian case, no direct study examined 
people acceptance. Therefore, the author had 
to rely on turnout statistical data obtained from 
the National Election Commission.  
Usability and accessibility 
To facilitate the registration phase, the 
experiment uses e-token which is “USB plug 
and play” which does not need any 
installation. A simple interface design was 
applied similar to the ballot paper currently in 
use in traditional voting. The system was 
designed to provide more information as each 
entity appeared on the screen for people who 
needed more information e.g. the login screen 
ask for username and PIN, users can hover 
Internet voting in Estonia uses an e-ID card, 
for identification via the Internet and to sign 
documents digitally. Voters must obtain a 
Smart-card reader, in order to authenticate 
voter in the Internet voting application. The 
voters must download and install voting 
software from the Election website. Three 
different operating systems (OS) were used for 
voting applications.  Statistically, Microsoft 
Windows, Mac OS and Linux were used 
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over the entry field for more help information  
 
98.9%, 0.75% and 0.42%, respectively.  The 
voting application interface was a standalone 
program that used a simple and easy to apply 
with Estonian language interface.  
Security 
The main security of the system relies on the 
use of a smart card, blind signature and 
encryption.  
The most important part in the security in 
Internet voting system is related to the 
separation between the storage of the vote and 
its counting. Storage of a vote is carried out on 
a server connected to the Internet whilst the 
Counting Server is disconnected from Internet.  
Transparency  
In this experiment, transparency was 
considered by using open source algorithms 
which guarantees anonymity, the so-called 
“blind signature” (Chaum, 1983).  
Estonian I-voting tries to make the process as 
transparent as possible by getting people and 
experts involved. Also procedures were 
defined and the law modified to cover I-voting 
problems.  
Quality 
Since the system was laboratory based, the 
existence of real attacks were not encountered. 
The experiment was not designed to stress the 
security of the system, more its usability. 
Therefore, the quality of the system were 
mainly focused on the usability, accessibility 
and how people found the quality of their 
experience. Furthermore, the people who used 
the system at the same time were only 17. The 
experiment relied on the quality of the 
Interface design and the time that the system 
takes to respond for the user request. 
Additional experiments need to be done to 
fully consider the quality part of this system. 
Estonian Internet voting has not been 
independently tested.  No full end-to-end 
accuracy test has been held (OSCE, 2007). 
The auditing is carried out by an external 
company that observes and checks the 
performance of the NEC against written 
documentations.  
Chapter 7: Experimental Study: Comparison between Qatar and Estonia in I-voting 
 
177 
7.5  Results 
The results of the experiment were gathered from questionnaire responses with 
participants and evaluation by experts, and the two election committees. A summary of 
questionnaire results and findings is shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Questionnaire results 
Questions at registration  
Question Yes No Researcher comments 
Did you find problems at 
the authentication stage? 
52% 48% Due to use of e-token instead of smart card. The 
Smart card application would load needed files 
automatically but e-token files must be 
uploaded manually.  
Did you find authentication 
process secure because it 
asks for two factors? 
83% 17% Using two or three factors of authentication 
would provide superior security. 
Did the system identify you 
without problems? 
90% 10% 10% of participants experienced a problem in 
identifying themselves to the system due to 
forgotten PIN numbers. To overcome this, it 
would be necessary to provide a method of 
delivering the PIN for each voter when needed 
(Key distribution management should consider 
sending the PIN via SMS, for example). 
Was the e-token easy to 
install?  
100% 0% It was USB plug and play, which participants 
can handle easily.  
Were you concerned about 
what would happen to your 
e-token, if it is lost? 
66% 34% A presentation to the participants explained that 
the e-token alone would not work. It would 
require a second authentication factor, the 
personal PIN number.  
Was the process fast? 40% 60% This is due to 52% asking for help 
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Vote casting phase 
Was the quality of ballot 
design maintained? 
90% 10% The interface design was kept simple, keeping 
the look and feel of a Qatar election. 
Was the system fast? 100% 0% The experiment was held within a lab set-up so 
this result is assumed to be because the system 
had all resources in place. 
Did you have any problems 
at the voting stage? If yes, 
please write it down. 
12% 88% Some problems with identifying IP addresses of 
voter machines. In some machines, the IP 
address was not registered in the server set-up 
for the experiment. 
Did you find confirmation 
of the vote received useful? 
77% 4% Not everyone completed this question. Some 
requested the receipt of voting to include the 
voter‟s choice along with their ID number so 
they could request an appeal if needed. 
Did you feel the same 
experience as with paper 
based voting? 
45% 55% Some felt I-voting was better than paper-based 
voting since they did not need to queue for 
hours. Others found traditional voting more 
exciting and worth the effort. 
Other questions 
Was the presentation 
given on how system 
works useful to build 
trust and confidence?  
84% 16% The presentation argued awareness is a key 
element in bridging the gap between trust and 
sociological beliefs. The results confirmed 84% 
found awareness useful and 32% of voters 
changed their minds after the presentation.  
Did the presentation 
change your mind about 
trusting the system? 
23%  77% 
 
The above findings in Table 7.2 from the experiment were compared with I-voting in 
Estonia, showing the similarities and differences between the results of each case study 
(see Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3: Comparison between Qatar and Estonia Results 
Acceptance and trust 
Qatar experiment Estonia election 
In the survey described in section 6.2, 76% of 
the 2,567 eligible voters who participated said 
they would prefer voting online rather than 
through the use of polling stations. Participants 
in this experiment confirmed their acceptance 
of the concept of I-voting after using the 
system to cast their vote. At the registration 
stage, 83% of 86 participants felt secure due to 
the combination of authentication factors used 
(note: the author had explained to participants 
that an additional factor of authentication 
would be added e.g. biometrics to achieve a 
high level of authentication) .the remainder 
had some difficulties during the authentication 
stage. Furthermore, trust on government was 
found by earlier research (see section 6.6) 
however, only 4% distrust the Qatar election. 
In this experiment, participants had mixed 
feelings, trusting the government but not the 
technology, especially in preserving voting 
anonymity.  
In 2009. 24.3% (140,846) of vote was casted 
over the Internet. 580,264 used traditional 
voting. 
The usage of I-voting has increased ever since 
I-voting was introduced in 2007. In the 
Parliament election in 2011, it was reported 
that voting over the Internet has reached 35%  
(EUDO, 2011) 
This could be a significant sign that the 
Estonian people accept voting over the 
Internet. On the other hand Internet voting did 
not significantly increase turnout. The author 
has argued that increasing turnout could be 
obtained by providing a different voting 
channel e.g. mobile voting. However, there 
was no evidence that this would maintain high 
turnout in this election.   
Usability and accessibility 
The participants were asked at both stages 
(registration and vote casting) about usability. 
More than 52% of participants asked for help 
at the registration stage although in this 
experiment we used an e-token, a “USB plug 
and play”, which does not need any 
installation. 
The result from the recent election in 2011 
shows that 35% of voters casted their vote 
using the Internet. This provides significant 
evidence that I-voting within Estonia is 
useable and accessible.  
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Security  
The security is based on smart card and blind 
signatures. According to the experts 
evaluation, the security of the system showed 
strengths and weaknesses as follows: 
1. The voter would interact with one online 
server while other servers are offline. This 
would reduce the consequences and risk of 
attack on the one server which only forwards 
voter requests. 
2. E-tokens are used to act as Smart cards to 
authenticate the voters. 
3. An e-certificate is downloaded from the CA 
server. This would reduce the voting process, 
instead of physically registering to obtain the 
certificate, the voter can download it online 
during authentication. 
4. A blind signature is used to make the 
process anonymous. 
5. A member of election committee has to 
enter their secret key to make sure votes are 
not altered. 
6. Voters digital certificates are modified to 
show that voters have already voted. (One vote 
per a voter is maintained.) 
7. Only Qatari IP addresses are allowed to 
access the system. In this experiment, the 
system only allowed a limited set of IPs to use 
the system. 
Weaknesses  
1. The client side still remains major concern 
in the system design. Alternative solutions, 
such as using a vote code sheet or using a 
The security is based on the separation 
between the storage of the vote and its 
counting.  The following protocols are 
employed to maintain security:   
1. Integrity checking of the installed 
voting software, to ensure that the 
correct software is installed. 
2. Setting up a firewall to secure the link 
between the Internet and the storage 
of vote by policing the traffic. 
3. Monitoring the traffic to the Internet 
server in order to check potential 
attacks and malfunctioning. 
4. Sealing and locking the Internet 
Server and the vote storage server in a 
place permanently protected by a 
police officer and CCTV.  
5. Backup of the private key of one of 
the members of the NEC in case of 
failure of the HSM. This ensures the 
availability of the results of the 
Election. 
6. To eliminate the possible attacks on a 
voter's machine. Three steps are 
considered: (1) Advise the voter to 
type directly the IP of the server in the 
URL of the browser, (2) Issue a 
certificate to the voter from the server 
(3) Check the integrity of the voting 
software by providing information 
from the server to the voter. 
7. Allow voters to overwrite votes in 
order to reduce problems of privacy 
and vote selling. 
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secure operating system or browser are 
possible. 
2. Voters are not allowed to over-write their 
vote due to the law, which might create 
problems of pressure on the voter to vote for 
particular person. This could be especially true 
in Qatar culture where families are closely 
connected, and people respect and follow their 
head of family, such as the father or an uncle. 
3. The e-token was not totally secure in the 
experiment because it is simply a USB stick 
which has a PKI file. 
4. The counting stage, fails to provide 
evidence that all votes cast have been counted. 
Although the system was designed to keep a 
copy of the votes at the election committee 
server, no comparison was performed in this 
experiment. Comparing the votes in the 
counting server against votes in the election 
committee server would ensure no insider 
attack could change the votes, 
Transparency   
Transparency could be obtained due to the 
design which relies on validated technology. 
Attack from an insider is possible as the 
system relies on the government‟s integrity 
and their willingness to provide fair and free 
election. The source code was also inspected 
by two experts. In addition, participants were 
asked to suggest ways to gain transparency. 
suggestions were received as listed below: 
Participant 
suggestions 
Response 
Receipt of my vote This would increase 
vote selling, but the 
system does send a 
The two main areas where the transparency is 
unclear: (1) The voters have no confirmation 
that their votes have been counted correctly, 
(2) the algorithm is designed to separate voter 
identity and choice to obtain anonymity. 
Moreover, there was no evidence of 
performing the separation of the vote identity. 
Nevertheless, the use of algorithms such as 
blind signature or mix-netting would 
guarantee anonymity (Chaum, 1981; Fujioka, 
et al., 1993). However, Estonia invited all 
political parties and qualified observers at 
Chapter 7: Experimental Study: Comparison between Qatar and Estonia in I-voting 
 
182 
confirmation of the 
vote cast. 
Involve a third party 
to monitor the process  
The system requires a 
secret key from the 
Election Committee 
(third party), therefore, 
a third party is 
involved. 
Make source code 
available for 
inspection 
In this experiment, the 
source code was public, 
and inspected by two 
experts 
Allow the head of a 
family tribe to 
monitor the voting 
process 
In a real election, a 
representative of each 
party would usually be 
allowed to observe. 
Therefore, this would 
be possible if the law 
permits it. 
Allow foreign experts 
to observe the election 
process 
This would be possible 
if the law permits it 
Although those comments are reasonable and 
can be achieved in future developments but 
amendments to election law would be needed. 
every stage of the Internet voting process, e.g. 
Inspecting the source code and setup 
procedures would gain trust and confidence in 
the system. 
Quality   
The quality outcome of this experiment was 
satisfactory, but it was in a lab session in 
which there was no outside or inside attackers. 
Experts who checked the software and the 
QEC officials who checked the count have 
found the system of good quality but not 
suitable for large scale in real elections and 
suggest the need for the government to support 
and improve the system and take it further 
from experiments to real elections. 
 The majority (90%) had a positive feedback 
on the quality. 77% of the participants found 
that the design was straight forward and 
similar to the system that they use in the e-
government portal. Voters simply needed to 
login and choose their candidate. 
The final report for quality auditing was not 
published publicly. The auditing company has 
not been asked to conduct a further post-
election test. Also, there is no clear 
information on government inspection of the 
software after receiving the system from the 
company. However, another third party 
company have perform the auditing other than 
the company who develop the system.   
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7.6  Discussion of the results  
This section draws a deeper analysis from the above table 7.3 discussing and comparing 
both the Qatari and Estonian case studies. Although, the Qatar experience is drawn from 
the boundaries of the laboratory experiment, there are still valuable points the 
government could draw from the comparison between Qatar and Estonia because both 
countries share so many similar characteristics. 
 
Investigations of both case studies involved the following aspects:  
 
7.3.1  Security of the theoretical approach 
The approach taken in the Qatar experiment was inspired by Estonia‟s use of I-voting, 
which relies on state-of-the-art technology to achieve a high degree of security. Both 
approaches used the same technologies for authentication and confidentiality. Strong 
cryptographic solutions based on digital signatures and a public key infrastructure were 
used. However, in the Qatar experiment, the voters were supplied with an e-token (USB 
Stick) instead of a Smart card as used in Estonian. This does the same job as the Smart 
card but without the need for card readers. Both approaches were open to possible 
threats, such as from web side spoofing and malware which could lead to re-direction to 
a site other than the one apparently displayed on the screen (Jefferson, et al., 2004). The 
Qatari and Estonian systems used some different techniques and algorithms. For 
example, the Qatar experiment relied on the well known, Blind signature protocol to 
maintain anonymity (Chaum, 1983) whereas the Estonian system separates the identity 
of the voter from the vote before decrypting the votes for counting. The Estonian 
approach could be questioned as the voter gets no proof of the voter identity separation 
from the vote. This relies on trust that the government and National Election Committee 
(NEC) would do this process fairly. Both approaches have no comprehensive auditing 
system although, in the Qatar experiment, there was a suggestion that having an 
additional copy of the vote at the Election Committee server would enable comparison 
with the result from the counting server. However, this was not implemented due to 
resources limitations of the research. Also, both approaches fail to inform the voters that 
their votes were counted successfully, however, it can be argued that it is unattainable to 
maintain anonymity and give acknowledgements to the voters that their votes were 
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counted successfully. Basically, it will not be possible to investigate who cast each vote. 
In the Estonian approach, this option was possible but counting the vote is done after the 
election has ended. Votes are kept safely in a storage server, then transferred to counting 
server, thus proof of vote counting is impossible when the vote is cast because it is not 
counted at that time.  
 
7.3.2  Election environment 
Both countries need to change their current election laws to accommodate Internet 
world challenges e.g. the Estonian Election Act does not contain specifications of the 
Internet voting system, does not define the responsibility of any institution, and does not 
provide for sanctions in case of failure of the system (EUDO, 2007). Estonia and Qatar 
have e-Laws covering Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), digital signatures and digital 
certificates (ENEC, 2007a,b). Although Estonia has already made some changes to their 
laws, the laws need to be adaptable for change to accommodate the evolving nature of 
the Internet. For example, Qatar and Estonia consider that digital signatures are 
equivalent to traditional handwritten signatures obtained from users (Solvak and Pettai, 
2008). Qatar has established the Computer Emergency Readiness Team (Q-cert), which 
is responsible for intercepting and dealing with Internet attacks. Also, it can 
communicate with similar organisations in other countries to react quickly to any 
incidents. In the literature, no record could be found of any Estonian plan to monitor the 
network to deal with Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (EUDO, 2007). 
 
In the Qatar election, the voters were invited by letter asking them to participate in I-
voting. 63% of participants felt that their contribution would be valuable for the 
research and this encouraged them to take part in a vote over the Internet. Whereas, in 
Estonia, voters were not invited by letter, but Internet voting is, nevertheless, becoming 
more and more popular, with 35% voting through the internet in 2011(ENEC, 2007a,b).  
Furthermore, the size of both counties means they may be more adaptable to changes 
than larger countries. This is a particular advantage for Qatar where eligible voters 
number around 50,000 whereas in Estonia there are just over 900,000 (ENEC, 2007a, 
b). 
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7.3.3  Acceptance and trust 
This section relies on statistical data. Both Qataris and Estonians show faith and trust in 
the system and government. In Qatar a national survey, held with 2,567 eligible voters, 
showed an encouraging outcome where 76% of participants said they would prefer I-
voting (see Section 6.2). The experiment recoded 83% of participants believed the 
system was secure and useful. In Estonia, statistical data from National Election 
Commission (2007) shows a high percentage of voters use the I-voting system and this 
figure is growing day by day. Therefore, both countries share a great interest in using I-
voting as additional tools for voting.  
 
7.3.4  Usability and accessibility 
With regard to usability probably a Smart card reader would have been easier for people 
to use since people are familiar with it in the e-government portal. However, this 
indicates that the usability of a system asking for hardware and software installation 
would be a problem for many voters. However, it could be argued that training to show 
the voters how the system works would overcome this problem, and the government 
should introduce I-voting gradually till technology can come-up with a better solution. 
 
One question this research attempts to answer is, would I-voting increase people turnout 
for election? The question is challenging however, according to the author point of view 
it could attract new user‟s who desire to use the I-voting and gradually increase voter 
turnout especially if it was usable and accessible to all voters. Nevertheless, we must 
bear in mind that the increasing of the voter turnout affects by other factors. 
1) Believing that one vote will not make different 
2) People self-satisfy or distrust government 
 
The accessibility of both approaches is similar, voters can use any operating system or 
Internet browser to cast their vote. Also, the software has the compatibility with tools 
and technologies that can help disabled voters. However, usability is a broad term. 
Installing hardware and software to perform the task makes it less usable, which is the 
case in Estonia. In the Qatar experiment, there was no additional hardware or software 
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required to cast the vote apart from plugging in the e-token (USB Stick). Participants 
found the Qatari system was easy to use. 
 
7.3.5  Transparency 
The Estonian system was not certified by an independent third party. In addition, no full 
end-to-end logic and accuracy tests were carried out. An auditing company has the 
responsibility to carry out a review of the election process. However, the final report is 
not public. Post-election audits were not requested from the company (OSCE, 2007). In 
Qatar, the experiment had an observer from QEC to check the accuracy of the counting 
process. Also two IT experts were asked to inspect the software. Participants suggested 
a few ways to enhance the transparency of the system (see table 7.3). Certain actions 
would help making the system transparent by involving the public and other parties. The 
observers can be divided into two: 
 
(1) Independent observers: These can be citizens, parties and third party observers as is 
normally the case in the traditional voting process to enable the population to be assured 
that the system is doing what it should do.  
(2) A Software Development Company: A company with a strong reputation for IT 
security needs to check the system against well-written documents such as the Council 
of Europe set of standards (2004) for e-voting. The outcome of their report should then 
be available to the public.  
 
However, I-voting is an unsupervised election system, which means voters are using 
their own computers to cast their vote. This could be the weakest link in I-voting as 
there is no evidence of the voter‟s machine being secured. This could be a fundamental 
obstacle to making I-voting secure. Basically, computers need to be considered as un-
trusted and infected with harmful viruses and malware which could change a voter‟s 
choices at their own computer.  
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7.3.7  Quality 
In the Estonian election, no security incidents have been reported. However, this is not 
evidence that none occurred. The I-voting deployment has been generally accepted by 
citizens, politicians, and election officials (ENEC, 2007a, b). This could be due to the 
fact that it was supported by the government of Estonia. In the Qatar experiment, there 
was no independent authority to examine the quality of the experiment although the 
researcher ask for independent observer two IT experts who checked the software and 
the QEC officials who checked the vote count. Moreover, participants of this 
experiment were asked about the quality of their experience in term of using I-voting 
compared to traditional voting. Qatar could clearly benefit from the Estonian experience 
in their efforts to achieve a high quality election process. 
 
7.4  Conclusion  
Implementation of Internet voting still remains a hard task in large-scale elections 
(Mohen and Glidden, 2001; Philips and Spankovsky, 2001). The Estonian experience 
could provide a solid basis for future development of I-voting in Qatar, since it has the 
advantage of highly innovative IT infrastructure, and Estonia is also a small nation.  
 
The future challenges are: 
(1) to provide a mechanism to secure client machines (chapter 8 further investigates 
this aspect with further research to measure Qataris awareness of the need for 
securing their computer) 
(2) to bridge between what has been proposed in the literature and what is implemented 
in practice 
(3) to develop a set of standards for I-voting based on best of practices For example, 
the  Council of Europe has developed guidelines and standards for certifying e-
voting (Council of Europe, 2004).  
 
The comparison between Qatar and Estonian was not a comparison of like for like, 
since Qatar was an experimental case study held in labs. However, this could be an 
introduction for future pilot projects and full testing for any further deployment of I-
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voting. Qatar would need to amend the current election law to consider new features, 
such as over-writing a vote to reduce vote selling or family pressure. 
 
The work described in this chapter could be used by the Government of Qatar to 
provide evidence for the feasibility of an I-voting system. Moreover, technology and IT 
management experts could learn from the results of the experiment carried out to enable 
them to better assist with the transition to I-voting, ensuring that the adoption of the new 
system does not interfere with the current processes which exist in Qatar. 
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Chapter 8  Assessment of Client side I-voting Security 
 
This chapter presents a profile of voters‟ awareness of information security derived 
from a survey designed to measure the level of awareness on the client side of I-voting. 
The previous chapter has pointed out the risks that might appear due to lack of 
awareness of information security, which could put an otherwise very secure I-voting 
system in danger of manipulation by unauthorised persons.  
 
8.1  Introduction 
The client side remains one of the important issues in introducing I-voting and the 
SERVE report (Jefferson et al., 2004) stresses that the weakest link in this process is the 
voter‟s end device, as no matter how secure the voting protocol is, hackers can change 
the voter‟s vote before it is transmitted over the Internet. Volkamer et al (2006) describe 
a few methods to overcome the problem of insecure voter devices:  
 
(1) Providing training and raising the awareness of computer security. 
(2) Using a secure operating system. 
(3) Using trusted computing elements. 
(4) Using voting code sheets.  
 
Jefferson et al. (2004) also argue that Internet voting has other security challenges 
because of the use of the Internet network, which is vulnerable to cyber attacks (insider 
attacks, DoS attacks, spoofing, etc.). I-voting has many challenges but, taking the 
example of the Estonian experience in using I-voting in a general election, these can be 
overcome. Although, in 2007, the system in Estonia failed due to a DoS attack after 
three days, this could be an acceptable experience as three days is a long time to carry 
out an election which could be carried out in one day. Furthermore, a secure voter 
machine would eliminate the DoS attack since attackers would need to use the voter‟s 
infected machine to strike. A reliable, trusted operating system could solve the problem. 
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Securing an I-voting system is shared responsibility of the developer and the user. 
Schneicher (2004) indicates that “Security is a process, not a product.” Therefore 
information security awareness is needed on the user side. The literature has argued that 
training and education could contribute and partly solve this problem (Aloul, 2010; 
Boujettif and Wang, 2010; Talib et al., 2010; Tolnai and von Solms, 2009; Meister and 
Biermann, 2008; Smith, 2006). 
The conclusion from the literature is that the main problem facing I-voting concerns the 
threats associated with the client side, either due to the unsecure client machine (e.g. 
contain viruses, Trojan programs) or a lack of users‟ awareness on information security 
(Gerck et al., 2001; Oppliger, 2002; Swiss Federal Council Report, 2006; Thielbeer, 
2007). Therefore, a focus for this research is enhancing the level of client awareness on 
information security to achieve a secure and reliable I-voting system, especially on the 
client side.   
 
To determine users‟ awareness of information security, a survey entitled Computer User 
Security Awareness Survey, was distributed manually to 400 Qatar Foundation students 
and employees, who were Qatari citizens aged over 18, regardless of their background 
or education level, to obtain a broad spectrum of views. The return rate was 37.5% (150 
completed questionnaires).     
  
The results demonstrate that most participants behave inappropriately, leaving them at 
risk, even though they are aware of the risks. Finally, the study concludes that technical 
solutions along with training would enhance users‟ information security knowledge, 
helping to eliminate client side risks.  
 
This study will be used to assist the development of I-voting in the State of Qatar by 
giving an understanding of the users‟ knowledge of the Internet and computer security 
to enable an appropriate solution. It shows more effort should be made in terms of 
practical training to solve the problem of phishing and that educational and training 
material about phishing can be presented in learning sessions, distance learning (e-
learning), embedded training, regular learning messages or even through the media. 
(Kawakami et al., 2010). 
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8.2   Problem of awareness   
The problem of security awareness of computer users has recently become apparent and 
some researchers (eg. Kvavik, 2004) emphasise that user awareness is a core element in 
securing the client side. For example, research by the EDUCAUSE Centre for Applied 
Research at the University of Minnesota was carried out to find the main common 
barriers in that university to effective IT security  (Kvavik, 2004) (see Figure 8.1). The 
research shows that user awareness and other cultural factors are the second most major 
problem in US institutions, concerning 46% of IT users, which shows how much 
awareness is needed to prevent any security failures in an organisation. Moreover, a 
survey by the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC, 2003) 
confirms that the top cause of corporate data risk (78%) is human incompetence and 
threats from disgruntled employees. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: IT security barriers, University of Minnesota (Kvavik, 2004) 
 
A survey in the UK (Furnell et al., 1999) to assess the awareness of the general public 
regarding computer crime and abuse showed that most people have the wrong idea 
about where the danger is coming from and who is responsible for it. In computer 
security, the media has a major influence on computer users‟ opinions, as the media 
tend to blame any computer breach on hackers. Moreover, they claim that hackers are 
knowledgeable in making cyber-attacks which can not be stopped. In reality, hackers 
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tend to attack the system from the weakest link, trying to find a “back-door” into the 
system in order to find a way to attack. Most computer users do not know how to 
configure their own computers to make them secure. In addition, the survey results 
indicate that 30% of participants believe that hackers are lonely, young, males without 
social skills, which shows a lack of awareness about hackers and their social skills 
which they use to trick their victims with so-called 'social engineering'. On the other 
hand, the media do help people understand that there is a danger of being attacked, 
showing them the type of crimes that might happen when using computers. The research 
shows that 80% of respondents felt that computer crime and abuse was a problem and 
most people consider computer crime is a serious concern (Furnell et al., 1999) (see 
Table 8.1). 
  
Sabotage cyber-attacks have been recorded as a serious threat to business. Recently, 
some credit card companies were sabotaged by a group of hackers in revenge for 
suspending WikiLeaks‟ accounts (BBC, 2010). This type of attack has come from both 
“black hat” attackers, who have criminal intentions, and “white hat” attackers with non-
criminal intentions. However, I-voting is expected to experience such attacks. Limiting 
access to I-voting within the country, so only people from Qatar have access to the 
system, could reduce possible security risks (see section 3.4). Although this will 
enhance the security of I-voting, it will make I-voting hard to access for overseas voters 
who would then have to vote in a Qatar embassy. 
 
Table 8.1: Views on computer crime and abuse (Furnell et al., 1999) 
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Security awareness is one of the most prominent security problems at the present time 
and research has shown (e.g. Aloul, 2010; Talib et al., 2010; Tolnai and von Solms, 
2009; Smith, 2006) that the best way to tackle it is by training to build a good security 
culture by making all users aware of the real threat they are facing. Both technical and 
non-technical solutions would be needed to provide a secure system. Training can take 
many different forms and styles. Providing an online training tool could be very useful 
and accessible to large numbers of users especially those who are familiar with 
computers (Edelson and O‟Neill, 1994; Pea, 1994; Dede, 1996; Khan, 1997; Edelson, 
Gordin and Pea, 1999; Kearsley, 2005; Willems, 2005). Research has found that 
e-learning would reduce overall cost and learning time by about 50% and increase 
knowledge retention by 25-60% compared to traditional learning methods (Fletcher, 
1991, pp.33-42; Hall, 1997, p. 108; Zenger and Uehlein, 2001).  
 
A training capability can be a powerful tool that can save organisations time and money 
and can even make people feel safer and more confident to use computers and other 
online technologies (Aloul, 2010; Boujettif and Wang, 2010). Interactive learning tools 
(e.g. e-learning, posters, leaflets, videos, games) could educate users on the importance 
of information security, making them aware of the potential security threats and the 
need to protect their information from unauthorised users, and give guidelines of how to 
protect themselves (Al-Hamar, 2010). Users should be taught what to do to protect 
themselves from possible security threats, for example never giving out their passwords, 
updating their anti-virus software, accessing only trusted websites, not opening 
unknown junk mails, and not download from untrusted websites.   
 
8.4   Reasons for survey 
The aim of the survey was to collect information about the normal behaviour and 
actions of people while using a computer and the Internet and to assess Qataris‟ level of 
awareness on information security. The level of security awareness was surveyed to 
determine the risks which might arise from users voting from their own machine 
through an I-voting system. 
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The survey target was a sample of Qatari voters who are eligible to vote. Their 
responses would play an important role in making recommendations or designing tools 
for Qatari people on how to enhance their awareness.  
 
8.5   Survey design 
In order to determine the level of users‟ security awareness, a survey was required to 
assess the use of computers and their vulnerability to security threats.  
 
This survey was intended to help find some of the common security mistakes of users 
and how they normally react to some common threats they can face in their daily use of 
the Internet, computers and some other electronic devices such as mobile phones. 
Important questions this survey tried to answer are the following: 
 
 Is the level of awareness of users reflected in their actions while using the 
Internet and computers? 
 Is a computer security awareness campaign needed? 
 Can such campaigns help to increase the level of security awareness among all 
computer users?  
 
The survey is divided into three sections, each with a number of questions, and 
participants were asked to complete each section in turn before moving to the next. The 
first section gathered general background information about the participants, who were 
asked about their gender, age and education. The second section covered computer and 
Internet security aspects. To measure participants‟ computer and Internet security 
awareness, questions were selected according to the book “Computer security – Client 
side” (Hossein, 2005, p.342) and the results constituted an empirical study of Qatari 
computer users.  The third section had questions about participants‟ willingness to take 
part in a further survey to evaluate the researcher‟s proposed solutions to the problems 
identified. Contact details were collected for this purpose. A copy of the questionnaire, 
in its English translation, is given in Appendix C. 
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8.6   Analysis of Survey 
8.6.1  Section 1.  Background 
The first section of the survey consisted of three questions asking participants for their 
background information.  
 
8.6.1.1  Question 1. Gender.  
The survey was dominated by 91% male respondents.  
 
8.6.1.2  Question 2. Age.  
Responses to the second question showed that most of the respondents were aged from 
18 to 29, this being 80% of the total, followed by 20% aged between 30 and 59. There 
were no respondents over the age of 60.  
 
8.6.1.3  Question 3. Education.  
The third and final question in this section concerned the level of education of 
respondents, to help to find out if education has any impact on the respondents‟ level of 
security awareness. The responses to Q3 covered the comprehensive range of 
certificate, diploma, bachelors‟, masters‟ and PhD programmes undertaken by the 
respondents. The results indicate that the main concentration of respondents was drawn 
from those educated to higher-level education, this being a total of 60%. The remaining 
40% are undergraduate and further education students, 22% being undergraduates and 
18% further education students. 
 
8.6.2  Section 2.  Computer and Internet security 
The second section of the survey concentrates on the computer and security issues faced 
by those computer users. Some questions included images related to the issues and 
which the participants were asked about. They were given multiple-choice questions, 
some single answer questions and others requiring a selection of more than one answer. 
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8.6.2.1  Question 1. Frequency of use of the Internet   
The first question asked participants how often they use the Internet. This can help to 
understand how experienced the respondents are with the Internet and the scale of the 
security problems they are facing, depending on their use of it. The response to Q1 
indicates that the majority of respondents (87%) use the Internet more than once a day, 
followed by nearly 7% who use it once a day, giving a total of 93% who use it every 
day, and nearly 7% using the Internet once a week. This indicates that the Internet plays 
an important role for the future of communication and services, therefore user privacy 
and security should be considered. 
 
8.6.2.2  Question 2.  User reaction to a fake Internet security pop-up.  
The second question looked at the response of the Internet users when an Internet pop-
up box comes up with a fake security warning while they are browsing the Internet (see 
Figure 8.2). The participants had a number of answers to choose from, one being to 
respond to the pop-up message box, another to ignore it. The appropriate choice is the 
latter, to avoid the possibility of clicking on a link that can lead to virus infection or 
security attack on one‟s computer. 78% of respondents said they would ignore the 
message if it came up, while the remaining 22% said they would respond to it.    
 
 
Figure 8.2: Example of a fake Internet pop-up message 
 
It may appear positive that most respondents had chosen to ignore the pop-up message 
but 22% is still a relatively big number, especially when bearing in mind that 80% of 
the respondents who chose to respond to the pop-up message are using the Internet more 
than once every day. A very serious security threat faces those who respond to that kind 
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of pop-up, since malware software could be installed in the PC, unknown to the user, 
and it could open a back door to take control of the user‟s computer remotely. An 
infected computer then could become part of the “botnet”. By widespread use of 
broadband, Internet criminal hackers use a botnet, a group of Internet computers 
controlled by malware code, to attack businesses using a denial of service (DoS) attack 
to gain financial benefit. This security threat could infect both the individual‟s computer 
and the wider Internet community. A good slogan to adopt is, therefore, “Be safe and 
keep others safe”. According to experts interviewed (see section 5.7.4), I-voting faces a 
serious threat from a botnet attack and user awareness and training could avoid users 
becoming part of a botnet, helping to keep the Internet safe (see section 3.4.1).  
 
There appears to be a relationship between a user‟s age and the amount of user security 
awareness. The responses indicate that most of those who responded to the pop-up 
message (70%) are in the 18 - 29 age group, with 30% of respondents aged 30 to 59. 
This demonstrates the importance of educating young Internet users about the safe use 
of computers and the Internet, particularly as 89% of respondents aged 18 to 29 use the 
Internet more than once a day and currently make up the majority of all users.  
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8.6.2.3  Question 3. The best way for computer protection.  
The third question asked participants about the best way to protect their computer. 
There were a number of options to choose from, with the possibility to choose more 
than one.  
 
The majority of respondents (91%), believed that virus protection software is one of the 
best methods of protection, followed by 62% for a firewall and 38% for patching their 
operating system. Some (15%) believed that the best way to protect their computer is by 
not accessing the Internet at all, which for most people would not be a practical 
solution. Most of the 11% remaining respondents had selected the “other” option, 
believed that Spyware software provides sufficient protection for their computers (see 
Figure 8.3). 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Perceived best way to protect computer 
  
The results indicate that one third of all respondents would want all options as the best 
way of protection. With 73% of these respondents having high level or postgraduate 
education, this indicates that people with higher education have better awareness when 
it comes to Internet security. In fact, of the 33% of respondents who answered that 
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question appropriately, 80% also chose to ignore the pop-up message in the previous 
question (Question 2).   
 
The results show that a high percentage of participants have the wrong idea or not the 
complete answer for computer and Internet security. This was evident when 91% of 
respondents had chosen virus protection software, whereas patching their operating 
system came in third, chosen by just 38% of the respondents, when it is in fact a more 
effective option. Internet voting would need a secure and recently patched operating 
system in order to have a secure computer to vote from, which could potentially be 
provided in a bootable CD. 
 
The next three questions (Questions 4 to 6) are about passwords and their use.  
 
8.6.2.4  Question 4.  Use of the same password.  
The response to Q4 indicates that 56% of respondents use the same password with 
different applications, whereas the other 44% claim they do not. 
 
8.6.2.5  Question 5. Remembering passwords.  
The response to Q5 indicates that 73% of respondents have no problem in memorising 
passwords. This represents positive feedback regarding their computer security 
awareness. 7% write down their passwords and keep them in a safe place, closely 
followed by a further 7% who do the same but keep it somewhere close to the computer 
or stick it on the computer monitor. 4% of respondents save their passwords on their 
computers, by writing them in a text document, which is then saved. Another 4% use 
password management software to keep their password in a safe place. 2% of 
respondents store passwords in their mobile phones. The remaining 2% of respondents 
have another way to remember their passwords but did not state what it is (see Figure 
8.4). This implies that using different levels of authentication such as a fingerprint, 
voice or iris recognition or a smart card in I-voting would provide stronger security than 
a password. A voter can choose a weak password but not weak biometric data. A better 
approach to overcome the problem of remembering passwords would be to use a one-
Chapter 8: Assessment of Client side I-voting Security 
 
200 
time password which would be generated while logging into the system or it would be 
sent to the user using a different method, for example SMS or email. The user would 
then not then be required to remember any password. 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Remembering passwords 
 
Among the majority of respondents (73%) who said that they have no problem in 
memorising their passwords, 82% of them are aged 18 to 29 and perhaps have better 
ability to memorise things than older people. However, 52% of those who have no 
problem in memorising are actually using the same password for more than one 
application, which provides further evidence that computer users lack simple security 
awareness. 
 
8.6.2.6 Question 6. Method of choosing a password.  
Participants were asked how they could describe the construction of their password. 
36% of respondents said that they constructed them by combining words, numbers and 
characters. 31% said that they used memorable words. Another 20% said that they 
combine words and numbers. 4% use words that are hard to predict as a password, even 
if it is a short one.  Most of the 9% remaining said they combined strange words and 
numbers (see Figure 8.5).    
Chapter 8: Assessment of Client side I-voting Security 
 
201 
 
Figure 8.5: Methods used for choosing password 
 
Using just a word as a password makes the password less strong, because of the 
possibility that the word used can be figured out, creating a weaknesses against 
dictionary attacks. What is more, most of the 4.4% respondents who use words as a 
password, use memorable words. Having a memorable word as a password can be 
described as weak as the chance for it to be figured out is high. Of those who use 
characters, names and numbers combined to construct their password, 81% said that 
they have no problem in memorising them. It is not clear whether it is just the 
memorising factor that makes people decide which type of password they are 
constructing, pure lack of awareness or a combination of both. Most respondents whose 
passwords can be described as strong, which is a combination of characters, words and 
numbers, are highly educated, with 75% with high level or postgraduate education.  
 
In the Internet voting system design described later in this thesis, the architecture is 
based on a number of security layers, which would not need users to remember 
information such as a code or password or even personal information. 
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8.6.2.7  Question 7. Trustworthiness of a suspicious link.  
Participants were provided with a picture (see Figure 8.6) showing a screenshot of an 
instant messaging window, with a link on it. They were asked about what they thought 
of the link. 
 
The response to Q7 indicates that 69% of respondents were suspicious about the link, 
but 13% thought it was a normal message from a friend and there was nothing wrong 
with it. Another 9% of respondents were suspicious about it but they were still going to 
click on the link. The remaining 9% of respondents said they did not know (see Figure 
8.7).  
 
Figure 8.6: Suspicious link in instant messaging window 
 
The link that appears in the instant messaging window is generated by malware, which 
has infected the computer of the person chatting. The malware sends the message with 
the link to other people, as if it was a message from a friend, in an attempt to deceive 
people to make them click on it and then get infected by the same malware, which in 
this case was being used for advertising purposes. Nearly a quarter of respondents 
indicated they would click on it, which shows that the purpose of the malware had been 
achieved and computer users were easily deceived.  
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Figure 8.7: Respondents’ thoughts on Instant Messaging window link 
 
Malware writers regularly come up with new ideas to trick Internet users. Obviously, it 
does work and the evidence of that is that 43% of the 31% of respondents who did not 
say that the link in the instant messaging window was suspicious (and who might click 
on the link) said they would respond to the Internet pop-up box presented to them 
earlier (see section 8.6.2.2). Furthermore, 86% of the respondents who may click on the 
link on the instant messaging window use the Internet more than once every day, with 
the same percentage of respondents (86%), aged 18-29.  
 
8.6.2.8  Question 8. Use of P2P software.  
This question asked participants about their use of peer-to-peer (P2P) software for file 
sharing. The respondents indicated that 38% use P2P software and 44% do not do so, 
with the other 18% of respondents saying they do not know (see Figure 8.8). The results 
indicate that 24% of the respondents who use P2P software also responded to the 
Internet pop-up message in Question 2 and the same number (24%) said they might 
click on the link appearing on the instant messaging window. P2P networking opens the 
user to various forms of attack, break-in and espionage. It gets around most security 
architectures in the same way that a Trojan horse does. Once a P2P application is 
installed on a „trusted device‟ a connection is made from the computer to the external 
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Internet attackers who can thereby have remote access for the purpose of stealing 
confidential and corporate data, launching a DoS attack or simply gaining control of 
network resources. 
 
Figure 8. 8: Respondents using P2P software 
 
8.6.2.9  Question 9. Checking file extensions before downloading. 
Participants were asked if they check file extensions before they download any files or 
music from the Internet. The majority of respondents (76%) claim that they do check 
the file extension before they download any file, while 18% admit they do not; 7% do 
not know (see Figure 8.9). However, this represents a positive discovery that 94% of 
respondents who use P2P software do check file extensions before downloading. 
Furthermore, 92% of respondents who use the Internet more than once a day indicate 
that they do check the file extension before they download any file and that 
demonstrates a very good awareness when it comes to downloading files, especially by 
regular Internet users. It is important in I-voting that users should not get phished by 
hackers who trick them into downloading a different file from the voting application. 
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Figure 8.9: Checking file extensions before downloading 
 
8.6.2.10  Question 10. Reaction to a warning of a virus attack that is imminent or 
on certain date. 
 
This question asked participants what they would do if they hear about a virus attack 
that is imminent or on a certain date. In this question, participants were given the option 
to choose more than one answer.  
 
The most popular action, accounting for 64% of respondents, is immediate updating of 
their virus protection software. Patching software in their computers came in second 
with 31%. Surprisingly, 27% of respondents said that they did not care and they would 
use their computer normally without taking any action. 9% also said they would do 
nothing because they have an anti-virus software, even if they are not sure if it is up to 
date or not, and 11% of respondents said they would use their computer but would not 
open any e-mail on the day of the virus attack. Just 2% said they would keep their 
computer turned off that day. The remaining 4% said they would be more cautious 
about opening emails and junk messages during that period (see Figure 8.10).  
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Internet security experts advise Internet users to download security patches for software 
and operating systems regularly to eliminate addressed security vulnerabilities. Just 
31% of respondents said they would do that (Herzberg, 2008).  
  
69% of the respondents indicated that they would take no action to prevent a virus 
attack on their machine and they would use their computer without concern over this 
problem. This clearly shows that Internet users are very vulnerable to attacks and, 
therefore, any Internet voting system should take into account this problem. 25% of 
these vulnerable respondents said they would respond to the Internet pop-up message 
and also the message on the P2P software. Furthermore, 50% of those respondents who 
did not care about the virus attacks would do nothing about it because they have anti-
virus software, even if they are not sure if it is up to date. 50% of those respondents who 
are not sure if their anti-virus is up to date use P2P software. 
  
 
Figure 8.10: Action on hearing about virus attack imminent or on certain date. 
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8.6.2.11  Question 11. Opening e-mails from unknown senders 
When participants were asked about whether they open e-mails from unknown senders, 
44% said they do not and 20% said it depends on the e-mail subject whether they would 
do so. 18% said they do sometimes open e-mails from unknown senders, with 9% not 
sure. A 7% minority of respondents said they do open e-mails from unknown senders. 
One respondent gave an interesting answer by declaring that he uses a university 
computer to open any suspicious e-mail messages he receives (see Figure 8.11).   
 
Moreover, 67% of respondents who do open e-mails from unknown senders do not 
check file extensions when they download files from the Internet. In contrast, 90% of 
respondents who do not open such e-mails do check file extensions before downloading 
any file from the Internet. Also, 33% of participants said they will use the computer and 
the Internet normally and would not care if there is an imminent virus attack and they 
would not even take action to protect their computers from being attacked. Most of 
those respondents (84%) use the Internet more than once a day. Experts in e-mail 
security who advise on deciding email legitimacy advocate not opening email 
attachments from unknown senders until confirmation is given that they were sent 
intentionally and free of viruses or malware (Downs et al. 2007). 
 
Figure 8.11: Opening email from unknown sender 
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8.6.2.12  Question 12. Reaction to a firewall alert 
Participants were provided with a screenshot of a firewall message (see Figure 8.12) and 
were asked what they would do if their firewall application keeps showing them a 
message like that. 57% of respondents claim that they do read the messages carefully 
every time one appears.  20% said that they would read the message the first time and 
then just click OK whenever it appears again. 11% said they just would just click OK 
every time the message appears, with a further 7% of respondents saying they would 
find the message a disturbance and get fed up with it (see Figure 8.13).  
 
 
Figure 8.12: Example of Firewall alert 
 
A firewall application is important as it monitors all traffic to and from a computer to 
block unauthorised access and protect personal information. However, it is also 
important to use the firewall properly, keeping it up to date and running all the time. 
One of the mistakes users make is to ignore firewall messages. For example, of the 
respondents who said they would read the firewall message the first time and then 
would just click OK whenever the message appears again asking for action to be taken, 
one third of them would also choose to respond to the Internet pop-up message. Such 
behaviour would not just result in their possible infection by malware because they 
clicked on a suspicious link, but they would have also prevented their firewall from 
being able to protect them. Furthermore, that same 33% of those respondents said that 
they would use their computer normally and would not care if they heard about a virus 
attack about to strike soon (auditmypc, 2011).  
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Figure 8.13: User behaviour on receiving firewall alerts 
 
8.6.2.13  Question 13. Switching off security applications in reaction to repeated 
alerts 
Here, participants were asked whether they switch off their firewall application or anti-
virus software when notification messages keep appearing a lot.  The majority of 
respondents (84%) said they do not, but 9% of respondents said that would do so, with 
the remaining 7% of respondents saying they did not know (see Figure 8.14).  
 
Generally, people get annoyed when notification messages keep on being displayed and 
a number may choose to switch off their anti-virus or firewall software to stop the 
annoyance. However, the notification messages are trying to inform users of a security 
breach.  The survey results show that 75% of the respondents who just do nothing and 
switch off their security application would also then respond to the Internet pop-up 
message. Furthermore, 25% of those respondents said they would use the Internet 
normally, even if there is a virus attack which they have been warned about, and they 
would not take any action to prevent the attack from happening. 75% of respondents 
who said they would switch off their security application use the Internet more than 
once a day.  
Chapter 8: Assessment of Client side I-voting Security 
 
210 
 
In addition, 50% of respondents who said they would switch off their security 
application if it keeps showing notification messages also open e-mails from unknown 
senders. Furthermore, a quarter of those respondents (25%) do not check any file 
extensions before they download files from Internet. 
 
 
Figure 8.14: Turn off security application 
 
8.6.2.14  Question 14.  Responsibility for Internet security failure 
The participants were asked about who would be responsible for any Internet security 
failure and were given the option to select more than one answer. The results indicate 
that 64% of participants claim that computer users have the responsibility, Internet 
service providers came second with 56%, followed by 29% of respondents who think it 
is a problem for big companies like Microsoft and Yahoo, 27% blame governments, 
while the remaining respondents think others have to be responsible, such as the web 
hosting companies which host virus attackers, malicious hackers and security software 
developers (see Figure 8.15).  
 
The fact that nearly two-thirds of respondents indicated that Internet users are 
responsible for Internet security failure shows awareness that it is in their hands to 
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protect themselves. On the other hand, they take no action to do so. For instance, 41% 
of those who said users are responsible also use P2P software. However, it is advisable 
to download P2P on another computer, making sure it has no valuable information, to 
reduce possible risks. Moreover, 24% of the respondents open e-mails from unknown 
senders and 7% do not check file extensions before they download files from the 
Internet. This confirms that users need to increase their computer security awareness. 
 
 
Figure 8.15: Responsibility for Internet security failure 
 
In Section C, the last two questions focused on security awareness and training.  
 
8.6.3.1  Question 1. Training in IT security 
When asked whether they had IT security training or not, 67% of respondents said they 
did not have any training, while the other 33% said they did. As well as having training, 
53% of respondents said they are reminded from time to time about computer and 
Internet security. The positive point is that 73% of the respondents who had training 
also used strong passwords, which is a combination of characters, words and numbers. 
In addition, 60% of them change their passwords every one to three months. On the 
other hand, 53% of respondents who had training do, nevertheless, open e-mails from 
unknown senders (see Figure 8.16).  
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Figure 8.16: User training in IT security 
 
8.6.3.2  Question 2.  Computer security training for users   
The participants were also asked about whether they think that computer users should 
have computer security training. 69% said that they think that they should have such 
training, 16% said users do not need it, while the remaining 16% said they did not know 
whether or not users should have that training (see Figure 8.17).  
 
While having computer and Internet security training may be important, not all kinds of 
training are beneficial to computer users. However, it seems that many respondents who 
had training in the past feel they have benefited from it and would recommend having 
training to other computer users. Overall, 42% of respondents who had training in the 
past believe computer users should have training related to computer and Internet 
security.   
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Figure 8.17: IT security training for computer users 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
The previous chapters concluded that I-voting is feasible but there might be issues 
associated with the client in terms of their knowledge and awareness on information 
security related to I-voting. Therefore, this chapter has focused on studying voters‟ 
awareness of information security and that, with I-voting, there may be a threat of 
manipulation by an unauthorised user. Based on a survey designed for this purpose, the 
research identifies the need for enhancing user awareness to attain an effective I-voting 
system. The survey of a sample of eligible Qatari voters aimed to measure their 
computer and Internet behaviour and their knowledge of information security. The 
conclusion from the survey is that users perform many inappropriate actions which 
might put them at a security risk due to lack of awareness of information security. 
However, the result shows that Qataris do know about methods of computer protection 
including virus protection and firewalls, though they may not always appreciate the 
need to employ these methods. 
 
The survey shows that 22% of participants would react to a fake security warning and 
respond to suspicious links, putting them at risk of malware. In addition, about 38% use 
P2P software, putting their computer at risk of being exposed to attackers. Furthermore, 
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very risky actions were found, with 43% of the respondents opening e-mail from 
unknown senders and 58% who do not read firewall alert messages.  
 
In contrast, the majority of participants perform some correct actions such as checking 
file extensions before downloading, turning on security applications and updating their 
anti-virus to protect their PC from viruses.  
 
Using different levels of authentication in I-voting could provide higher security than a 
password, since voters might choose a weak password and may not keep it safe from 
disclosure to other people.  
 
In conclusion, the survey indicates the need for enhancing awareness on information 
security to reduce the possible risks associated with the client in I-voting. Although user 
awareness and training play an important role in providing part of an overall awareness 
of security, technical solutions are still important to ensure secure I-voting on the client 
side and this is covered in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 9: A proposed model for I-voting in Qatar 
 
215 
Chapter 9  A proposed model for I-voting in Qatar 
 
This chapter begins with an examination of the requirements of voting systems, in particular, 
those for electronic voting (Section 9.2). These requirements were then re-analysed in terms 
of constraints upon any software system that performs I-voting tasks. Next, the model is 
presented in Section 9.4. Finally in section 9.5, a prototype of the proposed model is 
described that is used to test the implementation of the model. 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the presentation of a new model for I-voting, one that is 
particularly suitable for use in elections in Qatar. The model was developed after carefully 
considering the views of voters and experts on an effective I-voting system that would be 
appropriate to elections in that country. The resulting model attempts to fulfil a number of 
requirements of the voting process, including that it should ensure security, privacy, 
transparency and accuracy and should be useable by members of the public.  
The model was designed to satisfy the Qatar e-government roadmap for I-voting, which relies 
on the following three-pillar strategy to identify individuals accurately: 
 
(1) Use of a unique identification number (the QID) which consolidates the voter’s 
credentials in a single number; 
(2) Use of a set of multi-modal biometric credentials which allow strong identification 
and authentication of individual voters, and 
(3) Use of a unique digital certificate to enable secure interaction with the I-voting 
apparatus. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature review), these problems have attracted the attention of 
many researchers and various solutions have been produced. 
 
Figure 9.1 shows the Qatar e-government roadmap in terms of achievements and future 
milestones.  
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Figure 9.1: Qatar e-government roadmap 
 
The model proposed in this chapter is a form of electronic voting in which votes are cast over 
the Internet. It is intended that the Qatari National ID card will be used as a credential when 
the voter’s identity must be verified. It is also intended that the PKI credentials will be used 
within this smart card in order to ensure confidentiality and integrity. 
 
9.2  Requirements of the Voting Process 
The requirements imposed by the voting process amount to a challenge to the model builder. 
The main factor affecting election administration is security but other factors are also relevant 
to the evaluation of I-voting systems. Public confidence depends upon election security and 
integrity, but choosing a voting system must also involve consideration of other performance 
factors such as ease of use and efficiency. 
For present purposes, accuracy refers to how voting equipment completely records and 
counts votes precisely, ease of use refers to how understandable and accessible the equipment 
is to a diverse group of voters and election workers, while efficiency refers to how quickly a 
given vote can be cast and counted. For more details of voting requirements, see section 3.4 
and Appendix D. 
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9.2.1 Software requirements 
The requirements stated in the previous section apply to software. 
The section deals with the following aspects of the software: 
1.  Access controls 
2.  Physical controls 
3.  Audit trails 
4.  Accuracy 
5.  Ease of use 
6.  Efficiency 
 
Each aspect is defined in detail in see section 3.4 and Appendix D. 
 
9.3 The proposed model compared to the earlier experimental model   
The earlier experimental I-voting model, proposed in chapter 7, was focusing on secure 
voting and measuring Qatari's acceptance to such new technology. The evaluation of 
this model shows a high percentage of acceptances with some concerns on the 
scalability of the system to perform in large scale election in terms of ensuring the 
reliability of the system and achieving the voting principles including security. 
 
Therefore, the proposed model was modified to provide a comprehensive solution by 
securing the client machine using a customised CD to ensure the reliability of the 
machine. The model introduces the new idea of using a virtual private network for 
secure transmission of votes. It defines the detail of the end to end process of I-voting 
from registration, authentication, voting through to vote counting. Also, to provide more 
security to the process, the new proposed model uses a certificate authority to verify 
eligible voters. Multi-parties are used in the voting process to ensure confidentiality and 
integrity of the system. In addition, for authentication, a one-time-password is used to 
verify eligible voters, distributed through SMS and which expires after 10 minutes. 
Since Qatar has a tribal structure, family intimidtation can occur in election where 
courtesy and family pressure could happen. Therefore, a revote option is supported in 
this model to eliminate the family pressure to vote in any particular way. In addition, the 
interface of the modified model is more informative and simple, compared to earlier 
version to ensure ease of use. However, both models use PKI for encryption, a smart 
card for authentication and blind signature for anonymity.   
Chapter 9: A proposed model for I-voting in Qatar 
 
218 
9.4  The Process of Voting 
9.4.1  Introduction 
In this section, the new model is presented in software and hardware terms. The 
description consists of a discussion of the operating system and distribution medium 
used to give voters the software they require to access the Internet and cast their ballot. 
Authentication and registration are then discussed. Anonymity and its preservation, vote 
casting and vote counting then follow. From this, it can be seen that every stage of the 
voting process has been included. Both software and hardware problems are discussed. 
Figure 9.2 shows the proposed I-voting stages for the State of Qatar. 
 
 
Figure 9.2: I-voting stages for the State of Qatar 
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9.4.2 Technical aspects of the system 
The security of the proposed model depends on the security of its two main 
components: the servers and the client computers permitting users (voters) to connect to 
the election servers. The client software is clearly a critical element of the system since 
it is to be used by members of the public. It is also a security-critical component of the 
overall system and must be as reliable as possible. To this end, the Linux operating 
system is used to support the client software. This choice is partially motivated by the 
fact that Linux is available free of charge and can be downloaded easily; it is also open 
software, so its source code is available for inspection and/or modification, thus raising 
the users’ level of confidence in its code. The client software will be distributed on CDs, 
which can be inserted directly into the voter’s machine. The disk will then boot and the 
voting software will execute. 
 
The choice of Linux therefore reduces the cost of client software while increasing 
confidence in it. The problem with Linux is that it is not very secure (Chou et al., 2001), 
but there are no licence problems with this system. The use of Linux will have to be 
different from the normal in terms of usability if it is not to let the system down from a 
security viewpoint. 
 
To overcome any security problems, voters (users) will have to use Linux via a special, 
restricted shell, one that cannot interact with the file system and gives a highly restricted 
view of the operating system. The login shell should only run an interface to the voting 
software. It should not be possible to cause the voting software to terminate without 
terminating the login shell. This is very easily done on all Unix operating systems and 
the way to do it is well documented (Garfinkel et al., 2003). 
 
It is also necessary to restrict the standard path so that it only looks at, say /usr/local/bin 
(which is on the distribution CD), where all user-runable executables are stored. The 
system supplied on the CD would be a cut-down version of a standard Linux system 
that has the necessary software to run the voting system only. All other software 
normally associated with the Linux operating system (such as compilers, editors, etc.) 
would be removed. 
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All executables of the distributed CDs must be signed and the signatures signed secure 
hash algorithm (SHA) or MD5 will do, as long as the fact is publicly known for it serves 
to put people off attacking) (Eastlake and Jones, 2001). 
When running the I-voting software, no component should be part of the system root or 
equivalent. This requires a check of the software before the distribution CD is created.  
Just in case voters have to re-cast their vote, they should be required to change the 
password on their login shell. Next, SSH (secure shell) should not be used as the 
improved SSH2 version should be used instead (Barrett et al. 2005). 
 
Furthermore, the IP stack is a set of communications protocols used for the Internet and 
other similar networks, however it presents security problems of its own. TCP, in 
particular, is an insecure communications medium and requires additional measures if 
communications using it are to be secure (Comer, 2006). TCP is prone to man-in-the-
middle attacks, a widely known fact about the protocol (Comer, 2006). Instead, it is 
worth considering use of UDP (User Datagram Protocol) instead as it is largely used by 
time sensitive applications as well as by servers that answer small queries from huge 
number of clients. UDP is commonly used in the Domain Name System, Voice over IP, 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol and online games. 
 
The operating system on the voter CD will run a firewall to enhance security. It will 
also run only software upgraded to run the latest security patches and all software will 
have been checked using anti-virus software. As noted above, signed software should be 
used to ensure that it has not been ‘adjusted’ since it was dispatched from the central 
source. 
 
First, it should be noted that the CD’s system will almost certainly communicate with 
the I-voting servers using IP addresses provided by the Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP), which is a protocol for assigning dynamic IP addresses to devices on 
a network. Since these will change from time to time during a session, there is no one 
single IP address to attack. It also means that, if any ad hoc modifications are to be 
made to the way UDP works, this will have to be taken into account. This will become 
apparent when anonymity preservation is considered in Section 9.4.5 below. 
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Communication between the Client and the I-voting system are done through requests, 
as illustrated in Figure 9.3. 
 
Figure 9.3: Requests and response structure for I-voting 
Table 9.1 defines the structure of request/response which composed of header, data 
blocks and signature. It would identify what is needed to be include in the voting 
packets while transmitting on an Internet network. 
 
Table 9.1: Description of Requests and response for I-voting 
Group Item Description 
Header   
 Wrapped 3DES Key Encrypted session 3DES Key encrypting Data Blocks 
contained in the Request/Response in order to ensure 
their confidentiality during transit between the Client 
PC Module and the I-voting servers 
 Session ID Internal Session ID, associated with authentication, is 
send to the user a temporary session ID 
 Wrapped TimeStamp Encrypted time stamp used in order to avoid replays 
(where replays are the resending of information that 
has not been successfully received) 
 Data Block Info Structure containing information in a data block 
contained in a Request/Response message 
 Wrapping Certificate Client X509 Certificate (See section 3.4.2.4 .B), 
(depending if it is Request or Response) used to 
encrypt 3DES Key and TimeStamp (Halevi and 
Krawczyk, 1999) 
 Signing Certificate Client X509 Certificate (depending if Response or 
Request) used to sign Data Blocks to be used for 
proof of origin in order to authenticate Terminal or 
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Server initiating Request/Response 
Data Blocks   
 Data Blocks Data Blocks containing information coded in ASN.1 
(Abstract Syntax Notation One) format for 
Request/Response 
Signature   
 Signature Digital Signature of content of Data Blocks using a 
Signing Certificate 
 
 
At the level of data communication in the Network level, the model proposes a security 
engine using different layers of security. Figure 9.4 illustrates the I-voting Security 
Engine. In order to understand the functioning of the engine we need first to define the 
generic structure. 
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Figure 9.4:  I-voting security engine architecture 
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Based on the above communication structure, the functioning of the I-voting Security 
Engine is the following: 
 
9.4.2.1 Reception 
When a request is received the security process is the following: 
1. Request checked for validity in terms of adherence to the communication format 
in Table 9.1     
2. Request logged in the I-voting Security Audit Log 
3. Request authenticated on two levels: 
a. Through digital signature to authenticate the sender’s terminal 
b. Through the session ID to authenticate the user through their ID card 
credentials 
4. Request authenticated for voter 
5. Authorisations checked by examining the internal directory containing the ID 
card credentials for the authenticated user through their session ID 
6. Replays checked through analysis of the embedded time stamp on vote cast 
 
9.4.2.2 Responding 
When a response needs to be generated, the security process is the following: 
1. The response is converted to voting application format. 
2. Data blocks in the response are encrypted with a 3DES session Key. 
3. Data blocks are signed with the voter’s signing certificate. 
4. An entry in the Security Audit log is generated. 
 
9.4.2.3 Authentication and Authorisations 
The Authentication and Authorisations are enabled by the existing infrastructure on the 
server. A special Request/Response authentication is used, where: 
1. The user sends ID card credentials to the I-voting system through a logging process 
2. The Security Engine interfaces with voter machine to authenticate the user and if 
successful generates the session id in the internal directory containing its authorisations 
levels. 
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9.4.2.4 Audit trails 
It is important to note that extensive audit trails of two types will be implemented in the 
I-voting model: 
1. A security audit trail containing audit logs generated by the Security Engine to log all 
activities. 
2. An applications audit trail generated when processing the vote casting. 
 
In both cases these audit trails will be signed with the voter signing certificate in order 
to ensure their integrity. 
Figure 9.5 shows the proposed IT Infrastructure for the I-voting servers. It gives the list 
of servers that is needed along with the technology that could be used to deploy I-voting 
in action if the State of Qatar decided to implement I-voting .  
RDBMSApplication Servers
MOI
WAN
MOI
WAN
Browser 
client
Browser 
client
Browser 
client
Clients
Load
Balancing
DB
Firewalls
DB2
Firewalls
F5 Big IP
AIX
WebSphere
NeuroTechnologija 1:1
Windows 2003
Mainframe
Oracle 9i
RAC IBM
SAN
Precise Biometric
Windows 2003
 
Figure 9.5: Proposed IT Infrastructure for the I-voting servers. 
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9.4.3 Authentication 
In this model, authentication is based on three factors: 
1. Something one knows (PIN), 
2. Something one has (Smartcard) and 
3. Something one is (Biometric). 
The first system checks whether the voter is registered with the Vote Registration 
Server. If the voter is already logged as registered, it is taken as indicating that they 
have already voted.  
Otherwise, the following steps are taken. The voter should obtain a national ID card (a 
smart card with a signing certificate). The card would contain biometric information 
about the voter (in which case, biometric information will be used as identification or 
verification of identity) and his/her public and private keys for authentication 
(certificate signing). The stored biographic data will validate the fact that the voter is 
eligible to vote. 
Users prove their identity to the server through the following steps: 
1. Certificate validation occurs. This validates that the certificate has not expired.  
2. The issuer is validated. The issuer will be the Qatar Certificate Authority.  
3. The process determines that the certificate is not in the Certificate Revocation 
List.  
4. After passing these tests, the voter connects to a URL that is SSL V3.0 enabled. 
This permits him/her to download a secure applet (which is smart card 
middleware), which is used to assist the browser in accessing the smart card. 
5. Users access something they possess (the smart card) and/or enter information 
that only they could know (such as a password or PIN). By providing correct 
information, users are granted access to the keys and certificates in the 
corresponding digital ID. At this stage, though, users have not yet proved their 
identity as far as the system is concerned. 
6. Using the private signing key, the applet signs a challenge string (a text string 
containing numbers and letters, like a serial number) sent by the server on behalf 
of the user. The applet sends it plus the corresponding verification certificate to 
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the server. Note that the applet sends only public information, not the user’s 
private key or PIN.  
7. The server checks the signature using the verification certificate. If the check 
succeeds, the digital signature is verified and the server can then issue an 
authentication cookie to the user. 
 
An alternative using biometrics is as follows. A USB token is used to provide a 
hardware approach to two-factor authentication. USB tokens help provide greater 
security for authentication over Web portals. Tokens are designed to store securely 
users’ digital identities, including their digital certificates and keys. When users log into 
the web portal used for voting, they are prompted to connect their token to the desktop 
via a USB port and then to swipe their finger and provide a PIN. The PIN thus provided 
is matched against the one on the USB token. 
USB tokens have a number of advantages: 
 Security. Tokens cannot be duplicated and PINs are encrypted to increase 
security. 
 Extensible. USB tokens provide security capabilities beyond two-factor 
authentication because they store the users’ digital certificates. 
 Reliable. USB tokens are durable with an average lifespan of ten years. 
 Cost effective. The plug-and-play capabilities minimise helpdesk and training 
costs. 
The voter is asked to scan his/her fingerprint. The system would first check the scanned 
fingerprint against one stored in the USB token. If it matches with a print on the main 
biometric server at the Ministry of Interior, the system will then prompt for a PIN. 
Security can be enhanced by generating One-Time Passwords, which are sent to the 
voter using SMS, telephone, email, or some other means. One-Time Passwords will be 
stored in the Ministry of Interior database and the voter would need to enter the One-
Time Password to complete the authentication process. 
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9.4.4  Vote Registration  
In order to register a vote, first, an eligibility check is made. Each voter’s certificate 
contains biographic information that is sent to the Ministry of Interior database to verify 
eligibility in terms of Qatar law. 
 
Figure 9.6 illustrates the process through which a citizen card is printed and 
personalised with keys and certificates. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Issuing a citizen card with personalisation 
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Next, mutual certificate authentication occurs. That is, the system uses the PKI 
infrastructure to encrypt the messages between the client and server. Then a java applet 
sends the voter’s certificate serial number to the Vote Registration Server in order to 
register the voter as having voted. The confirmation flag is not set at this stage (this flag 
is used to indicate that the voter has completed the vote-casting). 
 
Finally, the Vote Registration Server sends a unique, random serial number to the voter. 
This serial number has no link whatsoever with the voter’s credentials. The purposes of 
this function are that it (1) is used as reference for an appeal in case the voter has 
concern that their vote has not been properly cast (2) could be used to over-write the 
vote. 
9.4.5 Anonymity preservation 
In order to preserve anonymity, voters can use the blind signature to conceal their 
unique identification number and then sign the output with their private key.  
A low-cost Virtual Private Network (VPN) channel using the PKI infrastructure and 
digital signatures for secure communication between client and server is an alternative 
to the above. However, it is important to note that the Secure Shell (SSH) network 
protocol, that allows data to be exchanged using a secure channel between two 
networked devices, is not as secure as was originally thought and a newer version SSH2 
should be preferred as a more modern and secure alternative (Barrett et al. 2005). The 
client would be able to connect to a trusted computer (see section 3.4.1.3) in order to 
vote from a reliable computer away from possible risks related with the client side. It is 
suggested a hybrid solution is used to secure the client-side by using a smart card reader 
with a vote code. This approach has proved its effectiveness in research conducted from 
Helbach and Schwenk (2007) and Oppliger (2002). It is further recommended to use a 
matrix table for the vote code to reduce the possibility of vote changing at the client 
machine. Although the first approach of using a clean operating system is clearly more 
secure, this second approach remains as an option.  
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9.4.6 Vote Casting 
Figure 9.7 illustrates the required end-to-end process through which a web certificate 
will be issued as in the second scenario above. 
 
 
Figure 9.7: The process of issuing a Web certificate 
 
In this stage, Hardware Security Modules (HSM) would be used for hardening the 
network where it would need more than one entity to access the service, thus enabling 
enterprises to add hardware protection to critical applications such as public key 
infrastructures, databases, and web and application servers. Apart from its ready 
integration with other applications (e.g., RSA certificate managers, various databases), 
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the use of hardware security modules simplifies the management of encryption and 
signing-key management. 
1. The voter encrypts the output of the previous step using the Election 
Committee’s public key (obtained from its hardware security module). Members 
of the Committee are the only ones allowed to decrypt the encrypted information 
for the purpose of non-repudiation to provide proof of origin of data; this data 
will then be sent to the Privacy Server. (The voter uses his/her digital certificate 
to authenticate to the Privacy Server). 
2. The Privacy Server decrypts the received message using the hardware security 
module private key and blindly signs the voter’s unique identification number 
using the private key from the hardware security module.  
3. The Privacy Server then encrypts the signed voter’s unique identification 
number using the voters’ election-certificate public key. 
4. The Privacy Server sends the encrypted, signed, unique identification number to 
the voter, and records the voter as an authentic voter so they cannot request 
another blind signature. 
5. The voter receives the blindly-signed unique identification number and decrypts 
it using his private key, then reverses the blinding signature to obtain his signed 
unique identification number, which he will use as his anonymous ID. (Now the 
voter holds an authentic and valid ID from the Privacy Server and, at the same 
time, no one can link the voter’s real identity to this ID). 
6. The voter contacts the Voting Sever and authenticates themself using the 
anonymous ID. 
7. The Voting Sever checks if the received anonymous ID is valid by deciphering it 
using the Election Committee private key. If the voter is an eligible voter, the 
Voting Sever allows them to cast their vote. 
8. Finally, the Voting Sever records the anonymous ID as that of a voter who has 
voted, so in this way, each voter can vote only once. 
9. The Privacy Server ensures that a voter can only obtain an ID that has been blind 
signed once; the Voting Server ensures that blind-signed IDs are associated with 
a vote once and once only. 
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9.4.7 Vote Counting (Tallying) 
After each vote, the Voting Severs are asked to print hard copies of user votes using 
printers. 
At the end of election, a copy of the votes is sent to the Count Server, which runs 
software to count the votes and also compare the count with that of the hard copies. 
 
9.5 Prototype implementation of the model 
In this section, the voting approach is described in section 9.5.1, followed by the result 
of an implementation is presented with some discussions in section 9.5.2. 
 
9.5.1 Voting approach for secure I-voting architecture  
This section describes the three steps for the proposed secured voting architecture using 
the Internet. Firstly, the vote registration process is presented. Secondly, the vote itself. 
Finally, the counting of votes. 
 
The proposed method is based on combining public-key cryptography, blind signature, 
smart card verification, a PIN and checking of the voter’s home address. Here, public-
key cryptography is used not only as a communication protocol to transfer secured 
information from the client but also, partly, for identification. A blind signature is used 
for candidate selection on the ballot paper.  A smart card is used to check the identity in 
the vote registration process. A PIN is used for identification in combination with the 
voting key file on polling day. A voting key file is a set of three elements:  an ID record, 
a private key and a signature. For storing information, three databases are used to 
decentralise the information and improve the security. A single database could be used 
but it is not preferable in an actual system for security reasons. 
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9.5.1.1 Vote registration process for I-voting system 
The full process of vote registration is described in Figure 9.8 in 11 steps.  
 
 
Figure 9.8: Vote registration 
 
The vote registration starts by asking the server for a public key to encrypt the 
information written by the client (step 1). The server generates a pair of keys (public 
and private) with their associated signature and then sends the public key to the client 
(steps 2-3). Since the public key is received on the client side, the voter types the 
following information: 
 Personal details:  National ID, First name, Surname, Date of birth and address.  
 Contact details:  Telephone number and e-mail.  
 Smart card details:  Name, Number and PIN.    
All of these are required to complete the vote registration. However, personal and smart 
card details are used to profile and verify the identity of the voter whilst contact details 
are extra information which can be used to invite the voter to vote on the polling day. 
Then, the typed data is encrypted and sent to the server (step 4). No one can read the 
information exchanged during the transfer without having the private key from the 
server side. In the next step, the server deciphers the information using its private key 
(step 5). The server then checks that the smart card information is valid (step 6). After 
that, the server checks that the national identity number or the number of the smart card 
has not already been recorded in the database 1 (step 7). Then the personal information 
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is checked with the database (step 8). All checking done, the personal information is 
recorded: smart card name, smart card number, personal information, public key and 
signature) in database 1 (step 9). Finally, the server sends the voting key file to the 
client using the ID generated by the record of step 9 (step 10). The voting key file is 
important and needs to be kept confidential by the client up to the vote. Then, during the 
time period separating the registration of voters and the polling day, a letter is sent to 
the client at the address (House number, Street, Postcode and City) provided (step 11). 
The letter contains a PIN code of 4 digits which is required to identify the voter on the 
polling day. Thus, two elements are needed to vote (voting key file and PIN from the 
letter). The letter is useful because if the voting key file is stolen, then the thief will not 
be able to vote without having the PIN. Also, this letter gives a certain physical security 
to the process and improves the confidence of voters in the architecture. The voter 
registration process is depicted in Figure 10.1. In the next section, the vote on the 
polling day is presented. 
 
9.5.1.2 Vote on polling day by Internet 
The full process of voting on the polling day is described in Figure 9.9 in 18 steps.  
 
Figure 9.9: Vote on polling day for voter 
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On the polling day, the voter is asked to provide his voting key file and the PIN from 
the letter he received. Similarly to the registration process, the voter requires a public 
key to the server to encrypt its PIN and send it with security to the server (steps 1-3). 
The PIN is encrypted with the public key and sent with the voting key file. At this point, 
the ID record in the voting key file is used to check whether or not the voter has already 
voted (step 4). The latter information is stored in a different database (database 2) from 
that used in the vote registration process to improve security (step 5). Then the private 
key and the signature in the voting key file are checked with the information stored 
during the vote registration process in database 1 (step 6). Afterwards, the PIN is 
deciphered using the private key on the server (step 7). Thus, the PIN can be checked 
with the one recorded in database 1 during the vote registration process (step 8). Only 
three tries of an invalid PIN are allowed to complete the process of voting on the polling 
day. After all the tries, the voter is not authorised to vote. From this point, the voter is 
allowed to vote and the rest of the voting process consists of sending the list of 
candidates to the voter and inviting the voter to choose one. Firstly, the list of 
candidates is selected from a third database (database 3) (step 9). Finally, to improve 
security, a blind signature approach is used to disguise the list of candidates before the 
voter encrypts the chosen candidate. The simple way to realise it is by providing a list of 
candidates and a list of random IDs, asking the voter to send the random ID 
corresponding to the chosen candidate and keeping the real order of the IDs in a 
memory session section in the server side (step 10). Thus the voter has just to send the 
random ID without knowing the real one. The signature is preformed by using a pair of 
keys (public and private) to encrypt the selection of the voter. The voter asks for the 
public key (step 12), the server generates a pair of keys (public and private) and sends 
the public key (steps 13-14). Then the voter encrypts the random id and sends it to the 
server (step 15).  In step 16, the server deciphers the random id using its private key and 
gets the real candidate id from the temporary memory session. In the end, the tally of 
the id candidate is updated in database 3 (step 17) and the voter is recorded as having 
voted in database 2 (step 18). In the next section, the counting of ballot papers after 
polling is described. 
9.5.1.3 Counting ballot papers in I- voting architecture 
Counting of ballot papers is done after the polling is over and is simply computed by 
querying the number of votes of each candidate from database 3. 
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9.5.2 Results and Discussion 
In this section, a prototype is described of the approach for a secure I-voting 
architecture presented in the previous section. For technical reasons and simplicity, a 
WAMP (Windows, Apache, mySQL, PHP) server was configured and installed for the 
evaluation. Encryption was realised using the Jcryption library, a javascript library for 
encrypting strings and HTML forms.  This library is easy to use, allows RSA encryption 
and can support encryption up to 2048 bit, these being the reasons for using it in the 
prototype (Hossain et al., 2011). To evaluate the proof of concept of the approach, the 
key length was fixed at 128 bits. Real personal and smart card information was not 
checked due to unavailability of the needed resources. For the prototype, four web 
pages were developed, one for the first step, two for the second and one for the last. 
The first web page shown in Figure 9.10 is used for the registration process described in 
Figure 9.8. On the loading of the page, steps 1 to 3 are carried out using the JCryption 
library by communication between the client and the web server using Ajax 
(Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) technology (W3Schools, 2011). 
 
Figure 9.10: Example of voter registration using a web form 
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Thus, the creation of the public key for the client to encrypt the form is captured behind 
the view of the user and in a very short time. During this time, the form is filled by the 
client and checked syntactically (the birth date is higher than 18 years, only integer 
numbers are filled for the smartcard number, validity of the email address, etc.). This 
checking is realised on the client-side using JavaScript before being submitted. 
Afterwards, the fields are encrypted into a single one using the JCryption library and 
sent to the server (step 4). The random PIN code was generated with 4 digits (step 9). A 
sample letter sent from the server to the home address of the voter (step 11) is presented 
in Figure 9.11.  
 
 
Figure 9.11: Example of letter 
 
The second and the third pages shown in Figure 9.12 and 9.13 are used on polling day 
by the voter as described in the process in Figure 9.14.  
 
 
Figure 9.12: Identification on polling day 
 
Chapter 9: A proposed model for I-voting in Qatar 
 
237 
The second page is used during steps 1 to 11 whilst the third page is operating for the 
rest. Note that the third page differs from the first and the second due to its dynamic 
content with the list of candidates.  
 
Figure 9.13: Example of candidates list 
 
 
Figure 9.14: Example of outcome for counting the scores of the candidates list 
 
The fourth web page in Figure 10.6 shows the counting of ballot papers after polling 
day. The content of the web page includes the list of candidates with their associated 
scores during the election. The fourth web page differs from the third, being for 
visualisation only. Thus, the server does not transfer the IDs of the candidates to the 
client. 
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9.6 Conclusion 
There has been much interest in I-voting in recent years, but fear of a possible threat to 
democracy has delayed the introduction of I-voting in a general election (Aeby and 
Wiget, 2007; Buchsbaum, 2004; Krimmer et al, 2007). The proposed I-voting model is 
based on the belief that satisfying the basic requirements of voting, which are security, 
privacy, accuracy, availability and usability, is possible with currently available 
technologies and algorithms. 
 
A secure client/server web architecture to vote through the Internet has been proposed 
using cryptography methods, smart card and PIN checking. This architecture has been 
validated using a prototype with a WAMP server (without testing a real smart card) and 
evaluated by an expert. The primary results, described in the next chapter, show that the 
architecture is feasible and is secure enough to be used for I-voting. However, the 
scalability of the architecture needs to be evaluated. 
 
The next chapter justifies and evaluates the proposed model using literature and both 
expert and voter opinion.    
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Chapter 10  Justification and evaluation 
 
This chapter begins by explaining eight assumptions on which the I-voting process is 
based. Using these assumptions a justification of the proposed I-voting model is given. 
An evaluation process was conducted by both experts and typical voters to collect 
feedback on the I-model’s concepts and design. This is followed by an evaluation by 
another expert of the prototype implementation of the proposed model. 
 
10.1  Introduction 
Voting is considered as a right and a duty for citizens. It has been a physical process for 
an individual, which can be a hard task for disabled people, thus some people are less 
inclined to vote. However, the Internet boom in recent years and its omnipresence in 
daily life may change voting practice. Voting with a computer from home or using a 
mobile will be dramatically less physical in terms of going to a specific place, thus the 
new voting process should increase the level of participation. However, voting through 
the Internet may be possible if and only if it is accepted in the minds of people. To be 
accepted, a secure process is required. Voting can be considered as a three step problem:  
 Registration to be able to vote. 
 Voting on polling day. 
 Counting the ballot papers.   
In the proposed system, a client/server Web architecture approach is used in which the 
voter (as the client) interacts with the server during the first two steps.   
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10.2  Security assumptions and justifications 
This section presents a set of eight assumptions about security for the developed model. 
They constitute the standards against which the system is to be measured and are based 
on assumptions made in the Estonian I-voting system and the US Secure Electronic 
Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE). The assumptions are expressed in terms 
of nine points.    
 
In order to simplify the problem, established security standards for encryption are used. 
Security experts have paid a great deal of attention to the digital signature problem and 
blind signature algorithms and other hybrid decoder or encryption algorithms used by 
voting systems. 
 
The section proceeds with a statement of the assumptions. After each statement, there is 
a short explanation and, in some cases, some implications are drawn. 
 
Assumption 1: Secure signature programs are safe. This means that the probability 
that an attacker with no access to secret keys can imitate the voter’s electronic signature 
is negligible. Encryption has been widely used to deal with this, so it can be assumed 
that secure signature programs are safe. 
 
Assumption 2: Encryption programs are safe. The probability of being able to deduce 
the vote by merely knowing the encrypted vote is also negligible. In other words, it is 
equivalent to conjecturing the vote without knowing the encrypted vote. 
 
Assumption 3: Attackers do not have access to the secret keys, SK and SK[S]. If the 
keys are stored in a restricted area in order to reduce the risk of possible attacks, 
assumption 3 is valid. This fact has been widely discussed in the literature and has 
attracted a great deal of attention and research (Rubin et al., 2004a). Therefore, it is 
assumed that this assumption about the voting system is safe.  
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Although attackers do not have wide access to the voter’s secret keys SK and SK[I], 
attackers can gain the keys from a client who may be unable to protect their security.  
Usually, the average voter is unable to secure his/her workstation in such a way that it 
can keep the secret key safe and prevent possible use. The username and password need 
to be secret. For example, an attacker can activate the secret key in a (stolen) smart card 
by stealing its owner’s password(s). Attackers with enough computing power can find, 
by calculation the passwords for any stolen ID card. 
 
Assumption 4: The voter-registration step is safe. The Qatar e-government portal is 
based on PKI security. Public keys are used to register users for this electronic service. 
PKI is used to issue Qatari identity cards, certificates for legal documents and digital 
signatures for all uses by the country’s citizens. Qatar has successfully used identity 
cards as identity documents. Many of the Qatar information systems use digital 
signatures, which have the same legal status as hand-written signatures. The digital 
signatures system is very robust, safe, and leads to a reliable I-voting registration 
system. As a consequence, it can be assumed that the vote registration phase in the I-
voting model is safe. 
 
Assumption 5: The vote-counting step acts exactly as specified. All votes are cast and 
counted correctly and recording of the data received by different servers takes place 
during the counting step. For this Assumption, insider threats have a greater significance 
than an external attacker (see Assumption 4). However, under this analysis, insider 
threats to vote counting are not considered. Consequently, we assume that the counting 
step works exactly as specified. 
 
Assumption 6: Each independently recoded file system in an I-voting system is safe. 
The encryption process automatically links all the records in each database. It is 
assumed that the linkage algorithm is safe, confirmed by analyses in the literature 
(Internet Voting Taskforce, 2000; NSF, 2001). 
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Assumption 7: If there are any signs of unreliability or a major discovery indicating 
the abuse of the I-voting system or of the democratic principles of an election which 
affects the reliability and validity of I-voting or appears to harm democratic principles, 
I-voting immediately stops and the result of the electronic poll will be cancelled. 
Discussions by a court or committee of electors will be used to perform plan B e.g. 
voting at polling station. 
 
Assumption 8: Attackers are unable to subvert a large number of voters and thereby 
gain control of the election. If attackers could do this, then privacy would be violated 
and considerable damage to the democratic intent would be caused. In order to change 
votes or otherwise affect the vote, encrypted information must be deciphered using the 
appropriate keys. 
For example, attackers can secretly activate the secret keys held in smart cards and can 
thereby steal votes. Attackers who have sufficient computing power can crack stolen ID 
smart cards and then calculate the owner’s password(s). Despite this broad attack, each 
voter’s secret keys remain safe.  
 
It can then be stated with justification that: 
 Legitimate voters are able to vote in secret. Their vote will be used in the final 
count. 
 Illegitimate voters are denied the opportunity to vote. 
 Legal voters cannot vote more than once in a secret ballot and be counted more 
than once in the final calculation. 
 Votes are secret. In addition, information verification and justification of other 
I-voting security features ensure: 
o Inspectors are able to check if all the votes have been properly counted in the 
final calculations; 
o Results of an election remain secret until the process is complete. 
o Repeating the calculation of vote numbers should be possible 
o All valid votes are properly counted. The final counting system, if all security 
features of the I-voting system are used, should ensure that the result is safe. 
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10.3  Justification of I-voting system based on the assumptions 
In this section, the security of I-voting is considered and analysed. It is based on the 
assumptions derived from other security models. Possible attacks, those requiring 
serious consideration, are shown to be unlikely to occur. It can therefore be concluded 
that all the security features of I-voting systems can be justified and validated. 
 
Wide-scale vote theft. In order that the I-voting system can act safely against a wide-
scale vote theft, it should have the following two security features: ineligible voters are 
not permitted to vote and eligible ones cannot vote twice. Stopping ineligible voters 
from voting does not prevent vote theft, but it could help to reduce unauthorised access 
to I-voting. 
There are four basic methods possible for extensive vote rigging: 
 Votes can be forged 
 Votes are cast by people who are not entitled so to do, and 
 More than one vote is cast by eligible voters. 
 Votes are excluded from a ballot. 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Possible ways of large-scale vote rigging identified in the Estonian I-voting system. 
(EUDO, 2007; redraw by the researcher) 
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Below, each type of vote rigging is considered in detail.  
10.3.1 Vote forgery 
A voter generates vote, v, and before it can be encrypted and secured, the attacker 
converts it into vote, vn, where v ≠ vn, all of this being completely unknown to the 
voter. In order to mount the attack, let alone for it to be successful, the attacker requires 
extensive control over the voter’s processes. The assumption states that attackers cannot 
extensively control such processes. Therefore, extensive vote rigging by imposing 
control over the vote-casting process is almost impossible. There are opportunities for 
vote rigging in the network server, the vote-recording server and in the connections 
between the applications used by the voter, but these opportunities can occur only as 
long as ineligible persons are able to vote or eligible voters can do so more than once. 
 
10.3.2 Voting by ineligible people 
Instead of one vote for each voter, the attacker attempts to create, for example, 2000 
new, confirmed, signed and encrypted votes. In order to create large numbers of 
encrypted, signed votes using voters’ names, the attacker is required to have extensive 
access to large numbers of voters’ confidential signature keys. Assumption 3 states that 
attackers do not have extensive access to voters’ confidential keys. Furthermore, if the 
attacker is able to vote without access to confidential keys, it is necessary to have the 
means to break the signature program. Assumption 1 assumes that this is impossible. 
Thus, based on the assumptions, ineligible voters are unable to cast many correct votes.  
 
10.3.3  Multiple votes by eligiable voters 
In the proposed I-voting system, voters can vote more than once but the system 
invalidates such multiple votes. In the case in which the attacker has access to the server 
and can alter the process that invalidates multiple votes, eligible voters would be able to 
vote many times. 
This kind of attack is not productive. Extensive vote rigging using attacks on the vote-
counting server or the connection between the vote-recording and vote-counting servers 
is regarded as an internal attack. The connection between servers performs data 
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transmission using data links, i.e., data transmission is non-linear or outside the 
network. The Estonian vote-counting server in the Estonian system is connected to the 
Internet. 
 
The vote-counting step is secure according to Assumption 3. Let us assume that it is 
possible to attack the data carriers or vote-counting server before the vote-counting step. 
Encrypted votes are transferred to the vote-counting server. Therefore, to add new votes 
to the server, the attacker is not required to have confidential signature keys. This attack 
requires knowledge of how the voting algorithms works to create encrypted votes and to 
send them over the data link or to the vote-counting servers. In the network’s storage 
(recording) server, a database registration file is present which contains all the 
encrypted votes and personal information about voters. Assumption 6 states that the 
independent file registration system in the proposed I-voting model is secure. 
 
For a successful attack on the vote-counting server or the data links, the attacker also 
has to attack the vote-privacy server in order to add encoded votes and voters’ personal 
data to the database files. This could mean that the attack also includes the vote 
registration and voting servers. The probability that the attack would succeed is low and 
it is therefore pointless. In addition, in order to change an auditing file on the vote-
privacy server, the attackers would need to alter the existing log file in the network 
server. It is obvious that the I-voting attack is unproductive. Hence, the attack would 
need to access the vote-counting server outside of network or data links. Vote theft is, 
however, unlikely on a large scale. 
 
The proposed I-voting model ensures that: (1) ineligible voters are deprived of the right 
to vote and (2) legitimate voters cannot put two votes in a ballot box and expect both to 
be counted towards the final result. 
 
10.3.4 Large-scale exclusion of votes from a ballot. 
Large-scale exclusion of votes from an election is another type of vote rigging which 
should be discussed to enhance the security of voting process. The purpose of excluding 
votes from an election is the deletion of votes for candidates the attacker does not want 
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to win. When considering the ways in which this can be accomplished, the first 
possibility is to attack the vote-registration stage. In the proposed model, electronic 
voting reference-determination certificates and digital signatures are distributed by the 
national PKI system to voters. By Assumption5, the Qatar National PKI is safe. 
Therefore the attack against the vote-registration stage is impossible by this assumption.  
 
In order to realise voter exclusion on a large scale using attacks on the I-voting system’s 
components, the possibilities are votes being removed from the I-voting system either 
with or without receiving a positive response from the I-voting system. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher considers points at which attacks are made on the network 
level. For example, this type of attack means that the votes from legitimate voters never 
reach the system; service attacks on the network level will deprive eligible voters of the 
right to vote. If voters are unable to vote, the election committee will be informed. 
Hence, the attack is possible but could be solved by Assumption 7. 
 
The first possibility is that a vote is omitted but the voter still receives confirmation that 
the vote has been cast. In this case, the voter’s voting application must be compromised 
to achieve successful attack without the need to compromise election servers, so that it 
converts an error message from the network server. This kind of attack has low profile 
of success., e.g. Estonia has not reported such incidence. 
 
Secondly, if there is an attack on the network server or connections between network 
servers and the vote-privacy server, voters can drop their votes into the ballot box but 
will receive error messages. By Assumption 6, this would mean that the Election 
Committee will be informed about misbehaviour and will bring the electronic voting 
process to an end. 
To carry out a vote deletion attack it would also be necessary to attack the vote-privacy 
server. The attacker would need information on the voters or votes to delete votes they 
did not want, but these are encoded, signed votes. If the attacker wants to delete votes 
based on their value, they need to decode the votes. Assumption 1 states that the 
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attacker cannot access the confidential SK, decoding key. Therefore, attackers could not 
delete votes they do not like using this method. In order to infer a vote’s value, the 
attacker needs to know the random numbers in the voting papers without having access 
to confidential keys. Hence, the attackers cannot control the voters’ processes in this 
way. As a result, the attack based on deleting unwanted, encoded ballots is not possible. 
 
Another alternative for achieving this aim is to use a list of voters and to delete their 
votes on the vote-privacy server. The proposed model would use an independent 
auditing system that guarantees a fair election. If some votes are deleted without 
modification of the log files, the total logs cannot be confirmed. As a result the validity 
of the electronic vote is compromised and the voting process ends and is nullified by 
Assumption 6.  
 
If it is assumed that the attacker deletes votes in the vote-privacy server so that the 
deleted votes do not reach the auditing system, it will also be necessary to connect to the 
network server in order to acquire the vote data written to the database. This kind of 
attack is unlikely to succeed, because vote auditing is established at each stage to 
guarantee the integrity of the election. 
 
Finally, consider an attack against the vote-counting server or an attack mounted at the 
end of the election process when the votes are transferred to the vote-counting server. 
To delete specific votes, the attacker needs to know the vote value (preference) and the 
number of votes. Thus, the attacker will need to gain access to the confidential keys. 
Assumption 3 states that attackers do not have access to the confidential I-voting keys. 
If attackers modify the encrypted ballots so that it appears as invalid or corrupted, a 
routine check is made at the counting stage comparing the electronic and the paper 
ballots to identify invalid votes. 
 
This analysis has shown that to decide which votes are unwanted, attackers would need 
considerable control over the voting process. In this case, Assumption 8 is violated. In 
addition, as attackers need to take control of the auditing system, this forces them to 
attack the network server and the vote-privacy server. 
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10.4 How the requirements of I-voting are met by the proposed system 
This section examines the proposed I-voting model to ensure that it fulfils the voting 
principles in term of security as mentioned in section 3.4.2.5. Table 10.1 Shows how 
voting principles are satisfied by the proposed I-voting model. 
 
Table 10.1: Fulfilling the I-voting requirements 
Requirement How the requirement is met 
Eligibility  
Only the eligible and authorized voter can vote. This is fulfilled by 
the authentication stage using a smart card and PKI. 
Privacy 
All votes are kept secret by encrypting each vote. Receipt-Freeness 
Fairness 
Accuracy The existence of two data sources for voter and candidate databases 
enables a double count of the vote using both sources giving a check 
on the results that is a guarantee high accuracy. Both individual and 
universal verifiability is guaranteed where a voter can check that 
their vote has been counted from the voters’ and candidates’ 
database. 
Individual 
Verifiability 
Universal 
Verifiability 
Reliability 
The security procedures are used to guarantee the reliability because 
the voting process cannot be completed unless all these steps are 
completed successfully. 
Convenience The model is convenient and can be used anywhere because of the 
use of the Internet Mobility  
Flexibility and 
usability 
The model is flexible because the voter needs only a few clicks to 
complete the voting process, also the use of a computer to cast vote 
could be useful for many individuals with disabilities since there are 
tools that assist disable people such as Braille keyboards and screen 
readers. 
Transparency 
All votes and credentials are kept secret but can be unambiguously 
retrieved at any time. 
Scalability 
The model is scalable in that it can cover all countries in the world 
because of the use of the Internet 
Efficiency 
The model covers almost all the principles for the secure elections, 
yet it does not need many resources. 
Security 
The model maintains security at every stage from the client machine 
to the servers. 
Cost effective 
The model could be implemented with minimum cost since the 
Intranet provides most of the required infrastructure for I-voting. 
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10.5 Evaluation 
The evaluation of the proposed model was done in three phases. The concepts and 
design of the system were firstly evaluated by two experts. The approach was to 
measure their opinions on the effectiveness of the system based on a seminar followed 
by a questionnaire and discussion of the system. The two experts who were involved in 
evaluating the proposed model were a network security expert from the Ministry of 
Interior and one from Integralis, an IT Security Solutions company. A local and a 
European expert were chosen for their knowledge in IT security. The researcher took 
advantage of personal contacts with the experts and asked them review the proposed 
model and to fill out the questionnaire on their own and provide their feedback. The 
questionnaire covers many aspects regarding I-voting in terms of security, model 
architecture, confidence of I-voting and legal aspects of it.  
 
A second evaluation of the concepts and design of the I-voting model was carried out by 
a sample of 75 eligible voters from different backgrounds to identify their acceptance of 
the proposed model and their opinion about the model design (see section 9.6.2). Their 
evaluation was conducted by given them a seminar on the system and then gathering 
their opinions by a questionnaire.  
 
Finally, after the design of the proposed model was validated by experts and voters’ 
opinions, the prototype implementation of the proposed model was developed to test the 
applicability of the model in the real world. An independent expert from University of 
Bristol, doing a PhD in Machine learning, volunteered to evaluate the implementation of 
the model.  
    
10.5.1  Expert evaluation on the proposed model design 
 
A summary of the experts evaluation is provided in Table 10.2  
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Table 10.2: Summary of expert evaluation 
Topic Ministry of Interior expert Integralis company expert 
Network 
bandwidth and 
performance, 
plus load 
balancing 
“It is important to note that the I-voting 
model is introducing extra information to 
be manipulated. These types of 
information imply more load on the 
network which needs to be addressed. 
From our experience with a previous 
project implemented for the MOI, the 
network has always been a disabler on 
performance. Due to the critical nature 
of the model, network performance will 
be studied and recommendations will be 
provided to the MOI in order to provide 
the necessary network capabilities.” 
“Evaluate load balancing using DRS 
between the client and the host server. 
DRS can head off a bottleneck before it 
happens. This allows effective use of 
all server resources, regardless of the 
server in which they are located. It 
also may eliminate or delay the need to 
purchase new hardware in the future 
by utilising all available hardware 
resources.” 
High 
Availability of 
I-voting 
system 
 “Putting several virtual machines onto 
one physical server is putting all your 
eggs in one basket. Mitigate this risk 
by deploying VMware High 
Availability to give all of your 
virtualised machines high availability 
without having to cluster each one of 
them.” 
Back-Up “Your approach in auditing at each 
stage would not be sufficient for a back-
up of each voter’s vote. It would be 
necessary to use virtual back-up to 
different secure locations.” 
“Allow an administrator to backup the 
virtual machine from “outside” but 
within the server host. This allows 
agentless backups, backups off the 
production network, no concerns for 
open files, and backups without 
impacting on the performance of the 
virtualised server.” 
Cryptographic 
algorithms 
Good use of different cryptographic 
algorithms to harden breaking in to the 
system: (1) RSA, for creating and 
checking blind and non-blind signatures 
and encrypting the keys (2) 3DES Key 
and the TimeStamp used for encryption 
(3) SHA-2 used to produce message 
digest.  
“Deploying the state of art of 
cryptographic algorithm would be 
efficient for carrying out such data 
with the Internet network. “ 
 “Communication between servers is 
authenticated using SSL-3 and public 
key.” 
“The accuracy of vote casting and vote 
counting is well demonstrated with a 
policing signature to verify the vote 
correctness.” 
 “Verifiability is achieved by allowing a 
third party (the Election Committee) to 
verifying the signatures of the votes 
before publishing the voting result.” 
The principle of one voter one vote is 
achieved due to the design of the 
model which guarantees t > V/2 All 
voters can vote as long as t are 
available in both the vote registration 
and privacy server.  
 Both experts stated that privacy was assured through the use of a hybrid protocol 
(blind signature and mix networking) to established anonymity and a process using 
three factors for authentication (1) smart card (2) PIN (3) biometrics.  
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10.5.2 Voter evaluation on the proposed model design 
The experts’ evaluation deduced that the proposed I-voting model could be possible and 
secure. However, it was also necessary to test whether people would accept the 
approach. For this purpose, a seminar was designed to demonstrate the approach simply 
through an understandable explanation. The seminar was then given to a number of 
eligible voters along with a questionnaire to be completed after the seminar was held. 
The presentation aimed to address the challenges that arise in an I-voting system, 
including accuracy, ease of use, efficiency and the security of such a system (i.e. 
identity assurance, vote confidentiality and integrity and auditability). 
  
The proposed solution was shown to satisfy these challenges (see Section 3.4) by 
proposing I-voting as a specific case of remote electronic voting, whereby the vote takes 
place over the Internet via a web site or voting applet. The approach was demonstrated 
in simple steps with simplified technical terms though real examples. The seminar took 
about 45 minutes including questions and answers during the seminar. 75 Qatari eligible 
voters from different backgrounds participated in the evaluation. They were selected as 
convenience sample of the researcher’s contacts from Qatar foundation, friends and 
family. The participants were representative of the total population since they were from 
different background and chosen carefully to cover variety of people. The seminar was 
delivered five times to cover the total sample population  
 
The questionnaire consisted of 27 questions in 8 question groups, as shown with the 
results in figures 10.2 to 10.9.  
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Figure 10.2: Do you agree that the Internet is safe and there are no legal issues concerned with 
I-voting? 
 
Figure 10.3: Do you agree that you are comfortable with I-voting, that it is a good idea and that 
e-services are secure? 
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Figure 10.4: Would you agree to use I-voting with available support? 
 
 
Figure 10.5: Do you agree to use your national ID, would you install software to vote and are you 
aware of phishing? 
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Figure 10.6: Would you agree to use biometric data to provide secure authentication for I-voting? 
 
 
Figure 10.7: Do you agree that the proposed system is understandable and convenient? 
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Figure 10.8: Do you agree that the proposed system is easier, faster and more secure than the 
existing system? 
 
 
Figure 10.9: Do you agree that I-voting is desirable and beneficial for people? 
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A summary of the voter evaluation is given in table 10.3. 
Table 10.3: A summary of the voter evaluation 
 Voter evaluation 
Background Most of the participants were male (70%) and the majority (40%) were of 
age group from 18-29 and few (4%) were above 50 years old. The 
majority (80%) had Internet experience of more than two years and only 
15% had no experience of information technology, a high proportion of 
which were older people above 45. 
Security of 
Internet 
technology 
The assurance of the Internet was assessed in terms of the people's trust 
and faith in Internet security. The result was encouraging, since about 
60% strongly agreed that the Internet can be a robust and safe 
environment if the system were built based on the ISO/IEC 27033 
standard (see Figure 10.2). This belief was based the fact that banks and 
the government won’t risk using the Internet if it was not a safe 
environment to run their systems. The other 40% either strongly 
disagreed or distrusted the security of the Internet, pointing to the history 
of e-crime. There was a high percentage (80%) who were cautious of the 
dangers of phishing and e-crimes and the intelligence of hackers in 
breaking any secure system (see Figure 10.5). 
About 63% did not trust the encryption process, pointing out the 
possibility of clever hackers breaking the process, especially with the 
development of computer power (see Figure 10.2). This was despite the 
fact that the researcher had clearly stated that there should be a very 
strong encryption process which would need years to break. In Internet 
voting, records would only need to be encrypted and secure until the 
official time for publishing the results, which is a limited time for 
hackers to break the encryption.  
Legal aspects of 
I-voting 
 
More than 70% were concerned about the legal aspects of I-voting due to 
the inefficiency of the current Internet law (see Figure 10.2) despite, the 
researcher explaining that Qatar is in the stage of approving the new 
Internet law, which was designed based on worldwide best practice.  
Comfort with 
the principle of 
I-voting 
 
The result of the survey were encouraging since about 76% strongly 
agree that I-voting is a good idea, 55% of participants strongly agreed 
they were comfortable with the system and 72% strongly believe that the 
government are providing adequate security for their online services and 
therefore would provide a secure I-voting system. However, some 40% 
felt uncomfortable using password protected Internet voting due to the 
possibility of passwords being broken by hackers (see Figure 10.3).  
Usability of 
I-voting 
 
61% strongly agreed that the I-voting system is easy to use if there is a 
consistent help service or if it people were trained how to use it. 
However, only 15% believed the user manuals would be useful to help 
users to interact with I-voting. This suggests the I-voting system should 
be tried first in a polling station to introduce users to the system and 
show them how to use it. A further possibility would be a call centre, 
available 24 hours a day during the voting period to help users (see 
Figure 10.4).   
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Technology used 
in I-voting 
 
68% strongly agreed with the use of national ID cards for I-voting since 
they found these to be trustworthy and secure. This is encouraging as 
national ID cards provide a secure method of authentication containing a 
biometric template of the card holder and they use existing resources.  
However, more than 60% strongly disagree with the use of Internet 
voting when it requires the installation of software since they would find 
it hard to use and time consuming. This suggests a better technology is 
required. A possibility is an applet which will act as a middleware 
between the server and client, doing the CD task without the need for 
installation (see Figure 10.5). 
More than 70% strongly agreed with the use of a biometric technology 
identity checker. 73% were strongly agreed they would feel more 
confident and secure with Internet voting if they owned their own 
fingerprint checking and ID card reader device. Therefore, the use of 
finger print technology is encouraged, although some 25% were strongly 
concerned that their biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet voting. On the other hand, there is considerable trust in the 
government and the security of the national ID card. 75% strongly agreed 
with and have no concerns on the security of the proposed I-voting 
system because it uses multi factors of authentication which is virtually 
unbreakable (see Figure 10.6). 
Acceptance of 
the proposed 
I-voting model 
 
The process of I-voting presented in the presentation was understood by 
more than 80% of the users. However, half of the participants still 
considered I-voting to be no more secure than the voting methods 
currently used in Qatar. The rest thought I-voting would be more secure. 
The majority, about 60%, felt strongly encouraged to use the proposed 
I-voting system with its confidentiality, improvement of the overall 
quality of voting service, and the ease and speed of the vote casting 
process (see Figure 10.7).  
The majority (about 60%) strongly agreed that I-voting would be easier, 
faster and secure compared to existing voting system. However some 
(40%) still believed the existing voting system would be much easier to 
use than I-voting since it is more familiar (see Figure 10.8). 
About 69% of the participants strongly agreed that Internet voting would 
be beneficial for them and more than 70% thought it would be beneficial 
for other people such as older people and those with disabilities who 
might have difficulty getting to a polling station. Overall, 81% strongly 
recommend and favoured the use the proposed Internet voting as an 
alternative voting system. 
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10.5.3 Expert Evaluation on the implementation of the proposed model 
The expert from Bristol University was given a demonstration of the I-voting model 
using the developed prototype. He agreed that the system seemed to work in practice 
and offered the following opinions on the implementation.  
 
The expert agreed the proposed approach offers a strong security process to register the 
votes by including smart card verification to complement the verification using personal 
information.  Moreover, the approach includes a PIN verification to reinforce the 
security of using a single private key during the identification on polling day. By 
decentralising the information in different databases (DBs), the architecture can support 
a good workload for a large scale of users and improve the security of the database. 
Also, getting access to the first database or the second database in read mode would not 
be enough to vote on behalf of a voter since the private key is not recorded. 
 
The expert noted that the weak point of the approach is at the end of the vote 
registration, as the structure of the voting key file contains the ID record as used in the 
table of the first database. This may simplify the process for the identification on polling 
day but also provides undesired information to the voter from the server. By using high 
performance computing, it may be possible to find the private key and the signature in 
the database for a particular recorded ID. Then, if the voter has not cast his/her vote then 
there are a number of chances for a person to vote illegally on behalf of the voter, 
particularly if the length of the PIN is short. The security can be easily improved by 
increasing the key length or the PIN length, but increasing the key length increases the 
computation time to generate the pair of keys and may reduce the ability of the server to 
manage a large number of users. Increasing the PIN length also increases the number of 
typing errors by the voters. On the other hand, increasing the PIN length reduces the 
probability of an illegal vote. One solution to avoid the computation of the pair of keys 
(public and private) could consist in storing a set of keys with a large key length and 
deleting them in the storage once selected by the server. 
 
The discussion with the expert then turned into a small brainstorming session between 
the expert and the researcher to identity the possible scenarios for an illegal vote, a 
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deeper analysis of the architecture was carried out. This showed the following different 
cases for an illegal vote which have been ordered in range of importance: 
1. Gaining write access to database 1, 2 or 3.  
2. Obtaining read access to database 1 and generating a private key which matches 
a record in database 1 of a person who had not yet voted.  
3. Stealing the voting key file and the PIN in the letter of a person who had not yet 
voted.  
4. Stealing the voting key file and generating the PIN of a person who had not yet 
voted.  
5. Generating a voting key file and a PIN which matches a record in database 1 of a 
person who had not yet voted. 
 
The conclusion from the brainstorming session was that all of the above are unlikely to 
happen with highly secured databases and with a large key length for the private key of 
the voting key file. But it is interesting to note that, in all but the first case, the number 
of illegal votes can be more important when an attacker has read access to database 2. 
The reason is that with this read access it is possible to identify a voter who had not yet 
cast their vote. Also, it is interesting to note that the PIN code, in itself, does not provide 
enough information for a person to vote illegally since a vote cannot be cast without the 
voting key file. Finally, it is important to observe that case 3 above is a special case of 
2. However, case 2 can be more secure by removing the PIN from database 1 and 
securely transferring it into a new database. Thus, case 4 can become a special case of 2. 
This decentralisation can have the benefit on reducing the workload on polling day. 
 
This analysis has shown that the architecture is appropriate for I-voting and that the 
security of the databases is at least as important as the voting key file generated for a 
voter. It would be interesting to evaluate the scalability of the application using real 
checking of personal information and smart cards. 
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10.6  Summary of evaluation 
The experts showed a great interest in the proposed I-voting model. They believed the 
model is effective and fulfils voting principles efficiently through a clear process that is 
usable by the voters. The model makes use of existing smart card technology along with 
strong authentication and anonymity process to ensure security, privacy and 
transparency of I-voting.  
 
The voters showed a high level of acceptance (above 80%) of the I-voting concept, 
believing it to be beneficial, secure, usable, accessible and reliable. They were 
comfortable with the concept and had confidence in the system. This is a strong 
motivation for implementing the proposed I-voting system as an additional, alternative 
means of voting, and more than 80% strongly favoured doing so. However, 70% have 
some concerned about the legal aspects of I-voting and about 80% had some concerns 
about the dangers associated with I-voting, such as phishing and e-crimes. The majority, 
about 60%, strongly agreed with the use of national ID cards for I-voting authentication, 
and the use of an identity check through different technology such as biometric and 
fingerprint methods.   
 
The results show the successfulness of the approach in theory and the  primary results 
from the prototype implementation of the model show that the architecture is feasible 
and is secure enough to be used for I-voting. However, the scalability of the architecture 
needs to be evaluated. 
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10.7 Conclusion 
The proposed model obtained a good degree of acceptance by experts, in term of 
satisfying these voting requirements, despite the challenges of possible attackers, which 
will always require further investigation to safeguard the system. In this chapter the 
model has been analysed and tested. However, the protection of each voter’s machine 
still remains an obstacle as it is the most vulnerable aspect of vote casting. The use of a 
secure operating system or Internet browser could solve the problem but the system 
usability would be affected. The voter survey showed that many users would find 
difficulties in using the system and would not favour using it. However, use of software 
middleware that does the same task as the secure operating may solve the problem, but 
more investigation is needed to identify all possible attacks.  
 
Possible means of meeting each threat in the proposed I-voting model are shown in 
Table 10.4 
Table 10.4: Possible threats and solution of I-voting 
Threat Potential solutions  
Network Security Encryption 
Intrusion detection system 
Redundant firewalls 
Penetration tests 
Privacy Digital signatures 
Secure socket layers 
Encryption 
Voter identity/ ballot data separation 
Voter ballots data verification 
Virus, Worm and Trojan horse Anti virus scanning 
Digital signatures 
Voted ballot data verification 
Spoofing Secure socket layers 
Digital signatures 
MMQ (Massage queuing) 
Voter ballots data verification 
Denial of service Large quantity of bandwidth, multiple carriers 
Multiple Internet service provider entry points 
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Utilization monitoring 
Voter fraud Digital signatures 
Voter authentication PKI 
Digital signatures 
Digital certificate 
Vote casting Blind signature 
Tor for anonymity 
Mix networking (Proxy server) 
Ssh-2 (Create secure tunnel) 
Voter Client machine customised Linux OS boot by CD 
Digital signatures 
SHA or MD5 
Availability  deploying VMware from Dell company 
Vote selling Three factor of authentication 
Smart card 
PIN (One time password) 
Biometric (Finger print) 
Transparency Open source (Linux OS)  
Tally Process DRE 
Paper backup 
 
The expert who evaluated the prototype suggested focusing mainly on evaluating the 
scalability of the architecture. This will provide an insight about how many servers are 
necessary to manage an election in a country and, in particular, the State of Qatar. 
Furthermore, the expert suggested the prototype should be tested using real smart card 
technology.  For future improvement, the expert believe that the security could be 
improved further by using a mix network but at the risk of losing the scalability of the 
architecture; this needs to be investigated and experiments carried out. In the research 
reported in this thesis, due to a lack of time and resources, a mix network could not be 
implemented. The technical resources needed to elaborate a mix network would have 
involved a set of servers to setup a chain of proxy servers.  
 
The next chapter focuses on providing recommendations to help Qatar government to 
introduce I-voting. The recommendations include the following areas digital divide, 
e-literacy, I-voting infrastructure, legal aspects, transparency, security and privacy.   
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Chapter 11  Recommendations for introducing Internet voting 
in Qatar 
 
This chapter presents recommendations derived from the study to assist the Qatar 
government in introducing I-voting in Qatar. The recommendations address aspects of 
I-voting which include the digital divide, e-literacy, I-voting infrastructure, legal 
aspects, transparency, security and privacy.   
  
11.1  Introduction 
Qatar is comprised of eight municipalities and had its municipal elections during the 
year 2007. The overall percentage of the population who exercised their vote came to 
around 51% of the total population who used the ballot paper system to cast their votes. 
The government feels that it was due to this that the percentage of people who voted 
was so low (Khalaf and Luciani, 2008). The country has been adopting, over recent 
years, new and emerging technologies aimed at its overall development and the 
government, therefore, feels that an electronic voting system will attract more people to 
exercise their voting rights (ICTQatar, 2007). This implies they believe it would be 
better for the country to introduce an I-voting system for future elections. 
 
This research thus focuses on introducing I-voting in Qatar, as an addition to the current 
voting system, to enhance democratic processes and e-literacy. Accordingly, the 
research aim is to provide effective recommendations for the government of the State of 
Qatar to help in introducing I-voting in future elections in Qatar. The outcomes of the 
empirical and non-empirical research carried out in Qatar have created a basis for 
putting forward the recommendations for introducing I-voting. A summary of the 
outcomes of research reported in previous chapters is given in Table 11.1.  
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Table 11.1: Summary of Outcomes and Implications of I-voting Research in Qatar 
Chapter Main outcomes Implications for the 
recommendations  
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
 Identifies barriers and potential solutions 
for I-voting. 
 Identifies motivations for I-voting 
 Identifies suitable I-voting protocols  
 Reveals the extent of previous experience 
of I-voting 
 Highlights a deficiency in the literature in a 
particular area of the world, the State of 
Qatar.  
 Forms the basis of 
recommendations to help 
adoption of I-voting in Qatar 
 Identifies potential 
solutions for I-voting 
 Enables recommendations to 
take into consideration 
I-voting barriers and how to 
overcome them. 
Chapter 5: 
Qatar 
 Identifies the feasibility of I-voting in 
Qatar, covering multiple factors such as 
government willingness, accessibility, 
availability of IT infrastructure, support 
from Qatar law and Qatar culture, 
availability of Internet law to protect online 
consumers and the existence of an 
e-government project. 
 Identifies issues for I-voting, concerning 
security, privacy, usability and 
transparency.  
 Ensures recommendations 
take into account local 
conditions and are suitable 
and practical in the State of 
Qatar.  
 Suggests I-voting should be 
implemented alongside the 
current paper-based voting 
system 
Chapter 6: 
Survey 
 Identifies factors concerned with the Qatari 
people and their willingness to participate 
in I-voting, such as high computer 
knowledge, high usage of e-services, and 
trust in general elections in Qatar. 
 Discovers features of I-voting preferred by 
Qatari citizens. 
 Discovers the effect of education level on 
people‟s responses. 
 Reveals that one third of the population 
would find difficulties in using I-voting 
technology. 
 Reveals one quarter of the population is 
concerned about security issues and one 
seventh about reliability and accuracy 
issues associated with I-voting 
 Ensures recommendations 
take into account abilities 
and preferences of the local 
population. 
 Identifies areas where the 
population would need 
greater information and 
assurances to be 
comfortable with I-voting 
Chapter 7: 
Experiments 
 Identifies the feasibility of I-voting but 
reveals possible client issues in terms of 
knowledge and awareness of information 
security related to I-voting. 
 Identifies areas where 
greater information and 
education are needed. 
Chapter 11: Recommendations for introducing Internet voting in Qatar 
 
265 
Chapter Main outcomes Implications for the 
recommendations  
Chapter 8: 
Awareness 
 
 Identifies the need for enhancing user 
awareness in information security to avoid 
risks associated with clients. 
 Reveals that users perform many 
inappropriate actions which might put them 
at a security risk due to a lack of awareness 
on information security, such as 22% react 
to fake security warnings and respond to 
suspicious links, 43% open e-mails from 
unknown senders and 58% do not read 
firewall alert messages. 
 Reveals that, in contrast, some participants 
perform some correct actions, such as 
checking file extensions before 
downloading, turning on security 
applications and updating their anti-virus 
software. 
 Shows a need for an 
awareness campaign on 
security issues. 
Chapter 9: 
Model 
definition 
 Defines an effective I-voting model for 
Qatar using advanced technologies and 
protocols such as smart cards, biometrics 
and mix networking.    
 Defines five phases to complete the voting 
process: authentication, registration, 
anonymity, vote casting and counting.   
 Shows that an I-voting 
system that addresses all the 
concerns of experts and 
voters could be possible 
using appropriate 
technology and processes. 
Chapter 10: 
Justification 
and evaluation 
 Shows the model has a high level of 
acceptance (more than 80%) amongst the 
Qatari population who believe it fulfils 
voting principles effectively. 
 Shows the model encourages I-voting as an 
alternative method of voting with more 
than 80% strongly favouring the proposed 
I-voting model and about 60% strongly 
agreeing with its use of national ID cards.  
 Reveals that, in contrast, 70% were 
concerned about legal aspects of I-voting 
and 80% about Internet threats associated 
with I-voting. 
 Shows that basing 
recommendations on a 
tested model has a high 
level of acceptability if the 
model takes into account all 
the issues and factors 
identified in earlier chapters 
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11.2  Recommendations 
Based on the findings of the previous chapters, recommendations have been defined to 
help the Qatar government promote and implement I-voting. These comprise 
recommendations on aiming to enhance reduction of the digital divide, e-literacy, 
Internet infrastructure, the law, transparency, security and privacy. These aspects are 
addressed as follows: 
 
11.2.1  Recommendations 1:  Reduction of Digital Divide in Qatar society 
The digital divide is the gap between people who have access to the Internet and those 
who do not. “Because of changes in technology, the digital divide is actually being 
defined in terms of broadband access versus telephone access.” (White 2007, p. 120).  
The government of Qatar has made a large investment in reducing the digital divide by 
launching the free ipark project for public access to the Internet. In addition, the 
competition in the telecommunication market has assisted in reducing the cost of 
Internet access and improving the quality of service provided by the Internet service 
providers. Therefore the Internet has become accessible even to people with low 
income.  According to ITU (2009), 52% of the population have access to the Internet 
and if we exclude the ineligible voters, this percentage could increase. Therefore, there 
is no problem in adopting an I-voting system in Qatar because the majority of Qataris 
use Internet facilities, providing the system is practical and compatible with the postal 
voting system.  
 
Although there is currently a plan by the Qatar government to reduce the digital divide, 
the research has provided some recommendations for the government to enhance this 
plan, as summarised in Table 11.2. 
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Table 11.2: Recommendations 1   Reducing the digital divide 
Recommendations Cross 
reference to 
chapter 
1.1. Provide I-voting at polling stations as an option for voters. This 
will provide accessibility to voters who do not have access to the 
Internet or who prefer not to use their own machines to cast their 
votes.  
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
1.2.  Use the Internet to provide training on how to use I-voting.  Chapter 8: 
Awareness  
1.3. Encourage organisations and the public sector to donate 
computers through an authority taking responsibility for distributing 
them to people in need. 
Chapter 5: 
Qatar 
1.4.  Provide the Internet free of charge in the election period, using 
telephone lines. This implies the government should pay the costs 
of Internet service providers. 
Chapter 5: 
Qatar 
1.5.  Enhance free wireless Internet in public areas such as shopping 
malls and coffee shops. 
Chapter 5: 
Qatar 
1.6   Ensure the availability of the Internet network in all areas in 
Qatar. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
1.7  Increase the Arabic content of the Internet, e.g. on government 
websites, because Arabic is the native language of Qatar and, 
hence, the electorate would feel more comfortable using Arabic 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
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11.2.2  Recommendations 2.  Enhance E–literacy in Qatar.  
With the huge development in technology, the problem of e-literacy appears. This refers 
to those people who do not have enough computer literacy and knowledge to carry out 
online activities. The government has focused on human development as an important 
element for the development of Qatar. Therefore it has invested intensively in 
education, recognising that education is an investment for Qatar‟s future and it is aiming 
to be the centre of educational excellence in the region. Accordingly, the Minister of 
Education has plans to change the education curriculum to make it equivalent to that of 
developed nations, through a project called „Education for the new era‟ (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007c). This involves enhancing citizens‟ English and computer 
literacy to university level. In addition, the government has developed an educational 
“city”, known as the Qatar Foundation, aiming to enhance education, containing 
educational facilities ranging from schools to some of the world's leading universities 
and research centres.  
 
Computer literacy has become an important achievement required for entry to university 
and for many jobs since most jobs today require IT skills. Therefore, the education 
sector and organisations need to work on developing computer literacy for their students 
or employees by providing training courses on computer skills such as the ICDL 
(International Computer Driving Licence) (ICDL GCC Foundation, 2009). In addition, 
Qatar has launched an e-government project which has more than 90 e-services to 
transform the traditional process of dealing with government departments into electronic 
form. Furthermore, many non-government e-services exist in Qatar, including online 
banking, online payment and e-commerce. This helps to increase e-literacy in the state. 
 
Although some steps are being taken to improve the e-literacy of the Qatari population, 
an increase in the overall level of e-literacy is clearly desirable for the country to adopt 
I-voting. To improve the level of e-literacy, Table 11.3 gives recommendations for the 
government, derived from this research. 
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Table 11.3: Recommendations 2   E-literacy 
Recommendations Cross 
reference to 
chapter 
2.1 Make the Internet widely available in the country (see reduction of the 
digital divide recommendations) 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
2.2 Provide e-training or e-learning on how to use the I-voting 
application. Also, in polling stations, provide a helpdesk where help can 
be given for people in need without interfering with the voting process 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
2.3 Promote awareness of I-voting by involving different parties, 
including the education sector, private and public organisations and the 
media, by means of newspapers, radio and television. An awareness 
programme should introduce I-voting technology to citizens, teaching 
them the benefits of boosting the democratic process and, at the same 
time, reducing the resistance to change to the new I-voting system. 
Further training on how to use I-voting system can be provided though 
posters, leaflets, and seminars. 
Chapter 8: 
Awareness 
2.4 Ensure the I-voting application is accessible for people with 
disabilities and easy to use by all voters. The government should define a 
legal requirement to introduce the technology to help people with 
disabilities in their daily life activities, including voting. For example, 
people with visual disability could, perhaps, be assisted with use of 
speech recognition technology. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
2.5 Evaluate the e-literacy of the nation using defined criteria and 
measures to enable refinement and continued development of e-literacy 
enhancement methods. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
2.6 Ensure information on the I-voting process itself and the supporting 
training and awareness information is available in the official Arabic 
language of Qatar. Include pictures and use speech technology along with 
understandable text, taking into account all the latest HCI (Human 
Computer Interaction) principles.   
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
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11.2.3  Recommendations 3. Enhance Internet Infrastructure Development 
Many countries have found difficulties in developing basic I-voting infrastructure. 
However, Qatar has a strong infrastructure base available from the e-government 
project, which has advanced technologies, including smart cards, biometrics and 
network infrastructure. This research has led to some recommendations to help create an 
I-voting infrastructure which will fulfil voting principles effectively:  
 
Table 11.4: Recommendations 3.  I-voting infrastructure 
Recommendations Cross 
reference to 
chapter 
3.1 Develop I-voting in Qatar using current telecommunication 
infrastructure and available resources, also taking into consideration past 
world-wide experience in applying I-voting in national elections such as 
in Austria, Canada, Estonia and France (ACE, 2010).  
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
3.2 Learn from the e-government project‟s current use of technology, 
including its failures and successes, to assist in introducing I-voting. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
3.3 Provide telecommunications in under-served areas and ensure 
sustainability of I-voting in the whole state. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
3.4 Establish a plan for I-voting in cooperation with experts from the 
Ministry of Information, ictQatar, Q-CERT and The Election Committee, 
to provide integrity and effectiveness in the I-voting infrastructure. 
Chapter 5:   
Qatar 
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11.2.4  Recommendations 4.  Provide laws to support I-voting 
The current election law in Qatar is not clear with regard to I-voting technology. This 
implies that for I-voting to be feasible in Qatar a new law is required. Interviews with 
members of the Election Committee, who showed an interest in I-voting, support this 
view (see Chapter 5). Some recommendations on legal aspects to support I-voting are 
therefore made in Table 11.5.   
 
Table 11.5: Recommendations 4.  I-voting law 
Recommendations Cross 
reference to 
chapter 
4.1 Consult current election law to assess how the existing law might 
work with the introduction of I-voting. 
E-law has been recently introduced in Qatar, but due to the limited scope 
of this research it has not been intensively reviewed. However the e-law 
was designed from worldwide experience. This e-law should, therefore, 
make I-voting more secure. 
Chapter 5:   
Qatar 
4.2 Clarify and simplify the process of appeal for a recount in I-voting Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
4.3 Provide the legal right for a voter to verify that his/her vote was cast, 
without revealing the voter‟s choice of candidate. This should reduce vote 
selling.  
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
4.4 Provide election law giving procedures and regulations to eliminate 
vote selling, for example laws should require a combination of 
technologies for authentication and limit the election duration to reduce 
cyber attacks. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
4.5 Clarify the laws and regulations, making them available for 
independent agencies to consult and review the effectiveness of the law. 
 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
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4.6 Reform the voting process by simplifying regulations and procedures 
to make I-voting preferable to traditional voting.  
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
4.7 Adopt legislation related to information security management, with 
laws that criminalise cyber attacks and enable effective investigation and 
prosecution of such activities (UN, 2005).  
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
4.8 Use privacy or network security laws or regulations to take action 
against misuse of ICT resources (similar to 4.7). 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
 
11.2.5  Recommendations 5. Ensure transparency of I-voting 
A lack of transparency can lead to low participation and dissatisfaction with government 
projects, therefore transparency should be present in I-voting to build trust. The 
recommendations in Table 11.6 address the need for transparency. 
 
Table 11.6: Recommendations 5. Transparency of I-voting 
Recommendations Cross 
reference to 
chapter 
5.1 Make details of the law, regulations and voting process 
available online for citizens. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
5.2 Use government trusted officials and organisations (e.g. The 
Ministry of the Interior and ictQATAR) to administer the I-voting 
process and ensure they provide the information required by 
citizens. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
5.3 Introduce a method of vote verification (see Recommendation 
4.2). 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
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5.4 Provide effective training for citizens on I-voting to promote 
understanding of the process to enhance transparency. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
5.5 Keep I-voting regulations, processes and procedures simple to 
enhance transparency for citizens. This would be similar to the 
Plain English Campaign (2011) which seeks to make sure public 
information is as clear as possible. . 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
5.6 Develop open source software for I-voting, but with access to 
the source limited to trusted worldwide experts to reduce misuse of 
the transparency concept by hackers who could abuse knowledge of 
the system algorithms and data flow. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
5.7 Employ independent third parties in the election process to 
monitor the election to ensure voting principles are met and 
maintained. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature 
review 
 
11.2.6  Recommendations 6.  Enhance the security and privacy of I-voting 
I-voting requires access to the citizens‟ database, therefore it becomes important to 
ensure the privacy of citizens‟ personal information while interacting with the I-voting 
system. Similarly, security should be ensured and addressed while designing the system. 
If security or privacy is breached, it will affect public trust in I-voting and reduce 
turnout. Therefore the recommendations shown in Table 11.7 are made to ensure 
privacy and security in I-voting. 
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Table 11.7: Recommendations 6.  Enhancing the security and privacy of I-voting 
Recommendations Cross 
reference to 
chapter 
6.1 Make voters aware of the importance of security, privacy and keeping 
their personal information private to minimise the security risks 
associated with client errors. 
Chapter 8: 
awareness 
6.2 Design I-voting to preserve privacy using different advanced 
technologies, such as anonymous algorithms. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
6.3 Minimise the amount of personal information required for I-voting. Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
6.4 Restrict access to the database to only trusted, high officials to avoid 
disclosure of information. 
Chapter 9: 
Model 
6.5 Assign a team of security experts to monitor the Internet network 
during the election, giving them the required authority to take action to 
stop attacks by, for example, blocking access by certain organisations if 
necessary, and giving them the responsibility for investigating any attack. 
Chapter 9: 
Model 
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
6.6 Make available a special secure browser allowing users to only access 
the Qatar voting website. This Internet browser should limit features to a 
minimum, blocking any feature which may result in allowing the user pc 
to be controlled. This will be necessary because Internet attackers never 
use their own identities to start an attack, so blocking the source of the 
attack will, therefore, create another problem. 
Chapter 5:   
Qatar 
6.7 Ensure all e-technology used is verified and certified by the Election 
Committee and computer experts to show its trustworthiness.  
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
6.8 Restrict use of I-voting to Internet users within the country as making 
I-voting accessible worldwide will create many technical and security 
challenges. This will eliminate many attacks and more control would be 
gained. The possibility of committing fraud from distant locations, such 
as from a foreign country, is high in I-voting. For Qatari citizens abroad, 
Chapter 5:   
Qatar 
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voting could be carried out in Qatar embassies using secure dedicated 
leased line network connections so that all data can be transferred 
securely. 
6.9 Provide an automated backup of systems, ensuring storage is in a safe 
place, and enabling reference to this backup when necessary, such as on 
discovery of security breaches.  
Chapter 3: 
Literature review 
6.10 Ensure all related agencies work together. This can be achieved 
through standardisation of the procedures required to integrate different 
internal processes. This will demand very clear prior definition of 
leadership and respective function. 
Chapter 5:   
Qatar 
 
 
11.3  Evaluation of Recommendations  
To evaluate the recommendations, relevant senior officials were interviewed to review 
the recommendations. Interviewees were recruited by direct personal contact. Five 
evaluators were gathered from different organisations in Qatar from the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI), ictQATAR, Qtel and the Supreme Judiciary Council. The interviewees 
were as follows: 
 
1.  Hassan Al-Sayed, Gov. IT Platform Manager, ictQATAR 
2.  Abdul Rahman Al-Sulaiti, Assistant Director of Elections Department, MOI 
3.  Jassim Alswadi, Head of ISP, Qtel 
4.  Mohanad alabad, Internet Security Consultant, MOI 
5. Mohamad Alobaidli, Judge participating in election monitoring, Supreme Judiciary 
Council (SJC) 
 
The purpose of the interviews was explained and confidentiality was assured in writing. 
In addition, interviews were held in a semi-structured form, where each interviewee was 
interviewed individually for about 30 to 45 minutes and notes were taken by the 
researcher. The interviewees were first provided with the recommendations to read and 
then they were asked the following questions: 
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Q1.  Do you believe the researcher‟s recommendations will be effective for introducing 
I-voting in Qatar? 
Q2. After reading the recommendations, would you encourage Qatar to introduce 
I-voting?  
Q3.  Do you believe that the recommendations satisfy voting principles of security, 
privacy, transparency, etc.? 
Q4.   Do you think the recommendations could help to increase voting turnout? 
Q5.   Do you think the recommendations on the legal aspects are valuable? 
Q6. Is Qatar ready to introduce I-voting in terms of its infrastructure? And, are the 
recommendations for enhancing infrastructure development adequate? 
 
Commenting on I-voting, most of the interviewees acknowledged that some countries 
had attempted to adopt e-voting. The experts from the MOI and ictQATAR believed 
that a system of I-voting can be made fully reliable and authentic because these days 
many tasks are done through computers and people can fully rely on these systems. 
They added that the security agencies can take the help of suppliers of the online voting 
system for administering the votes authentically. As Avaliktos (2004, p.152) states, 
“Safeguards can be provided through the establishment of computer security 
procedures that prevent unauthorized individuals from seeing the contents of a ballot.”  
   
All evaluators believed the recommendations would be very effective for the 
government of Qatar in assisting in the uptake of I-voting. The experts from the MOI, 
ictQATAR and Qtel believed the recommendations are comprehensive, clear, consistent 
and well-structured. Moreover, the Internet Security Consultant and the Assistant 
Director of Elections Department believed that the recommendations were very 
valuable, relevant and well designed since they are based on grounded research in the 
field. Most commented on the importance of the research since it sheds light on a new 
technology which has not been introduced before in Qatar.  
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The majority of evaluators would encourage the introduction of I-voting since they 
believe it would enhance voting participation, provide accessibility and facilitate the 
voting process. However, they pointed out the security, privacy and trust issues raised 
from such system. On the other hand, the judge from SJC does not favour introducing 
I-voting in Qatar, believing that it is impractical, since people have used paper-based 
voting for a long time without problems and most would find difficulties in using the 
I-voting system. He added that worldwide experience of I-voting has shown many 
associated issues in terms of security, privacy and getting people‟s acceptance. 
Although he thought it is a good area of research, he warned that the government have 
to make a careful decision on introducing I-voting, making sure it would be an effective 
voting system for Qatar elections in the future, taking into considerations its possible 
impacts. Furthermore, the SJC expert felt there was a need to prove the effectiveness of 
the proposed I-voting model in ensuring its fulfilment of voting principles in practice 
and getting acceptance and the confidence of Qatari citizens.  
   
While the majority of experts believed that most of the recommendations would satisfy 
voting principles including security, privacy and transparency, they however felt the 
recommendations needed to be put into practice to ensure they would work in the real 
world.  
 
The expert from ictQATAR stated that I-voting is highly dependent on aspects like the 
political, social and economic situation of a state. I-voting will not actually have much 
effect on the operation of the political process or the distribution of power in advanced 
societies. Most of the experts agreed that it would be a good idea to introduce 
supervised I-voting in polling stations, so that Qataris could become familiar with using 
such new technology.  
 
The MOI Internet Security Consultant expert suggested that the I-voting stations should 
not be configured, requiring each voter to open the application and type in the URL for 
security reasons. Although this would be too difficult and confusing for some users, the 
online tutorial would guide them in how to access the system or, alternatively, they 
could be provided with an easy step-by-step user manual. Most of the interviewees 
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commented that education and training should be recommended to build the citizens‟ 
acceptance and trust. They recommended having I-voting alongside paper-based voting, 
so citizens who are still not comfortable with I-voting could choose to vote at the 
polling stations. However, they believed the government should distribute information 
on how to use I-voting from home so they can follow all the security procedures to 
ensure securing the client-side machine. As in the Qatar e-government project 
(Hokomati), whenever there is a problem with one of the e-services in government, the 
user should be able to call the e-government team who should be able help to solve the 
problem. Similarly there should be an Incident and Response Team available 24 hours a 
day during the election period to assist voters in casting their votes by I-voting, without 
knowing who the user is going to vote for. 
 
The Assistant Director of the Elections Department commented on the need for a trusted 
third party to inspect the I-voting process to ensure the fairness of system. This 
complies  with the proposed model design (see Chapter 9) where the Election 
Committee act as a third party where it issues a secret key to each voter, this is used to 
ensure that the voting process has not been manipulated at any stage. In order to access 
the system there would be a need for more than one party to access it.  
 
Moreover, he added that some countries such as the USA and the UK have not gone 
further in developing I-voting due to technical and non-technical issues and, therefore, it 
would be hard to gain political approval for using such system in Qatar with a risk of 
affecting citizens' confidence in the government. Also, some parties fear that I-voting 
would ignore the needs of some voters who have no knowledge of using the computer 
or the Internet. 
 
The Assistant Director of Elections Department pointed out that I-voting could simplify 
the voting processing, for example the registration stage could be disregarded if the 
voter has an ID card and the voting process could be done straightforwardly with a few 
clicks. However, there are some political concerns on the security, anonymity and 
privacy of I-voting. On the other hand, the SJC and MOI evaluators believed that 
I-voting will boost the political agenda. 
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The MOI and ictQATAR experts stated that government should make an effort to make 
citizens knowledgeable about I-voting. Moreover, the experts commented, the public 
adoption of government electronic systems has been satisfactory in Qatar. This was 
confirmed in the literature by Shafi and Vishanth (2010) who state, “The Qatari 
e-government initiative was launched in 2003. In global terms, the UN e-government 
readiness report (2008) ranked Qatar’s e-government project as number 53 
worldwide.”  As in many countries, the national e-government focus in Qatar is to 
achieve the highest performance in executing governmental transactions electronically, 
through streamlined business processes and integrated Information Technology (IT) 
solutions (ictQATAR, 2009). The public organisations in Qatar have set themselves a 
target to commercialise their technologies with the new developments (Qatar Science & 
Technology Park, 2009). The advantage is that this implies there is a solid infrastructure 
available to introduce I-voting.  
 
The experts from Qtel and ictQATAR emphasised the need to ensure that the I-voting 
system is connected to the election server to ensure a secure and trusted system. This 
agrees with Avi Rubin (2001) who stated, “The infrastructure does exist right now for 
computer security specialists, who are suspicious that they could be communicating 
with an imposter, to verify that their browser is communicating with a valid election 
server.” 
 
The expert from ictQATAR stated that in order to make I-voting practical and widely 
adopted, it should come with proper hardware to facilitate a reliable connection between 
the user and the election server. Malevolent code to infiltrate the normal functioning of 
voting systems has to be strictly prevented. 
 
Most evaluators believed that further trials should be held before adoption of I-voting, 
to measure the effectiveness of such a system in reality. Also, this will help to assess 
I-voting against other systems. Furthermore, the system should be tested to ensure it is 
equipped with the proper security measures to decrease possible hazards, and there 
should also be a comparative economic analysis of this system. Some experts suggested 
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the development of new procedures for continuous testing and certification of election 
systems and test methods for election systems, pointing to the need to consider usability 
in the design of I-voting. However, any certification of I-voting should be able to adapt 
to technology changes in the hardware, operating systems, browsers, plug-ins, crypto 
standards, authentication mechanisms and technology threats. Therefore it is hard to 
certify something that is always changing. In addition, some experts suggested the need 
to develop a protocol for preventing vote selling and reducing coercion. 
 
11.4  Conclusion  
The recommendations on I-voting presented in this chapter have included aspects 
concerning the digital divide, e-literacy, I-voting infrastructure, the law, transparency, 
security and privacy.  These recommendations were derived from the research outcomes 
reported in previous chapters. They were judged to be valuable, according to a number 
of expert evaluators who, as a result, would encourage the introduction of I-voting in 
Qatar as they believed it would be feasible, if care was taken over issues such as 
security, privacy and people‟s acceptance.  The evaluators believed that the proposed 
model and recommendations need to be implemented in reality to confirm their 
effectiveness, taking it from theory into real world practice. It is recommended that the 
government of Qatar should boost e-democracy by implementing the proposed I-voting 
model (see Chapter 9) in phases, alongside paper-based voting, starting with an 
experimental trial in specific places (e.g. universities, polling stations, and some 
organisations) to evaluate the success or failure of I-voting in Qatar and investigate the 
problems encountered to help in improving the system.   
 
Apart from the Judge from the SJC, the evaluators were clear that an I-voting system 
should be introduced in Qatar. It is therefore recommended that the government of 
Qatar should make efforts to implement such an I-voting system, ensuring proper 
security of systems being used for the purpose, and educating the voting population of 
the advantages of the system and of the security and privacy measures being used to 
protect their vote.  
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Chapter 12  Conclusions and Future work 
 
This chapter presents the contribution, implications, achievements and limitations of this 
research, along with the overall conclusion and proposed continuation work.  
 
12.1  Research contributions 
The research provides a significant contribution to knowledge by shedding light on 
improving a voting system by adopting I-voting in a particular area of the world which has 
not been covered before in the literature, the State of Qatar. The research contributes by 
identifying the willingness and barriers of government and citizens to adopting I-voting in 
Qatar and proposes a secure I-voting model for the Qatar government that address issues of 
I-voting which might arise due to the introduction of such new technology. It also makes 
recommendations to the Qatar government to assist the introduction of I-voting.  
 
The research is valuable not only for the Qatar government but also for Qatari citizens and 
I-voting research scholars. The lessons learned from the Qatari case study could also be 
useful for other nations, if account is taken of the cultural and country-specific factors, 
especially those countries with a culture similar to Qatar’s, such as the Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) and Arab countries. 
 
12.2  Research implications 
This work was based on a variety of data gathering methods, including interviews, 
questionnaires and experiments to determine the possibility of introducing I-voting in Qatar, 
taking into account the possible barriers which might be faced and proposing an effective 
I-voting model, along with recommendations, to help the Qatar government to introduce 
I-voting. 
 
This research has had many positive implications for the researcher in both personal and 
professional terms. It was an inspiring and knowledge enhancing experience which has 
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improved the researcher’s knowledge professionally, academically and personally in many 
aspects: problem solving, communication skills, research skills, management skills and 
gaining experience and knowledge in the field of I-voting.  This research will make a 
valuable input in the researcher’s approach to professional work in the Ministry of Interior in 
Qatar in being responsible for improving the voting system in Qatar as part of the 
government’s e-government initiative, ensuring the fulfilment of voting principles and the 
willingness of the Qatar government and citizens to introduce such an improvement.  
  
12.3  Research achievements 
The research aim and objectives (see Section 1.5) were achieved in this thesis through 
empirical and non-empirical research in the State of Qatar as a case study of introducing 
I-voting in this part of the world. 
 
The research followed a carefully planned progression through the intended objectives which 
built on each other, towards finally fulfilling them by investigating the readiness of the Qatar 
government and willingness of citizens to take part in the initiative of I-voting. Also, it 
discovered the barriers that would deter I-voting in Qatar. Furthermore, it proposes an 
effective I-voting model for the state of Qatar, based on best practices and country-specific 
factors to overcome the investigated I-voting challenges. Finally, it proposes effective 
recommendations for Qatar government to help the introduction of I-voting. 
 
12.4  Research limitations 
This research faced many limitations in terms of resources, time and access. It was not 
possible to produce large-scale interviews, questionnaires and experiments, due to the 
limitation in resources and difficulties in obtaining authority for access and support from 
responsible organisations. Also, unwillingness of some respondents to contribute to the 
research by participating in interviews, surveys and experiments was a further constraint. 
Consequently, the researcher took advantage of personal contacts to gather the participants. 
Nevertheless, the researcher tried to take positive steps to encourage people to participate, for 
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instance by inspiring them by showing them the importance of their input to the research and 
ensuring their privacy and confidentiality. 
 
It was not possible to introduce the proposed model and recommendations in reality due to 
difficulties in getting government acceptance to implement the proposed solution in the time 
available. However, the effectiveness of the proposals was tested by experts from a range of 
private and government organisations in the field of voting, information security, Qatar 
culture and the law. Furthermore, due to the lack of resources and access to organisations, as 
well as the time constraint, there was a limit to the extent that world-wide experience could 
be reviewed. However, it was possible to review the adoption and experiences of I-voting in 
Estonia which provided a good example for the uptake of I-voting in Qatar, although it would 
have been beneficial to proceed with more detailed comparison between Qatar and Estonia to 
investigate the similarities and differences between each country, considering country-
specific, social and cultural aspects. 
 
12.5  Conclusion 
This thesis has aimed to assess the willingness of Qatari citizens to take part in the initiative 
of I-voting and identify the barriers that would inhibit I-voting in Qatar and the means to 
overcome them by proposing an effective Internet voting model for the State of Qatar to be 
used for future elections and make recommendations for the Qatari government to introduce 
and encourage I-voting. 
 
The research presents a literature review of I-voting experience, identifying the willingness 
and barriers of such a system and best practice and models used in creating I-voting that 
fulfils voting principles. Based on the literature and interviews with representative experts 
and a sample of candidates and voting experts, it is concluded that I-voting is feasible with 
government readiness and willingness, due to multiple factors: voting experience, educational 
development, telecommunication development, the large number of Internet users, Qatar law 
which does not bar the use of I-voting, and Qatar culture which supports I-voting 
introduction. The interviewees considered the government willingness to provide I-voting for 
reasons of accessibility, availability of IT infrastructure, availability of Internet law to protect 
online consumers and the existence of the e-government project. However, most interviewees 
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pointed to the need for considering the possible barriers to introducing I-voting in Qatar 
needing to be resolved, such as ensuring security, privacy, usability and transparency. 
Therefore, a proposal was made for providing I-voting as an alternative method of voting 
alongside the current paper-based voting system to ensure the voting process fulfils voting 
principles. 
 
A survey has assisted in discovering Qatari citizens’ views on the barriers and willingness to 
participate in I-voting and the features they would like to have in I-voting. Most participants 
were comfortable with I-voting and were confident that their privacy and security would be 
ensured. In general, a high percentage of people indicated a preference for I-voting over 
traditional methods, especially for citizens abroad. The willingness to participate was 
considerably higher for people with high computer knowledge, high usage of e-services and 
those with a trust in general elections in Qatar.  However, the surveys have highlighted some 
barriers to I-voting needing to be considered, including security, reliability and accuracy of 
I-voting, vote selling, difficulties with using the technology and preference for personal 
interaction. There was clearly a great deal of uncertainty by participants on whether to 
support I-voting or not, which suggests the need to see I-voting in reality in order to assess its 
acceptability. With regard to I-voting features, about half suggested the essential need for 
vote confirmation and verification to ensure voters have successfully cast their votes and to 
support a vote audit. 
 
An experiment was made to assess Qatar’s acceptance of I-voting, which involved 
developing a trial version of an I-voting system based on Qatar election requirements and 
taking into account the best practice of successful I-voting models. It benefited mainly from 
the I-voting experience in the Republic of Estonia which provided a reference to compare the 
results from the experiment. The experiment’s participants were 86 Qatari citizens and two IT 
experts from Almajaz Telecommunication. The results showed a high user acceptance of 
I-voting in Qatar, and highlighted some improvements required in terms of the design of the 
system, the use of best practice to ensure the security and privacy aspects and consideration 
of the legal issues of I-voting. However, the experiment showed some concerns about 
I-voting security and the threat of manipulation by an unauthorised user mainly on the client-
side where user awareness plays an important factor. 
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Therefore another survey was carried out to assess Qatari voters’ awareness of information 
security. This survey showed the necessity for enhancing user awareness on information 
security to achieve an effective and secure I-voting system, mainly on the client-side. It 
discovered that users have a lack of awareness of information security and, therefore, take 
several incorrect actions which might put them at a security risk, such as reacting to fake 
security warnings, replying to suspicious links, using peer to peer software with people the 
user does not know and responding to unknown senders. The survey participants also 
confirmed that the use of different levels of authentication in I-voting to provide higher 
security was a good idea. 
 
An effective model for I-voting appropriate for Qatar elections was then proposed, based on 
outcomes from the previous data collections. Opinions from a sample of voters and experts 
were used to evaluate the model. The model attempts to satisfy voting principles including 
security, privacy, transparency, accuracy and usability. The model introduced a secure 
platform for I-voting using the Linux operating system booted from a CD which uses the 
Qatari National ID to verify eligible voters, and PKI credentials within the smart card to 
ensure confidentiality and integrity, along with a unique digital certificate to enable secure 
interaction with the I-voting apparatus. The proposed model shows a good degree of 
acceptance by experts in terms of satisfying voting principles, although there is a need to 
consider possible cyber-attacks and risks associated with the client side which could be 
reduced by enhancing user awareness on security and using secure operating systems or 
Internet browsers. 
 
A prototype of the proposed system was implemented with a WAMP server and evaluated by 
an expert. The expert was very interested in the system, and agreed that the system provided a 
secure client/server web architecture for a prototype, but he did not favour it for real practice, 
advising that the security could be improved with mix networking and smart card technology. 
The expert was also concerned about the scalability of the architecture for real elections, 
where a sufficient number of servers and advance technologies would have to be applied to 
meet the Qatar election requirements to provide an effective I-voting system.  
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Recommendations then emerged from the grounded theory based on the findings from the 
research carried out in the field. These were defined for the Qatar government to assist the 
introduction of I-voting in Qatar. They concern the aspects of I-voting of the digital divide, 
e-literacy, I-voting infrastructure, legal issues, transparency, security and privacy. Five 
experts in the field of IT, information security and the law, found the recommendations to be 
valuable. The recommendations were believed to provide an encouragement for governments 
on how to introduce I-voting, ensuring fulfilment of voting principles. The experts showed 
interest in introducing I-voting in Qatar to boost e-democracy and, apart from a Judge from 
the Supreme Judicial Council, have recommended that the government should introduce 
I-voting in general elections. However, those recommendations could be evaluated more 
effectively when the government of Qatar puts them into practice with an experimental trial 
of the proposed I-voting system; this would evaluate the success or failure of such new 
technology in Qatar. 
 
12.6  Future work 
This research has made a major contribution to the field of research. Although the research 
has successfully achieved its stated aim, there is still scope for further work as follows:   
 
1. Confirming research outcomes 
Due to the limitation of time and resources, the small number of participants contributing to 
this research has limited the certainty of the outcomes. Therefore, increasing participation in 
the interviews, questionnaire survey and experiments would obtain more reliable results and 
reduce the margin of error. This would increase confidence in the research outcome since it 
would be a better representative sample of the population.   
   
2. Applying real trials  
Although many I-voting schemes were proposed in the literature, a significant number of 
them rely on theory rather than real-world trials. Similarly, the researcher was unable to 
perform real world trials of I-voting in Qatar due to the limitation of resources and difficulties 
of getting approval from responsible personnel to conduct such research on a real election. 
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However, in this research, experiments were carried out to assess the proposed model under 
laboratory conditions. Nevertheless, applying real trials of the proposed I-voting model 
would be beneficial to test the model’s applicability and effectiveness in practice and could 
be used to measure more effectively the willingness and barriers for I-voting in Qatar in real 
life.     
 
3. Establishing a research team  
This research could be used as a concrete start for further studies on I-voting in Qatar. Further 
work could be done by the government of Qatar to initiate a team of experts responsible for 
improving the voting system and further investigating the adoption of I-voting. The proposals 
and recommendations in this thesis could then become the basis for any further research that 
is carried out. 
 
4. Investigating the cultural considerations of I-voting 
The huge development in IT raises the question of whether Qatari people have fully absorbed 
this development and its associated threats. This also suggests the need to look at the cultural 
considerations which are also of interest, where customs, traditions and the Islamic religion 
form the Qatari culture in which Islam has a major influence on people’s behaviour and 
responses in their daily life. The Qatari people are generally trustful, helpful and generous, 
which comes from their culture. This might lead to putting trust in malicious messages, 
making them more susceptible to security vulnerabilities on the client side of I-voting. 
 
5. Providing appropriate legislation 
Appropriate legislation to accommodate I-voting should be considered before the deployment 
of I-voting in Qatar. For example, some voting features would be beneficial to include in the 
voting system such as override voting and vote verification. However, there are some 
constraints on these features in terms of increasing vote selling. To eliminate vote selling 
issues, voters should be able to verify their vote without the system revealing knowledge of 
their choices. This needs further investigation by experts in law who would need to take into 
account the country-specific factors of Qatar. 
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6. Assessing applicability of the proposed solution in other countries 
Although this research has focused on studying I-voting in Qatar as the main case study, it 
would be beneficial to further investigate I-voting experience in other countries to provide 
comparative results, learn from others and assess the applicability of the proposed solution. 
However, due to limitations of time and available resources, this has not been possible. 
However, advantage has been taken of the reported experience of I-voting in Estonia, which 
shares many of the same characteristics as Qatar. 
 
12.7  Success of this PhD Research 
Although this research is a first step in introducing I-voting in the State of Qatar, there is still 
scope for future work in extending investigations. However, the research has been very 
successful since the aims and objectives were achieved. Although there were some 
limitations, they were not serious and useful results have been obtained.  
 
The research is original and introduces a valuable contribution to knowledge, particularly in 
relation to improving the voting process in Qatar. The greatest success of this research would 
be to get it into reality, where the proposed I-voting model and recommendations would be 
introduced in the succeeding municipal election as an alternative voting system to assess the 
willingness towards and acceptance of such new technology in practice. In this research, 
several councils and ministries of the Qatar government (e.g. central Municipal 
Council, Supreme Council for Communications and Information Technology (ictQatar), the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have shown interest in promoting 
I-voting in Qatar as an improvement in the current voting system. They appreciate its 
advantages in terms of accessibility and convenience, and recognise the need to assess the 
effectiveness of the proposed I-voting model in ensuring conformance to voting principles. 
As a result, the researcher has prepared a business case for the Ministry of Interior upon their 
request (see Appendix F) to support their decision to introduce I-voting and to further explore 
the Estonia case study to learn from its successful experience in I-voting. 
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Appendix A   Interviews 
 
A1 Consent Forms  
 
 
CERTIFICATION BY PARTICIPANT 
 
 
I, certify that I am voluntarily giving my consent to provide information for the above 
described project entitled: Introduce I-voting in the State of Qatar, being conducted 
at Loughborough University, UK by: Mr. Jassim AL-Hamar. 
 
 
I certify that I have agreed to be interviewed in the subject of as previously explained by 
Mr. Jassim AL-Hamar and that that I freely consent to participate in this project. I have 
had the opportunity to have any questions answered, I have been fully explained the 
procedures of interview and that information gathered will be only used for the benefit 
of the entitled research and will be confidential and kept strictly private.  
 
 
Signed: ….............................................. 
Date: …................. 
 
For any queries about the research topic please don't hesitate to contact the researcher 
(Name: Mr. Jassim AL-Hamar, ph. +974 55558105, E-mail: j.alhamar@hotmail.com). 
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A2 Example of signed consent Forms 
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A3 Interview questions 
 
The seven representative experts interviewed were as follows:  
 
1.  Head of IT department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
2.  Manager of Patient Care department, Ministry of Health (MOH) 
3.  Head of IT, Ministry of Interior  (MOI)   
4.  Manager of e-services, IBQ Bank (IBQ Bank)   
5.  Head of ISP, Q-Tel (Q-Tel)   
6. Manager of Incident Management, Supreme Council of Information and Communication 
Technology (ictQATAR)  
7.  Head of Prosecution, Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC)  
8. A random sample of 4 candidates from the 2007 election and 6 voters, from different 
backgrounds 
 
They were asked questions on the following 10 topics, according to their level knowledge and 
level of expertise:  
 
1. The feasibility of I-voting in Qatar 
2. Election procedure with or without I-voting 
3. Willingness to participate in and barriers to I-voting 
4. Government opinion and readiness   
5. Legislation and laws regarding the e-project (I-voting) 
6. The ability of the IT Infrastructure in Qatar to adopt I-voting 
7. Political opinions on introducing I-voting that can contrast voting system 
8. I-voting implications of security, privacy, accessibility, vote selling and the 
digital divide and the research recommendations to overcome those problems 
9. Increased turnout of voters. 
10. The results of the survey conducted earlier in this research 
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A4  Examples of interviews 
 
Interview 1 
Date of interview: 11-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately 30 minutes  
Interviewee: Tariq Al-Othman, Head of IT department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
 
Q1: How do the abroad Qatari voters vote? Do they vote through the embassy? 
Currently they can vote through the embassy of Qatar where Qatari citizens comes to 
the embassy and we provide them with voting box to vote to their preferred candidates 
safely and securely. Then we send it through diplomatic bag into Qatar.  
 
Q2: In case there is no embassy in the country what would be the solution? 
At the moment no recorder incidence, however Qatar do incorporate with some other 
countries to perform some of the Qatari embassy duties. 
For example in kazekhstan there no Qatari embassy but we do incorporate with Oman 
embassy. If the Question is about what extend at the moment I don't have answer 
regarding this.    
 
Q3: Does running the election in the embassy would meet all voting principles 
(e.g. security)? 
Yes, Qatar embassy would provide safe election environment even though it's abroad. 
Every embassy has very secure system for sending and receiving document, however 
Qatar is  
 
Q4: Lately some countries and global institutions use I-voting (e.g. FIFA), would 
you consider an I-voting as an option for abroad Qatari voters? 
Indeed, Qatar is fast growing country in term of technology, of course it would be 
looking forward to have such system, but from my understanding the I-voting project 
still facing problem to provide free error election. I- voting would be a superior option for 
abroad Qatari voters where they can vote remotely and securely through the internet. 
 
Q5: Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently developing a project to implement a 
secure communication between embassies and Qatar, such project make 
internet voting more feasible in terms of security? 
Yes it is, currently the ministry is working on developing a secure communication 
between Qatar embassies. All the information is encrypted and transferred into a MPLS 
line or either satellite communication towards covering all embassies around the world. 
Appendix A: Interviews 
293 
In addition, all communications are monitored and controlled in the ministry of foreign 
affairs in Qatar. This implies that I-voting through embassies would ensure reliable and 
secure I-voting.  
 
Q6: Qatar have experienced a huge development in economy, technology, 
telecommunication, education and other sectors, as a result would this support 
the introduction of Internet voting? 
Yes of course, this huge shift in the country might make I-voting feasible and 
acceptable especially that Qatar aim to lead the development in technology in the 
region. 
  
Q7: What are the major barriers faced or expected to be faced in the uptake of I-
voting in Qatar?  
There might be a problem on getting people's acceptance on such technology with 
paying intention to the security and privacy issues especially with the huge possibilities 
of threat available nowadays. In political point of view, it will affect on measuring voting 
practice were a lot won't go to pooling stations to vote. Basically, the country and 
people will miss voting experience including media coverage of voting practice. 
 
Interview 2 
Date of interview: 17-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately 20 minutes  
Interviewee: Ahmed Ali, Manager of Patient Care department, Ministry of Health (MOH) 
 
Q1: What are the average numbers of Qatari patient in hospital? 
 
Well, there no excite number it's hard to determine Qatari number, however Qatar have 
two main hospital Hamad and alkor with 1000 bed capacity and there is five main 
private hospital with capacity of 500 bed, currently ministry of health are in process to 
expand this number to reach 5000 bed. 
 
 
Q2: How patient participate in election while he is hospital? 
 
At the moment, the hospital can arrange it upon patient request, Simply the judge will 
come to collect the votes  
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Q3: Is internet connection are available in hospital? 
Yes , it's available for the staff and with small cost for the patient, however there is 
telephone point at each patient room therefore they can connect at the internet using 
dial-up 'Ebhair' 
 
Q4: Lately some countries and global institutions use I-voting (e.g. FIFA), would 
you consider an I-voting as an option for patients and staff? 
Well I'm not expert of the field but my personal openion that internet voting 
might solve some problem but it will also introduce other the question now is 
going to be secure like traditional voting  
 
Q5: What are the major barriers faced or expected to be faced in the uptake of I-
voting in Qatar?  
I believe that older people would experience really problem with dealing with computer, 
in the other hand, new generation would welcome such system. Therefore, they need 
to involve in training sessions on how to use such system successfully and securely.  
 
Interview 3 
Date of interview: 4-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately one hour  
Interviewee: Abdulla Al-Noaimy, Head of IT, Ministry of Interior  (MOI)   
 
Q1: What are the roles of MOI in e-government project? 
MOI hold the responsibility belongs to their services such as traffic violation payment. 
About 15 out of 64 is responsible for MOI. Our responsibility is integration, back end 
support and sharing population database.  
 
Q2: Is there a plan any plan for e-democracy? 
Yes there is currently a plan for e-voting by kioks but we have not run not because of 
technical issues but because of political issues. 
 
Q3: Lately some countries and global institutions use I-voting (e.g. FIFA), 
is it possible to have I-voting in Qatar? and why? 
 
I think it is possible but not at the mean time, may be in the future were people 
would be capable to use such technology. 
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Q4: Do you suggest using e-government infrastructure as a base for e-
democracy (I-voting)? 
Yes indeed actually e-democracy is part of e-government initiative. MOI have a 
plan for e-voting using kioks machine. For i-voting it would be even more 
utilizing e-government infrastructure since it could work at the same platform. 
 
 
Q5: How do you suggest I-voting could be implemented in Qatar with 
ensuring voting principle are fulfilled (e.g. security, transparency)? 
Regarding the security technically it can be implemented with acceptable 
percentage of error. However, political, law and transparency still remain as 
barriers to implement such system. However, currently Q-CERT with MOI have 
developed n e-law from best of practice and own country rules but it has not yet 
been approved by the government. Regarding transparency, Qatari government 
has developed strong relationships with its citizens there is a coherent trust on 
the government. As a political there is a fear of failure such system which might 
consequence negatively on government trust. 
   
Q6: What are the difficulties might be encountered with I-voting (cost, 
resources, people acceptance, security issues, missing voting 
experience)? 
I do agree on the factors you've mentioned. I think the main difficulties we might 
face are people acceptance to I-voting and missing voting experience. Also it is 
important to ensure the reliability and security of such system. However, MOI 
has a strong profile in developing such critical system, for example e-gate, e-
passport and e-government. 
 
 
Q7: What do you think I-voting could add compared to the current voting 
system? 
 
Currently Qatar is using paper ballot system for voting, introducing Internet 
voting as an option would increase the voting participant and would add new 
channel to vote. There are many people who are not participating because of 
the long line or because there work  
 
Q8: Is it worth introducing I-voting? And why? 
Yes, it's worth if we can provide I-voting without violating voting principle, 
however in my opinion Qatar is capable  of doing such system due to the 
political willingness and technical capability and most important the absent of 
strong law for election this would help that any future law would take in 
consideration I-voting requirements 
  
 
Q9: Do you think people would accept I-voting? 
 
I think Qatar is taking huge step to improve the education and to make 
computer lectures as priority for example all school have Computer subject at 
different level also most employee in the country are asked to join computer 
courses, this would show that majority would have no problem dealing with I-
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voting the only remaining people is the older people who unable or refusing to 
change. However this won't be big issues for I-voting since it's introduced as an 
option. It is better to carry out i-voting as an experiment to measure people's 
acceptance. I think old people and people with low computer literacy might find 
difficulties on using i-voting. However, the government is working on enhancing 
computer literacy through schools and jobs by carrying out ICDEL and 
computer courses.   
 
 
Q10: Do you think I-voting will increase the participation level? 
Well yes, many people now a days interested in performing tasks online rather 
than physically doing it.    
 
Q11: MOI Provide e-services to citizen using smart card and biometric, How and 
why and success and failure? 
Overall, it record 99% success and there was just one incident that one of the 
passenger using e-gate service had burn with his finger but we are here in Qatar 
recording all 10 finger and having all the scenarios into consideration. Using smart card 
and finger print provide vary secure authentication  
 
Q12: Is it possible to use Smart card and biometric in internet voting? 
Technically yes, for example e-government using smart card and e-gate using smart 
card and finger print what work for those system should work for other and what is 
most important is that I-voting is part of e-government   
 
Q13: Some of the countries recognise Digital signature as the person signature, 
how about Qatar? 
Yes, with the e-government we are using Digital signature as the person signature. 
 
Q14: E-government Project attract make hackers to attack their service, Is MOI 
capable to secure such system. 
So far e-government website had never been dawn because of attacker, yes we are 
receiving many attacks from different countries, however all team in Qatar Q-cert and 
ICT and MOI and Qtel are taking part to prevent and eliminate the attacks   
 
Q15: What are the challenges and opportunity to introduce I-voting  
People acceptance and Vote selling are the main challenges. The main Opportunities 
for I-voting are Government willingness and E-government project infrastructure. 
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Q16: What are the number of eligible voters 
At the moment I don't have the eligible voter number since there are many conditions 
to be valid voter 
 
Q17: What is the number of Smart card holder 
At the moment about 120,000 card has been printed which almost 55% percent of the 
population, however the number are increasing by 100 card per day  
 
Q18: What are the major barriers faced or expected to be faced in the uptake of I-
voting in Qatar?  
People acceptance and ability to vote successfully and securely using such system 
especially that there is a large portion of Qatari voters have low computer literacy. 
Although ipark will facilitate the process of internet voting but still it is not accessible to 
all people and some might not have computers or even the knowledge to use such 
system. Also verification of voting and ensuring security, transparency and 
privacy are top barriers. Moreover, accessibility and usability have to be 
assured. 
 
Q19: It is predictable that fear and trust issues occur with any e-solution. How do 
you plan to cope with this challenge?  
We have taken into account to these issues; we have built our trust on our sold 
reputation. Also we have involved the society in evaluation the system and to measure 
the effectiveness and people's acceptance. 
 
Q20: Do you find any difficulties with the current voting system (e.g. 
accessibility especially for disable people)? 
There is sort of accessibility, but still disable people who wish to vote have to 
come to the polling station and then we can then help them and take their votes 
and register it by a trusted person such as a judge. However, we have face a 
difficulty before with deef legable voter who come to vote but we were not able 
to understand him through sign language. Therefore, I think the current system 
is not accessible especially to disable people, I recommend to have in each 
polling station a person who can deal with people of special needs and assist 
them in their votes. Also in case of disable people who can't come to polling 
station they have to be assisted and went to their homes and take their votes if 
they wish to.     
 
 
 
Q21: Do you think some of these difficulties in the current voting could be 
resolved with adapting the technology (i.e. I-voting) were for examples 
accessibility and automate counting for voting is available in I-voting? 
Yes, I think so it will make voting more accessible especially for disable people 
who are not able to come to polling stations. However, i-voting I think would be 
an optional voting system along with the traditional paper based voting. But then 
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comes the issues of integrating the votes and ensure that there are no 
redundant votes. I-voting would facilitate voting process for use were votes are 
counted automatically so this will avoid human errors and reduce the time and 
effort spent on counting votes.   
   
Q22: How much would it cost to setup and run an election in Qatar? 
I'm not certainly sure; however, cost is not the main concern for the 
governments, we are rich country and would like to invest in all sectors 
especially the democracy. The country does not think of the cost as a main 
factor, so even if i-voting is less cost than traditional voting system the 
government might still not accept i-voting if it does not fulfill voting 
fundamentals.  
 
Q23: Past election records shows a low participation, could you indicate 
the reasons? And do you think I-voting could increase participation level? 
Voting in Qatar is fairly new; it is now in its third revenue that may be why there 
was low participation. But in the future voters will get use to voting experience. 
The country has work on motivating voters to vote and practice their right on 
democracy through media and some activities. I think i-voting will increase 
participant level especially for people who are not able to go to polling stations 
and wait for long times in queues were then voters especially disable people 
can vote flexibly from anywhere and at any time through fast and easy system. 
 
Q24: Do you think I-voting could be feasible in Qatar? Why? 
Yes, but we have to ensure people's acceptance and that such system would 
fulfill all voting fundamentals. Therefore, if it would be approved by the 
government then it would be used as an alternative way of voting along with 
polling stations. Before that we have to perform a study on i-voting and look at 
other experience on i-voting and then perform a feasibility study with looking at 
the country specific factors. I can't judge on its feasibility it is subject to a lot of 
factors.  
 
Q25: Does the Qatar law permit I-voting to be introduced as an option of 
voting? 
I'm not in the position to verify this; you can refer to experts in the law. But as far 
as I know there is nothing says that i-voting is not allowed if it approved that it 
fulfill all of voting fundamentals then why not it could be applied, but I still think it 
could be applied as an experiment for while to assess its effectiveness a long 
with traditional voting system towards assess as well people acceptance and 
get use to it.  
 
 
 
   
Interview 4 
Date of interview: 14-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately 25 minutes  
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Interviewee: Abdulla Al-Malki, Head of Prosecution, Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC) 
 
Q1: Does Qatar law permit I-voting to be introduced as an option of 
voting? 
The law does not prevent the technology of e-voting or i-voting. The law states 
the need for practicing voting through a system that fulfills all of voting 
fundamentals such as security, privacy and transparency.      
 
Q2: Does the Qatar law have an e-law?  
Currently, e-law is in the way of approval. The law involves all topics associated 
to electronic communications. It is developed by  ICT Qatar and in 
cooperation with other related institutes including us and ministry of interior. The 
law will protect online consumers' right. 
 
Q3: Do you allow voter to have a receipt to verify their vote casting? And 
why? 
With regard to verification, the law does not allow it for voting because it may be 
used for vote selling. Although it is required to ensure that voters have vote 
successfully, but because of that risk the law avoid it.  
 
Q4: Does Qatar law permit override voting? 
Override is complex feature, the current law does not allow it because it could 
be used for vote selling as well were voters might change their vote several 
times for the purpose to sell itto different candidates. The voter have got only 
one choice and once to choose their preferred candidate. Although some might 
say override is a valid option especially for people who might be intimidated and 
forced to vote to specific candidate. However, this is difficult to be approved and 
therefore we still believe overriding is not a valid option.  
 
Q5: Does Qatar law permit open source voting system or not? And why? 
We does not allow open source to public to avoid voting been used by malicious 
people who wish to hack into system and manipulate voting results. 
  
Q6: Some scientist claims that i-voting could cause Digital divide, how do 
this could be resolved? 
It could be resolved by carrying out training sessions and holding awareness for 
public on how to use i-voting through effective method of education and learning 
principle through different tools e.g. seminars, media, video.etc.   
 
Q7: What are the major barriers faced or expected to be faced in the 
uptake of I-voting in Qatar? 
Ensuring security is an issue especially with the possible huge threats available 
in the internet. In addition, people acceptance and the usability are main issues. 
Still government approval on such system and ensuring trust on the system is 
essential to achieve successful system. Also since the technology is new, we 
expect that voters and candidates might not accept and trust such technology and 
therefore might distrust the result of votes. 
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Q8: Have you discuss e-voting to be option for voting in Qatar?  And why 
No, we have not discuss i-voting, but we've examine the implementation of e-voting as 
an option using kiosk, but it has been paused because of the need for more research 
carried out on kiosk technology and the need for approvals.  
 
Interview 5 
Date of interview: 27-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately 15 minutes  
Interviewee:  Rashid Al-ali, Head of ISP, Q-Tel (Q-Tel)   
 
Q1: Lately some countries and global institutions use I-voting (e.g. FIFA), 
is it possible to have I-voting in Qatar? and why? 
Yes, it is possible, Qatar is always leading in the technology revolution and 
applying such technology in voting system will be interesting and effective with 
concerning its issues and how to avoid it.  
 
Q2: What are the difficulties might be encountered with I-voting (cost, 
resources, people acceptance, security issues, missing voting 
experience)? 
Security, privacy, transparency, gaining people acceptance and trust and 
missing voting experience all are the top issues might be encountered with i-
voting. Therefore, the government have to plan for those issues to ensure 
effective voting system that fulfill the voting fundamentals 
 
 
Q3: Is it worth introducing I-voting? And why? 
This is hard to measure, I can guess that it is worth but we have to consider the 
security issues and getting people acceptance since this might affect on trust of 
voting results. In terms of cost, i-voting will save effort, time and staff working in 
process voting. 
 
Q4: Do you think people would accept I-voting? 
Yes I do if they have trust on the system and they find it usable then they would 
accept it with no problems. However, this would take time, i-voting could be 
started as an alternative and optional voting system as a trial to measure its 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Q5: Do you think I-voting will increase the participation level? 
It might be, this could only been know if it was implemented in reality. In some 
countries i-voting was successful and have increased participant level and 
others not, each country have its own special factors which might differ in the 
successful of i-voting system.   
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Q6: What are the major barriers faced or expected to be faced in the uptake of I-
voting in Qatar? 
As I've mentioned earlier security, missing voting experience, people acceptance and 
trust on i-voting are main difficulties might face with i-voting technology. 
Q7: It is predictable that fear and trust issues occur with any e-solution. How do 
you plan to cope with this challenge?  
This could be resolved by assuring an effective and secure system were then will be no 
fears of using i-voting and trust will be built then gradually. These could be assured 
practically when voter interact with the system.   
 
  
Interview 6 
Date of interview: 6-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately 10 minutes  
Interviewee: Fahad AL-Abdullah, Manager of e-services, IBQ Bank (IBQ Bank)   
 
Q1: The bank provides I-banking service, how secure is this technology?  
It is very secure; we applied a lot of security measures that is approved internationally 
in banks towards ensuring a very secure system. We also aware customers on how to 
use such system as well as how to ensure their security to avoid possible threats which 
intend to miss use their accounts. 
Q2: Do you think the current security applied in I-banking could be implemented 
in I-voting to achieve a secure voting? 
Yes, I think so. I-park has approved its security and people accept it and trust it so I 
think using such technology on i-voting would be effective. 
 
Q3: What is the number of I-Banking users and are they increasing? 
They are a lot, about 70% of the customers use i-banking and it is increasing because 
it approve its security and effectiveness in processing services online, faster and 
easier.  
Q4: It is predictable that fear and trust issues occur with any e-solution. How do 
you plan to cope with this challenge? 
Yes, we have tried to build people's trust on e-solution and this was based on 
awareness we provide on the benefit and effectiveness of e-solution. Also the trust was 
built by ensuring a secure and effective e-solution.     
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Interview 7 
Date of interview: 20-Aug-2009 
Duration: Approximately 20 minutes  
Interviewee: A Voter 
 
Q1: What are the difficulties might be encountered with I-voting (cost, resources, 
people acceptance, security issues, missing voting experience)? 
I agreed with you, people acceptance, usability, security, privacy issues and missing 
voting experience are the main difficulties might be faced in i-voting. 
Q2: What do you think I-voting could add compared to the current voting 
system? 
It will add accessibility especially for voters who can't come to polling stations where 
they can vote online at anytime. Also it facilitate effort of voting committee since votes 
are counted automatically through the website and this might reduce human errors and 
save time and effort required for counting votes. However, there is possibility as well for 
hackers to hack the i-voting and manipulate results.    
Q3: Do you find any difficulties with the current voting system (e.g. accessibility 
especially for disable people)? 
The main difficulty is the time and effort spent in verifying voters, collecting, counting 
votes manually. Also, there is a problem of accessibility especially for old and disable 
people to reach polling stations and cast their votes.     
Q4: Could i-voting be feasible? 
Yes, it could be in the future but not know because people have to be ready for such 
technology and have to accept it. Also the issues associated with i-voting have to be 
resolved especially security, privacy and usability. There is also a issue of missing 
voting experience which have to be taken into account, therefore we think i-voting 
could be applied as an alternative option of voting along with traditional voting system. 
Q5: Do you think people would accept I-voting? Why? 
It is hard to measure this, I think having i-voting as an experiment would give an 
estimation of people acceptance. 
Q6: Do you think I-voting will increase the participation level? 
It might be for people who find difficulties to come to polling stations, however this 
could be estimated if i-voting were applied as an experiment along with traditional 
voting. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaires 
 
B1  Questionnaire 1: Exploring I-voting acceptance in Qatar 
 
B1.1  First version of questionnaire 
1. What age group are you in? 
 
 18-25       26-35     36-45     45-60     over 60 
 
2. Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
3. Level of education 
School          Further or Higher Education         Post Graduate          Others 
 
4. Your computer knowledge 
 Novice       Average     Advanced     Expert 
 
5. How well do you know about  eVoting 
    None       Poor        Average       Good         Expert 
 
6. Do you think that voting in Qatar is held democratically?  
 
             Definately           probably      probably not   definitely not    don’t know 
 
7. What is the best way to cast the vote through e-voting? 
 By using Website  
 By using touch-screen  
 By using buttons around the screen (like in the ATM)  
 Other  
 
8. What way of voting is the most suitable for you?  
 
 Paper-based voting      Electronic voting 
 
9. Do you think there is a need of implementing e-voting system in Qatar?  
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Definately           probably      probably not   definitely not    don’t know 
 
10. If you do not believe there should be electronic voting in Qatar, please 
state why: 
 The technology would be too difficult for some people to use. 
 The technology may not be reliable. 
 A computer hacker may be able to affect the results 
 There would be no easy check that the results are correct and have not 
been manipulated. 
 Other, please specify: .................................................................... 
 
 
 
11. Do you think paper base elections may be easily cheated or miscounted  
 
12. Is Political parties influence voting results by appointing their members as 
staff on the polling booth  
 
13.Does the Government can affect results of the voting by manipulating votes  
 
14. Evoting is more accurate. 
 
15. Evoting increase the potential for fraud 
 
16. Evoting is prone to unintentional failures. 
 
 
17. In your opinion which of the following authentication is the most appropriate 
for e-voting?  
Login and Password  
Scratch-codes  
Issued certificates to access government’s system  
Digital signature  
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Biometrical access (thumb-scans, eye-scans)  
Other, please specify: ........................................ 
Don’t know 
 
18. Who in your opinion should have access to the voting Database to retrieve 
the results?  
Election commission  
Judiciary  
Military  
Immigration (id-card issuing department)  
Other, please specify: ....................................................... 
 
19. Who should develop the machines of evoting?  
Local companies  
Government bodies  
Foreign companies  
Other, please specify:............................................. 
 
20. Regarding the Qatari citizens who are abroad, how do you think they should 
vote? 
Going to Qatar embassy 
Through the website 
Phone 
Others,  please specify..................................................    
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B1.2  Questionnaire after first review 
 
Section 1 – Background 
1.1 What is your age? 
18 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 39 50 – 59 60 – 64 65+ 
 
1.2  What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
1.3 Which Level of education are you currently studying? 
School College University Postgraduate Others 
 
1.4 Self rating of computing knowledge? 
Absolute 
beginner 
Some 
knowledge 
Average 
knowledge 
Pretty 
knowledgeable Expert 
 
 
Section 2 – Use of the Online Banking 
2.1 On average, how often do you use the internet for Online banking or making 
online purchases?  
Once a week or 
more 
2-4 times a 
month Once a month 
Less than once 
a month Not at all 
 
2.2 Why don't you use the internet for online banking or making online purchases 
more often?  What are your reasons? (Please fill all that apply) 
Don’t think it is 
very safe/ secure 
Things restricting 
internet use No need for it 
Prefer personal 
interaction Unsure 
[Asked of those who use online banking or make online purchases less than once a month:] 
 
Section 3 –Confidence in management and accuracy of general elections 
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3.1 Rate how confidantes are you that general elections in Qatar are managed 
fairly and that vote counting is accurate. 
← Not Confident 
( 0 – 3 ) 
Mid-Range 
( 4 – 6 ) 
Very Confident → 
( 7 – 10 ) 
 
3.2 Regarding abroad citizens, how do you think they should vote? 
Going to Qatar 
embassy Through the website Phone Others 
 
Section 4 – Online Voting  
4.1 How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
online voting in Qatar general elections, assuming that it would use security systems 
similar to internet banking and reputable online retailers? 
 
Rate the following:  
 
← Strongly 
Agree 
( 0 – 3 )  
 
Mid-Range  
( 4 – 6 ) 
 
Strongly 
Disagree → 
( 7 – 10 ) 
4.1.1 - I would choose to vote online instead of 
visiting a polling place 
   
4.1.2 - I would be comfortable with voting online    
4.1.3 - I would be confident that I could vote 
online without anyone seeing who I was voting 
for 
   
4.1.4 - I would be confident that I could vote 
online without anyone else unduly influencing 
my vote 
   
4.1.5 - I would be confident that vote online is 
more accurate    
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4.2 If you were to vote online, would you regard the following security features as 
essential, nice to have or not important? 
 
Essential 
Nice to 
have 
Not 
important 
Unsure 
A screen which would ask you to confirm 
who you were voting for before it was 
made final. 
    
Being able to revisit the voting website to 
confirm that your vote has been received 
but not who you have voted for. 
    
Being able to request confirmation using a 
different means of communication, such as 
text 
    
Other, please specify: ...............................  
 
4.3 If you do not believe there should be Online voting in Qatar, please state why: 
The technology would be too difficult for some people to use.  
The technology may not be reliable.  
There would be no easy check that the results are correct and have not been 
manipulated. 
 
A computer hacker may be able to affect the results  
Vote selling  
Other, please specify: ....................................................................  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix B: Questionnaires 
7 
B1.3  Questionnaire final version (after pilot-test) 
Covering letter 
Dear Fellow Citizen, 
I am a PhD student at Loughborough University in the UK and I am doing my research 
on “Internet Voting” which is part of e-democracy project that make use of IT 
infrastructure to introduce easy way to perform election. 
I have designed a questionnaire to examine people acceptance and concern about 
Internet voting and how to defend against it challenges. This questionnaire is intended 
only for Qatari.  Therefore, if you are Qatari above 18, please help us by completing the 
questionnaire, otherwise just ignore it. It is important that participants answer the 
questionnaire honestly.  
The questionnaire will take no more than 2 minutes of your time to complete.  I hope 
you will contribute. It is intended to use the results in developing secure Internet voting 
to be used in future election, so the people can benefit from voting anytime any where 
in there convenient.  
Please bear in mind that participants should be only Qatari citizens above 18. I assure 
you that all responses will be confidential and kept private.  
Thank you in anticipation of your involvement. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Jassim Al-Hamar 
 
For any questions about the research topic please do not hesitate to contact me by e-
mail: j.alhamar@hotmail.com. 
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Internet Voting Survey 
 
 
Section 1 – Background 
1.1 What is your age? 
18 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 39 50 – 59 60 – 64 65+ 
 
1.2  What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
1.3 Which Level of education are you currently studying? 
School College University Postgraduate Others 
 
1.4 Self rating of computing knowledge? 
Absolute 
beginner 
Some 
knowledge 
Average 
knowledge 
Pretty 
knowledgeable Expert 
 
 
Section 2 – Use of the Online Banking 
2.1 On average, how often do you use the internet for Online banking or making 
online purchases?  
Once a week or 
more 
2-4 times a 
month 
Once a month Less than once 
a month 
Not at all 
 
2.2 Why don't you use the internet for online banking or making online purchases 
more often?  What are your reasons? (Please fill all that apply) 
Don’t think it is 
very safe/ secure 
Things restricting 
internet use No need for it 
Prefer personal 
interaction Unsure 
[Asked of those who use online banking or make online purchases less than once a month:] 
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Section 3 –Confidence in management and accuracy of general elections 
3.1 Rate how confidantes are you that general elections in Qatar are managed 
fairly and that vote counting is accurate. 
← Not Confident 
( 0 – 3 ) 
Mid-Range 
( 4 – 6 ) 
Very Confident → 
( 7 – 10 ) 
 
3.2 Regarding abroad citizens, how do you think they should vote? 
Going to Qatar 
embassy 
Through the website Phone Others 
 
Section 4 – Online Voting  
4.1 How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
online voting in Qatar general elections, assuming that it would use security systems 
similar to internet banking and reputable online retailers? 
 
Rate the following:  
 
← Strongly 
Agree 
( 0 – 3 )  
 
Mid-Range  
( 4 – 6 ) 
 
Strongly 
Disagree → 
( 7 – 10 ) 
4.1.1 - I would choose to vote online instead of 
visiting a polling place    
4.1.2 - I would be comfortable with voting online    
4.1.3 - I would be confident that I could vote 
online without anyone seeing who I was voting 
for 
   
4.1.4 - I would be confident that I could vote 
online without anyone else unduly influencing 
my vote 
   
4.1.5 - I would be confident that vote online is 
more accurate    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Questionnaires 
10 
 
4.2 If you were to vote online, would you regard the following security features as 
essential, nice to have or not important? 
 
Essential 
Nice to 
have 
Not 
important 
Unsure 
A screen which would ask you to confirm 
who you were voting for before it was 
made final. 
    
Being able to revisit the voting website to 
confirm that your vote has been received 
but not who you have voted for. 
    
Being able to request confirmation using a 
different means of communication, such as 
text 
    
Other, please specify: ...............................  
 
4.3 If you do not believe there should be Online voting in Qatar, please state why: 
The technology would be too difficult for some people to use.  
The technology may not be reliable.  
There would be no easy check that the results are correct and have not been 
manipulated. 
 
A computer hacker may be able to affect the results  
Vote selling  
Other, please specify: ....................................................................  
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B1.4  Electronic version of questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
B1.5  Questionnaire participants     
 
4000 thousand of hard copy were distributed among participants institutions In Qatar, 
2,567 Qatari e-mail users over 12 participated in the questionnaire survey, as follows: 
 
 Carnegie Mellon University 
 Commercial Bank of Qatar 
 Doha Bank 
 Friends and relatives 
 Georgetown University 
 ICT Qatar 
 International Bank of Qatar (IBQ) 
 Ministry of Defence 
 Ministry of Economy & Commerce 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Ministry of Education  
 Ministry of Interior 
 Ministry of Municipal and Agriculture Affairs 
 Qatar Foundation 
 Qatar Petroleum (QP) 
 Qatar Telecommunication (Qtel) 
 Ras Gas 
 College of the North Atlantic (CAN) 
 University of Qatar 
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B1.6  Questionnaire support  
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B1.7  Samples of completed questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Questionnaires 
15 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Questionnaires 
16 
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B2  Questionnaire 2: Assessing client-side security awareness 
 
B2.1  Questionnaire final version 
 
Security Awareness Survey 
 
Section A 
1: 1/31: Gender 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Female 
Male 
 
2: 2/31: Age 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Under 17 
17-29 
30-59 
Over 60 
 
3: 3/31: Education 
Please choose only one of the following: 
School 
Further Education 
Higher Education 
Post Graduate 
Other 
 
Section B 
1: 4/31: How often do u use internet? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
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More than once every day 
Once everyday 
More than once a week 
Once a week 
Other, Please Specify 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
 
2: 5/31: What are you going to do if you see a warning message box like the one below, 
while you browsing the internet? 
 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Response to it 
Ignore it 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
 
3: 6/31: What do you think is the best way to protect your computer? By using.. 
Please choose all that apply 
Virus protection software 
Firewall 
Patching your operating system 
Not Accessing to Internet 
Other, Please Specify 
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Other: 
 
4: 7/31: How often do you back up your important information, and files? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Never 
Everyday 
Once a week 
Once a month 
Three to four times a year 
Other 
 
5: 8/31: Do you use the same password for more than one application and e -mail? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes 
No 
 
6: 9/31:What do you do to remember your passwords? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Write it down and keep it in safe place 
Write it down and stick it on the computer monitor or close to your pc 
Save it inside your computer in a document 
Save it in your mobile phone 
Use software to manage your passwords 
You don’t find problem memorising passwords 
Other 
 
7: 10/31: How many characters you use for your passwords? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
5 characters 
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6-7 characters 
8 characters 
9 characters 
Other 
 
8: 11/31: Which one of following describes most of your password? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Using a memorable word 
Combine words and numbers 
Combine words, numbers, and characters 
Use a strange word even if it's short 
Other 
 
 
 
9: 12/31: How often do you change your passwords, including what you use for online 
banking? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Never 
Every month 
Every three months 
Once every year 
Other 
 
10: 13/31: How important do you think it is to changing your passwords time to time? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Not Important 
Important 
Very Important 
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Don't Know 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
 
11: 14/31: What do you think of the link appears on the Instant Messaging window? 
 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Normal message send from friend 
Suspicious 
Suspicious but you still going to click it 
Don’t know 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
 
12: 15/31: Do you use P2P software? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
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13: 16/31: Do you check files extension before you download any files or music from the 
internet? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
 
14: 17/31: What do you do when you hear about virus attack going to struck soon, or in 
certain date? 
Please choose all that apply 
Don’t care and use the computer normally 
Do nothing because you have anti-virus software even if you are not sure if it's updated or not 
Update your anti-virus software immediately 
Patch software in your computer 
Keep the computer shut at that day 
Use computer but you don’t open any emails at that day. 
Other: 
 
15: 18/31: Do you open e-mails from unknown senders? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes 
Depends on e-mail subject 
Sometimes 
Not Sure 
No 
Other 
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16: 19/31: What do you do when your firewall keep showing you messages like the 
messages below? 
 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Just click OK every time message appears 
Do read the message carefully every time it appears 
Read the message the first time and then just click OK whenever it appears again 
Find it disturbing and get fed up with its 
Other 
 
17: 20/31: Do you switch off firewall application or anti-virus software when notification 
messages keep appearing to you a lot? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
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18: 21/31: Who should act, and who's to blame for Internet Security? 
Please choose all that apply 
Governments 
Internet providers 
Big companies problem e.g. Microsoft, Yahoo 
Computer users 
Other, Please Specify 
Other: 
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B2.2 Sample of completed questionnaire 
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B2.3 Questionnaire results 
 
Q1  
Male 91.00% 
Female 9.00% 
 
Q2  
Under 18 0% 
18-29 80.00% 
30-59 20.00% 
Over 60 0% 
 
Q3  
Virus protection software 91.11% 
Firewall 62.22% 
Patching OS 37.78% 
Not accessing the Internet 15.56% 
Others 12.00% 
  
  
Q4  
Everyday 13.33% 
Once a week 17.78% 
Once a month 24.44% 
Three to four times a year 20.00% 
Never 24.44% 
  
Q6  
Do not have problem memorising passwords 73.33% 
Use password management system 4.44% 
Save it in mobile phone 2.22% 
Save it in a computer document 4.44% 
Write it down and stick it on monitor or next to PC 6.67% 
Write it down and keep it safe 6.67% 
Other 2.22% 
Q7  
5 Characters 6.67% 
6-7 Characters 28.89% 
8 Characters 17.78% 
9 Characters 17.78% 
Other 28.89% 
  
Q8  
Use strange word even if it's short 4.44% 
Using a memorable word 31.11% 
Combine words and numbers 20.00% 
Combine words and numbers and characters 35.56% 
Other 8.89% 
  
Q9  
Every month 2.20% 
Every three months 37.78% 
Once a year 4.44% 
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Never 46.67% 
Other 8.89% 
  
Q 11 Importance of changing passwords   
Very important 31.26% 
Important 33.26% 
Not important 33.26% 
Do not know 2.22% 
  
  
  
  
Q11- Trustworthiness of suspicious link  
Suspicious 68.89% 
Suspicious but still going to click at it 8.89% 
Normal message sent from friend 13.33% 
Do not know 8.89% 
  
Question 12. Use of P2P software  
Yes 37.78% 
No 44.44% 
Do not know 17.78% 
  
Q 13 Checking file extensions before downloading.  
  
Yes 75.56% 
No 17.78% 
Do not know 6.67% 
  
  
Q 14 Reaction to virus attack, imminent or on certain 
date  
Use computer without opening any email that day 11.11% 
Keep the computer shut that day 2.22% 
Patch computer software’s 31.11% 
Updating the anti-virus immediately 64.44% 
Do nothing once there is anti-virus software 8.89% 
Do not care and use the computer normally 26.67% 
Other 4.44% 
  
  
Q15 Opening e-mails from unknown senders   
Yes 6.67% 
Depends on email subject 20.00% 
Sometimes 17.78% 
Not sure 8.89% 
No 44.44% 
Other 2.22% 
  
  
Q16 Respondents’ reaction to repeated firewall 
notification messages 
Find it disturbing and get fed up with it 6.67% 
Read the message the first time and then 
just click Ok when ever it appear again 20.00% 
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Do read the message carefully every time it 
appears 57.78% 
Just click ok every time message appears 11.11% 
Other 4.44% 
  
  
Q17 Switching off security application     
Yes 8.89% 
No 84.44% 
Do not know 6.67% 
  
  
  
  
Q 18 Blame for Internet security problems  
Governments 26.67% 
ISP 55.56% 
Big Companies 28.89% 
Computer users 64.67% 
Others 20.00% 
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Appendix C: I-voting Experiment  
 
C1   Plan and Design 
The system is a prototypical I-voting system which receives votes from citizens over the 
Internet. The votes are encrypted. This encryption system is based on private and public keys. A 
public key is given to the citizen in order to secure their data. The private key is used by the 
server to identify and confirm the eligibility of the voter. It also uses this key to determine, 
which voting area the citizen belongs to. The votes are stored on the administrative computer, 
while the key is stored on the server. However, the server does not store the votes. Therefore, 
the information connecting any particular person to a specific vote is in two different places and 
resistant to security breaches. This is an additional safeguard to the encryption. 
 
The I-voting process can be described as follows: 
 
1. The voter will login to the system and use an ID number along with a password for 
 identity.   
2. The system will check the eligibility of the voter (i.e., voting age, constituency).   
3. The voter sees only the candidate list with useful information about them (i.e., short 
 biography, action plan, an invitation for meetings, speech and clips, etc.).  
4. The voter chooses a candidate. This information is encrypted and e-signed for security 
 and anonymity purposes. 
5. The voter confirms their choice and attaches their digital signature. This enhances 
 security and maintains anonymity. The following illustration gives an idea of the 
 encryption techniques. 
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Figure C1 - Use case demonstrates system operations. 
 
Voter: a person allowed to vote in the election. 
Administrator: responsible for starting and stopping server. 
PEC: responsible for counting votes of each candidate. 
Registration: create pass 
Login: (Login to the system) 
 Voter starts the system, and enters his/her ID and PIN. Password provided by Election 
board. 
 Voter presses Login button. 
 System checks ID and corresponding PIN for validity. 
 If ID and PIN are correct, system will take a voter to the voting page. 
Failed Login: Failed 
 Voter starts the system and enters his ID and PIN.   
 Voter presses Login button. 
 System checks ID and corresponding PIN for validity. 
 If ID and PIN are incorrect, system will refuse voter and will not let him/her in. 
Give Information: 
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 Voter will be asked about some personal information for verification. 
 Voter will enter the information and press Next button. 
 System holds his/her information. 
Vote: (Casting Vote) 
 Voter chooses a candidate from his/her area. 
 Voter clicks on Vote button. 
 System validates data and casts the voter’s vote. 
 System shows a message to the voter that the vote was successful. 
Failed Vote: 
 Voter enters wrong information about him/herself. 
 System refuses the operation. 
PEC: (Monitoring and counting votes) 
 Observation of the change of number of votes for each candidate. 
Start Server: 
 Make server ready to accept votes. 
Stop Server: 
 Close system so no votes can be accepted. 
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Start
Read ID
And 
Password
Check
Valid ID and 
Password?
No
Login Page
Candidates 
Page
Load Candidates 
Depending on Area
Yes
Read 
Voter’s 
Choice
2nd Encryption 
(Envelope)
Send Envelope to 
Government’s 1st  
Server
Decrypt Voter’s 
Identity
Voter’s 
Info. Page
Read 
Voter’s 
Information
Send Envelope to 
government’s 2nd 
Server
Counting 
Votes
PCE sends  
acknowledgment to 
1st server
Mark the voter as 
VOTED
Inform User that 
the Vote is 
successfull
Check 
Conditions YES
End
No
Message: User 
Cannot Vote
B 
Figure C2 - System flow chart 
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C2  Preparations 
The Qatari Interior Ministry has called on the Qatari citizens registered in the election lists to 
vote in the elections of the Municipal council and drew their attention to the following:  
·The election will be held be secret ballot. 
·A voter should not publicly declare the name of the candidate to whom he voted. 
·A voter who cannot use the ballot may tell the members of the committee, openly or secretly, 
the name of the candidate he wanted to vote for, after which the chairman of the committee 
would write the name of the candidate in the ballot. 
·The Ministry warned against the use of the various forms of election propaganda inside the 
election premises. 
·The election committees start the vote counting and the declaration of the results at the end of 
the balloting process. The winner in the election is the candidate who gets the largest number of 
correct votes. If votes are equal for more than one candidate, the committee would vote on who 
is the winner in their presence. 
Appeals procedure. 
The period of appeals begins on the second day of elections and continues for 15 days. During 
this period, each candidate or voter may request the declaration of the candidate elected in his 
constituency as non-authentic. The request shall be submitted in writing to the election 
department to be referred to the chairman of the committee investigating the appeals and 
grievances. 
The state is gradually increasing popular participation in public affairs. 
Those aged 18 or above, both men and women, can vote in the municipal elections while those 
aged 21 years or above can become candidates. The specific rules for the legislative assembly 
were still to be announced, the official pointed out. 
During the last Municipal Council elections, there were 28,139 registered voters and 13,959 of 
them cast their votes. The new law under consideration would spell out who would be eligible 
to vote in the general elections, Lt Col Sulaiti said. 
The elections will be the first of its kind to be held under a new state constitution. Under it, two-
thirds of the 45-member legislative assembly will be elected while the rest would be nominated 
by HH the Emir. 
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C3   Implementation 
An investigation was made regarding currently available programming languages. In most 
cases, the researcher found that technologies such as Visual studio and Oracle offered highly 
optimized and efficient tools for creating a Voting system. 
The experiments were carried out at ALMAJAZ Computer Lab, In ALMAJAZ. The computers 
have the following specification: Intel Core™ 2.8 Quad 2 Duo, 4GB memory and 500GB HDD.  
Based on available resources and skills, I-voting system was implemented successfully. Some 
screen shots of the system are shown below:   
 
Voter Interface  
 
1. Voter’s ID number. Each voter 
was asked to enter their ID 
number for authentication. 
2.  Pin number given by 
Government to a voter 
Login Button. However, in the 
experiment a unique Pin was 
given manually to each voter in 
order to log in to the system. 
Voter Information Interface  
1 
2 
3 
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1. Voter’s region which is defined 
based on voter living area. 
2. Candidate’s region 
3. Vote button to encrypt vote and 
send It securely. 
 
 
PEC Interface 
Election committee and 3
rd
 party are allowed view vote 
counting according to areas without the ability to 
manipulate voting results. 
 
 
 
  
1 
2 
3 
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Permanent Elections Committee (PEC), aims at activity participation in Qatari Community. The 
PEC seeks to accomplish some of the following goals. 
1) Activating political participation in the Qatari community through holding meetings, 
seminars, training courses and other activities necessary to achieve this. 
2) Raising awareness of voters about their rights and obligations and introducing them to the 
mechanisms of the election process. 
3) Encouraging candidates to acquire skills of democratic elections process. 
4) Evaluating the election process. 
5) Rehabilitating women and girls to participate in elections. 
6) Working towards establishing a national center for rehabilitating women and girls for 
elections. 
A law has yet to be drafted specifying what powers will be delegated to the parliament. Voters, 
including women, will be able to choose 30 of the 45 members of parliament while the emir, 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, will appoint the rest. The Gulf Arab state is home to some 
850,000 people, about 150,000 of them Qatari nationals. Qatar currently has an advisory Shura 
council whose members are all appointed by the emir.  
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C4 Screenshots 
I-Voting Server Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voter Interface 
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Voter Information Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Candidates List Interface 
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PEC Interface: 
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C5 Unit Testing 
 
Unit testing is the procedure used to validate that the individual units or subsystems are working 
properly. The goal of unit testing is to test each function of the system separately to ensure 
functioning correctly. Parts of the program are tested first individually. As a result, testing the 
whole system, i.e. integration testing, will become much easier. The following are some 
selected examples of unit testing: 
 
Example (1): The entry data in the login screen was in a wrong type. 
 
Example (2): A person who is younger than 18 years old. 
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C6  user manual 
E-Voting Server Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Start Button to Start the Server 
2- Stop Button to Stop the Server
 2  1 
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Voter Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Voter’s ID Number 
2- Pin Number Given by the Government to the Voter 
3- Login Button
1 
2 
3 
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Voter Information Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Voter’s Name 
2- Voter’s ID 
3- Voter’s Date of Birth 
4- Next Button to Candidate List Interface 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Candidates List Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Voter’s Region 
2- Candidate’s Region 
3- Vote Button to Encrypt the Vote and Send It. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
Appendix C: I-voting Experiment 
 355 
C7 Experiment evaluation  
C7.1 Questionnaire first version 
For the following questions, please tick or circle the number that best represents your 
experience when exploring the Electronic Voting. 
1). Please rate, on a scale of 1 to 7, your sense of being in the Electronic Voting, on a scale of 
1 to 7, where 7 represents your normal experience of being in a place. 
I had a sense of “being there” in the Electronic Voting: 
 
 
2). How much were you able to control events in Electronic Voting? 
How much were you able to control events: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No times      Almost all the time 
 
3). When you think back to the experience, do you think of the Electronic Voting more as 
images that you saw or more as somewhere that you visited ‘Poll station’? 
The Electronic Voting seemed to me to be more like: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Images that 
I had seen 
     Somewhere that I 
had visited 
 
4). During the time of the experience, which was the strongest on the whole, your sense of being 
in the Electronic Voting or of being elsewhere? 
I had a stronger sense of: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being 
elsewhere 
     Being in Electronic 
Voting 
 
5). How aware were you of events occurring in the real world around you 
I think of the Electronic Voting events were so clear: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very much 
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Not at all      very much  
 
 
6).   How compelling was your sense of moving around the Electronic Voting? 
How compelling was your sense of moving around the Electronic Voting: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not very 
often 
     Most of the time 
 
7). During the time of your experience, did you often think to yourself that you were actually 
in the Electronic Voting? 
During the experience I often thought that I was really standing in the Election: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not very 
often 
     Most of the time 
 
8). How was your experience while using the electronic voting, do you think it was easy to 
use or difficult to use 
I found the electronic voting: 
 
 
9). How much were you able to read the content in Electronic Voting? 
Electronic voting content seem to me to be more like: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Easy to 
Read 
     Hard to Read 
10). When you think back to the experience, do you think to content of the Electronic Voting 
was well presented or more confusing? 
The organization of information in Electronic Voting seemed to me to be more like: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Clear      Confusing 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Easy to use      Difficult to use 
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11). During the time of the experience, how was the voting process, did you had the sense of 
being in long procedure voting? 
I found that vote casting process: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very easy      Very difficult 
 
12). How did you found the structure of the system, was it so clear and easy 
I think of the Electronic Voting structure was so clear: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      very much so 
 
13).  In traditional election, citizen were asked to registered before election, in electronic voting 
participant were pre-registered by default? 
I found pre-registration useful: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      very much  
 
14). During your experience, did you think that information about candidate were useful to 
make your mind in choosing candidate? 
During the experience I often thought that information about candidate was useful: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not very 
useful 
     Very useful 
15). What else would you like us to know about your reaction to the electronic voting 
design? All feedback, whether negative or positive, is welcome? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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C7.2  Questionnaire final version 
I-voting Experiment Evaluation 
 
Authentication Phase Yes No 
Did you find problems at the authentication stage?   
Did you find authentication process secure because it asks for two 
factors? 
  
Did the system identify you without problems?   
Was the e-token easy to install?    
Were you concerned about your e-token, what would happen if e-
token is lost? 
  
Was the process fast?   
Vote casting phase   
Was the quality of ballot design maintained?   
Was the system fast?   
Did you have any problems at voting stage? If yes, please write it down.   
Did you find confirmation of vote received useful?   
Did you feel same experience with paper based voting? 
 
  
Other questions   
Was the  presentation given on how system works useful to build trust 
and confidence?  
  
Did the  presentation change your mind towards trusting system?   
Please comment on system transparency 
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C7.2  Sample of completed Questionnaire  
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C7.3  Presentation of I-voting prototype   
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Appendix D: Proposed Model 
 
D1 Requirements of the Voting Process 
 
Accuracy 
An essential property of any equipment used by the voting process is that it must 
accurately record and tally votes. Unless such an assurance can be given, the voters’ 
confidence in the election, as well as the integrity and legitimacy of the election’s 
outcome are at risk. 
Even though voting equipment can be designed to count votes as recorded with 100% 
accuracy, the frequency with which the equipment counts votes in the way intended by 
voters is a function not just of the equipment’s design but also of the interaction of 
people and processes. These latter factors include: 
 Technicians have followed the proper procedures in testing and maintaining the 
system; 
 Voters have followed the proper procedures when using the system; 
 Election officials have provided voters with procedures that they can understand 
and follow; 
 Poll workers have properly instructed and guided voters. 
Security 
In conducting elections, officials must be in a position to assure the public that the 
confidentiality of the ballot is always maintained and that fraud is prevented. The 
people, processes and technology involved in the election system all play a part in 
providing this assurance. This depends on and consists of the security procedures and 
practises implemented by the election authority, as well as the security awareness and 
training of the election workers executing them and the security features of the systems 
employed. 
Election officials are responsible for establishing and maintaining privacy and security 
procedures that protect against threats to the integrity of elections. These security threats 
include the potential modification or loss of electronic voting data (specifically votes), 
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the loss, theft or modification of physical ballots, as well as unauthorised access to 
software and electronic equipment. Physical access controls must be implemented to 
secure voting equipment, vote tabulation equipment and ballots. Software access 
controls (such as passwords and firewalls) are required to limit the number of people 
who can access and operate voting devices, election management software and vote-
tabulation software. In addition, election processes must be designed to ensure privacy 
by protecting the confidentiality of the vote: physical screens are deployed around 
voting booths and poll workers are present to prevent voters from being observed or 
coerced while voting. 
In order to provide security assurance for an I-voting system, the implementation of an 
ISO 27001 approach can provide an appropriate response to the security challenges 
posed by an I-voting system. ISO 27001 is an international standard that covers every 
aspect of information security: 
 Equipment; 
 Management policies; 
 Legal aspects, and 
 Human resources. 
The standard provides a set of controls based on the best practises in information 
security grouped into 10 domains. The domains are shown in Figure 9.2. 
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Identity Assurance 
The cornerstone of trust in the results of an election is the ability to assure the identity of voters 
against identity and over-voting. Taking each separately, this means that trust that their identity 
will be respected and preserved; nothing will change or remove their identity in the voting 
process.  The second aspect is that electors trust that the election process will prevent 
individuals from voting more than once using the same or different names or identities. 
In the same way that an electronic election brings the advantages of the I-world to the 
election process, it also brings with it threats. A successful I-voting system must 
efficiently address the threats to personal identity that the digital world introduces. 
Confidentiality and Integrity of Votes 
Votes must be confidential when cast and nothing should affect their confidentiality. This is 
essential for avoiding vote selling and voter coercion. The integrity of a vote (in the sense of an 
election, referendum, etc.) is the assurance that the results cannot be contested or votes 
repudiated. A trusted I-voting system must implement mechanisms for confidentiality and 
integrity, examples of which are the use of Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) technologies for the 
encryption of voting information (i.e., for the maintenance of confidentiality) and for digital 
signatures (used to maintain integrity). Access to voting information must be handled by a well-
defined process which exists in parallel with the PKI technical infrastructure. 
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D2 Software requirement 
Access controls 
Multi election workers have to enter their user names and passwords so that they can 
access voting systems and software. This is intended to ensure that only authorised 
users make modifications. 
Physical controls 
Hardware locks and software seals can be used to protect against the unauthorised 
access to voting equipment and software once it has been prepared for an election. 
Audit trails 
Audit trails are used to provide documentary evidence to be used in the recreation of 
election-day activity. Audit-trail information includes the number of ballots cast (by 
each ballot configuration or type) and the totals of votes for each candidate in each 
context. Audit trails can also be used for verification purposes, particularly when a 
recount is performed. 
Accuracy 
As noted above, by accuracy is intended the accuracy of recording and tallying of votes 
by voting equipment. The approach recommended here for security I-voting systems 
against identity threats is to implement an efficient security-management system for 
voters. Such a system would employ authentication using at least two of the following 
three factors: 
1. What I know (passwords, PINs, etc.); 
2. What I can bring or what I have (identity document, election card, dongle, etc.), 
and 
3. What I am (biometrics such as fingerprints, iris recognition, voice recognition, 
and so on). 
Ease of Use 
In a fashion similar to accuracy, ease of use, or user friendliness, largely depends upon 
how voters interact with the voting system, both physically and intellectually. This 
interaction, commonly referred to as the human/machine interface, is a function of the 
system design, the processes established for its use and user education and training. 
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Among other things, the quality of ballot design and how well voters are educated in the 
use of e-government portal affect how easy voters find the system to use. 
A further aspect of ease of use is the ease with which diverse groups of voters, including 
those with disabilities. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency relates to the speed of tallying votes. It is an important consideration for 
jurisdictions because it influences the time voters have to wait to cast their votes, which 
can be a factor in voter turnout. In addition, it affects the number of voting systems that 
a jurisdiction needs to acquire and maintain, and thus affects the cost of engaging in a 
ballot. 
Efficiency can be measures in terms of the number of people that the I-voting can 
accommodate within a given time, how quickly the system can count votes and the 
length of time that voters are required to wait. 
 
For the proposed model application refer to Appendix F (CD). 
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D3 Presentation of the model 
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D4 Evaluation of the Model 
D4.1 Questionnaire sheet 
Proposed I-voting model 
Section 1 – Demographics 
Q1: What is your age? 
18 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 39 50 – 59 60 – 64 65+ 
Q2:  What is your gender? 
Male Female 
Q3: Please state how long you have been using the Internet: 
Never Less than one year 1 – 2 years Over 2 years 
Q4: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Internet safeguard? 
 Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
The internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness  
to make me feel comfortable using it to transact 
personal business  
  
 
I feel concerned about the legal aspects of I-voting     
I feel confident that encryption and other technological 
advances on the Internet make it safe for me to do 
Internet voting  
  
 
     
Q5: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following    
 Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
 I am very comfortable using Internet voting facilities     
I believe government are providing adequate security 
for their online services  
  
 
I am comfortable using password protected internet 
voting  
  
 
Overall, I believe that Internet voting is a good idea     
     
Q6: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following    
 Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I could use the internet voting system if I had only the 
system manuals for reference  
  
 
I could use the internet voting system if I had seen 
someone else using it before trying it myself  
  
 
I could use the internet voting system if I could call 
someone for help when I got stuck  
  
 
     
Q7: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about general security 
practice? 
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 Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I am aware of the dangers of phishing     
I support the use of national ID cards to participate in I-
voting  
  
 
I would vote over the internet even if it required to 
install software or use CD  
  
 
     
Q8: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about general awareness of 
I-voting security issues? 
  Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I would feel more confident and secure about Internet 
Voting security if I owned my own fingerprint checking 
and ID card reader device  
  
 
Overall, I have no concerns about the security of 
Internet Voting  
  
 
I would not feel comfortable using I-voting unless 
fingerprint checking or other biometrics were used to 
check my identity  
  
 
I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if 
used for Internet Voting  
  
 
      
Q9: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about usefulness? 
  Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I understand how the proposed voting system works     
Using I-voting will improve the overall quality of voting 
service  
  
 
I find I-voting to be more convenient     
I would be willing to use the proposed system for 
Internet voting  
  
 
     
Q10: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Comparison of the 
system to the process it replace? 
  Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
The proposed I-voting system would be easier to use 
compared to the existing Voting systems with which I 
am familiar  
  
 
The proposed I-voting system would be faster 
compared to the existing voting systems with which I 
am familiar  
  
 
The proposed system would be more secure compared 
to the existing voting systems with which I am familiar  
  
 
     
Q11: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about overall views to the 
system? 
  Strongly agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I think Internet voting would be of benefit to me     
I think Internet voting would be of benefit to some 
other people  
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Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is 
favourable  
  
 
D4.2 Sample of completed questionnaire  
 
 
Appendix D: Proposed Model 
383 
 
Appendix D: Proposed Model 
384 
 
Appendix D: Proposed Model 
385 
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D4.3 Questionnaire results 
 
Q1: Gender     
Male 70    
female 30    
     
Q2: Age     
18-29 40    
30-39 29    
40-49 27    
Above 50 4    
 100    
Q3: how long you have been using the Internet:     
Never 15    
Less than one year 0    
1-2 years 5    
Over 2 years 80    
 100    
Q4: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
Internet safeguard? 
 
Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
The internet has sufficient safeguards and 
robustness  to make me feel comfortable using it to 
transact personal business 11 
16 13 
60 
I feel concerned about the legal aspects of I-voting 4 11 15 70 
I feel confident that encryption and other 
technological advances on the Internet make it safe 
for me to do Internet voting 2 
8 27 
63 
     
Q5: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following    
 
Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
 I am very comfortable using Internet voting 
facilities 9 
8 11 
72 
I believe government are providing adequate 
security for their online services 2 
7 15 
76 
I am comfortable using password protected internet 
voting 40 
23 18 
19 
Overall, I believe that Internet voting is a good idea 8 7 9 76 
     
Q6: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following    
 
Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I could use the internet voting system if I had only 
the system manuals for reference 37 
28 20 
15 
I could use the internet voting system if I had seen 
someone else using it before trying it myself 6 
14 20 
60 
I could use the internet voting system if I could call 
someone for help when I got stuck 6 
12 21 
61 
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Q7: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
general security practice? 
 
Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I am aware of the dangers of phishing 7 6 7 80 
I support the use of national ID cards to participate 
in I-voting 3 
13 16 
68 
I would vote over the internet even if it required to 
install software or use CD 7 
13 20 
60 
     
Q8: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
general awareness of I-voting security issues? 
  Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I would feel more confident and secure about 
Internet Voting security if I owned my own 
fingerprint checking and ID card reader device 2 
8 17 
73 
Overall, I have no concerns about the security of 
Internet Voting 4 
10 11 
75 
I would not feel comfortable using I-voting unless 
fingerprint checking or other biometrics were used 
to check my identity 7 
9 14 
70 
I fear that my biometric information might be stolen 
if used for Internet Voting 17 
26 32 
25 
      
Q9: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about usefulness? 
  
Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I understand how the proposed voting system 
works 3 
5 9 
83 
Using I-voting will improve the overall quality of 
voting service 3 
12 10 
75 
I find I-voting to be more convenient 5 8 18 69 
I would be willing to use the proposed system for 
Internet voting 6 
11 23 
60 
     
Q10: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
Comparison of the system to the process it replace? 
  Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
The proposed I-voting system would be easier to 
use compared to the existing Voting systems with 
which I am familiar 7 
16 17 
60 
The proposed I-voting system would be faster 
compared to the existing voting systems with which 
I am familiar 8 
16 19 
57 
The proposed system would be more secure 
compared to the existing voting systems with which 
I am familiar 14 
11 16 
59 
     
Q11: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
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overall views to the system? 
  Strongly 
agree Agree natural  Disagree 
I think Internet voting would be of benefit to me 7 9 15 69 
I think Internet voting would be of benefit to some 
other people 9 
9 12 
70 
Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is 
favourable 3 
5 11 
81 
     
 
Correlation test 
 
Chi-squared test were applied to measure the significance between survey variables, there were 
potential relationships between the following variables: 
 
Variable Related with 
Internet 
experience 
All variables 
The internet 
has sufficient 
safeguards 
and 
robustness 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I believe government are providing adequate security for their 
online services 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I would feel more confident and secure about Internet Voting 
security if I owned my own fingerprint checking and ID card reader device 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
I feel 
concerned 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
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about the 
legal aspects 
of I-voting 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
I feel 
confident that 
encryption 
and other 
technological 
advances on 
the Internet 
make it safe 
for me to do 
Internet 
voting 
 The Internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal business 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 Overall, I have no concerns about the security of Internet Voting 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Using I-voting will improve the overall quality of voting service 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 I think Internet voting would be of benefit to some other people 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
I am very 
comfortable 
using Internet 
voting 
facilities 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
I believe 
government 
are providing 
adequate 
security for 
 The Internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness  to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal business 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
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their online 
services 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be easier to use compared to 
the existing Voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
Iam 
comfortable 
using 
password 
protected 
Internet 
voting  
All variables except I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the 
system manuals for reference 
Overall, I 
believe that 
Internet 
voting is a 
good idea 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had seen someone else 
using it before trying it myself 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I could call someone for 
help when I got stuck 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I would be willing to use the proposed system for Internet voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
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I could use 
the Internet 
voting system 
if I had only 
the system 
manuals for 
reference 
All variable except I am comfortable using password protected Internet 
voting 
I could use 
the Internet 
voting system 
if I had seen 
someone else 
using it 
before trying 
it myself 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 Overall, I believe that Internet voting is a good idea 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
I could use 
the Internet 
voting system 
if I could call 
someone for 
help when I 
got stuck 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 Overall, I believe that Internet voting is a good idea 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favorable 
I am aware of 
the dangers 
of phishing 
 The Internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness  to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal business 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
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 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had seen someone else 
using it before trying it myself 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I could call someone for 
help when I got stuck 
 I support the use of national ID cards to participate in I-voting 
 I would vote over the Internet even if it required to install software 
or use CD 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I would be willing to use the proposed system for Internet voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be easier to use compared to 
the existing Voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
I support the 
use of 
national ID 
cards to 
participate in 
I-voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
I would vote 
over the 
Internet even 
if it required 
to install 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
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software or 
use CD 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
I would feel 
more 
confident and 
secure about 
Internet 
Voting 
security if I 
owned my 
own 
fingerprint 
checking and 
ID card 
reader device 
 The Internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness  to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal business 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
Overall, I 
have no 
concerns 
about the 
security of 
Internet 
Voting 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
I would not 
feel 
comfortable 
using I-
voting unless 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
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fingerprint 
checking or 
other 
biometrics 
were used to 
check my 
identity 
Internet Voting 
I fear that my 
biometric 
information 
might be 
stolen if used 
for Internet 
Voting 
All variables 
I understand 
how the 
proposed 
voting system 
works 
 The Internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness  to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal business 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had seen someone else 
using it before trying it myself 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I could call someone for 
help when I got stuck 
 I would vote over the Internet even if it required to install software 
or use CD 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I would be willing to use the proposed system for Internet voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be easier to use compared to 
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the existing Voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
Using I-
voting will 
improve the 
overall 
quality of 
voting 
service 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
I find I-
voting to be 
more 
convenient 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
I would be 
willing to use 
the proposed 
system for 
Internet 
voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 Overall, I believe that Internet voting is a good idea 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
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 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
The proposed 
I-voting 
system would 
be easier to 
use compared 
to the 
existing 
Voting 
systems with 
which I am 
familiar 
 I believe government are providing adequate security for their 
online services 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
The proposed 
I-voting 
system would 
be faster 
compared to 
the existing 
voting 
systems with 
which I am 
familiar 
 I believe government are providing adequate security for their 
online services 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 Overall, I believe that Internet voting is a good idea 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I would feel more confident and secure about Internet Voting 
security if I owned my own fingerprint checking and ID card reader device 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Using I-voting will improve the overall quality of voting service 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
The proposed 
system would 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
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be more 
secure 
compared to 
the existing 
voting 
systems with 
which I am 
familiar 
 I believe government are providing adequate security for their 
online services 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I am aware of the dangers of phishing 
 I would feel more confident and secure about Internet Voting 
security if I owned my own fingerprint checking and ID card reader device 
 Overall, I have no concerns about the security of Internet Voting 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I understand how the proposed voting system works 
 Using I-voting will improve the overall quality of voting service 
 Overall, my attitude towards Internet voting is favourable 
I think 
Internet 
voting would 
be of benefit 
to me 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
I think 
Internet 
voting would 
be of benefit 
to some other 
people 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
Overall, my 
attitude 
towards 
 The Internet has sufficient safeguards and robustness to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal business 
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Internet 
voting is 
favourable 
 I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances 
on the Internet make it safe for me to do Internet voting 
 I am comfortable using password protected Internet voting 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had only the system 
manuals for reference 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I had seen someone else 
using it before trying it myself 
 I could use the Internet voting system if I could call someone for 
help when I got stuck 
 I would vote over the Internet even if it required to install software 
or use CD 
 I fear that my biometric information might be stolen if used for 
Internet Voting 
 I would be willing to use the proposed system for Internet voting 
 The proposed I-voting system would be easier to use compared to 
the existing Voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed I-voting system would be faster compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
 The proposed system would be more secure compared to the 
existing voting systems with which I am familiar 
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Appendix E: Recommendations 
 
 
E1 Consent Form 
 
CERTIFICATION BY PARTICIPANT 
 
 
I, certify that I am voluntarily giving my consent to provide information for the above 
described project entitled: Introduce I-voting in the State of Qatar, being conducted 
at Loughborough University, UK by: Mr. Jassim AL-Hamar. 
 
 
I certify that I have agreed to be interviewed in the subject of as previously explained by 
Mr. Jassim AL-Hamar and that that I freely consent to participate in this project. I have 
had the opportunity to have any questions answered, I have been fully explained the 
procedures of interview and that information gathered will be only used for the benefit 
of the entitled research and will be confidential and kept strictly private.  
 
 
Signed: ….............................................. 
Date: …................. 
 
For any queries about the research topic please don't hesitate to contact the researcher 
(Name: Mr. Jassim AL-Hamar, ph. +97455558105, E-mail: j.alhamar@hotmail.com). 
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E2  Example of signed Consent Form  
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E3 Recommendation evaluation 
 
Five evaluators were gathered from different organisations in Qatar from the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI), ictQATAR, election committee, Qtel and the Supreme Judiciary Council. The 
interviewees were as follows: 
1.  Hassan Al-Sayed, Gov. IT Platform Manager, ictQATAR 
2.  Abdul Rahman Al-Sulaiti, Assistant Director of Elections Department, MOI 
3.  Mohanad alabad, Internet security consultant, MOI 
4.  Jassim Alswadi, Head of ISP, Qtel 
5. Mohamad Alobaidli, Judge participating in election monitoring, Supreme Judiciary Council  
(SJC) 
 
Each evaluator were asked the following Interview questions: 
Q1.  Do you believe the researcher’s recommendations will be effective for introducing I-voting 
in Qatar? 
Q2.  After reading the recommendations, would you encourage Qatar to introduce I-voting?  
Q3.  Do you find that the recommendations satisfy voting principles (security, privacy, 
transparency, etc.)? 
Q4.   Do you think the recommendations could help to increase voting turnout? 
Q5.   Do you think the recommendations on the legal aspects are valuable? 
Q6. Is Qatar ready to introduce I-voting in terms of its infrastructure? And, are the 
recommendations proposed to enhance infrastructure development significant? 
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E4  Details of evaluator's interview 
 
Interview 1 
Date of interview: 20-Jan- 2011 
Duration: Approximately 30 minutes  
Interviewee: Hassan Al-Sayed, Gov. IT Platform Manager, ictQATAR 
 
Q1.  Do you believe the researcher’s recommendations will be effective for introducing I-voting 
in Qatar? 
Yes, of course it is very effective. It is based on in-depth research carried out with experiments, 
surveys and interviews. It help to introduce I-voting technology in Qatar by providing 
recommendations to help the uptake of it based on cultural and country-specific factors. 
 
Q2.  After reading the recommendations, would you encourage Qatar to introduce I-voting?  
Yes, I do encourage to have I-voting technology in Qatar since it will provide flexibility to 
voters and will facilitate the election process were everything is done electronically and vote 
count is automatically calculated. However, I still think there is a need for more trials and 
experiments on I-voting to ensure that it fulfil voting principles. It must be considered that I-
voting is highly dependent on political, social and economic situation of a state.  
 
Q3.  Do you find that the recommendations satisfy voting principles (security, privacy, 
transparency, etc.)? 
Yes, it will help to satisfy voting principles it is was applied effectively. However, there ius a 
need to consider the possible threats and attacks that might encounter I-voting and therefore 
provide a team of expert to handle possible threats. I still think it is imposible to achieve 100% 
of security with nowadays improving computer power. 
 
Q4.   Do you think the recommendations could help to increase voting turnout? 
I could help voting turnout, this is hard to know. We only can know whether there is an increase 
in participation once I-voting is applied in practice. People acceptance is a critical factor which 
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could increase participation, therefore the government should work on how to enhance people 
acceptance and encourage them to use such new technology. 
  
Q5.   Do you think the recommendations on the legal aspects are valuable? 
Yes, they are. I agree on the need to review the current election law and modify it to adapt I-
voting by adding sections for appeal process to recount votes, effective actions to prevent vote 
selling and process for vote verification. Also the current E-law should help the uptake of I-
voting.  
 
Q6. Is Qatar ready to introduce I-voting in terms of its infrastructure? And, are the 
recommendations proposed to enhance infrastructure development significant? 
Yes, it is ready for I-voting. The e-government project have assisted in improving the 
telecommunication infrastructure. Therefore, introducing I-voting could use the same 
infrastructure, with taking account to provide telecommunications in under-served areas to 
ensure all voters could vote through the system. Furthermore, there is a critical need for a clear 
plan to ensure an effective infrastructure for I-voting, this plan should be developed by the 
government and companies responsible to ensure information security.  
 
Interview 2 
Date of interview: 26-Jan- 2011 
Duration: Approximately 40 minutes  
Interviewees: Abdul Rahman Al-Sulaiti, Assistant Director of Elections Department, MOI and 
Mohanad alabad, Internet security consultant, MOI 
 
Q1.  Do you believe the researcher’s recommendations will be effective for introducing I-voting 
in Qatar? 
I like the drive of your recommendations, it seems to be well-structured and valuable. Those 
recommendations are effective to uptake I-voting in Qatar.  
Q2.  After reading the recommendations, would you encourage Qatar to introduce I-voting?  
Yes, I-voting can exist in Qatar.  I believe I-voting will enhance the political agenda. Many 
countries do introduce I-voting and it was effective, however I must mention as well that other 
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counties were have a negative experience with I-voting, where it encounter many issues with 
regard to ensuring security, privacy and transparency of votes.  Therefore, to avoid that 
happening in Qatar, more experiments should be held to test the reliability of I-voting in 
practice since each country has its own factors that has to be addressed in their voting system.  
 
Q3.  Do you find that the recommendations satisfy voting principles (security, privacy, 
transparency, etc.)? 
Yes, it satisfies voting principles including security, privacy and transparency. However, it need 
to put into practice to ensure that those recommendations would work effectively and efficiently 
in the real world and that it would get people acceptance and therefore increase voter 
participation.  
 
Q4.   Do you think the recommendations could help to increase voting turnout? 
Yes it could if it was implemented successfully taking into account country specific factors and 
cultural considerations. If I-voting has satisfied voters and get their acceptance voting turnout 
could increase.  
 
Q5.   Do you think the recommendations on the legal aspects are valuable? 
Yes, there are effective. However, I think a team of experts in law and information technology 
should work together to update the current election law to help the uptake of I-voting. Also 
there are some terms should be considered such as vote selling, verification and appeal process 
in I-voting.  
 
Q6. Is Qatar ready to introduce I-voting in terms of its infrastructure? And, are the 
recommendations proposed to enhance infrastructure development significant? 
Yes, it is ready enough. The initiative of E-government, smart card and ipark with a great 
development in telecommunication sector could assist the introduction of I-voting in Qatar. 
However, I suggest introducing a supervised I-voting in polling stations, so that Qataris would 
be familiar with using such new technology. This would act as a test for the effectiveness of 
such system in Qatar and the possible barriers that might be encountered in real life.  
Interview 3 
Date of interview: 23-Jan- 2011 
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Duration: Approximately 20 minutes 
Interviewee: Jassim Alswadi, Head of ISP, Qtel 
Q1.  Do you believe the researcher’s recommendations will be effective for introducing I-voting 
in Qatar? 
Yes, the recommendations were very valuable, I like the way it is driven and showing from 
where it was established based on earlier chapter of the research. It well defined and very clear. 
I think if it was applied effectively, it would help the introduction of  I-voting in Qatar. It must 
be noted that there is a need to ensure that the I-voting system is connected to the election server 
for defining a secure and trusted system. 
 
Q2.  After reading the recommendations, would you encourage Qatar to introduce I-voting?  
I encourage the uptake of I-voting in Qatar especially that many counties have already adapt it 
in their election process. But it must be considered that there are possible technical and non-
technical issues might arise from I-voting system. Those issues has led some countries such as 
USA and UK to stop going further in developing I-voting.  
 
Q3.  Do you find that the recommendations satisfy voting principles (security, privacy, 
transparency, etc.)? 
Yes. Those recommendation could simplify the voting process for both voters and election 
committees and ensure that voting principles are achieved sine it is based on best practices and 
solutions that are tested in literature such as mix netting and blind signature. However, there are 
some political concerns on security, anonymity and privacy of I-voting. Therefore, those 
recommendation should be put into practice in real world to ensure their fulfilment to voting 
principles and gain trust of government. 
 
Q4.   Do you think the recommendations could help to increase voting turnout? 
Yes, it could if it was applied successfully based on a solid infrastructure. But this is a testable 
factor that which only can be approved in reality. 
Q5.   Do you think the recommendations on the legal aspects are valuable? 
Yes, I think they are valuable. There is a need for efforts on establishing a law that support I-
voting and help the uptake of it. This would be a long process which need approvals and 
involvement of experts in law and IT.  
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Q6. Is Qatar ready to introduce I-voting in terms of its infrastructure? And, are the 
recommendations proposed to enhance infrastructure development significant? 
Yes, the infrastructure is there, only few enhancements might be required to ensure that it is capable to 
introduce an effective and reliable I-voting system. Furthermore, I-voting should come with proper 
hardware to facilitate a reliable connection between the user and the election server. 
 
Interview 4 
Date of interview: 21-Jan- 2011  
Duration: Approximately 30 minutes 
Interviewee: Mohamad Alobaidli, Judge participating in election monitoring, Supreme Judiciary 
Council  (SJC) 
 
Q1.  Do you believe the researcher’s recommendations will be effective for introducing I-voting 
in Qatar? 
Yes, they are effective if applied efficiently and if there were effective cooperation between 
responsible parties to take up those recommendations. I think I-voting will boost the political 
agenda but also I do not encourage it since it hard to gain political approval for using such 
system in Qatar with a risk of affecting citizens' confidence in the government due to many 
impact associated to such system. 
 
Q2.  After reading the recommendations, would you encourage Qatar to introduce I-voting?  
I do not encourage the introduction of I-voting in Qatar since it will miss voting experience, and 
most people would find difficulties in using it. Also worldwide experience of I-voting shows 
that there are many issues associated to I-voting such as security, privacy and transparency. I 
suggest the government have to be careful before making their decision on introducing I-voting. 
A procedures and experiment should be held to ensure the effective of such voting system for 
Qatar elections in the future, taking into considerations its possible impacts.  
Q3.  Do you find that the recommendations satisfy voting principles (security, privacy, 
transparency, etc.)? 
Yes, I think.  but I can not provide a fair judgment on those recommendations as it is not my 
expertise. But it shows clearly that it was well defined based on a depth research in the field.  
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Q4.   Do you think the recommendations could help to increase voting turnout? 
Yes, if the digital and social divide were encountered effectively voting turnout could be 
increased. The government could enhance the turnout by taking into account to educate people 
on I-voting and how to use it efficiently.  
 
Q5.   Do you think the recommendations on the legal aspects are valuable? 
Yes, I have read them carefully. Although there are very general but they provide some valuable 
procedures for experts in law to take up and investigate further. I do think the current election 
law could be support the introduction of I-voting. I think developing a separate section for I-
voting which would handle all of the regulation and laws related to I-voting such as verification 
and appealing process making sure that possible issues are addressed alongside with the current 
E-law. This need an approval from the government and an involvement of a team of experts in 
law and IT filed to establish a legal approval for I-voting. 
      
Q6. Is Qatar ready to introduce I-voting in terms of its infrastructure? And, are the 
recommendations proposed to enhance infrastructure development significant? 
I can't judge in terms of infrastructure, but I believe Qatar is experiencing a huge development 
in ICT and telecommunication sector that perform a good foundation for initiating I-voting. 
However, there is need to prove the effectiveness of the proposed I-voting model in ensuring its 
fulfilment of voting principles in practice and getting acceptance and confidence of Qatari 
citizens. This is very important to ensure trust of such system.  
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